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SUMMARY
This thesis extends a recent vein of literature which investigates the implications of 
wage decisions for the optimal design of the monetary regime when the goods market is 
monopolistically competitive. Chapter II abstracts from the existence of stochastic shocks 
and examines in detail the resulting macroeconomic wage-setting externality. It points 
out that when the monetary instrument is set after wage determination, there exists a 
monetary rule which can induce non-atomistic unions to set the market-clearing nominal 
wage, and which therefore is fully credible. This result is shown to be implicit in (and to 
have been overlooked by) previous contributions, and its sensitivity to the precise 
formulation of the union objective function is discussed. Chapter III allows for stochastic 
shocks, and in particular builds upon Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) by assuming that 
each union receives a (common) noisy signal of a productivity shock prior to setting its 
individual wage. The adverse macroeconomic externality which arises in this scenario is 
analysed, and the circumstances under which improvements in signal quality are 
detrimental to union welfare are identified. It is shown that when unions are non- 
atomistic, the externality’s strength, and hence also both employment variability and the 
stochastic inflation bias, are sensitive to the specification of the authorities’ monetary 
reaction function. This implies a candidate explanation for why greater central-bank 
conservatism has generally not been found to be associated with greater output 
variability. The optimal central-bank delegation arrangements are identified, as well as 
the optimal amount of transparency regarding supply shocks. Chapters V and VI then 
analyse the externalities appertaining to indexation decisions taken in the absence of 
informative signals, both for the standard scenario in which the wage is indexed only to 
the price level, and for multiparameter indexation scenarios in which the wage is also 
contingent on a second aggregate variable.
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Preface
The research findings presented in Chapters III, V and VI below are the fruits of 
research undertaken jointly with my supervisor, Dr. Phillip Lawler. These chapters 
consider a model economy featuring unions, a monopolistically competitive goods 
market and stochastic shocks. Several working papers and, at the date of submission of 
this thesis for examination, two publications have sprung from this research effort. James 
and Lawler (2004a) is a short paper which discusses the wage-setting externality which 
arises when unions receive noisy signals of productivity shocks and the money supply is 
kept fixed, while its companion piece, James and Lawler (2004b), analyses the effect of a 
change in signal quality in this scenario. These papers therefore report and concisely 
explain the key results of Section 3 of Chapter III of this thesis. A similar task is 
performed in respect of the findings presented later in Chapter III for an activist monetary 
policy scenario by James and Lawler (2005a) and James and Lawler (2006a). The former 
of these two papers was presented at the 2005 MMF Research Group conference in 
Rethymno, Crete, and is concerned with ‘economic transparency’ (in other words, the 
disclosure by the central bank of its private information regarding supply shocks). The 
latter paper was presented at the 2006 ATINER conference in Athens: its focus is on the 
implications of the externality for the relationship between the central bank’s weight 
parameter and employment variability. A further working paper, James and Lawler 
(2005b) sets out the findings of Chapter V below for scenarios in which each union 
chooses the degree of indexation of its wage to the price level. Finally, Chapter VI 
undertakes a similar investigation for the case of multiparameter indexation: its findings 
have found their way into print as James and Lawler (2006b).
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Chapter I 
Wage-Setting Externalities and the 
Optimal Design of the Monetary Regime:
Introduction and Literature Review
1.1 Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the relationships between three themes which are 
present in the macroeconomic literature. The merits and demerits of rule-based 
regimes considered relative to the performance of discretionary policymaking, is the 
first of these themes. The second is the relationship between macroeconomic 
outcomes and the degree of informational asymmetry between the policymaker and 
private-sector agents, while the third concerns the macroeconomic externalities which 
appertain to the decisions of such agents. Their inter-relationship is studied by means 
o f a model economy which is subject to stochastic shocks to productivity and 
aggregate demand, and which features a unionised labour force employed by 
monopolistically competitive firms which produce differentiated products. An 
analysis is undertaken of the nature of the externalities arising from union wage- 
setting and indexation decisions, and the conditions which give rise to these 
externalities are identified, with particular attention being devoted to the role played 
in their genesis by the economy’s information structure. An investigation is conducted 
into both the welfare repercussions of these externalities, and the implications of their 
existence for the conduct of monetary policy and the optimal design of the monetary 
regime.
One of the principal tasks o f this chapter is to set the scene for our subsequent 
analysis by providing some background in respect of the aforementioned three major 
themes. This is done in sections 1.2 to 1.4, which describe in broad terms the 
development of the literature on monetary policy since the advent of rational 
expectations, with particular attention being paid to the important issues of (alleged) 
policy ineffectiveness, time inconsistency and delegation. Section 1.5 provides more 
detailed discussion o f issues which will figure prominently as aspects of the model 
developed in the thesis itself. Specifically, an account is given of the literature’s 
approach to modelling monopolistic competition, as well as of the assumptions 
typically made in macroeconomics regarding unions’ objectives in making decisions.
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The survey then proceeds to discuss the role played by these issues in the evolution of
the monetary policy literature. (Note that the focus here is primarily on models in
which private sector agents set nominal wages, rather than the degree of wage
indexation, since preparatory to Chapters V and VI, a separate survey of the
>
macroeconomic literature on wage indexation is provided later as Chapter IV.) 
Considerable attention is paid to models of strategic interaction between the monetary 
authorities and large unions which recognise that their decisions have a non-negligible 
macroeconomic impact, and a fairly detailed account is given of the model of 
Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), a modified version of which forms the basis of the 
analysis conducted in Chapter III below. A briefer penultimate section discusses the 
current state o f the literature on transparency with regard to macroeconomic 
disturbances, and Section 1.8 then concludes.
1.2 A Brief Outline of Rational Expectations Models of Monetary Policy
By definition, a rational expectation makes full use of every aspect of the available 
information set, and hence implies that expectational errors have a zero mean and are 
uncorrelated with any item of information available to the forecaster. The seminal 
contribution of Lucas (1972) showed that the empirically well-attested short-run 
Phillips-curve relationship between inflation and unemployment can be explained in 
terms of the optimising behaviour of overlapping generations of imperfectly informed 
private agents who form rational expectations conditional on their information about 
the current state o f the economy. In Lucas’ model, each optimising producer, in 
deciding how much to produce and trade, infers the aggregate price level from the 
prevailing market price of his particular good. Rational expectations-formation 
therefore involves application of the statistical technique of signal-extraction. Lucas’ 
principal point is that when expectations are formed using a methodology of this kind 
which exploits all available information, a temporarily large increase in the money 
supply, and the induced increase in aggregate demand and hence in the particular 
price observed by each agent, leads imperfectly informed traders to attribute 
(rationally) the strength of demand in their particular market to a favourable demand 
shock in respect o f their good, which therefore induces them to increase their supply 
of that good even when no such favourable shock has occurred. Consequently, the 
supply side o f the economy exhibits a relationship of the following form between (log)
output, y,  and the (average) expectational error in respect of the (log) price level, 
p - E p
y  = y N + a ( p - E p ) ,  a>  0 (la)
*
where y N is the natural level of (log) output, a is the parameter which governs the
responsiveness o f aggregate supply to the average expectational error in respect of p, 
and E is the rational-expectations operator. Equation (la) is the Lucas surprise-supply 
function, and it implies an associated Phillips-curve relationship between
unemployment ( U ), its natural rate ( UN), and expectational errors regarding inflation 
( 7 T - E tt):
U = UN + b{n -  Ex),  b<  0 (lb)
The Lucas model thus provides a theoretical rationale for why policymakers may, by 
implementing an inflationary surprise, be able to cause output temporarily to depart 
from the natural level.
The central implication for policy design of the Lucas model, and in particular its 
assumptions of rational, expectations and continuously clearing markets, is 
summarised in the policy-ineffectiveness proposition of Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
and Barro (1976). This holds that the non-stochastic component o f the money supply 
cannot systematically affect the distribution of that component o f output which relates 
to the private sector’s reactions to the information it does possess at the time prices 
are set. The formulation o f the monetary rule only matters for output insofar as those 
in charge of the conduct o f policy possess superior information regarding 
macroeconomic disturbances. Furthermore, if  it is assumed that the policymaker’s
1 Throughout the thesis, upper-case letters are used to denote variables in levels, while lower-case 
letters are generally used to denote their (natural) log counterparts.
2 Barro concedes that were his model modified so that private agents are not informed about the 
(potentially arbitrary) specification o f  the rule (i.e. the monetary reaction function) on the date at which 
it is first adopted, the rule’s specification would then matter for the behaviour o f  output in the short run 
during which agents gradually acquire information from which the specification may be inferred. 
However, as Barro emphasises, private-sector ignorance o f  the rule specification will be an ephemeral 
phenomenon, since under rational expectations the component o f  the variance o f  private-sector forecast 
errors regarding the price level which arises from ignorance o f  the rule coefficients will be rapidly 
eliminated. Furthermore, this learning process only becomes an issue if  the policymaker’s ultimate
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objective is to minimise the variance of output about its full-information level, an 
important further implication is that the policymaker need not practise activist 
monetary policy in order to stabilise the economy as desired, since this can 
alternatively be achieved by disclosing to the public, at the time output and purchase 
decisions are made, the authorities’ superior information regarding the current values 
of aggregate variables.
A related elaboration of this point is the Lucas (1976) critique o f the use of 
statistical relationships between aggregate variables to guide policy decisions. Under 
rational expectations, the responsiveness o f aggregate supply to price-level 
movements depends on how individual product prices covary with the aggregate price 
level, and this covariance is recognised by private agents to be a function of the 
prevailing policy regime. Only naive agents would expect the correlation patterns 
which have existed in the past between nominal variables to continue to hold after a 
change of policy regime. Such naivety is entirely precluded when agents form rational 
expectations, and hence the Lucas critique predicts that systematic attempts to exploit 
past statistical relationships will lead to their rapid disappearance.
While space constraints preclude a comprehensive discussion o f the voluminous 
literature which stemmed from these important early new-classical contributions, it is 
fair to say that the principal focus of this research effort has been to investigate the 
implications of relaxing the new-classical assumption that all markets continuously 
clear. In other words, rational-expectations models have had incorporated into them 
structural features which give rise to nominal rigidities, and which therefore create the 
potential for policy to be non-neutral even when the policymaker lacks an 
informational advantage over the public. Examples include overlapping multi-period 
wage contracts (Fischer, 1977a; Taylor, 1979), and menu costs (Mankiw, 1985; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1985). While nominal wage rigidities play an important role in the 
literature surveyed later in this chapter, our immediate concern must be to describe the 
impact of the rational-expectations concept on the debate over the wisdom of 
constraining the monetary authority to conduct its operations in accordance with a 
rule.
objectives which determine the choice o f  rule are unknown to the private sector. If  the policymaker’s 
objective function is known to private agents, they will always infer the optimal choice o f  rule without 
error.
3 In other words, it is assumed to be socially desirable that output in the representative market be at the 
level it would take were the participants in that market fully informed about the price level when 
making their demand and supply decisions.
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1.3 Rules versus Discretion
1.3.1 Introductory Remarks
Prior to the nineteen-seventies such vociferous advocates o f rules as Simons (1948) 
and Friedman (1962) failed, in general, to devise a compelling set o f arguments in 
their favour. The only such argument of any substance identified by these authors is 
that a rule has the potential advantage of insulating policymakers from lobbying by 
politicians and private interest-groups who stand to gain, at least in the short term, 
from monetary policy being conducted in a particular fashion. (Note that 
underpinning this argument is the implicit assumption that rules, once constitutionally 
enacted, are inviolable.) As Barro (1986) and Fischer (1990) point out in their 
authoritative surveys, Friedman’s other arguments for requiring the central bank to 
adhere to a monetary rule have little to recommend them, since they do not directly 
(and possibly do not even indirectly) concern the macroeconomic performance o f the 
rule, and instead inappropriately assume that the welfare of society’s members is 
necessarily contingent on the settings of monetary instruments, rather than on 
macroeconomic outcomes.4
1.3.2 Time Inconsistency
It is generally agreed that the most persuasive argument in favour o f rules received 
its first clear articulation in the macroeconomic literature in the work o f Kydland and 
Prescott (1977).5 The key idea of their seminal contribution is that optimal plans 
which stipulate in advance the future setting of a choice-variable, may be time- 
inconsistent if  the person endowed with the responsibility for implementing the plan 
has the discretion subsequently to alter the stipulated setting.6 The concept of time- 
inconsistency is o f such central importance to the remainder of this literature review, 
and indeed to the thesis as a whole, that a precise definition is called for. Accordingly, 
we provide the following, which draws on the verbal definition given by Blanchard
4 Another argument for rules (specifically, for constraining the authorities to increase the money supply 
at a constant rate) put forward by Friedman, is that discretionary policymakers who practise activist 
monetary policy are more likely to have a destabilising than a stabilising effect on the econom y if  their 
information regarding its current state is incomplete. However, as Barro (1986) points out, this 
argument inappropriately assumes that a sensible discretionary policymaker w ill fail to take into 
account the limited nature o f  his or her information.
5 As pointed out by Tabellini (2005), the idea that optimal monetary policy may be time-inconsistent 
can be discerned in embryonic form in Simons (1948).
6 During the course o f  a paper on time-inconsistency issues relating to money seigniorage, Calvo (1978) 
usefully points out that, in dynamic-programming terms, time-inconsistency is attributable to a change 
over time in the constraints facing the policymaker.
n '
and Fischer (1989). Time-inconsistency arises when it is initially optimal for a 
policymaker to announce a (sincere) intention to perform a certain action at a future 
date, only for that action to prove suboptimal, compared to some alternative action 
available to the policymaker, when that date arrives, and this change in the optimality 
status of the action in question is not attributable to any change that has occurred to 
the policymaker’s information-set. Although time-inconsistency characterises 
numerous economic situations (for example, patent-protection legislation), there is a 
school of thought (discussed by Fischer and Summers, 1989) that macroeconomic 
policymaking is particularly susceptible to this problem. (However, as we shall see, 
this view is far from universal, and some of the counterarguments which have been 
put forward will be discussed below.)
. One of several economic examples cited by Kydland and Prescott of plans which 
are ex-ante optimal but time-inconsistent, is that of a policymaker faced with a variant 
of the Phillips-curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment represented by 
equation (lb ) above. This scenario was analysed in somewhat greater depth by Barro 
and Gordon (1983a), and it is on the non-stochastic version of their model that we 
principally focus here. To assist the ensuing discussion we state a generalised version 
of (lb) which does not make specific assumptions regarding the expectation of 
inflation formed by private agents, so that this expectation, denoted n e, need not be 
the rational expectation E n  :
U = U N + b ( 7 T - 7 T e) ,  b <  0 ( l b ' )
The policymaker aims to minimise the following social welfare function:
n* =(U  ~ k U „ f  +<yr2 (2)
7 Blanchard and Fischer (1989, p.592): “A policy is dynamically inconsistent when a future policy 
decision that forms part o f  an optimal plan formulated at an initial date is no longer optimal from the 
viewpoint o f  a later date, even though no relevant new information has appeared in the meantime.” 
Note that throughout the thesis the term ‘time inconsistency’ w ill be used rather than its synonym 
‘dynamic inconsistency’.
8 Fischer and Summers (1989) ponder whether time-inconsistency problems may be especially acute 
for macroeconomic policymaking, on account o f those members o f  society who stand to lose the most 
from the wealth-redistribution effects o f  high mean inflation (e.g. recipients o f  non-indexed nominal 
incomes, creditors) being widely dispersed and poorly placed to coordinate lobbying activity against 
lax monetary policy.
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where cs > 0 and 0 < k < 1. A crucial aspect of (2) is that it is generally assumed that
k < 1, and hence that the natural rate of unemployment is greater than that which is 
socially optimal. (The two coincide only if & = 1,) This represents a departure from 
the assumption found in Barro (1976), for instance, that social welfare is appropriately 
measured by the variance of departures of output (or employment) from the market- 
clearing values which would obtain under full information, and is justified by Barro 
and Gordon on the grounds that individual labour-supply decisions are distorted by 
the presence of disincentives such as income tax and unemployment benefits.
An important implication o f assuming k < 1 is that social welfare is increased by the 
reductions in unemployment below the natural rate which result when inflation is 
higher than expected. This in turn implies that an announced intention to deliver low 
inflation and not exploit any future Phillips curve, while ex-ante optimal (i.e. optimal 
at the date on which such an announcement is made), is nevertheless not optimal once 
expectations are formed and the opportunity to exploit the Phillips-curve trade-off 
arises. Barro and Gordon show that were this model economy also to feature some 
precommitment mechanism, the optimal choice o f inflation rate would then be zero, 
and under this optimal rule private sector expectations of inflation would never be 
disappointed. However, in the absence of such a mechanism which ensures that 
announced policy intentions are binding constraints on the policymaker’s subsequent 
conduct of policy, this optimal zero-inflation rule is not credible. Were private agents 
naively to expect adherence to such a rule, so that n e = 0 is the case, the policymaker 
would have an ex-post incentive to deliver an inflation surprise and hence reduce 
unemployment below the natural rate. In this scenario of discretionary policymaking, 
it is rational for the public to expect that inflation rate to be delivered which equates 
the marginal benefit o f an inflation surprise to its marginal cost. In other words, the 
inflation rate which it is rational to expect is that which is incentive-compatible, in the 
sense that the expectation does not provide the policymaker with an incentive to 
disappoint private sector agents as regards this commonly held expectation. 
Consequently, the rational-expectations equilibrium is characterised by n e -  E n  = n , 
and the Phillips curve, (1 b ' ), then implies that unemployment is equal to its natural 
rate, just as it would be under the optimal rule were the latter credible. However, 
equilibrium inflation under discretion is generally in excess o f its social optimum 
(zero), as is evident from the following solution expression:
7
_ i ( l  -  k)UN
f tN E  ~  w )
This solution exhibits several key aspects of a general result which commonly arises 
in the literature on the time-inconsistency of discretionary monetary policy. Equation
(3) indicates that the inflation bias associated with discretion would not arise were the 
natural rate of unemployment coincident with the socially optimal rate (i.e. if  k = 1). 
Furthermore, the bias is sensitive to the value of cs , the weight placed by society on
inflation stabilisation relative to employment stabilisation, as well as to the 
responsiveness o f actual unemployment to inflation surprises (as represented by the 
Phillips-curve slope, b).
1.3.3 Overview o f  the Early Literature Subsequent to Barro and Gordon (1983a) 
Research on the causes o f inflation has built on the insights of the Barro and Gordon 
model in two principal ways. The first o f these two bodies of research effort has 
extended the Barro and Gordon framework to allow the policymaker’s reputation for 
disciplined control o f the money supply to play a role in mitigating, and possibly 
entirely eliminating, the inflation bias associated with discretion. Barro and Gordon 
(1983a, 1983b) themselves investigated the implications of introducing reputation 
effects into a repeated-game version of the model presented above. Among the factors 
found to matter for the sustainability o f a low-inflation reputational equilibrium are 
the non-existence o f a definite termination date for the repeated game, and a 
sufficiently low discount factor on the part of the policymaker. Subsequent research 
on this theme has largely focused on incorporating asymmetric information into the 
repeated game, so that the policymaker’s observed actions convey information about 
some aspect of the economy which the private sector cannot directly observe. Since 
this lineage of papers is largely peripheral to the subjects addressed in this thesis, it 
suffices here merely to give a brief description of two o f its most salient examples. In 
Canzoneri (1985) the policymaker’s forecast of the velocity shock is private 
information. Since the private sector cannot verify the forecast, it cannot judge the 
extent to which the inflation surprise delivered by the policymaker was justified by its 
private information. This implies that in Canzoneri’s model, a reputational
8
equilibrium is characterised by periodic episodes of high expected inflation. In
Backus and Driffill (1985) on the other hand, there is ‘intrinsic uncertainty’9 in that
the private sector is ignorant of the policymaker’s type. In this scenario, weak
policymakers who care about unemployment can, by delivering low inflation, sustain
>
a reputation for being indifferent to unemployment for at least some repetitions of the 
single-period subgame.
The second main line of literature stemming from Barro and Gordon (1983a) 
ignores reputation issues and pursues another o f these authors’ hints regarding 
possible extensions of their analysis. This particular hint relates to the fact that, as 
mentioned above, the mean inflation bias, as given by (3), is dependent on the values 
taken by two parameters which occur in the social loss function, namely k and cs .
Barro and Gordon (1983a, p.607) suggest in passing that it may be possible to 
overcome the time-inconsistency problem and hence eliminate the bias if  the 
“policymaker’s preferences [are] artificially manipulated”. In other words, they 
entertain the possibility that the central banker to whom the conduct of monetary 
policy is delegated may be instructed to minimise a loss function which has the same 
functional form as the social loss function, (2), but which differs from (2) as regards 
the specific values taken by the parameters. Although Barro and Gordon do not 
explicitly state this contrived loss function, it is clear from their verbal comments that 
they have in mind the following specification, where / and lN denote employment and 
its natural level:10
n cb = ( i - k biN)2 + cb7T2 (4)
where cb > 0 and 0 <kb < 1. Q cb denotes the loss function of the central banker to
whom the conduct o f monetary policy is delegated. (The ‘central banker’ could be a 
committee of individuals.) There are two potential interpretations o f this loss function. 
The first of these is to regard (4) as an objective function which is assigned to the
9 The phrase ‘intrinsic uncertainty’, coined by Blackburn and Christensen (1989), refers to a lack o f  
perfect knowledge, on the private sector’s part, regarding the preferences o f  the policymaker, which 
must consequently be inferred from policy actions and/or announcements. This is a different kind o f  
uncertainty to ‘extrinsic uncertainty’, which relates to the realised values o f  stochastic shocks.
10 Note that since the papers which develop this idea typically specify the policymaker’s loss function 
to be quadratic in employment or output (rather than unemployment) deviations from a target value, 
this more common practice is henceforth adopted. This in no way affects the results derived from the 
model.
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relevant members of staff at the central bank, who then robotically set about
minimising it by appropriate period-by-period adjustments to the monetary
instrument(s). (This interpretation appears to be what Barro and Gordon themselves
had in mind when making their brief comment mentioned above.) Note that this
>
interpretation assumes that those delegated with the conduct of policy put to one side 
their personal views regarding which macroeconomic outcomes are desirable, and 
how much weight should be attached to achieving certain outcomes relative to others. 
In the terminology of Fischer (1995), the interpretation assumes that only ‘instrument 
independence’ is granted to the central banker to whom (4) is assigned, and that this 
delegate deferentially accepts that he or she does not possess ‘goal independence’ (in 
other words does not have the discretion to decide what should be the objectives of 
policy). The second possible interpretation of (4) instead assumes that some degree of 
goal independence must necessarily reside with the central banker, since the 
appointed person will invariably be swayed, whether consciously or not, by his or her 
personal views on the relative importance of stabilising inflation. Under this second 
interpretation, the personal preferences of candidate central bankers are observable to 
society (or those members o f society who are responsible for taking the delegation 
decision), and in choosing a particular candidate society in effect accepts that policy 
will be directed to the task o f minimising the candidate’s personal objective function,
(4), with cb, and potentially kb as well, the candidate’s personal preference 
parameters.
1.4 Monetary Policy Delegation
1.4.1 The Rogoff (1985) Model 
This alternative interpretation of the delegation issue first entered the literature by 
way of the important paper by Rogoff (1985), although it should be noted that Rogoff 
regards the two interpretations as equally valid alternatives which are not mutually 
exclusive. It is significant that the parameter kb is assumed not to vary across
candidates, who are all implicitly characterised by a personal Jcb value which
coincides with the value taken by its counterpart in the social loss function. (The 
significance of this assumption will become apparent below.) The candidates are 
distinguished from each other, rather, solely in respect of the preference parameter cb,
10
with those individuals who place a higher relative weight on inflation stabilisation 
than does society (i.e. those for whom cb > cs is the case) being referred to as
‘conservative’, in the sense that they are drawn from the “conservative, elements o f the
financial community” (Rogoff, 1985, p.l 179). Following this lead, later contributions
*
to the literature have adopted the terms ‘representative’ and ‘liberal’ to refer 
respectively to the cases in which cb = cs and cb < cs . The immediate consequence of
allowing cb to differ from cs is that the mean inflation bias which characterises the 
model is lower, the greater the conservatism of the appointed central banker, and is 
eliminated entirely in the extreme limiting case in which cb -> oo (i.e. if  the appointee
is solely concerned to deliver zero inflation).
This difference in the specification of the policymaker’s loss function is one of the 
two principal respects in which the Rogoff (1985) model differs from Barro and 
Gordon (1983a). The second principal difference between them concerns the assumed 
information structure. In Barro and Gordon both policymaker and public are ignorant 
of the supply shock’s value when (respectively) setting the monetary instrument and 
forming expectations o f inflation, and a stabilisation role for activist monetary policy 
is therefore precluded. Rogoff, by contrast, assumes that the central bank does have an 
informational advantage over the private sector in respect o f aggregate shocks, and 
possesses this additional information at the time it sets its instrument. Crucially, 
however, the fact that the central bank’s loss function may differ from that of society 
means that stabilisation of supply shocks will potentially be suboptimal from society’s 
viewpoint. This fact implies that society, in making its central-banker appointment 
decision, is faced with a trade-off. Increasing the conservatism of the central banker 
lowers the mean inflation bias associated with discretion, but also causes greater 
emphasis than is socially optimal to be placed on offsetting the price-level impact of 
supply shocks, which consequently exacerbates the output impact o f those shocks and 
results in greater variability o f output about its natural level.11 Marginal increases in 
conservatism (i.e. the weight cb) therefore trade a greater distortion in the stabilisation 
response to supply shocks, for a lower mean inflation bias, and Rogoff demonstrates, 
by means of an envelope theorem argument, that the optimal cb must be finite but
11 As in Barro and Gordon (1983a), in the R ogoff model the natural rate itself is invariant to the 
specification o f  the policymaker’s loss function.
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greater than cs . In other words, the key result of his paper is that the socially optimal 
delegation decision is to choose a conservative, but one who is not solely concerned
19with achieving price-level stability.
Before moving on, we briefly discuss the appropriateness o f two of R ogoff s key
*
assumptions. The first o f these is that the central bank has an informational advantage 
over the private sector in respect of macroeconomic shocks; the second is that 
monetary policy is inherently more flexible than wages. The first assumption seems 
eminently reasonable in the light of the finding of Romer and Romer (2000) that the 
macroeconomic forecasts of the US Federal Reserve greatly outperform those of 
private-sector professionals, and that this superiority is not attributable to the Fed’s 
informational advantage in respect of its own imminent policy actions. The 
appropriateness of the second assumption remains unsettled. Like many papers, this 
thesis will adopt R ogoff s assumption that the monetary instrument can be adjusted 
after wages have been set, and that (more controversially) macroeconomic variables 
are rapidly responsive in the short term to such instrument adjustments. While this is a 
respectable view, the reader should note that there are also arguments for thinking that 
the transmission mechanism is sluggish: in other words, that the main macroeconomic 
impact of monetary policy actions occurs only after a considerable lapse of time. In 
papers which consider this alternative view, such as Goodhart and Huang (1998), 
Jerger (2002) and Geraats (2004a), the policy game is therefore modelled as one in 
which the central bank sets the money supply either simultaneously with, or prior to, 
the setting of wages by the private sector.
1.4.2 Alternative Delegation Arrangements
This seems an appropriate point at which to mention that the economic (as opposed 
to logical) legitimacy o f the Barro-Gordon-Rogoff framework has been questioned in
12 R o g o ff s paper also exam ines the consequences o f  assigning the central bank a loss function which 
consists o f  the social loss function itself, supplemented by an additional quadratic term in the deviation 
o f  the money supply (or nominal income, or the interest rate) from a target value. In the money-supply 
targeting case, for example, (4) is modified to Q cb = (I -  klN)2 + cstt2 + /u(m -  m)2 where ju is a
weight parameter and m the money-supply target. The relative merits o f  these regimes are assessed in 
relation to a variety o f  exogenous factors, including the relative importance o f  supply shocks versus 
aggregate-demand shocks, and the information available to the central bank when setting its instrument. 
Since these issues are only distantly related to the themes addressed in this thesis, we do not discuss 
them further here.
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some quarters. The earliest expression of scepticism as to whether the implicit 
assumptions o f this framework faithfully capture the attitudes of real-world 
policymakers appears to have been Taylor (1983), who gave instances of other 
economic situations in which the authorities abstain from reneging on preannounced 
policy intentions, even though a precommitment technology does not. exist and short- 
run welfare gains may accrue from such behaviour. Elaborating on Taylor’s point, 
McCallum (1995, 1997, 1999) has argued that central bankers are typically wise 
enough to appreciate that securing short-run output gains by means of inflation 
surprises is ultimately futile, since myopic conduct of this kind leads to a worse 
outcome, on average, in the long run. Furthermore, the public quickly comes to 
recognise (correctly) that this view prevails at the central bank, thus making a low- 
inflation equilibrium possible, despite the discretionary central bank’s rule-like 
intentions being technically time-inconsistent. It would appear that McCallum has in 
mind the scenario which Blinder, during his professional stint as a central banker,
1 'Xfound to be the actual situation at the US Federal Reserve: namely one in which, 
contrary to the assumption made by Rogoff, the parameter kb in the central banker’s
objective function is equal to unity. In other words, it is argued that the professional 
ethos of central bankers is such as to lead them to view the stabilisation of output at its 
natural level as desirable, regardless of how this rate compares with the social 
optimum. While this argument is undoubtedly cogent, its relevance appears to be 
restricted to those countries in which central bank staff have long established a 
reputation for disciplined conduct of monetary policy.
Rogoff s seminal paper initiated a very large body of research with arguably two or 
three major preoccupations. The first of these principal concerns has been to devise 
alternative proposals for institutional design which will improve upon Rogoff s 
conservative central banker. Contributions in this vein include Lohmann (1992), who 
argues that the appointment of a Rogoffian conservative ought to be supplemented 
with a constitutional provision which allows the government to over-ride this central 
banker and assume control over monetary policy when large supply shocks occur. 
Although the inflation bias is worsened by such a provision, society is made better off 
since the very large swings in output which would occasionally arise in the 
provision’s absence are avoided. The most important papers to identify institutional
13 As described in Blinder (1997).
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arrangements which can potentially outperform Rogoffian delegation in
macroeconomic terms are Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995) and Svensson
(1997). These contributions build on Rogoff s own observation that the policymaker’s 
objective function in his model can be decomposed into the sum of the social loss 
function and an additional quadratic term in inflation, with the latter to be interpreted 
as a penalty (perhaps taking the form of a loss of prestige) incurred by the central 
banker for failing to achieve the socially optimal inflation rate. As pointed out by 
Walsh (1995), R ogoff s implicit restriction that this term be quadratic is arbitrary. 
Relaxing this restriction, Walsh finds that imposing instead a contractual obligation 
on the central bank to minimise a loss function which is a weighted sum of the social 
loss and a linear term in inflation, can, if  the additional weight parameter is set 
appropriately, induce the central banker to both deliver zero mean inflation (thus 
eliminating the bias) and stabilise the economy in accordance with society’s
preferences. This loss function has the following specification:
Q cb = (/ -  klN )2 + CSK2 + 2T7T (5)
where r is the linear contract parameter. Persson and Tabellini (1993) obtain a more 
general set of results which encompasses that of Walsh, but which also covers cases in 
which the central bank’s informational advantage over the private sector cannot 
ultimately be verified, and hence there is a need to induce, via the penalty term in the 
contract, a truthful announcement by the bank of its current (i.e. state-contingent) 
inflation target. Svensson (1997), meanwhile, showed that an alternative modification 
of the policymaker’s loss function could also eliminate the bias without distorting 
stabilisation responses to shocks: his proposed objective function only differs from 
that of society as regards the specified target inflation rate.
The papers discussed in the last few paragraphs impinge on a second major concern 
of the post-Rogoff literature, namely the identification of the optimal degree of 
conservatism (and perhaps other aspects o f regime design) when Rogoff s 
assumptions regarding the economy’s structure are modified. The most significant 
such modification from the point of view of this thesis is the introduction of non- 
atomistic agents, and Section 1.6 below is devoted to discussion of this portion of the 
literature. It would be inappropriate to provide a detailed survey of those contributions
14
which build on Barro-Gordon and Rogoff whilst maintaining their assumption that 
private-sector agents are atomistic, and we therefore confine our remarks here to the 
principal structural modifications which have been attempted. One such approach, 
exemplified by Waller (1992), has been to endogenise the degree of conservatism by 
linking it to the electoral cycle. Another important series o f papers considers the 
implications for optimal regime design of persistence in unemployment over time. 
Hysteresis implies that current monetary policy decisions will affect real outcomes in 
future periods, and this consideration prompts policymakers to utilise Bellman’s 
principle to determine the optimal setting of the monetary instrument (Lockwood and 
Phillipopoulos, 1994, Svensson, 1997, Lockwood et al. 1998). Beetsma and Jensen
(1998), Muscatelli (1998) and Walsh (1999), meanwhile, study how optimal 
delegation arrangements are affected by the presence of intrinsic uncertainty, while 
another set o f papers focuses on the implications for optimal regime design of the 
functional relationship between the policymaker’s intended instrument setting and 
either its actual realisation or the realisation of inflation itself, being subject to 
multiplicative uncertainty (Schellekens, 2002, Lawler, 2004).
1.4.3 Empirical Evidence and Interpretation 
The literature’s third major preoccupation since Rogoff (1985) overlaps, to a certain 
extent, the theme of structural modifications that has just been discussed. This is the 
concern to provide explanations for an alleged empirical failure of the Rogoff model, 
namely that empirical studies generally do not confirm its prediction that more 
conservative central banks ought to be associated with lower mean inflation and 
greater output variability than their less conservative counterparts. To name but three 
such studies, Grilli et al. (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993) and Crosby (1998) all 
find that inflation is significantly negatively related to measures of central bank 
independence, but that there is no systematic relationship between these measures and 
output variability. One response to these findings is to question their validity on 
methodological grounds. Such studies typically assume that the conservatism of the 
central banker is measurable by an index of central bank independence, but as Forder 
(1996) and Romer (1996) point out, this approach potentially confuses the issue of 
how well-shielded the central bank is from political pressures, with R ogoff s idea that
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the optimal central banker’s objective function ought to differ from that of society.14 
This criticism would appear to apply to some of the theoretical explanations which 
have been devised for the Rogoff model’s empirical failure. Alesina and Gatti (1995), 
for instance, construct a model in which greater central bank independence (rather 
than, properly speaking, Rogoffian conservatism) reduces output variability on 
account of the reduced susceptibility of the economy to boom-bust episodes induced 
by politicians. Svensson (1997) briefly discusses some rather more mundane 
explanations, and points out that his proposed low-inflation targeting regime (which 
results in socially optimal stabilisation) may already have evolved into an institutional 
feature of many central banks. Crosby (1998), meanwhile, suggests an explanation in 
terms of country-specific supply-shock variances: those countries with a lower such 
variance will tend to favour greater central bank conservatism, since for them the 
additional output-variability cost of securing lower mean inflation is comparatively 
modest.
1.5 Unions and Monopolistic Competition in Macroeconomics
1.5.1 Introductory Remarks
For the purposes o f this thesis, the most important papers to have modified the 
Rogoff model’s structural underpinnings do so by allowing for unions and/or 
monopolistically competitive markets. These features are natural extensions of the 
original framework, since they provide additional justifications for assuming the level 
of output to be socially suboptimal. This section describes how these features are 
generally modelled in macroeconomics, and thus prepares the ground for the 
subsequent survey o f the literature on their implications for regime design.
1.5.2 A Macroeconomic Model with Monopolistically Competitive Markets 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) is a general-equilibrium model featuring
monopolistically competitive firms, each of which produces a specialised good using
14 Also pertinent in this respect is the Posen (1995) critique, which argues that studies which allegedly 
find a negative relationship between inflation and central bank independence are potentially biased, in 
that they inappropriately treat the latter as an exogenous variable, and do not allow for the possibility 
that it may be endogenously determined by social attitudes and/or interest groups which differ across 
countries.
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a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production technology. Each household 
uniquely specialises in a particular variety of labour, which is a potential input into 
every firm’s production process. (Households therefore may alternatively be regarded 
as craft syndicates representing workers endowed with a particular skill.) The demand
M
for each good, Yt° , is derived from the aggregation o f the individual consumption
decisions of optimising households. Subject to its budget constraint, the individual 
household maximises a utility function which is increasing in real money balances, 
and in a CES function of consumption-good varieties, but is decreasing in hours of 
work. As a consequence o f these household optimisation decisions, the fraction of 
aggregate demand, Y ° , accounted for by the individual firm’s product demand, is 
found to be given by the following equation:15
D /
D = * c l ^ l  (6a)Y d c i P
where Kc is a constant, Pt and P are respectively the price of the individual firm’s
good and the aggregate price level, and s  is an elasticity parameter which, for an 
equilibrium to exist, is constrained to exceed unity. Each household, meanwhile, 
similarly faces a derived demand for its labour type, denoted , which depends on
the aggregate demand for labour, N ° , and on the ratio of its individual wage, W ., to 
the aggregate wage, W :
N ? (W
W
(6b)
where KN is a constant, and a  is the elasticity of substitution of labour varieties in
production. Each household takes into account the implications of this relationship for 
its labour demand when setting its wage, in order to bring about its individually 
optimal combination of leisure and labour income, where the latter is devoted to the
15 This equation corresponds to equation (7) o f  Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987, p.650), with the notation 
altered in the interests o f  closer conformity with the practice adopted in subsequent chapters o f  this 
thesis. Equation (6b) is essentially the same as equation (10) o f Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987, p.664).
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purchase of its optimal basket of consumption goods (and perhaps to an optimal
adjustment in money holdings as well). Blanchard and Kiyotaki assume continuous
clearing of both goods and labour markets, and focus on the symmetric equilibrium in
which decisions relating to wages, prices and consumption expenditures are taken
*
simultaneously by atomistic participants. Hence each household, in choosing its 
individual wage regards this decision’s impact on firm profits and on aggregate 
variables as negligible. Similarly, even though each firm’s profit depends upon 
aggregate demand, the repercussions of its pricing decision for aggregate demand are 
disregarded by the individual firm. One of the paper’s key findings follows directly 
from this fact: namely that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is associated with an 
adverse externality. Were every firm to lower its price and every household to lower 
its wage, the resulting expansion of aggregate demand and hence output would make 
every household better off, despite the reduction in leisure hours. In equilibrium, 
however, each firm and household lacks an incentive to lower its price or wage, since 
the benefits from the resulting marginal increase in aggregate demand accrue to other 
firms and households, rather than to itself. Although the introduction o f a small menu 
cost to each price adjustment does create a channel for monetary non-neutrality, 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki concede that the version of their model with menu costs is not 
fully satisfactory.16 The details need not concern us, since the essential point for our 
purposes is that the subsequent literature has combined Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s 
monopolistically competitive markets with other structural features which are not 
microfounded (in the sense that they are consistent with the specified utility functions 
of the agents within the model), but are argued to characterise real-world economies. 
For instance, several important contributions discussed below locate monopolistic 
competition solely in the goods market, while assuming the labour market features 
nominal wage rigidities which can impede continuous market clearing. Other papers, 
meanwhile, retain Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s continuum of imperfectly substitutable 
■labour varieties, and study instead the implications of relaxing the assumption that 
wage-setters do not set wages strategically.
16 The reason is that if money supply expansions are to cause substantial movements in output in this 
version, the elasticity o f  labour supply with respect to the real wage must take an implausibly high 
value.
18
1.5.3 The Monopoly Union Model
Economic theorists have devised a number of hypotheses regarding the objectives 
which impel trade unions during wage negotiations. A plausible assumption common 
to these hypotheses is that a trade union which enjoys monopoly power over either a 
particular type of skilled labour, or, via the ‘closed shop’, over the potential pool of 
labour available to a firm or industry, will typically be motivated to take steps to 
increase the real wage received by its employed members above the market-clearing 
real wage. While this idea underlies every proposal for the form of the trade-union 
objective function to be used in theoretical work, differences o f opinion exist as to 
whether its specification should capture the welfare of those union members who 
become unemployed as a result of the obstruction of market clearing. Oswald (1982, 
1985), for example, discusses an objective function which is a weighted sum of the 
utility levels received respectively by employed and unemployed members. The utility 
function is identical across members, and is concave in the wage (or goods- 
consumption) and leisure, with unemployed members presumed to receive a 
reservation level of utility, while the weights depend simply on the proportions of the
17membership in employment. (One potential objection to this approach is that if  the 
real wage is persistently in excess o f its market-clearing level, those among the 
classically unemployed who were once union members will, sooner or later, lose their 
insider status and enter the body of outsiders in respect of whose welfare the union is 
indifferent.18)
An alternative approach to formulating union objectives is also discussed in Oswald 
(1985). This does not attempt to derive these objectives using the representative 
member’s postulated utility function. Instead the objective function’s specification is 
designed to capture the intuitively appealing idea that the union views increases in the 
real wage as desirable, and that the reduction in labour demand that results (given a 
negatively sloped labour demand curve) from a higher real wage is viewed as 
undesirable. The particular specification cited by Oswald as illustrative of this notion 
is the Stone-Geary utility function. However, since the bulk o f the macroeconomic
17 In other words, the union’s objective is to maximise the expected utility o f  the representative member. 
In the closely related ‘utilitarian’ formulation, the union objective function is simply the sum o f  all 
members’ utility, whether they are employed or not.
18 This idea is central to the Blanchard and Summers (1986) hysteresis model, which endeavoured to 
explain secular trends in unemployment in terms o f  the interaction o f  exogenous supply-side shocks 
with endogenous changes in the proportion o f  the workforce who are insiders, and the concomitant 
evolution o f trade-union objectives.
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literature which adopts this approach assumes union objectives take the form of a loss 
rather than utility function, we couch the present discussion instead in terms of the 
two principal loss-function formulations. The first of these assumes a quadratic term 
in (log) employment deviations from a specified value (here denoted lu), together 
with a linear term (with negative coefficient) in the (log) real wage:
n uJ = 0 j - l u)2 -2c'u(wJ - p ) (7a)
where c'u > 0 is the relative-weight parameter. The alternative union loss function 
ascribes a particular desired real wage to the union in addition to the ostensible 
preferred employment level of lu :
crj =(lj - l u)2 +cu{wj - p - w r:°lf  (7b)
With this specification, i f  the loss function is to exhibit the desirable property that a 
real wage in excess o f the market-clearing wage represents a better outcome for the 
union than the market-clearing outcome, restrictions must be imposed on how lu and
the ‘target’ real wage, w[eal, are related to one another. Chapter II provides a detailed
discussion of this loss function, and consequently we do not pursue this matter further 
here. However, two important points regarding (7b) ought immediately to be 
mentioned. Firstly, with appropriate values assigned to the two ‘targets’ lu and w rueal,
(7b) can be argued to capture the welfare loss experienced by union members as a 
result of being exposed to the outcome-uncertainty associated with stochastic 
productivity shocks. Such shocks necessarily cause at least one o f (and potentially 
both) the real wage and employment to depart from their respective unconditional 
expected values. It is intuitively plausible that union members, and consequently the 
union that represents them as well, would prefer both their hours of employment and 
their real wage to be constant, rather than subject to random fluctuations caused by 
productivity shocks. Equation (7b) therefore seems a suitable union objective function 
to adopt in macroeconomic models featuring stochastic productivity shocks, and 
indeed this is the very specification used in Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997).
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The second important point regarding (7a) and (7b) is that both implicitly assume
that the union’s objectives exist independently of the labour-demand conditions which
it faces, in much the same way as the specification of a representative consumer’s
utility function is independent o f that consumer’s budget constraint. The specification
>
given by (7b) has greater generality than (7a) in this respect, however, since it is 
possible to restrict the two objectives lu and wrueal to represent a point on the expected
labour demand curve. This issue is also the subject of detailed investigation in 
Chapter II: for the present, it suffices to mention that this point is central to the Cubitt 
(1997) critique o f models o f monetary policy featuring non-atomistic unions, namely 
that the conclusions to be drawn regarding the efficacy of delegation arrangements in 
unionised economies may be sensitive to the assumption that non-atomistic unions 
ignore the constraints facing them when formulating their objectives.
This completes our discussion of monopoly-union objective functions. Papers 
deploying this approach very generally assume that each union is empowered to set 
the contract nominal wage, and abstract from the possibility o f wage bargaining,19 
while the firm is assumed to have the freedom to decide upon the level of 
employment.20
1.6 Monetary Policy Games with Non-Atomistic Unions
1.6.1 Introductory Remarks 
This section reviews the macroeconomic literature featuring non-atomistic wage- 
setters (which are generally, although not universally, interpreted to be trade
9 1unions). Each such union perceives the influence of its wage on aggregate variables
19 The profession’s consensus view, as stated by Oswald (1985, p. 169) for instance, appears to be that 
few, if  any, additional insights are to be gained by incorporating a bargaining stage into the model. 
Note also that in the literature relating to trade-union objectives much attention has been devoted to the 
question o f  whether contracts which stipulate unilateral determination o f  employment by the firm are 
efficient (i.e. are Pareto-optimal agreements between the firm and the union), McDonald and Solow  
(1981) being a well-known instance. The details o f  this debate are, however, o f  no concern to this 
thesis.
20 This assumption that employment under wage contracts is demand-determined is widely considered 
to be consistent with the findings o f  econometric studies. For example, Blanchard (1979, p.802) 
describes the evidence for this as “overwhelming”, while Card (1990) is a much-cited paper which 
provides supporting empirical evidence.
21 In the interests o f  brevity, no discussion is provided here o f  contributions to this literature which 
concern macroeconomic topics only remotely related to the theme o f  the thesis. This includes papers 
which investigate the implications o f  strategic wage-setting for monetary-union and open-economy
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to be non-negligible, and the strategic considerations which follow from this have 
important consequences for the individually optimal choice o f wage. This literature is 
divisible into two major strands, one of which assumes that union objectives are 
represented by either (7a) or (7b), and hence that inflation in itself is not viewed as 
inherently undesirable: for such inflation-indifferent unions, price-level movements 
are only potentially detrimental to union welfare insofar as they affect the real wage 
or employment. The second strand allows for union inflation-aversion by 
incorporating a quadratic term in inflation into the union objective function, so that 
(7a) and (7b) respectively become:
n ;  = (fj - h f -  2c: (Wy -  p )  +Mix ~ x u)2 (8a)
= Vj - 0 2 + cu (W y - P -  K ealf  + Mix -  n uf  (8b)
where /i > 0 is an additional relative-weight parameter, n  = p  -  p_x is inflation, and
k u is the union’s preferred inflation rate. Although it is to this second strand
concerning inflation-averse unions that we first direct our attention, our discussion of 
it will be relatively brief, since throughout the thesis unions are assumed to be 
inflation-indifferent.
1.6.2 The Macroeconomics o f  Inflation-Averse Non-Atomistic Unions 
The four closely related papers by Cubitt (1992, 1995, 1997) and Gylfason and 
Lindbeck (1994) figure prominently among the contributions which initiated the study 
of the macroeconomic consequences of inflation-averse unions.22 These papers 
investigated the implications of strategic interaction between the monetary authority 
and a single economy-wide inflation-averse union in the absence o f stochastic
issues (for example: Forteza, 1998; Gruner and Hefeker, 1999; Cukierman and Lippi, 2001; Holden, 
2003; Coricelli et al., 2004b).
22 Agell and Ysander (1993) is another o f  the earliest papers to consider a single economy-wide 
inflation-averse union. Its focus is on how the union may be induced to be more moderate in wage- 
setting (with potentially beneficial effects on inflation) when its after-tax real wage is doubly 
vulnerable to erosion by inflation, as a consequence o f the progressive income-tax system featuring 
non-indexed nominal tax brackets.
j
f
22
91 • •shocks. While space constraints preclude a detailed discussion o f every aspect of
these papers, it is worth mentioning the key finding that, under discretion, the
resulting moderation in wage-setting induced by the union’s inflation-aversion can
render a regime in which the money supply is set in a discretionary fashion after
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wages, superior to one o f monetary precommitment. The major focus of the literature 
subsequent to Cubitt has been on working out the implications o f this finding for 
optimal regime design. Skott (1997), for instance, allows for multiple non-atomistic 
unions and derives the socially optimal output target that should be assigned to a 
discretionary central bank, while Lawler (2001) identifies the optimal combination of 
state-contingent inflation target and central bank ‘liberalism’ when Cubitt’s single­
union economy is subject to stochastic shocks, confirming in so doing Cubitt’s result 
regarding the superiority of (optimally delegated) discretion over precommitment.24
There are two aspects o f this literature which are of interest to this thesis. The first is 
the ‘Cubitt critique’ briefly mentioned earlier. Cubitt (1997) presents a model which 
subsumes, as distinct special cases, the models o f Cubitt (1992, 1995) and Gylfason 
and Lindbeck (1994). The latter model suggests that it may be possible for the policy 
game in which the money supply and wages are set simultaneously to exhibit both an 
inflation bias and an employment outcome below either o f the two players’ desired 
employment levels, whereas such a result cannot arise in the Cubitt (1992, 1995) 
model. In his 1997 paper, Cubitt showed that the difference in results is attributable to 
Gylfason and Lindbeck’s use of a specification equivalent to (8b), and that a 
necessary condition for their stagflation result to be possible, is that the combination 
of union employment and real wage targets (/„ and w™al) be ‘over-ambitious’, in the
sense that it is not a feasible outcome given the economy’s assumed supply-side 
structure. (Cubitt in his earlier papers had omitted a quadratic real-wage term, and 
hence had implicitly assumed that the union’s objectives were feasible.) These facts 
prompted the critique o f policy-game models featuring non-atomistic unions outlined 
in the concluding section of Cubitt (1997), the gist o f which has already been 
summarised in Section 5.3 above.
23 In a response to Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Acocella and Ciccarone (1997) established that 
similar results arise when unions are inflation-indifferent but share some other macroeconomic 
objective with the authorities, such as the budget deficit.
24 Lawler (2000) conducts a similar exercise with regard to the optimal linear-in-inflation contract, and 
finds that, for optimality, this alternative delegation arrangement should involve the appointment o f  a 
‘liberal’ central banker. In Jerger (2002) and Lawler (2005) an inflation contract is found to be 
beneficial, when there are multiple non-atomistic unions, even in the absence o f  stochastic shocks.
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The second aspect o f this strand of literature which needs to be mentioned is that its 
later contributions have wedded the monopolistically competitive structure of 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) to the inflation-averse unions framework of such 
papers as Skott (1997), in the hope of thus being able to provide theoretical 
explanations for the stylised fact to which Calmfors and Driffill (1988) drew attention. 
The empirical regularity in question is that the mean unemployment rate and the 
degree of wage-bargaining centralisation (which, roughly speaking, can be equated to 
the number o f unions) exhibit a non-monotonic ‘hump-shaped’ relationship. (In other 
words, countries with atomistic or highly centralised wage-bargaining have tended to 
experience lower unemployment than countries with intermediate levels of wage- 
bargaining.) The model of Cukierman and Lippi (1999), which assumes each union 
controls a monopolistically competitive labour variety, is partly successful in this 
regard, since it does exhibit the non-monotonic Calmfors-Driffill relationship, 
provided unions are inflation-averse. However, another important paper, Coricelli et 
al. (2004a, 2006), which instead assumes homogenous labour and locates the 
monopolistic competition in the goods market, contrastingly finds that mean 
unemployment is increasing in the number of unions, regardless of the strength of
9 ctheir inflation aversion.
1.6.3 The Macroeconomics o f  Inflation-Indifferent Non-Atomistic Unions
1.6.3 (i) Initial Remarks
We now turn to a discussion of the related strand of literature in which non- 
atomistic unions are indifferent to inflation. The earliest such papers need not concern 
us, since they either ignore monetary issues entirely, analysing instead an economy in 
which a single union sets the real wage while the government’s policy variable is real 
public-sector expenditure (Driffill, 1984; Calmfors and Horn, 1985; Soderstrom, 
1985), or alternatively consider a scenario in which a single union can, via an
25 Guzzo and Velasco (1999) also investigated the implications for optimal delegation o f  monopolistic 
competition and strategic wage-setting by inflation-averse unions. Detailed discussion o f  this paper is 
unnecessary, however, since it contains an error pointed out by Lippi (2002): specifically, it is 
inappropriately assumed that the individual union treats the real (rather than the nominal) wages o f  
other unions as beyond its influence. As is apparent from the exchange between Lippi (2002) and 
Guzzo and Velasco (2002), when the equilibrium expressions for this model with inflation-averse 
unions are correctly derived, the conclusions which follow are not dissimilar to those obtained by 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999).
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appropriate setting of the nominal wage, dispel the intrinsic uncertainty it faces 
regarding the monetary policymaker’s type (Tabellini, 1988; Andersen, 1989). Our 
principal interest lies, rather, with those contributions which feature monopolistically 
competitive markets, and these are conveniently divisible according to whether or not 
they assume monetary policy is able to influence real outcomes by affecting aggregate 
demand.
1.6.3 (ii) Monopolistically Competitive Models without an Aggregate Demand 
Channel
The earliest paper to demonstrate that institutional design is non-neutral as regards 
real outcomes when wage-setters are non-atomistic and inflation-indifferent, was the 
little-noticed paper by Akhand (1992). This paper is closely related to the version of 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) in which unions are not inflation-averse, in that the 
starting-point for the analysis in both papers is an expression for the (non-stochastic) 
aggregate demand for labour which is solely a function of the aggregate real wage. 
The assumption that monopolistic competition is located only in the labour market 
ensures that the aggregate demand for goods, and hence for labour also, is invariant to 
changes in real money balances, so that monetary policy can only influence real 
outcomes via the real wage. The results which follow from this assumption differ 
considerably between the two papers, and this is attributable to the difference in 
specification of the wage-setters’ objective function. Since the specification adopted 
by Akhand is not easily motivated on intuitive grounds, we will largely confine 
attention here to the findings of Cukierman and Lippi, who assume unions minimise
'j/r
(7a). In both papers, the extent to which the real wage exceeds its full-employment 
level depends on the degree of monopolistic competition between labour varieties, 
with the real wage being lower, the higher the degree of substitutability o f labour 
types in production. A coordination failure in wage-setting causes the equilibrium real 
wage to differ not only from its market-clearing value, but also from its ideal value 
from the representative union’s viewpoint. In Cukierman and Lippi, the real wage is 
lower, and indeed is further below the representative union’s desired real wage, the 
larger is the number of unions, since the stronger competition between labour varieties
26 In Akhand (1992), the wage-setter’s utility function is (apparently arbitrarily) assumed to be:
Utility = [1 + log (real wage)]  x Share o f  aggregate employment.
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induces each union exclusively representing a particular variety to exercise greater
* 97 •restraint in wage-setting. So far as delegation is concerned, greater central-bank 
conservatism reduces equilibrium employment, and this has to do with its 
exacerbation o f the externality present in individual union wage-setting choices 
(although the authors themselves do not use this terminology, couching the discussion 
instead in terms o f a “competition-induced strategic non-neutrality” (Cukierman and 
Lippi, 1999, p. 1411)). Rephrased somewhat, their explanation is essentially as follows. 
When labour types are monopolistically competitive, an individual union can, given 
the nominal wage of other unions, secure an increase in its real wage by raising its 
own nominal wage, at the acceptable cost to it of lower employment as a result o f its 
reduced wage-competitiveness. The greater is central-bank conservatism, and hence 
the less accommodating of wages is monetary policy, the stronger is the real wage 
impact of a given increase in the individual union’s nominal wage relative to other 
unions’ wages. Hence the incentive to raise the nominal wage is stronger, and the 
equilibrium real wage premium (i.e. over the competitive real wage) is greater, the 
more conservative is the central bank.
1.6.3 (iii) Some General Remarks on Monopolistically Competitive Models which 
Incorporate an Aggregate Demand Channel 
By introducing monopolistic labour-market competition into a model featuring non- 
atomistic unions, Cukierman and Lippi (as well as Akhand) showed that design- 
aspects of the monetary regime can matter for equilibrium real outcomes even when 
unions are not inflation-averse. A limitation of these papers, however, is their 
assumption that the strategic behaviour of unions can only affect the aggregate 
demand for labour via the equilibrium real wage. No allowance is made for the 
possibility that each union may also perceive its nominal wage to have an indirect 
influence on the derived demand for its labour, as a consequence of the contributory 
effect of its wage in inducing changes in monetary response, the price level and 
aggregate demand. Contributions contemporaneous with, and subsequent to
27 Akhand’s objective function generates a result contrary to that obtained by Cukierman and Lippi, 
namely that failure to coordinate wage-setting causes the equilibrium real wage to exceed the desired 
real wage, and the extent o f  this departure is worse the stronger the competition between unions (i.e. 
the more o f them there are).
28 Again, Akhand’s assumed objective function causes the relationship between central-bank 
conservatism and employment to be the very reverse o f  that found by Cukierman and Lippi.
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Cukierman and Lippi have therefore sought to allow for alternative channels through
which the strategic interaction of unions’ wage decisions with monetary policy can
affect employment outcomes. Two such channels have been modelled. The ‘output
channel’ has its sole exemplar in Lippi (2003), who uses a model that has similarities
*
to Cukierman and Lippi (1999), since it features monopolistic competition in the 
labour market and perfect competition in goods. It differs from the earlier paper, 
however, by building on microfoundations for optimising firms and workers, and 
hence does not rely on the assumption implicit in Cukierman and Lippi that aggregate
9Qoutput is taken as given by each union. Secondly, several papers alternatively 
introduce an aggregate demand channel by modelling the goods market as 
monopolistically competitive, while labour is homogenous but immobile between 
monopoly unions, each o f which has exclusive control over the workforce available to 
a particular firm. In what follows, we first of all discuss the three papers in this 
category which feature policy rules, and which therefore implicitly assume that the 
real wage cannot be affected by monetary surprises. We follow this with a comparison 
of Coricelli et al. with Lippi (2003), since although these papers differ in that they 
locate monopolistic competition in different markets, they share in common the 
assumption that the monetary regime is one of discretion.
Before proceeding to these tasks, however, it is appropriate briefly to discuss 
Bleaney (1996), which features monopolistic competition among both firms and 
unions. While Bleaney’s non-stochastic model does exhibit the Calmfors-Driffill 
hump-shaped relationship between unemployment and the number of unions, 
equilibrium real outcomes are found by him to be independent of the central bank’s 
weight parameter. This result is attributable to his assumption that wages and the 
monetary instrument are set simultaneously. As previously noted by Akhand (1992), 
strategic non-neutralities cannot arise in a simultaneous-move game o f this kind, since 
every wage-setter treats the price level as beyond its influence.
1.6.3 (iv) Models with an Aggregate Demand Channel and a Monetary Rule 
Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) and Soskice and Iversen (2000) differ from Bleaney in 
that, like Cukierman and Lippi (1999), they assume monetary policy is implemented
29 Another way o f  making this point is to say that Lippi (2003) is a general equilibrium model, whereas 
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) is not.
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after unions have set wages. Furthermore, both papers assume there is credible
precommitment to a rule which involves the money supply being adjusted, in a
mechanical fashion, according to the realised value of the price level. The two papers
principally differ in that Bratsiotis and Martin allow for stochastic shocks, whereas
>
Soskice and Iversen do not. A second difference is that whereas in Bratsiotis and 
Martin each o f the set o f differentiated products is uniquely produced by a particular 
firm, in Soskice and Iversen this role is allotted to industry sectors, with the firms in 
each sector instead assumed to be oligopolistic Bertrand competitors. Consequently, 
in Soskice and Iversen’s model each sector’s product price is always equal to the 
nominal wage: hence the equilibrium real wage is zero, and the impotence of 
monetary policy to influence employment by altering the real wage is secured in a 
second way quite distinct from the assumption that monetary policy is conducted in 
accordance with a rule. While the two papers also differ in their assumptions 
regarding the objective functions of unions (Bratsiotis and Martin assume (7b)30, 
while Soskice and Iversen adopt the utility function of Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
(1987)), both specifications ensure the individual union, in choosing its wage, faces a 
trade-off between inducing the real wage to move closer towards, and employment 
further away from, their respective desired values. Given these specifications, the key 
result common to both models then follows, namely that mean employment is higher, 
the less accommodating o f prices is the monetary rule. This is because the lower the 
degree of accommodation, the greater the impact on aggregate demand, and hence on 
the derived demand for the individual union’s labour, of an incremental increase in its
o ]
wage. Less accommodation therefore induces greater wage restraint on the part of 
each non-atomistic union.
These two models differ somewhat, however, as regards the relationship between 
the number o f unions and mean employment. Soskice and Iversen find mean 
employment to be monotonically falling in the number of unions. This monotonicity 
appears to be a consequence of their assumption of Bertrand competition between 
sectors, each of which is associated with a single monopoly union. Each such union
30 Bratsiotis and Martin depart from other models which use (7b) by specifying the union’s desired real 
wage, w rueal, to vary according to the realised value o f the stochastic productivity shock. However, 
since each union in their model possesses no information regarding these shocks when choosing its 
individual wage, this departure from the standard specification is o f  no consequence for their results.
31 Such an increase in its wage also reduces the union’s derived demand for labour by a more direct 
route, namely by causing the employing firm (or sector’s) product price to rise relative to the average 
price, and hence reducing that product’s share o f  aggregate demand.
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therefore realises that the product real wage of its employer firms is zero, and that 
therefore its wage choice can only affect its employment via the contribution made by 
that wage to the determination of aggregate demand. Things are rather more 
complicated in Bratsiotis and Martin since with monopolistic competition between 
firms, rather than sectors, each non-atomistic union recognises that its wage choice 
not only affects its employment outcomes indirectly via aggregate demand, but also 
via the product real wage. Hence in their model the sign of the impact of an increase 
in the number of unions on mean employment is ambiguous, and depends on how 
accommodating of prices is the monetary rule.
A limitation of both these papers pointed out by Holden (2005) is that their models 
confine attention to a one-shot game, and neglect to consider whether different wage- 
setting behaviour might arise in a repeated-game context. Using a (non-stochastic) 
hybrid of these two models, Holden shows that with infinite-horizon repeated play, 
coordinated wage-setting can be maintained in an equilibrium featuring trigger 
strategies, provided the unemployment costs of a breakdown in coordination are 
sufficiently high. As discussed above, equilibrium unemployment in the one-shot 
game is higher, the less accommodating is the monetary rule. The upshot is that when 
Soskice and Iversen’s and Bratsiotis and Martin’s models are extended to allow for 
repeated play, the conclusion of these papers that a stricter (i.e. less accommodating) 
rule is beneficial in terms o f unemployment outcomes is shown to be questionable, 
since a stricter rule effectively reduces the unemployment costs o f a breakdown, and 
hence increases the minimum sustainable unemployment level under coordination.
Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) is one of the minority of papers in this field which 
allow for stochastic shocks. The remaining aspects of it which require discussion are 
its conclusions regarding the relative merits of alternative targeting regimes when the 
economy is subject to such shocks. One finding is that while a regime which places a 
higher weight on stabilising inflation at its socially optimal value results in both lower 
mean inflation and lower mean unemployment, this double benefit is offset by higher 
unemployment variability. This trade-off is reminiscent o f that present in Rogoff 
(1985), save that, as we saw earlier, in the Rogoff model the assumption of an 
atomistic private sector causes mean unemployment to be invariant to the regime’s 
design. (Although the regime in question here involves a rule rather than discretion, it 
nevertheless corresponds to the appointment of a more conservative central banker in 
the Rogoff model. The reason for the correspondence is that the assignment of a loss
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function to the central bank is equivalent to assigning it a particular monetary reaction
function or rule. ) Another of Bratsiotis and Martin’s findings is that in their
framework, a regime akin to that proposed by Svensson (1997), in which the central
bank announces an inflation target, does not affect equilibrium mean employment.
*
Hence the Svensson model’s prediction that such a regime can lower mean inflation 
without affecting real outcomes is found to be robust to the introduction of 
monopolistic competition and strategic wage-setting. Bratsiotis and Martin also 
compare the relative merits of rules according to which the money supply is adjusted 
in response to observed movements in output or nominal income, and generally find 
that mean unemployment varies systematically with the resulting degree of monetary 
accommodation, although the accompanying amount of unemployment variability is 
sensitive to the nature o f the rule. For example, if the central bank is instructed to 
solely pursue employment stability, the resulting monetary rule is fully 
accommodating o f prices, and the mean unemployment rate is increased for the 
strategic-interaction reasons discussed earlier, although this drawback is offset by the 
complete elimination of unemployment variability about that higher mean. This real 
outcome is inferior to that from nominal-income targeting, which Bratsiotis and 
Martin also find results in the elimination of unemployment variability. This superior 
performance is attributable to the fact that nominal-income targeting involves a lower 
degree of monetary accommodation of the price level than employment targeting, so 
that mean unemployment is consequently lower under the former.
1.6.3 (v) Monopolistically Competitive Models with Discretion 
The two key papers in this category are Lippi (2003) and the version of Coricelli et 
al. (2004a, 2006) in which unions are not inflation-averse. Despite numerous 
differences in approach, both models have features which cause individual union
32 McCallum’s (1995, 1997) dictum that the delegation approach merely relocates the time- 
inconsistency problem, rather than definitively solving it, appears particularly compelling when this 
correspondence between the assignment o f a loss function to the central bank (delegation), and the 
assignment to it o f  a particular monetary reaction function (a rule) is pointed out, since there is an 
implicit assumption underpinning the former that delegation decisions cannot be reneged upon.
33 Acocella et al. (2005) study the policy implications o f  the Coricelli et al. (2004a) model when 
plausible numerical values are assigned to its parameters. They also conduct a similar exercise in 
respect o f  a variant model in which wages and the money supply are set simultaneously, replicating in 
so doing the findings o f  Bleaney (1996). Since this paper makes no original contribution to theory, 
further discussion o f  it here is not warranted.
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wage-setting decisions to have a general-equilibrium effect. By modelling the goods 
market as monopolistically competitive, Coricelli et al. incorporate the aggregate- 
demand channel central to Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) and Soskice and Iversen 
(2000). It is unsurprising therefore, that Coricelli et al.’s findings have affinities to 
those of the latter pair of papers. In particular, greater central-bank conservatism 
induces greater wage restraint by inflation-indifferent unions, and hence reduces mean 
unemployment and inflation, while a greater number of unions always worsens 
macroeconomic outcomes because of the reduced internalisation by each union of the 
price-level impact of its wage.
In Lippi (2003) firms are perfectly competitive, and hence there is no aggregate 
demand channel through which the interaction of strategic wage-setting and monetary 
policy can affect employment. The key feature of Lippi’s model is the representative 
firm’s CES production function, which leads different labour types to be substitutable 
in production. Each union exclusively represents workers o f a particular type, and 
unions are consequently monopolistic competitors in the labour market. In this respect 
the model has affinities to Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Akhand (1992). It differs 
from them, however, in that labour demand is explicitly microfounded, and in such a 
way as to render different workers’ labour inputs complements in production. It is the 
allowance made for the production-complementarity of labour inputs which underlies 
the divergence of the results generated by this model from those of Cukierman and 
Lippi (1999). It will be recalled from our earlier discussion of that paper that the 
individual union, in adjusting its nominal wage above the average, must weigh the 
resulting gain in its real wage against its loss o f competitiveness vis-a-vis other unions. 
Higher central bank conservatism (less monetary accommodation of wages) makes 
this trade-off more favourable for the individual union, leading (if unions are 
inflation-indifferent) to a higher real wage, and hence higher unemployment and 
inflation. In Lippi’s model there arises a second effect which works against this 
‘substitution effect’. The second effect is absent from Cukierman and Lippi (1999), 
and involves a channel running from the individual wage to labour demand via the 
aggregate real wage. Lippi somewhat obscures its underpinnings by describing it as an 
“output effect” (Lippi, 2003, p.913), and argues that the individual union, in setting its 
nominal wage, recognises that the resulting impact on the aggregate real wage will 
reduce aggregate output, and hence the derived demand for its members’ labour, with 
this effect being stronger, the more conservative is the central bank. Doubtless Lippi’s
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choice of descriptive phrasing here is designed to make the effect seem analogous to
the aggregate demand channel of Soskice and Iversen (2000) and related papers. The
analogy appears not to be a particularly close one, however, and a more
straightforward explanation for the effect can be devised. The key point is that each
/
union appreciates that the impact on the aggregate real wage of its individual nominal 
wage decision will affect its employer firms’ demand for labour varieties other than 
that of its members. A contraction in demand for these other labour types must entail 
lower demand for the union’s labour type as well, since they are complements in 
production. Thus a second channel, involving this output or complementarity-of- 
inputs effect, arises through which greater central bank conservatism can affect mean 
employment. The repercussions of a marginal increase in conservatism in Lippi (2003) 
are therefore ambiguous, since its macroeconomic impact depends on the relative 
strength of the substitution and output effects, with the former inducing less, and the 
latter more, wage restraint by each union. For plausible parameter values Lippi 
concludes that appointing a conservative central banker will be beneficial, a 
conclusion similar to that arrived at by Coricelli et al.
1.6.3 (vi) Non-neutrality of Regime Design in the Absence o f Monopolistic 
Competition
Before concluding this section we note a recent contribution which shows that 
neither union inflation-aversion nor monopolistic competition is necessary for the 
design of the monetary regime to be non-neutral as regards mean employment. The 
crucial feature o f the single-union economy of Lawler (2002) is that the inflation 
outcome which results from the central bank’s setting of its instrument is subject to 
multiplicative uncertainty. The union seeks to minimise (7a), and recognises that 
while a marginally higher nominal wage leads to a higher expected price level and 
higher expected real wage, the latter beneficial effect has a drawback in that the 
consequent increase in inflation variability worsens employment variability. The more 
conservative is the central bank, the smaller will be the increase in mean inflation 
which will accompany a given increase in the nominal wage, and hence the less costly 
will be such a wage increase in terms of higher employment variability. Thus greater 
conservatism induces less moderation in wage-setting, and hence leads to a higher 
mean real wage and lower mean employment. This finding is obviously more
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reminiscent o f the strand of literature featuring inflation-averse unions, than the strand 
which assumes more conventional union objectives and incorporates aggregate- 
demand or aggregate-output channels through which strategic wage decisions can 
influence real outcomes.34
i
1.7 The Macroeconomics of Supply-Shock Information
1.7.1 Initial Remarks
It is evident from the previous section that the strategic wage-setting literature has 
mainly focused on two of the three macroeconomic themes mentioned at the outset of 
this survey, namely the externalities theme and the differing consequences of rule- 
based and discretionary regimes. The third theme mentioned earlier, that of 
informational asymmetries between policymaker and private sector, remains largely 
unaddressed. In particular, no paper has investigated as yet the implications of non- 
atomistic unions possessing, at the time wages are set, information regarding the 
realised value o f a supply shock. However, an important analysis o f this scenario for 
the case of atomistic unions has been carried out by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997). 
This model is described in the next subsection, following which the literature on the 
provision by the authorities o f such information to the private sector is briefly 
surveyed.
1.7.2 The Herrendorf. and Lockwood (1997) Model
\
The principal purpose o f Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) was to show that when 
the Rogoff model is modified to allow for a unionised labour force which possesses 
some information about a productivity shock’s realisation at the time wages are set, a 
Rogoffian conservative central banker continues to be relevant to optimal regime 
design. Furthermore, this is shown to be the case even when the objective function 
assigned to the central bank features an inflation target, or a linear-in-inflation penalty, 
which, when appropriately set, eliminates the inflation bias associated with 
discretionary monetary policy.
34 Lawler (2006) extends this framework to allow for stochastic productivity shocks, and finds the 
optima] delegation arrangements to be similar to those derived in Lawler (2000) for the case o f an 
economy-wide inflation-averse union.
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In Herrendorf and Lockwood’s model, firms are perfectly competitive, and each
concludes a wage contract with an atomistic monopoly union which represents all the
(immobile) potential employees of that firm. Each union seeks to minimise, by choice
of the contract wage, an objective function akin to (7b), with the values taken by the
>
parameters lu and w[eal assumed to be such that the union’s preferred mean real wage
outcome (i.e. its outcome in the absence of a productivity shock) exceeds the mean 
market-clearing real wage. Since social welfare is assumed to be quadratic in 
deviations of employment from its market-clearing level, however, a discretionary 
policymaker concerned with social welfare engenders a mean inflation bias, for the
*5 C
standard time-inconsistency reasons discussed earlier. Herrendorf and Lockwood 
introduce an additional element which complicates the delegation issue, however. 
Prior to setting the contract nominal wage, unions commonly observe a potentially 
noisy item of information regarding the productivity shock, and conditional on this 
‘signal’ form a forecast of the shock’s value. The realisation of the productivity shock 
in any particular period covered by the (simultaneously signed) wage contracts may 
therefore be decomposed into a component which is anticipated by unions at the time 
wages are set, and a component which they do not foresee at that juncture, but which 
does come to be known by the central bank at the time monetary policy is conducted.
Each union realises that the authorities would, in the absence of any nominal wage 
response to the signal, adjust the monetary instrument to stabilise the shock’s impact 
optimally in accordance with the social loss function. However, this stabilisation 
pattern is not, in general, the pattern preferred by the unions. By forming a rational 
expectation o f the central bank’s response to the anticipated component of the shock, 
and adjusting its wage appropriately, each union can bring about a preferred 
movement in the real wage in response to this component. This adjustment is, in 
general, smaller in absolute terms than that which is socially optimal. The adverse 
consequence o f this from society’s viewpoint is that discretionary monetary policy is 
characterised by a stochastic inflation bias. In other words, the variability of inflation 
is higher than it would be were a policymaker concerned with social welfare able
35 Note that Herrendorf and Lockwood do not define an objective function for society, and instead 
derive the monetary-delegation arrangements which are optimal from the point o f  view o f  the 
government’s objective function. However, since the latter is essentially the same as the social 
objective function which appears in R ogoff (1985), and since the very title o f  Herrendorf and 
Lockwood’s paper indicates that they share the same concerns as Rogoff, it seems entirely reasonable 
to interpret government policymakers in their model as being concerned with social welfare.
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credibly to precommit to a rule under which monetary policy is devoted exclusively to 
shielding the price level from the impact of each shock. Such a rule is not time- 
consistent, since given naive expectations that it will be adhered to, the policymaker 
has an incentive to deliver surprise inflation in order to stabilise employment in
'  36accordance with society’s objectives rather than those of unions. Herrendorf and 
Lockwood demonstrate that in this scenario, socially optimal delegation arrangements 
involve appointing a conservative central banker who places a higher (but not 
infinitely high) weight on inflation stabilisation, on account o f the mitigating effect 
such an appointment has on the stochastic inflation bias.
The principal aspects o f Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) which are o f interest 
from the perspective o f this thesis have been summarised in the foregoing paragraphs. 
Of less interest to us is the paper’s investigation of whether it is possible to implement 
the socially optimal state-contingent rule by making the central-banker appointment 
decision contingent on the realised value of the aggregate nominal wage. They find 
that it is indeed possible to do so provided the unions’ preferences are directly 
observable by the designers of the monetary regime. These issues need not detain us, 
however, since, as Herrendorf and Lockwood themselves remark, the notion of state- 
contingent delegation militates somewhat against the idea that central bank 
appointments are long-term in nature.
1.7.3 Economic Transparency
Transparency in macroeconomics concerns the disclosure o f information to the 
public which would otherwise be private to the policymaker. Geraats (2002) 
distinguishes several different categories of transparency according to whether the 
information in question relates to the economic environment, the actual conduct of 
policy (including control errors), or the policymaker’s objectives. Chapter III below 
investigates the consequences of the policymaker divulging its private information 
regarding productivity shocks prior to wages and the money supply being set, and 
therefore constitutes an instance of what Geraats (2002, p.F547) terms “economic 
transparency”. For this reason we confine attention here to this kind of transparency,
36 Note that socially optimal stabilisation o f the unanticipated component o f  the shock is not impeded: 
as in Barro (1976), the policym aker’s informational advantage enables it to bring about its preferred 
outcomes in relation to the component o f  the shock which is not anticipated by unions.
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which concerns information regarding macroeconomic disturbances possessed by the
policymaker prior to setting its instrument. Most of the previous contributions on this
theme are not in fact very closely related to the model developed in the thesis. Geraats
(2004b) and Jensen (2000), for instance, investigate the implications of transparency
/
regarding the central bank’s macroeconomic forecasts in a two-period model featuring 
intrinsic uncertainty (i.e. regarding the central bank’s preferences). The two papers’ 
disagreement regarding the desirability of economic transparency is attributable to 
their very different assumptions regarding supply-side structure. However, since this 
thesis abstracts throughout from intrinsic uncertainty, a detailed discussion of these 
papers is not warranted. This also justifies giving only the very briefest account of 
Tarkka and Mayes (1999), which, in a similar manner, assumes that the private sector 
does not know the central bank’s inflation target. Tarkka and Mayes assume output is 
determined according to the Lucas surprise-supply function, with supply shocks 
unobserved by either the public when forming expectations o f inflation, or the central 
bank when setting the money supply. The central bank’s informational advantage 
relates to the velocity shock, in respect of which it receives a noisy signal, while it 
cannot observe the private sector’s expectation of inflation. In this scenario, with the 
private sector concerned to minimise its expectational errors regarding inflation, and 
the central bank concerned solely to achieve its inflation target, transparency 
regarding the central bank’s estimate of private-sector expectations of inflation are 
shown to be beneficial to all parties.
This conclusion is not affirmed by the pair of papers by Cukierman (2001) and 
Gersbach (2002), which like Tarkka and Mayes assume output is determined by a 
Lucas surprise-supply function, but unlike the latter authors abstract entirely from 
intrinsic uncertainty, while also assuming that the central bank minimises a social loss 
function akin to (2). Despite superficial differences in the two models, the two papers 
arrive at the same principal result, namely that transparency regarding the supply 
shock is detrimental to welfare since, by causing private-sector agents to revise their 
rational expectation o f inflation, it alters the marginal cost of delivering an 
employment-stabilising inflation surprise in such a way as to render such stabilisation 
measures socially undesirable. This is found to be the case regardless of the value 
taken by k in the social loss function.
Cukierman (2001) presents a second model which also suggests that transparency 
regarding supply shocks may be detrimental to social welfare. This model does not
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utilise the Lucas surprise-supply function, but instead assumes that deviations of 
output from its desirable value depend on the real interest rate expected by the private 
sector, as well as on a supply shock, while inflation is increasing in lagged output and 
is affected by a velocity shock. Cukierman shows that the central bank can, by 
appropriate adjustments of the nominal interest rate, achieve precisely the same 
stabilisation of output and inflation regardless of whether or not it discloses its 
information regarding both shocks prior to the formation o f inflation expectations. 
The potential drawback to disclosure, however, is that the induced revisions of 
private-sector inflation expectations imply that larger (absolute value) adjustments in 
nominal interest rates are then required to bring about the desired stabilising 
movements in the (expected) real rate. The resulting increased variability of nominal 
interest rates may be undesirable if it increases the fragility o f the financial sector.37
An element common to both Cukierman (2001) models and to Gersbach (2002) is 
the assumption that the private-sector response to the disclosure o f information about 
the supply shock solely takes the form of a revision of inflation expectations. These 
papers therefore neglect to consider the possibility that transparency regarding supply 
shocks may, by changing a private agent’s perceived opportunity set of real outcomes, 
induce some other change in that agent’s behaviour. This issue is addressed in 
Chapter III below.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
This opening chapter has provided some background information on such topics as 
the role played by the time-inconsistency concept in the debate over rules versus 
discretion, proposed delegation solutions to the inflation-bias problem, and the 
modelling of monopolistic competition and of trade-union objectives. The later parts 
of the survey have focused on three partly overlapping portions o f the very extensive 
literature on rational-expectations macroeconomic models. The first o f these concerns 
strategic wage-setting, the second the optimal design of the monetary regime when the 
central bank can potentially perform stabilising actions in respect o f macroeconomic 
shocks, while the theme o f the third is economic transparency. The first two of these
37 One difference in results between this model and the Cukierman and Gersbach models with the 
Lucas surprise-supply function, is that it suggests that transparency regarding velocity shocks may be 
undesirable.
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categories overlap, albeit not to a very great extent, while the literature on economic 
transparency has yet to examine the implications of strategic wage-setting and 
monetary delegation for this issue.
In what follows, Chapter II belongs exclusively to the first of these strands of 
literature, and in particular to that subsidiary part o f it which investigates the 
implications of monopolistic competition for optimal regime design. Its purpose is to 
address some issues which have been overlooked by previous contributions in this 
vein. Chapter III is rather more ambitious in its aims, in that it presents a model which 
falls within all three of the aforementioned areas o f research. As mentioned above, the 
only previous paper to feature strategic wage-setting, monopolistic competition and a 
monetary authority that can react to shocks is Bratsiotis and Martin (1999). This paper, 
however, focuses on monetary rules rather than discretion, ignores the possibility that 
the private sector might, as in Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), receive information 
about productivity shocks before setting wages, and does not address economic 
transparency issues. It is apparent, therefore, that a considerable gap exists in the 
literature, and it is this gap which Chapter III endeavours to fill.
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Chapter II
Wage-Setting Externalities in the Absence of Stochastic Shocks
II. 1 Introductory Remarks and Outline of the Model
As explained in the Introduction, the principal aim of this thesis is to study the 
influence of wage-setting and indexation decisions on macroeconomic outcomes 
when the economy is subject to stochastic shocks. Having said this, results relating to 
a purely deterministic context are of some interest in themselves, and a useful 
beginning can be made to the thesis by considering a basic version of our model 
which abstracts from stochastic disturbances. Among the advantages of initially 
analysing the non-stochastic model are the following. Firstly, it will allow an 
immediate focus to be brought to a theme which figures prominently throughout this 
work, namely the existence of macroeconomic externalities arising from individual 
unions’ decisions in respect of the nominal wage, when the goods market in which 
their employer firms operate is monopolistically competitive. Secondly, potentially 
important results regarding the socially optimal monetary regime will be derived: 
these results are implicit in some major previous contributions to the literature, but 
appear to have been overlooked by the authors concerned. Thirdly, it will allow the 
sensitivity of such externality results to the particular specification o f the individual 
union’s objective function to be demonstrated, and a discussion o f the appropriate 
specification of that entity to be provided.
We begin therefore by presenting non-stochastic variants of the key structural 
equations of the model which will feature in every chapter of the thesis. Except where 
stated otherwise, all variables are in logarithms, and time subscripts are almost always 
suppressed apart from when their use is helpful to the exposition.
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, normalised for 
convenience on the unit interval. The firms are identical in their production 
technology, each having the following log-linear production function:
y f  = a l i 0 < a < l  (1)
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where y f  and /, are firm Vs, output and labour input respectively, and a  is the
elasticity of output with respect to labour input. Aggregate supply is defined to be the 
integral over the unit interval of individual firm outputs:1
*
7 s = ) y fd i  (2)
0
The individual firm’s product demand, y f ,  is a function of aggregate demand, y D, 
and of the ratio o f its individual price, to the aggregate price level, p, where
i
p  = jp jd i}  The precise specification of this relationship is:
/=o
y f  -  y D = - £ ( Pi -  P i  S > \  (3)
The parameter e  is the elasticity of firm /’ s share of aggregate demand, y f  -  y D, 
with respect to its relative price, /?, -  p . The interpretation assigned to s  is that it
constitutes a measure o f the degree of competition in the goods market, with 
competition being stronger the higher the value of e , and with the limiting case in 
which s  -»  oo corresponding to the case of perfect competition.3 
Aggregate demand is specified to be a simple function o f real money balances:
y D = y(m - p ) ,  y >  0 (4)
where m is the money supply (whether exogenously given, or set at the discretion of 
the central bank) and y  the elasticity parameter.
Throughout the thesis it is assumed that prices are fully flexible and adjust, as a 
result of the profit-maximising pricing decisions of firms, to ensure the goods market 
clears at all times. Hence y f  = y f  = y t is always the case, while at the aggregate level
1 SHence y  , the arithmetic mean of individual firm log outputs, is the log of the geometric mean of 
firm outputs in levels.
2 Hence p  is the (log) geometric mean of firm prices in levels.
3 The restriction e  > 1 arises for the standard microeconomic reason that s < 1 implies a non-positive 
marginal revenue.
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p  adjusts to ensure the equality of y D and y 5. The assumption o f continuous market 
clearing allows the suppression of the superscripts ‘S’ and iD \  so that firm z’s output 
and product demand may, by substituting (4) into (3), be written as follows:
y i = Y ( m - p ) - s ( j p i - p ) (5)
The individual firm sets its price to maximise its profits for given values o f m, p , and 
the predetermined contract nominal wage, w,. The derivation of this profit-maximising
The supply side o f the labour market is comprised o f n unions, where n > 1. Each 
union is the exclusive representative of the immobile pool of workers available to a 
particular firm, and the firms to which union j  is thus the monopoly supplier are 
arranged so as to lie contiguously on the subinterval from (j -  1)1 n to j/n. The demand 
for labour represented by union j  is consequently:
price is contained in Appendix II.l. This price implies a particular demand for labour 
by the firm, which in the non-stochastic version o f the model being considered here is 
given by the following expression:
jd =
a  + s ( l - a ) (6)
1f  = /  jdi
(y-i)/« / (y-i)/»
j / n  j  j / n y(m -  p ) -  s(Wj -  p)  
a  + s ( \ -  a ) (7)
where
The (desired) supply of labour to firm i (and represented by union j )  is assumed to be 
perfectly inelastic, with its value normalised for convenience at zero, i.e.:
Note that given the specification of the union’s objective function adopted below, 
relaxing this assumption by allowing for a positive elasticity of labour supply with 
respect to the real wage would not alter the conclusions to be derived from the model.
In accordance with the ‘monopoly union’ vein of literature, employment and the 
nominal wage are assumed to depend on the terms of a contract between the firm and 
its associated union. The union sets the nominal wage, and the firm has the right to 
decide upon employment unilaterally (i.e. the union agrees to supply whatever amount 
of labour happens to be demanded by the firm).
Before proceeding to analyse the principal issue of interest o f this section of the 
thesis, namely the macroeconomic repercussions of individual unions’ wage-setting 
decisions, it is necessary to specify the characteristics of the five monetary regimes 
which will be considered below (i.e. the determinants of m). The characteristics o f 
each regime are assumed to be laid down once and for all at the very outset of the 
multi-stage game, and this constitutional enactment relating to the design of the 
monetary regime is assumed to be irreversible. Furthermore, it is assumed that every 
agent in the economy is fully informed about the outcome of this initial regime-design 
stage, and that this is common knowledge. (The model thus abstracts entirely from 
private-sector uncertainty regarding the nature of the regime.)
Four of the five regimes will involve the monetary authorities4 setting their 
instrument, m, in accordance with a preannounced rule which is assumed to be fully 
credible to all agents. In the fifth regime the central bank has the discretionary power 
to set m as it sees fit in order minimise the objective function assigned to it under the 
constitution. Note that when the model features one o f the rule-based regimes, the 
central bank is not a player in a game-theoretic sense: the part of the model 
subsequent to the regime-design stage simply consists of two simultaneous-move 
subgames, one involving wage-setting by unions, and a subsequent one involving 
price-setting by firms, with m being set in a purely mechanical fashion in accordance 
with the rule, so that in a non-stochastic context in which all agents are rational (and 
this is common knowledge), the precise realisation of m can be predicted without 
error. The four rules are a simple fixed money supply rule, a price level (or inflation) 
targeting rule, a nominal income targeting rule, and an employment targeting rule. For
4 Throughout the thesis the terms ‘monetary authorities’ and ‘central bank’ are synonymous.
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convenience we will refer to these in what follows as, respectively, the simple rule, 
the price level rule, the nominal income rule, and the employment rule.
Note that for three o f the four rules, the possibility of the implementation of 
monetary policy under the rule taking place after wage-setting has occurred, is 
essential for their feasibility. The odd one out of the three is the simple rule, which 
differs from the other three in that the precise timing of the implementation of policy 
is immaterial for the resulting equilibrium: m may be set at its fixed value under this 
rule either prior to, simultaneous with, or after the determination of the aggregate 
nominal wage, and may either precede or occur simultaneously with the determination 
of the price level (i.e. with goods-market clearing). This is not true of the other three 
regimes, however, since each of these involves a monetary response to an aggregate 
variable which is necessarily determined after the aggregate nominal wage is 
determined. Consequently, for these three regimes the nature o f the monetary rule is 
such that it necessarily envisages the actual implementation of policy under the rule 
(i.e. the timing of the setting of the money supply) as taking place subsequent to the 
determination o f the aggregate nominal wage. This means that if technological 
constraints on the actual conduct of monetary policy are such that m cannot be 
adjusted in response to w, but must be set in advance of, or simultaneously with w, 
these three rules will be non-feasible, and even if  adopted as rules by the monetary 
authorities will in fact result in the same outcome, as regards employment and output, 
as the simple rule. (Further comments on this will be made below when appropriate.) 
However, if it is possible to set m after w has been realised, so that the three non­
simple rules are feasible, it is then immaterial to the results whether the money supply 
is set before or at the same time as the price level is determined. Assuming their 
feasibility, there are therefore two possible scenarios relating to these aggregate- 
variable-contingent rules, which differ only in the relative timing of monetary policy 
implementation relative to the simultaneous setting of prices by firms, and which have 
in common the assumption that m is set subsequent to w. The time-lines for these two 
scenarios are as follows:
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Rule
parameters 
are set, and 
are observed 
by unions 
and by firms.
Em and Ep 
formed, Wj 
set by each 
union, w 
determined.
Central bank 
sets m.
Firms set prices and the 
goods market clears. 
The price level, output, 
and employment are 
determined.
Rule parameters 
are set, and are 
observed by unions 
and by firms.
Em and Ep 
formed, wj 
set by each 
union, w 
determined.
The central bank sets m , firms 
set prices, and the goods 
market clears. The money 
supply, price level, output, 
and employment are all 
simultaneously determined.
We emphasise that these two scenarios differ only in superficial respects, and in fact 
are equivalent in the sense that, for a given setting of the rule parameter, they will lead 
to the same employment and price level outcomes.
The various timing scenarios have quite different implications in the case of the 
discretionary regime, which involves the central bank setting m either at the same 
time as, or after the determination of w, and with the objective of minimising a 
particular loss function. There are two possibilities for the temporal sequencing of 
events when the regime being considered is discretionary.5 The first has already been
5 Arguably, there is a third possible scenario in which the central bank sets the money supply prior to 
unions setting wages. This scenario, however, would not in general be classified as one o f  discretionary
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discussed by Acocella et al. (2005), and involves the central bank moving 
simultaneously with the determination of the aggregate nominal wage in the 
simultaneous-move game between unions. It is described by the following time-line:
Society delegates 
monetary policy to 
the central bank, 
which is assigned a 
specific objective 
function.
Em and Ep formed. 
Each union sets Wj 
without observing 
either w or m, and w 
is determined. 
Central bank sets m 
without observing w
Firms set prices and the 
goods market clears. 
The price level, output, 
and employment are 
determined.
The key point about this scenario is that each player in the game, when calculating its 
own optimal strategy, treats the strategies o f other players as given, i.e. as beyond its 
influence. We will comment further on this scenario at an appropriate juncture below.
The second scenario is that investigated by Coricelli et al. (2004a, 2006), and will 
be further analysed later in this chapter. In this scenario the central bank’s setting of 
its monetary instrument, m, takes place after the determination o f the aggregate 
nominal wage, w, while w itself is the outcome of simultaneous wage-setting by the 
economy’s n unions. As we shall see, a very important consequence of this temporal 
structure is that the individual non-atomistic union will perceive its wage to have a 
non-negligible influence on the subsequent realisation of the money supply. (If unions 
are atomistic, however, so that strategic considerations play no part in their individual 
wage decisions, the two scenarios turn out to be equivalent.) The time-line for this 
scenario is as follows:
monetary policy, but rather as one o f  credible precommitment by the central bank to a particular setting 
o f the money supply.
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Society delegates 
monetary policy to 
the central bank, 
and assigns it a 
specific objective 
function.
Em and Ep 
formed, Wj 
set by each 
union, w 
determined.
Central bank 
observes w 
and sets m.
Firms set prices 
and the goods 
market clears. 
The price level, 
output, and 
employment are 
determined.
For the discretionary regime, it is important to distinguish between the loss function 
o f the central bank and that of society itself: these two loss functions may differ. In 
accordance with standard practice in the literature the social loss is specified to consist 
of a weighted sum of quadratic terms in deviations in aggregate employment6,
/ = f ltd i , and inflation from their respective socially optimal values:JO
Cl' = ( l - r f  + c 1(x - k ' ) 2 (9)
n
where asterisks denote socially optimal values, n  = p  -  p_x proxies the inflation rate , 
and cs is the relative weight placed by society on inflation deviations from the 
optimum. The most general specification of the loss function assigned by society to
o
the central bank is:
6 The social loss function could alternatively feature a quadratic term in deviations o f  output from its 
socially optimal value. However, provided the socially optimal output level is defined to be consistent 
with the socially optimal employment level (where ‘consistency’ relates to the production technology 
as given by equation (1)), the alternative specification Q* = ( y - y * ) 1 + cs(k  -  k *)2 , y* - a V + B ,  
implies that the conclusions which w ill be drawn from the analysis w ill be identical to those identified 
in the text.
7 ;ris not the log o f  the inflation rate in levels, but rather is the log o f  (1 + inflation rate in levels). 
However, this practice is standard in the literature.
8 The terms ‘central bank’ and ‘central banker’ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. This 
amounts to assuming that the head o f  the central bank has complete control over policy implementation 
at that institution.
46
a £,’ = ( / - / 4)2 + c 6( ^ - ^ ) 2 + 2 c > (10a)
This is the specification adopted by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) in their 
investigation of optimal delegation. It features assigned target values for employment 
( lb) and inflation ( n b), as well as a linear penalty term in inflation, cb being the 
linear contract parameter. For the purposes of this chapter, the delegation parameters 
lb,7rb and c'b can be set to zero without any loss of insight, yielding the simpler
central bank loss function in which the weight cb is the sole delegation parameter:
Q cb= l2 +cb7r2 (10b)
Note that no restriction is placed on the sign of cb . In line with the bulk of the 
literature, we will refer to cases in which cb >cs as a ‘conservative’ central bank, with 
the limiting cb -> °o case corresponding to that of an ‘ultraconservative’. When 
Cb <cs , the central bank is ‘liberal’, and the case in which cb = 0 has variously been
referred to as an ‘ultraliberal’ (Coricelli et al., 2004a), or ‘populist’ (Guzzo and 
Velasco, 1999). Underlying this nomenclature is the literature’s implicit (or, in the 
case of many papers, explicit) assumption that negative values for cb are 
inadmissible. The imposition of a lower bound of zero on the range of values which 
cb can take is not a restriction compelled by logic, however. The non-negativity
restriction is made on the basis of an (usually tacit) intuitive argument that the central 
bank ought not to be modelled as benefiting directly from inflation (or, for that matter, 
deflation) per se. In the discussion which follows, however, considerable insight will 
be gained into the socially optimal delegation arrangements for a discretionary regime 
by allowing the parameter cb potentially to take any value on the real line.9
9 Note that if  cb < 0 the central bank’s isoloss map will lack a bliss point. For the simpler case in which 
lb = nb = c 'b = cl  = 0 , the isoloss map w ill consist o f  hyperbolae, with the isoloss contour representing 
a zero realisation o f  the loss being a degenerate hyperbola (i.e. a pair o f  straight lines which intersect at 
the origin). Commencing from the origin, a movement along the employment axis in either direction 
will give rise to an increase in the loss, while movements away from the origin along the inflation axis 
will render the loss negative. Since for any given employment level a numerically lower value o f  the 
loss always results from a movement in inflation further away from the notional target o f  7tb = 0 , it 
follows that no bliss point exists. A llowing for lb *  0 and Kb 0 does not alter the general character
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On the basis of standard welfare arguments, it is customary in models of this kind to 
assume that the socially optimal employment level is that which would prevail under 
labour-market clearing. Since (8) implies (log) market-clearing employment is zero, it
follows that V = 0 , while for simplicity it is assumed that the socially optimal
*
inflation rate is also zero, so that n* = 0 .10 Following the innocuous normalisation, 
p_i = 0,  the loss functions o f society and of the central bank therefore become:
ns=i2 + csP2 (9')
ncb = i2 + cbp 2 ( i o ' )
The only structural equation in the model which remains to be discussed is the 
union’s objective function. However, since one of the principal purposes of this 
section is to demonstrate the sensitivity o f key results to the specification of this 
objective function, detailed discussion is best deferred until semi-reduced forms for 
the central bank’s setting of m and the resulting realisation of the price level have 
been stated, and it is to the derivation of these expressions that we now turn.
Our assumption of fully flexible prices implies that individual firm prices, and 
consequently the aggregate price level as well, will adjust instantaneously to ensure 
the equality o f aggregate demand with aggregate supply. In order to derive the price 
level as a function of m and w, we therefore initially substitute (6) into (1) and 
integrate over the unit interval in order to express aggregate supply as a function of m,
i
p, and the aggregate nominal wage, w = j w ^ i :
s _ a [ r ( m - p ) - e ( w - p ) ]  n i )
[a + e ( l - a ) \
Equating (11) with (4) and solving for the price level yields:
o f  the isoloss map: rather, it merely alters the location o f the degenerate hyperbola along which the 
central bank’s loss is zero.
10 Although n  is not the log o f  inflation, the adopted normalisation p_x = 0 implies that k " = 0 
corresponds to the assumption o f  a zero desired inflation rate in levels.
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.. r { \ - a ) m  + a w
[a + y ( l - a ) ]
The simple rule prescribes that the money supply be kept fixed by the monetary 
authorities irrespective o f the realised values of other variables. This amounts to 
mt =mr = where t and r denote the time period and the rule respectively, and
m is a constant. Using (12) the semi-reduced form for the price level under the simple 
rule is therefore found to be:
y { \ - a ) m + a w  
[a  + r(1 _ a)] )
The second rule which will be analysed below is the price level rule. The 
normalisation p_x = 0 renders the price level identical to inflation, so this rule is 
exactly equivalent to an inflation targeting rule. Its general form is:11
price t (14)
This rule therefore prescribes a particular monetary response, the sign and magnitude 
of which depends on the value of the parameter rx, to deviations of the price level 
from its socially optimal value of zero. Thus rx is the degree of monetary 
‘accommodation’ o f prices. With this general formulation of the price level rule, 
substitution of (14) into (12) and some rearrangement yields the semi-reduced form:
price level rule aW (15)[a + r Q - a X l - T j l
Substituting (15) into (14) allows the money supply to be expressed as a function of 
the aggregate nominal wage:
11 Note that a still more general form o f  the price level targeting rule would also allow for a potentially 
non-zero constant term, so that m ricelevelrule = i n + r xp . The key result o f  the analysis conducted below,
however, is unaffected by m , and so without any loss o f generality we adopt the normalisation m = 0 
for this rule, yielding (14).
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m =  h   n 6 )
P'M " k [a  + r ( i _ a ) ( i_ r |) ] v '
By a similar procedure we could also derive output as a function of w and model 
parameters. The expression in question, however, is not essential to the task of 
describing the derivation o f our results for the case o f the price level rule, and 
consequently we omit it.
Our third rule is nominal income targeting, which involves the automatic
adjustment of m in response to a deviation in (log) nominal income, y  + p , from its
1 9socially optimal value of zero :
= h ( y  + P) (17)
Substituting (17) into (6), and the resulting expression into (1) to obtain (using (2)) an 
expression for aggregate supply, and equating this with the aggregate demand 
expression obtained after substitution of (17) into (4), allows the semi-reduced form 
for the price level to be obtained for the nominal income rule scenario:
a ( \ - r r 2)w
P N I  rule r / I  \ l[a + y ( l - a - r 2)]
It is useful for this scenario also to state output as a function o f w:
ra ( r2 -  l)w_ _
y N I  rule r / i  M  ^ '[a + r ( l - a - r 2)]
The degree of monetary accommodation of wages under the nominal income rule is 
therefore given by:
12 As in the case o f  the price level rule, a more general specification o f  the nominal income rule would 
allow for a constant term in . However, the explanation given in the footnote relating to equation (14) 
is equally applicable to (18) in that m = 0 can be adopted as an innocuous normalisation.
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( l - y ) a r ?w
™ N 1 rule =  r ' n ------- -— t :
[ a  +  r ( l - a - T 2)]
(20)
The last of our four rules is the employment rule, according to which the money
I n
supply responds to departures of employment from the social optimum (zero). A 
significant difference between this fourth rule and the previous three rules is that 
whereas the others prescribe a particular monetary response to the departure of a 
purely nominal variable from its socially optimal value, in the case of this fourth rule 
the target variable is real:
^em p lo ym en t rule ( ^ 0
By following a similar procedure to that described previously for the case o f the 
nominal income rule, the semi-reduced forms for the price level, output, and the 
money supply are found to be:
[ a + y { i r_ a _ Z})] <22)
= - y a w
y  employment rule r /1 \  )[a + r ( l - a - T , ) ]
yr3w
[a + y ( l - a - T , ) ]
m = _______IH Z   (7d)
employment rule r /1 \ i
It remains to derive counterpart semi-reduced form expressions for the discretionary 
regime. For the purposes o f this section, (10'), the simpler variant of the central bank 
loss function discussed earlier, will suffice. Substituting (12) and the aggregate 
counterpart to (6) into (10 '), the central bank’s loss as a function of m and w is:
13 Note that since in this non-stochastic version o f  the model output is a simple monotonic function o f  
employment, y  = a  I , the employment-targeting rule given by (21) is identical to an output-targeting 
rule, moulpulrvle = r Ay  = r 4a l , so that r3 = r 4a  . Note also that just as in the cases o f  equations (14) and
(17), the implicit normalisation at zero o f  the constant term m does not matter in any way as regards 
this section’s key result.
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Q cb = y 2( m - w f  + c b[ y ( \ - a ) m  + a w ] 2
[a + / ( I - a ) ] 2
(25)
Differentiating with respect to m and solving the central bank’s first-order condition
Substituting (26) into (12) yields the price level under discretion, expressed as a 
function of the aggregate nominal wage:
Having derived the semi-reduced forms for each of the five monetary regimes, we 
now turn to the analysis of union wage-setting behaviour. It is therefore appropriate at 
this juncture to set out the one remaining structural equation of the model, namely the 
objective function o f the representative individual union. One of the two key findings
variants of this objective function are sensitive to its precise specification. In view of 
this, an extensive discussion of its key features is called for.
The general specification of the individual union’s loss function is:
The weight parameters cu and c'u are restricted to be non-negative, cu,c'u > 0 , but 
we impose no such sign restrictions to begin with on the union’s employment 
objective, lu , and real wage objective, wrueal. The imposition of particular restrictions
on the parameters cu, c 'u , lu, and wrueal, yield variants of (28) which have been used
extensively in the literature on monetary policy games. This vein o f literature has 
already been discussed in detail in Chapter I: it therefore suffices here to mention the
dQcb/dm = 0 , the central bank’s optimal setting of m emerges as:
YYldiscretion
[;y - c ba ( \ - a ) ] w  
y[l + cb{ \ - a f ]
(26)
w
(27)(iscretion [l + c„ (l-a )2]
of this chapter will be that many of the results obtained by previous papers which use
(28)
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two papers most closely related to the analysis of this section, namely Coricelli et al. 
(2004a) and Bratsiotis and Martin (1999). By imposing cu = 0 in (28) a specification 
almost identical to that used by Coricelli et al. is obtained:
0 . )= ( lJ - l u? - 2 c : { w r p)  (29)
Coricelli et al.’s union loss function differs from this in one minor and one major 
respect. The minor difference is that a quadratic term in unemployment deviations 
from zero is included, rather than the (/y - l u)2 term of (29). Consequently, setting lu
equal to our model’s market-clearing employment level o f zero would correspond 
exactly to the assumption made by Coricelli et al. Imposing particular values on c'
and lu does not affect the conclusions drawn below regarding the equilibrium when
the union loss function is given by (29). The major difference between (29) and 
Coricelli et al.’s loss function is the absence of a quadratic term in inflation from (29). 
Its omission is justified here since this thesis abstracts entirely from union inflation- 
aversion, while some of Coricelli et al.’s most interesting results are not dependent on 
the presence of an inflation-aversion term in their union loss function.
The key point about (29) is that this specification ensures the union loss is always 
directly decreasing in the real wage, and this is the case regardless of the value 
assigned to the employment objective lu. One important implication of this is that 
given a negatively sloped labour demand curve, further increases in the real wage 
beyond the level which generates labour demand of lu must entail a trade-off, so far
as union welfare is concerned, between the direct beneficial effect o f the real wage 
being higher and the detrimental indirect effect of labour demand being lowered 
below lu, with the former beneficial effect outweighing the latter. The fact that the 
individual union which has (29) for its loss function and which faces a downward- 
sloping labour demand curve is always better off when employment is below lu, and
the concomitant real wage is above that which results in labour demand of /M, implies
that the union will not aim to generate a demand for its labour o f lu when setting its
nominal wage. Consequently, when account is taken of the trade-off between 
employment and the real wage embodied in the labour demand curve, the desired
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employment level, lu, in (29) may be regarded as merely notional, since its attainment
conflicts with the union’s concern to achieve as high a real wage as possible.
A diagrammatic representation of the union’s isoloss map in real wage, employment 
space is helpful at this point. The linear real wage term ensures that at any particular
M
employment level, an increase in the real wage must place the outcome on an isoloss 
contour which represents a (numerically) lower value of the loss, and consequently 
the isoloss map lacks a bliss point. The isoloss contours are parabolas with axis of 
symmetry given by the line /y = lu. The symmetric-wage labour demand curve has
equation /y = - ( w J - p ) / ( \ - a ) ,  and therefore passes through the origin in Figure
II. 1, with the origin being the outcome associated with labour-market clearing.14 The 
diagram assumes lu > 0 , although the same key point would emerge were lu < 0 or
even lu = 0 assumed instead, namely that since the line /y = lu is the axis of symmetry
of the isoloss map, it follows that the tangency point between the map and the 
negatively sloped symmetric-wage labour demand curve must involve an employment 
level which is less than lu . Hence lu may be described as the union’s notional
employment objective which exceeds the employment level which is most desirable 
from the union’s point of view, given the constraint it faces that the employment and 
real wage outcome pair must lie on the symmetric-wage labour demand curve.
To obtain the version of (28) used by Bratsiotis and Martin (1999),15 the parameter 
c'u is restricted to be zero, giving:
n ^ V j - L f  + c ^ j - p - K 01)2 (30)
14 By ‘symmetric-wage labour demand curve’ is meant here the labour demand curve which prevails 
when there is symmetric wage-setting, Wj = w V y , which in turn implies profit-maximising firms will
engage in symmetric price-setting, p t = pVz. The labour demand equation (6) is derived from the 
individual firm’s profit-maximising price and associated output level, without making any assumptions 
regarding the relationship between w. and w, i.e. without assuming that wage-setting is necessarily
symmetric. (In deciding upon its own price p n  firm z treats the aggregate price p  as beyond its 
influence.) Hence equation (7) is not the symmetric-wage labour demand curve faced by union j. 
Further light will be shed on this issue by the discussion o f  the wage-setting equilibrium in the main 
body o f  the text, a few pages further on.
15 More precisely, (30) is the specification o f  the union loss function in the non-stochastic version o f  
Bratsiotis and Martin’s model.
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Figure II. 1
Union/ s isoloss map for the loss function Q]  = (/, -  lu) 2 -  2c' (wy -  p )
Symmetric-wage and aggregate-level labour demand curve
( Wj - p)
(I -  « )
Notes:
1. It is assumed for illustrative purposes that /„ = 0  .
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As is well known, the isoloss map in /y , W j - p  space generated by this specification 
consists of elliptical isoloss contours with axes of symmetry which pass through the 
map’s bliss point located at (lu,w rueal) ,16 It is noteworthy that whereas in the case of
(29) lu is merely notional, in the case of (30), by contrast, lu cannot be described as
notional and is indeed the union’s true desired employment level. A second and 
closely related difference between (29) and (30) is that with (30) an increase in the 
real wage need not necessarily be directly beneficial to the union (where ‘directly’ 
here means that the indirect effect of an increase in the real wage on the loss via the 
induced change in employment is disregarded). These differences between (29) and
(30) imply that, whereas with (29) the individual union will always prefer a real wage 
which is higher than that required to bring about the notional objective o f /u, with
(30) this will only be the case if the bliss point given by (lu,w 'eal) lies above the 
symmetric-wage labour demand curve. In algebraic terms this amounts to 
lu > - w rueal/ ( } - a )  being the case, since the right-hand side of this inequality is the
labour demand which results when wrueal happens to be the real wage. This case in 
which the bliss point is above the labour demand curve is depicted in Figure II.2 
below. If lu < - w rueal / ( } - a ) , the bliss point will be below the labour demand curve 
and hence the tangency point between the demand curve and the isoloss map will 
involve a level o f employment in excess of lu (and a real wage which is less than that
required to induce labour demand of lu). If lu = -  wrueal/{\ -  a ) , the union’s bliss point 
will be located on the labour demand curve, with the important implication that, 
unlike the cases in which lu is either greater or less than -  wruea! /(1 -  a ) ,  the individual 
union, in making its nominal wage decision, does not face a trade-off between moving 
its real wage closer to its notional objective of wrueal and thereby incurring the cost of 
moving its employment further away from the notional objective of lu . In the 
case an appropriate setting of the nominal wage will, given p, 
enable both objectives to be attained simultaneously. For convenience, lu and 
wrueal will be described as being consistent with one another if  they satisfy the equation
16 The eccentricity o f  the ellipses depends on the weight parameter cu .
56
Figure 11.2
Union/ s isoloss map for the loss function Q" = (/; -  lu )2 + c u ( Wj -  p  -  w rueal )2
Bliss point
Symmetric-wage and aggregate-level labour demand curve 
/ = _ ( w J ~  p )
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lu = - w rueal/ ( \ - a ) . As we shall see, the case in which the union’s objectives are
consistent will figure prominently in the results reported below.
Finally, we need to discuss the nature of (28) when both of the weight parameters 
cu and c'u are positive. In this case the isoloss contours are elliptical just as they are in
the c'u = 0 case represented by (30). However, the presence of the linear real wage
term in the general specification given by (28) does create a significant difference 
between its isoloss map and that associated with (30), namely that whereas the bliss 
point for (30) is given by (lu,w rueal) , in the case of (28) the isoloss contours are centred
not on (Iu,w rueal) but rather on the point [lu, (cfu/cv) + w™al), so that whereas lu is 
indeed the desired employment level of the union, its ostensible real wage objective of 
wrueal is merely notional.17 The true desired real wage of the union is (c'u / c u) + w[eal,
and this exceeds wrueaI if  c'u > 0 . Despite this departure of the true bliss point from the 
ostensible bliss point when < > 0  , the general appearance o f the union’s isoloss map 
in this case closely resembles that of the c[ = 0 case. In particular, (28), like (30),
allows for the possibility that the union’s preference parameters may be such as 
to cause the true bliss point to be located on the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve. This will be the case when lu = ~(c'u + cuwrueal)/cu(\ -  a ) , with
lu > (<) — (c'u + cuwrueal)/cu( l -  a)  resulting in the true bliss point being located above
(below) the symmetric-wage labour demand curve.
We are now in a position to derive the macroeconomic equilibrium for each of the 
five monetary regimes. We assume to begin with that each of the n unions has (29) as 
its objective function, and that the labour force is evenly divided between the unions 
(hence each union’s share of the total labour force is 1 /n).  The first regime we will 
consider is the simple rule, according to which the money supply is kept fixed 
regardless of the realised value of the aggregate nominal wage.
17 These facts are elicited by considering the slope o f  one o f  the isoloss contours o f  Q", as given by 
(28). This slope is d l j jd {Wj  - p )  = [c' - c u(Wj -  p - w ”al)]/[(lj - / „ ) ] .  Note that whereas with 
c ' =  0 the union loss evaluated at the bliss point is zero, i.e. £2“ = 0 , with c' > 0 the
I c ' = 0 , !]  = /„ ,  W j  - p  =  w™
union loss evaluated at its true bliss point o f ( /; = lu, Wj -  p  = (c'u/ c u) + w*al ) is negative for all
v /ea/ > 0: Q" = —(c' / c )2 -  2c' w"al. This negative minimum value o f  the union loss
" j  ~ K , w j  ~ p  -  (c» / c« )+w*
is purely a consequence o f  earlier normalisations.
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II.2 W age-Setting under the Simple Rule
II. 2.1 Derivation o f  the Efficient Nominal Wage
Under this rule mr = m, where m is a constant. It is appropriate to begin by
deriving the efficient nominal wage from the collective viewpoint of unions.18 This is
*
the nominal wage which minimises the individual union’s loss, as represented by (29), 
given that every union in the economy abides by this particular wage, regardless of 
whether it is optimal for the individual union to do so. In notation, this amounts to the 
assumption that Wj = w*\/j, where w* is the efficient wage. To derive w*, we
substitute equation (7) for uniony’s demand for labour, together with (13), the price 
level reduced form derived earlier for the simple rule, into (29), in order to yield the 
individual union’s loss as a function of w . and w:19
QU _ f Y[a + g(l ~ a)]m + ( e - y ) a w -  e[a + y(l -  a)]Wj j 2 
J \  [a + £(l-a)][a  + y(l -a ) ]  "J
[y(l - a ) m  +aw]  
[a + y ( l - a ) ]
- 2  f  (31)
The efficient wage, w*, is the wage Wj which minimises (31) subject to the restriction 
that Wj = w \ f j . Since is quadratic in wJ(= w), it follows that w* is the solution to
dw = 0 , and this is found to be:d\ Cl]
Wj  =wVy
w = m +
r )
\a + y(  1 -  a)] [c'u ( ! - « ) - / „ ]  (32a)
Combining this with (13) yields the price level under efficient wage-setting:
18 Throughout the thesis the concept o f  efficiency in wage-setting relates in general to its impact on the 
welfare o f unions, rather than on the welfare o f  society.
19 From this point onward subscripts denoting the type o f monetary regime w ill be omitted in order to 
avoid encumbering the expressions with unnecessary notational appendages.
59
(32b)
Combining (32a), (32b) and (7), allows us to derive the efficient real wage and
*
employment:
This real wage, employment pair is located at the tangency point between union / s 
isoloss map and the aggregate-level labour demand curve in real wage, employment 
space. The aggregate-level labour demand curve is simply that which relates average 
labour demand (across both firms and unions) to the average real wage. Its equation, 
derived in Appendix II.2, is:20
This aggregate-level curve is graphically coincident with, but not identical to, a 
closely related entity which will be referred to as the ‘symmetric-wage labour demand 
curve’. The latter is the set of possible real wage, labour demand outcome pairs when 
wage-setting is symmetric ( Wj = wVy), which in turn implies that price-setting will
also be symmetric ( p (. = pVi).  This means that the symmetric-wage labour demand.
curve is a special case of the aggregate-level labour demand curve, the difference 
between the two being merely that in the case of the aggregate-level curve wage- 
setting may be either symmetric or asymmetric. The equation of the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve, also.derived in Appendix II.2, is:
20 The ‘D ’ superscript denoting ‘demand’ is henceforth dropped. (This notational simplification can be 
made because employment is demand-determined within the model.)
(W -  p)  Ly,„-v, = 0  -  “ ) K  0  -  « ) - 'U (33a)
(33b)
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Symmetric setting of nominal wages by unions will imply particular realisations of
01 *the price level and real wage, with labour demand and employment then being 
determined in accordance with (34a) and (34b). Note that if unions possess a means of 
coordinating their wage decisions, any point on the symmetric-wage labour demand 
curve would then be attainable by them. In particular, (13) implies that were unions to 
coordinate on the wage Wj = -  y ( \ - a ) m / a  , the real wage and employment would be
at their market-clearing values of zero. With the union loss function given by (29), 
however, this outcome would not be pursued by unions since it is not collectively 
optimal: rather, efficient wage-setting requires co-ordination on w*, as given by (32a), 
since as mentioned above this wage, if  adopted by every union, will ensure that the 
outcome in each union’s individual labour market is at the tangency point with the 
isoloss map.
Before proceeding to discuss equilibrium wage-setting it is worthwhile pointing out 
that (33b) reveals efficient employment from the viewpoint of unions to be less than 
their notional employment objective of lu, and that the shortfall of employment below
lu is greater, the higher is c[ , the relative weight placed on the real wage. A second
point which emerges from scrutiny of (33a) is that the efficient real wage is not 
necessarily greater than the market-clearing real wage of zero: this will only be the 
case if  c'u (1 -  a)  > lu . (Coricelli at al.’s (2004a, 2006) assumption that unions care
about unemployment corresponds in our notation to lu = 0 , and this would clearly
imply an efficient real wage in excess of the market-clearing value.)
II. 2.2 Derivation o f  the Equilibrium Nominal Wage 
We now turn to equilibrium wage-setting. As shown by Coricelli at al. (2004a, 
2006) the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which unions all set the same nominal wage 
will be unique in the model being considered here. We therefore proceed to find the
21 This realisation o f  the price level would be given by (13), where w would be the symmetric wage 
(and hence also the average wage).
individual union’s optimal wage, w**, as a function of its rational expectation of the
aggregate nominal wage and structural parameters, and then impose symmetry in 
wages to obtain an equation implicitly defining the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
wage, wNE. The individual union in setting w. regards the other unions’ wage
decisions as given. (Since the model assumes simultaneity of moves across the n 
unions, each union will have to form a rational expectation of the wages chosen by the 
other n - 1 unions, and these wage decisions are beyond union f s  influence.) With 
each union representing the same proportion of the workforce as every other union, 
the aggregate nominal wage can be written as follows:
(35) implies that dwfdwj = \ /n ,  i.e. the contribution made by union j  to the aggregate
wage (defined to be the average wage across unions) is the fraction of the labour force 
constituted by union f  s membership, and because o f the symmetry assumption this is 
simply the inverse of the number of unions. Hence the total derivative with respect to 
Wj of union f s  expected loss is:
where E  is the rational expectations operator and Q “ is given by (31). Substituting the
requisite derivatives into (36), the first-order condition for union f s  optimal wage is 
found to be:
(35)
dEQ“ _ dEQ]
+   ---------
dw ^ dwj ^
dEQ.) f  dw \
(36)
dwj dwj
w fixed
-  2{ya + eA) y[a  + s(\ -  a)]m + ( e -  y )aEw  -  s[a  + y(  1 -  a)]Wj
[a + y(  1 -  a)] [a + e(  1 -  a)} [a + y( 1 -  a )] [a + £(1 -  a)]
(37)
where A = a{n  -1) + ny{  1 -  a ) .
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Solving for wy yields union f s  individually optimal wage, w**:
w, = y[a + s(l -  aj]m + (e -  y)aEw + _ j c'[a + g(l -oQ]A ;
[a + y ( \ - a) ] (ya + sA)
(38)
Given the symmetry across unions and the assumed information structure, union j  will 
appreciate that every other union’s optimal wage will be equal to the right-hand side 
of (38). Hence union f s  rational expectation of w will be its own optimal wage: 
Ew = (l/n^nw**) = w**. Since this is true of every union, and not just o f union j ,
w** = Ew = wNE\/j must be the case, where wNE is the equilibrium nominal wage.
Replacing w** and Ew with wNE in (38) therefore gives an equation which can be
solved for wNE:
wNE=m +— [cc + y(l -a)] lc'u[a + £(l -a)]A
r {ya + sA)
- I (39)
Substituting (39) into (13), the price level under equilibrium wage-setting is:
p\ = m + c'u[a + s ( \ -  a)]A 
{ya + sA)
(40)
It is useful for expositional purposes to state the value taken by wNE in the two
extreme cases of wage-bargaining structure , namely the case of a single economy- 
wide union which has the entire labour force as its membership and the atomistic 
case:
22 Although the model abstracts from wage bargaining between each union and the firm(s) to which it is 
the monopoly supplier o f  labour services, it is convenient to use the phrase ‘wage-bargaining structure’ 
as a synonym for the more cumbersome ‘labour-market supply-side structure’.
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I - + [ « + r ( i - g ) K ( i - « ) - / . i  (41)
ln-1 y
lira
n->°o ^ N E
= _  + [a + yQ- c ‘)] \c’u[a + S( l - a ) ] _ l \  (42)
The effects on wNE o f marginal increases in the number of unions and the degree of 
goods market competition (as represented by ) are given by:
dwm a[a  + y(l -  a)]1 c' [a + g(l -  g ) ] ; Q v  ^  ^ ;
8n (ya + sA)2
(43)
d*NE _ - ( r i - \ ) a [ a  + y ( \ - a ) f c [ A  ;Q w ; ; . t 
y(yor + £/V)2
(44)
Under perfect goods market competition, the nominal wage is found to be:
Using (39), (40) and (34b), the real wage and employment in equilibrium are:
( w - p i  = ( l - g ) { c> .t £ ( 1.- « ) ] A _ / l  (46a)
V  ^ J[ (ya +eh)  "J
= / _ c^[g + g (l-a )]A
Wa® “ (ya + sA)
For the extremes of labour-market structure the real outcomes are:
(47a)
A , = K - < ( ! - « )Iw=yvwj:. n=\ u u v  y (47b)
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The effects of marginal increases in n and s on the real wage are:
d(w -p ) \ ya{ 1 -  a)[a  + y(l -  ct)]c'u [a + £-(1 -  a)] 
(ya  + sA)2
> 0  V w >l (49)
dn
d { w - p )  | -  (« -  l)a ( l -  a)[a  + y(  1 -  a)]c’u [a + s (1 -  a)] 
(ya + sA)2
< 0  V «>1 (50)
ds
II. 2.3 Discussion o f  the Wage-Setting Externality under the Simple Rule 
Examined together, expressions (39) to (50) reveal the presence of an adverse 
externality arising from individual wage-setting decisions when the union loss 
function is given by (29) and monetary policy is conducted according to the simple 
rule. Comparing the equilibrium nominal wage, (39), with its efficient counterpart, 
(32a), it is apparent that apart from in the special cases of a single union (see (41)) or 
a perfectly competitive goods market (see (45)), the equilibrium nominal wage is 
inefficiently high. This shows up as an inefficiently high real wage (compare (46a) 
with (33a)), together with inefficiently low employment (compare (46b) with (33b)). 
The derivatives (43) and (49) reveal the extent of the inefficiency to be increasing in 
the number of unions, with the real wage at its highest and most inefficient under 
atomistic unions (see (48a)). The externality involves a failure by the individual union 
fully to internalise the price level repercussions of its wage decision. In setting its 
wage, union j  will only take into account the impact o f Wj on the aggregate wage,
and hence its impact via (13) on the price level, to the extent that it is perceived to 
affect its own welfare: the impact of Wj on the welfare o f other unions is disregarded.
If unions are atomistic, each union’s wage makes a negligibly small (formally zero) 
contribution to w, and so the individual union sets its wage in the (correct) belief that
its individual wage will not induce any change in the price level. Consequently the 
adverse price level repercussions of aggregated wage decisions do not exercise any 
restraining influence on atomistic unions, with the result that the wage is pushed
union f  s wage are non-negligible mitigates the externality. In the non-atomistic case 
the fact that has a non-negligible influence on p , and hence on aggregate demand
also, induces wage restraint on the part of the union.
To examine this a little more deeply, it is helpful at this point to decompose the 
marginal impact o f union f  s wage, wy, on its labour demand into two effects, one
involving the induced change in the real wage, and one involving the induced change 
in real money balances and hence aggregate demand:
Note that (51) is the total derivative, with respect to wJ9 o f union f  s demand for
labour as given by (7) rather than (34b). Equation (7) states the demand for union/ s 
labour when its employer firms have set their profit-maximising prices, taking the 
aggregate price level as given (i.e. symmetric price-setting by firms, p = /?Vz, has
yet to occur), whereas the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, (34b), assumes 
symmetry o f both wages and prices. The ability of union f  s employer firms to set a 
price or prices which differ from the average price is fundamental to the externality. 
Under monopolistic competition, there is scope for firm V s price to exceed that of its 
competitors without the disparity triggering a complete collapse of the former’s 
product demand, and hence also a collapse in the derived demand for union/  s labour. 
Recognising this, union j  perceives there is scope for its own wage to exceed that set
beyond its efficient value. An inefficiently high nominal wage also arises under
*
multiple non-atomistic unions, but the recognition that the price level repercussions of
where d ( m -  P) (1  ^ d i m -  p)  
dw: v n )  dw
(52)
and d (W j~ p )  ( l \ dP (53)
dwj \ n ) d w
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by other unions. It turns out that were every other union to abide by the efficient 
wage, union j  would make itself better off by setting its wage in excess of the 
efficient wage. While this would occasion some contraction of its labour demand, and 
hence a larger departure of employment from its desired value of lu, the gain in terms
of a higher real wage would more than compensate for this. Alternatively put, the 
trade-off between employment and the real wage is advantageous for union j  if  all 
other unions set the efficient wage. In the simultaneous-move game between the 
unions, of course, every union perceives that its rivals will face this incentive to set a 
wage in excess of the efficient wage. The wage which is consistent with optimising 
behaviour by unions is perfectly foreseen and every union has the incentive to set this 
wage, wNE, despite its manifest collective inefficiency. The greater the degree of
goods-market competition (i.e. the higher is s ) the less scope is there for union f  s 
employer firms to set prices in excess of the efficient wage. This explains why the 
equilibrium real wage is falling in s , as revealed by (50), and why wage-setting is 
efficient when the goods market is perfectly competitive, as revealed by (45). Under 
perfect competition no firm can allow its own price to depart from the average price: 
hence union j  cannot possibly gain from setting a wage in excess of the efficient 
wage.
The total derivative, (51), reveals that there are two channels via which a marginal 
increase in union f  s wage can affect its demand for labour. One of these involves 
(52), the marginal impact of on real money balances, and hence on aggregate
demand, via the induced change in the price level. Coricelli et al. (2004a, p.3) refer to 
this channel, (y/[a + s ( \ - a ) ] \ d ( m - p ) / d \ V j ) ,  as the “aggregate demand channel”.
Note that since ^ i ( / K - p)/dwj  = 0 , this channel is not operative in the atomistic
case. It is also worth noting that under the simple rule which is the immediate context 
of the present discussion, the effect of a marginal increase in wj on real money 
balances is negative, since m is kept fixed and an increase in Wj contributes to 
increase the price level. Under the alternative monetary regimes discussed below, 
however, the monetary response to the aggregate wage may be such as to cause 
d ( m -  p)/d\Vj > 0  rather than d ( m -  p)/d\Vj <0  to be the case. The second of the
two channels through which a marginal increase in Wj influences labour demand
involves the real wage, and it is this real wage channel,
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- ( s ! [ a  + s ( \ - a y ^ d { W j  -p ) /d W j ) ,  which is the source of the externality
irrespective of the monetary regime. The reason why a smaller number of unions 
reduces the severity of the externality has nothing to do with the real wage channel: 
rather, the mitigating effect greater centralisation has on the externality is due to its 
influence on the channel involving aggregate demand.
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium each individual union recognises that its 
counterparts will face the same incentive as itself to exploit the trade-off between real 
wage and employment embodied in (7), and hence to set a particular nominal wage 
which, in the case of the simple rule, exceeds the efficient wage. Every union knows 
the structure of the economy, and therefore knows that symmetric pricing by firms, 
/?, = p \ / i ,  and symmetric wage-setting by unions, Wj = w V /, must ensue. Moreover,
every union recognises that the equilibrium involves a particular nominal wage, wNE,
from which no union has an incentive to deviate, and that the resulting outcome in 
terms of employment and the real wage must lie on the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve, (34b), as opposed to (7), the demand curve which holds in the absence 
of symmetry in prices and wages.
The efficiency of the outcome when there is a single economy-wide union has a 
simple explanation: the ability to set the aggregate nominal wage enables the union, 
by judiciously taking into account the behaviour of the price level, to set the wage 
which will bring about the efficient combination of real wage and employment. In 
other words, efficiency is achieved under a single union because the price level and 
aggregate demand repercussions of the wage which is set at the level of the individual 
firm are fully internalised.
It seems apt to conclude this discussion of the wage-setting externality under the 
simple rule with a diagrammatic representation of its source. To this end we introduce 
the notion of the individual union’s perceived labour demand curve, which is to be 
distinguished from the symmetric-wage labour demand curve which has already been 
discussed. In formulating union f s  perceived labour demand curve it is assumed that 
every other union, apart from union j ,  sets the same nominal wage. Hence were union 
j  also to set that particular wage, symmetric wage-setting would occur and a particular 
outcome on the aggregate-level labour demand curve would be brought about. It 
follows from this that there is an infinite set of perceived labour demand curves. Each 
of these curves is associated with the other (n - 1) unions setting a particular nominal
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wage, and consequently passes through the point on the aggregate-level labour 
demand curve associated with symmetric setting of that nominal wage.
In explaining the externality, only two members of the infinite set of perceived
labour demand curves need be mentioned. The first of these is that which assumes
*
that every other union, apart from union y, does set the efficient wage. Hence were 
union j  also to set the efficient wage, the aggregate wage would be efficient and the 
efficient combination of real wage and employment would be brought about. This 
perceived labour demand curve of union j  must therefore intersect the symmetric- 
wage labour demand curve at the efficient outcome, labelled point “a” in Figure II.3 
below. The perceived labour demand curve’s slope is the trade-off between the 
individual union’s employment and real wage, with all other unions’ nominal wages 
taken as given. Since this trade-off is independent of other unions’ nominal wages, all 
of union j ’s possible perceived labour demand curves have the same slope. The 
equation of the perceived labour demand curve passing through the efficient outcome, 
derived in Appendix II.3, is:
j | _  (»  - ! ) « [ «  +  r(l -  « ) ] [ / .  -  < 0  -  <*)] -  ( r «  +  fA )(w y -  p)
[a + f(l -  a)]A
In interpreting this expression the reader should bear in mind that efficient wage- 
setting by all other unions save j  is assumed, and that (13) therefore implies that the 
price level will be given by:
, ny{ 1 -  a)m + a [ ( n - 1) w* + w , ]
P\ = -------------------------------------- — (55)
n[a + y ( \ - a ) ]
where w* is given by (32a). By taking into account this expression, union j  will, 
given wk = w*\/k * . j , be able to determine a particular realisation of its real wage
together with the associated employment outcome implied by (54). Thus any point on 
the upper perceived labour demand curve depicted in Figure II.3 will be attainable by 
choice of Wj, with the optimal choice that which attains the tangency point between it
and the union’s isoloss map. This point is labelled “6” in Figure II.3, which assumes
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Figure II.3
L abour demand curves under the simple rule
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for simplicity that lu = 0 , so that the axis of symmetry of the isoloss contours
coincides with the horizontal axis.
What is true o f union j  is also true of every other union, of course, and thus all
unions have an incentive to deviate from the efficient wage in an attempt to attain
>
point b. Recognising this, every union realises that the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
wage must be that consistent with the outcome being at point c in Figure II.3, which 
is inefficient in that the real wage is too high and employment too low. Note that the 
second perceived labour demand curve o f particular interest, namely the equilibrium 
perceived labour demand curve which passes through the equilibrium outcome at c, is 
tangent to the union’s isoloss map at that point. Were every other union to set the 
equilibrium wage, union j  could attain any point on the equilibrium perceived labour 
demand curve by setting its wage appropriately. Union/ s optimal strategy, o f course, 
is to set the equilibrium nominal wage, so that it too attains the tangency point 
between the equilibrium perceived labour demand curve and the isoloss map. O f all 
the points on the aggregate-level labour demand curve, therefore, c is unique in that 
the individual union’s perceived labour demand curve is tangent to the union’s isoloss 
map at that point. It is this latter characteristic of c which makes it the unique 
symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome.
Note that the slope of the perceived labour demand curves, and hence the proximity 
of the equilibrium outcome, c, to the efficient outcome, a, is a function o f n and s . 
The slope becomes more negative (i.e. steepens) as e increases (provided n > 1), but 
becomes less negative (i.e. gets flatter) as n increases, as is revealed by the following 
derivatives:24
d[dlj/d(Wj -  p))  -  (n - 1  )a[a  + y(l  -  a)} . Q w ; | . t (56)
ds [a + f ( l - a ) ] 2A
d{dlj/d(wj  -  p))  ra [a  + r ( l - g ) ]
dn [a + * ( l - a ) ] A 2 ’
23 The equation o f  the equilibrium perceived labour demand curve is derived and stated in Appendix
II.3 and differs from (54) only as regards the intercept term.
24 The cross partial derivatives (56) and (57) relate to (54), the equation o f  the perceived labour demand 
curve passing through the efficient outcome.
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The higher the degree of goods market competition, and the lower the number of 
unions, the weaker is the adverse externality and this is reflected diagrammatically by 
a clockwise rotation, as s  increases and n decreases, of the depicted perceived labour 
demand curves about their intersection points with the aggregate-level labour demand 
curve. In the limiting cases of perfect goods-market competition and a single union 
the perceived labour demand curve coincides with the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve, ensuring equilibrium is at the efficient outcome. With /y given by
(54), we have for these extreme cases:
■ ™ 7 = ,I o , - . p )
(1 - a )
The nature of the wage-setting externality has been discussed at considerable length 
because of its importance to the results of the remainder of this chapter and several 
later chapters, and because existing contributions to the literature do not provide a 
detailed description o f its source.25 As we shall see, the externality is essentially the 
same under the alternative monetary regimes which will be discussed shortly. Before 
moving on to these other regimes, however, we conclude our discussion of the simple 
rule by stating the socially optimal setting of the rule parameter m , the fixed value of 
the money stock under the rule. It is apparent from (46a) and (46b) that real outcomes 
are independent of m . Since there is no monetary response to the individual union’s 
setting of its wage, regardless of how large a share of the labour force it represents, it 
follows that m cannot influence the trade-off faced by the union between 
employment and the real wage: union j  need only adjust its nominal wage 
appropriately to take into account the perfectly foreseen contribution o f m to price 
level determination. Hence the socially optimal setting of m , denoted m *, is that 
which minimises inflation, i.e. the departure of p  from zero. From (40) it is apparent 
that m* is:
25 Although Coricelli et al. (2004a, 2006) do not use the word ‘externality’ in the course o f  their papers, 
they are clearly aware o f  its existence, as is revealed by their use o f  the word “internalize” at p. 19 o f  
Section 3.2 o f the longer (2004a) version o f  the paper, when explaining why greater centralisation o f  
wage bargaining leads to a smaller wage premium. Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), who use a close 
variant o f  loss function (30), do not mention ‘externality’ or use the word ‘internalise’ at all.
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Equation (39) reveals that for any given value of m , the effect of the wage-setting 
externality is to push up the nominal wage, which in turn, via (13), increases the price 
level. However, by taking this phenomenon into account, the appropriate setting of 
m neutralises the impact of wages on the price level completely. The social loss
employment from its market-clearing value: using (9 ') , (40), (46b), and (59), it is 
found to be:
II.3 Wage-Setting under the Price Level Rule
11.3.1 Inadmissible Values o f  the Price Level Rule Parameter 
The first of our three rules which involve the money supply being set contingent on 
the realised value of a macroeconomic variable is (14), the price level rule mT = zxp . 
The relevant semi-reduced forms for this rule are equations (15) and (16). Note that 
this rule captures the simple rule as a special case, namely the r, = 0 case. A second 
special case encompassed by (14) is that in which monetary policy is devoted 
exclusively to preventing departures of p  from its socially optimal value of zero: this 
special case is the limiting xx -> ±oocase, and we will refer to it below as the strict 
price level rule. Note that Soskice and Iversen, in analysing the macroeconomic 
consequences of a rule of the form (14), impose an arbitrary restriction on the rule 
parameter , namely that it must only take a value in the unit interval, 0 < < 1.
There is, however, no economic reason to justify such a restriction (nor is one 
provided by Soskice and Iversen), and in this section we will assume that zx .may take 
almost any value on the real line. The very few values which are not admissible 
will be discussed when appropriate during the course of the exposition. One such 
inadmissible value of r, is immediately apparent from scrutiny of (15), however,
under the socially optimal simple rule therefore solely consists of the deviation of
(60)
since the price level will not be defined when xx = [a + y(l -  a )]/y(1 -  a ) . The reason 
for this is that when xx has this value a non-zero realisation o f the aggregate nominal 
wage implies there is no finite price level which can equate aggregate supply with 
aggregate demand. Hence goods-market clearing can only occur if  w; = 0Vz when
r l = [a + y{ 1 -  a)] /y (  1 ~ a ) • Furthermore, even if = 0V/ when xx has this value, so
that the goods market does clear, that market-clearing may occur at any price, since 
there is nothing to pin down a particular market-clearing price in this situation. Hence 
p  is indeterminate when xx -  \a + y ( l -  a ) ] / y ( \ - a ) , irrespective of the value wages 
take.
II. 3.2 Efficient Wage-Setting under the Price Level Rule 
The efficient nominal wage under the price level rule is obtained by following an 
analogous procedure to that described earlier for the case of the simple rule, save that 
now account must be taken of how w influences real outcomes via the induced 
monetary response to the price level. This wage is found to be:
. [g + yQ-aXl-r, )][<(!-«)-/.]  
r O - * i )
Using (61) in conjunction with (15) and (35), the efficient real wage and employment 
are found to be given by (33a) and (33b), the same as the efficient outcomes under the 
simple rule. This is not surprising: if the individual wage is set taking full account of 
how wages in the aggregate induce a particular monetary response, and thus 
contribute to determine the price level, real money balances, and aggregate demand, 
the best feasible outcome can almost always be brought about by means of 
coordinated wage-setting, irrespective of the monetary regime’s characteristics.
26 Aggregate supply and aggregate demand in this situation are given by:
r n » /„  = [ « / 0 - « ) ] [ p - W 1" « ) +  ^ 0 -« ) ] } ]»  and ^ I  . n ,./n  = a p / ( \ - a ) .
I r ,=  [ a + r O - a O l / r O - a )  l r , =  [ c t + y Q - a ) ] / y ( \ - a )
It is straightforward to show that y 5 = y D is only possible when r, = [a  + y{  1 - a ) \ / y {  1 - a )  if  w = 0
is the case, and that i f  w  = 0 is the case then any p  will equate y s with y D .
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The reason for the qualifying phrase “almost always” in the previous sentence is
that there are two specific. t x values which deprive fully coordinated wage-setting of
the ability to bring about the efficient wage. The first o f these is
T\ = [a + y ( l - a ) ] / y ( l - a ) , which, as we saw above, renders the price level
>
indeterminate. Equation (61) therefore cannot be evaluated for this value of rx, since 
it has been derived on the assumption that xx * [a + y(l -  a)]/y(  1 -  a)  .27 The second 
tx value which precludes efficient wage-setting is tx = 1. It is apparent from (61) and
(15) that the efficient nominal wage and consequently the price level also, are 
undefined when r, = 1. The explanation for this is that when xx = l ,  coordinated 
wage-setting on any wage will necessarily induce a price level realisation which is 
equal to that wage. In other words, when xx = 1, and wage-setting is symmetric, 
Wj = wV/, profit-maximising behaviour by firms brings about a price which ensures
9 Rthat the real wage is zero. Since attempts to bring about the efficient real wage are 
therefore futile when r , = l ,  it is hardly surprising that (61) reveals w* to be 
undefined when xx =\ .
II. 3.3 Equilibrium Wage-Setting under the Price Level Rule
II.3.3 .(i) Derivation of Equilibrium Expressions 
Following procedures analogous to those described for the simple rule allows us to 
derive the equilibrium nominal wage under the price level rule:
27 Note that while (15) implies that the real wage under the price level rule is given by 
w -  p  = y(  1 - a) {  1 -  r x) w / [ a  + y{\  - a ) {  1 - r , ) ] , substituting w * as given by (61) into this expression to 
obtain (33a) is an invalid procedure when r, = [a + y{\  -  a ) ] / y { [  -  a ) , since it involves the division o f  
an expression by zero.
28 Using (A.II.1.7) once again, firm V s profit-maximising price when r , = l  is: 
p*\ = f ( l  -  a ) p  + a  w j  [a + f ( l  -  a ) ] , and consequently with symmetric wage-setting, = w V i,
l r ,=  1
the single market-clearing price will be p t = p  = w . Note also that when r, = 1, real money balances, 
and hence aggregate demand also, are always zero, regardless o f  the aggregate wage, w.  Since 
aggregate supply is jyq = -  a s  (w -  p ) /  [a + £(1 -  a ) ] , it follows that the price level must adjust to
l r , =  l
ensure that the aggregate real wage is zero.
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W NE =
,)
c '[a  + £(1 -  a)] [A -  ny(  1 -  a ) z x\ 
{ya + s A -  y[a + ns{ 1 -  a)]zx)
(62)
The associated realisation of the price level is (using (15)):
a
r (  I - * , )
c'u\a  + s ( l -  a )] [A - n y ( l -  a)  r, ] 
{ya + s A -  y[a + ns{ 1 -  a)]zx)}
(63)
In the extreme cases of a single union and atomistic unions, (62) becomes:
w [a + r  (1 -  oQ(l -  T,)] [<  (1 ~ g)  - 1J  
r (  l - r , ) (64)
r Q - r i)
c :[a  + £ ( l - a ) ]
(65)
The equilibrium nominal wage when the goods market is perfectly competitive is:
iim ... [a + r ( l - a ) 0 - O ] K ( l - a W J
e - > * W NE ~
r ( i - i ' i )
(66)
Note that the right-hand side of (66) is identical to the right-hand sides of (64) and 
(61). We shall comment further on this below. Combining (62) and (63), the 
equilibrium real wage under the price level rule is:
(W~P) L ,
cl [a + g(l -  a)] [A -  ny{\ - a ) z x] 
{ya + sA -  y[a + ns{  1 -  a)]zx}
(67a)
The associated equilibrium employment level is found, using (34b) to be:
l \ = lulw = V t “
c'u [a + £(1 -  a )] [A -  ny{ 1 -  a ) z x ] 
{ya + s A -  y[a + ns{ 1 -  a){zx}
(67b)
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II.3.3 .(ii) Discussion o f Equilibrium Outcomes under the Price Level Rule
A number o f interesting points can be made with regard to (67a) and (67b). The first 
thing to notice is that setting t ] equal to zero in (67a) and (67b) yields 
(46a) and (46b), the counterpart equilibrium expressions for the simple rule. This is 
unremarkable, but comparison of (67a) with (46a) for rx ^  0 elicits a much more 
interesting point, namely that whereas equilibrium outcomes are invariant to the 
constant term in the rule, m , regardless of the number of unions, the value taken by 
r , , the rule parameter which governs the response of the money supply to the price 
level, does matter for equilibrium outcomes. The sole exceptions to this are the two 
extremes of labour-market structure, namely a single union and the case of atomistic 
unions: evaluating (67a) at n = 1 yields (33a), the efficient real wage, while taking the 
limit of (67a) as n —» oo yields (48a), the real wage outcome under the simple rule 
when unions are atomistic. This finding that r, is irrelevant to real outcomes in these 
extreme cases has an immediate implication: if n = 1 or unions are atomistic, a strict 
price level rule ( r, -> ± o o )  must be socially optimal.
The inability of the rule parameter to influence real outcomes when n = 1 has a 
straightforward explanation. A single union has the incentive to take full account of 
the monetary response and price level repercussions o f its wage choice, and the 
complete internalisation of these macroeconomic repercussions ensures that the 
efficient real wage will always be achieved when n = 1, regardless of ,29 In the 
atomistic case, each individual union disregards the negligibly small contribution its 
wage makes to inducing a monetary response, and hence the response parameter rx 
cannot influence wage-setting behaviour in any way other than through the individual 
union’s rational expectation of the price level. Put alternatively, real outcomes are 
invariant to rx in the atomistic case since there is no internalisation whatsoever of the 
monetary response repercussions of individual wage decisions. For intermediate 
values of n, such that 1 < n < o o , however, some (albeit incomplete) internalisation of 
these repercussions does occur, and the very fact that the internalisation is partial 
creates an opportunity for the rule parameter xx to influence real outcomes.
29 Provided, o f  course, that r, does not take one o f the two values discussed earlier which result in an 
indeterminate price level, namely r, =1 and r, = [ a +  y { \ - a ) \ l y { \ - a ) .
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Underpinning this finding is the wage-setting externality which was
comprehensively discussed in our earlier section on the simple rule. Comparison of
(67a) with (33 a) reveals that the adverse externality also arises under the price level
rule, provided o f course n > 1. We have already established in the previous paragraph
/
that in the atomistic case the externality has exactly the same severity under the price 
level rule as under the simple rule. However, for 1 <n  <oo the externality’s strength 
and direction (where by ‘direction’ is meant whether the resulting real wage is greater 
than or less than the efficient wage) is subtly dependent on zx . This contrasts sharply 
with the simple rule, where the externality is independent of m and always manifests 
itself as an inefficiently high real wage, with the inefficiency declining in s  and 
increasing in n in a straightforward way. If zx ^  0 , however, the externality can, 
depending on the value of zx, operate in such a way as to cause the equilibrium real 
wage to be inefficiently low, so that equilibrium employment exceeds the efficient 
level.
To be more specific about this, (67a) tells us that an inefficiently low 
real wage, i.e. ( w - p ) \ w_w < { w - p ) \w=w.,  will result if  zx is in the range
([ya + eA)/y[a + ns(  1 -  a)] <zx < [a + y(l -  a)]/y{  1 - a ) .  If zx lies outside this 
interval, so that zx <(ya  + eA)/y[a + n s ( l - a ) ]  or zx >[or + / ( l - « ) ] / y ( l - « ) ,  a 
result akin to that of the simple-rule case arises, namely an inefficiently high real 
wage.
Scrutiny of (67a) is informative not only because it reveals which zx values can 
result in an inefficiently low or high real wage, however, but also because it tells us 
that certain specific values of zx give rise to particularly interesting outcomes:
(i) A strict price level rule is revealed by (67b) to outperform the simple rule as 
regards its employment outcome, both from the point of view of unions and from the 
point of view of the social loss function (9 '). Formally, we have using (67b):
iim Z| =l nc'u( l - a ) [ a  + e ( l - a ) \
r , - ± »  L =Wne * +  n £ Q  _ a ^
78
From comparing (68) with (46b) it is evident that equilibrium employment under the 
strict price level rule is closer to both its efficient level, as given by (33b), and the 
market-clearing level of zero, than is equilibrium employment under the simple rule. 
Hence the wage-setting externality under the strict price level rule is less detrimental 
as regards real outcomes than is the simple rule. Unsurprisingly, (63) reveals that the 
strict price level rule also ensures the price level attains its socially optimal value of 
zero. It follows that the social loss, as given by (9 '), must be lower under the strict 
price level rule than under the simple rule. This finding is closely related to that of 
Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), who, using a variant of loss function (30) rather than 
(29), also find that in the absence of stochastic shocks a strict price level rule 
outperforms a simple rule. As we shall see, however, it remains to be investigated 
whether there is some less-than-strict price level rule (i.e. some finite non-zero zx) 
which can outperform the strict price level rule in the non-stochastic version of 
Bratsiotis and M artin’s model.
(ii) It was established above that two particular zx values, namely zx = 1 and 
r, = [a  + y ( l - « ) ] / / ( l - c r ) ,  are inadmissible since they result in an undefined price
O A
level and nominal wage. Strictly speaking, therefore, these two values must be 
excluded from the domain o f the equilibrium real wage, considered as a function of 
zx, and the same is true o f equilibrium employment. It is apparent from (67a), 
however, that the limiting value of the equilibrium real wage as zx approaches unity is 
its value when unions are atomistic, while its limiting value as zx approaches 
[a + y(  1 -  a)] /y(  1 -  a)  is the efficient real wage (alternatively, its value when there is 
a single union):
~ c[[a + e ( \ - a ) ]
p)
-~W N E
= ( ! - « ) (69)
>-«)(w "  P )   = (1 ~ (1 -  a )  -  /„]w=wNE (70)
30 It is not immediately obvious from (63) that the price level under equilibrium wage-setting is 
undefined when r, = [ a  + y ( \ - a ) ] / y ( l - a ) . Recall, however, that (63) has been derived on the 
assumption that r, *  [a  + / ( l  -  a)]/y{\ .  -  a ) .
19
As we shall see, there is a sound economic explanation for this pair of results: it will 
be demonstrated below that these limiting rx values cause the trade-off between real 
wage and employment faced by the individual non-atomistic union to equal the trade­
off which is faced under either one of the extremes of wage-bargaining structure.
/
(iii) (67a) and (67b) reveal the existence of a third inadmissible value for tx when 
1 < n < oo, namely f, = (ya + fiA)/y[a + ns(\ -  a ) ] . Note that whereas xx = 1 and 
r l = [a + y(l  -  a)] /y(  1 -  a )  are inadmissible values for the rule parameter for all n, i x 
is admissible when n = 1 and in the limiting n - » co case, and is inadmissible only for 
1 < n < go . This is because the explanation for why t] = i x results in both the 
equilibrium nominal wage and the price level, as given by (62) and (63), being 
undefined, involves the effect this setting has on the perceived real wage- 
employment trade-off faced by multiple non-atomistic unions. A proper explanation 
of this result requires an investigation of how rx influences a non-atomistic union’s 
perceived trade-off, and this will be provided below.
(iv) The most remarkable result implied by expressions (67a) and (67b), however, is 
the following: there exists a value for tx which, provided 1 < n < oo, results in the 
equilibrium real wage and employment attaining their market-clearing values (of 
zero). This xx value will be denoted r *. Simply by setting (67a) or (67b) equal to zero 
and solving for rx, it is found to be:
For the simpler case in which lu = 0 , which will be referred to frequently below, r,*
(71)
is:
A
(71')
/„=° n y ( \ - a )
i
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Furthermore, (62) and (63) both reveal that the equilibrium nominal wage and price 
level are, provided 1 < n < oo, both equal to zero when rx = rx. With employment and 
the price level at their socially optimal values of zero, it follows that the social loss 
when rx - x \  is also zero. Because it achieves the first-best outcome (society’s bliss 
point in employment, inflation space) the rule mr = rxp  must also be time-consistent 
and fully credible.
Before proceeding to provide an economic explanation for this key result, there are 
several aspects of it which call for comment. The first thing to point out is that r*x 
does satisfy the first-order condition for the socially optimal tx, namely
d Q s 'drx = 0 ,  it nevertheless does not satisfy the equation dl\wmw j d t x=Q.
Secondly, considerable insight into the result can be gained from examining the 
relationship between equilibrium employment and the rule parameter.
II.3.3.(iii)Equilibrium Employment as a Function of rx 
It is straightforward to show that for all admissible values of xx, equilibrium 
employment is falling in tx, provided 1 < n < co :
81l „ „  - ( n - \ ) y a 2c[ [g + g ( l - g ) ]  . 0 w ; i . 1 (?2)
drx {ya + £ h - y [ a  + n£ ( \ -a )]Tx}2
Note that for the case o f a strict price level rule we have (d/|w_w j d r x )=  0 , while
from (67b) it is clear that /! , is a discontinuous function of r , , with the
discontinuity occurring at rx = r x.31
The graph o f this function is depicted below as Figure II.4, which assumes that 
lu < c'u (1 -  a ) , so that z\ lies in the interval rx < t * <[a + y(  1 -  a)] /y(  1 -  a ) . (Note 
that the most obvious case to consider, that in which each union’s notional desired 
employment level is the market-clearing level, so that lu = 0 , is one case which
31 Note that d/I _ /d r , , as given by (73), is also undefined at r, = f , .
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satisfies the lu < c'u( l - a )  inequality, and therefore would be encompassed by Figure 
II.4.) Although the graph gives the appearance of equilibrium employment being a 
continuous function o f r, in the vicinity of r, = 1 and tx = [a + y(l -  a )] /y(\ -  a ) ,  this 
is not in fact the case. For the reasons given earlier, the function is discontinuous at 
these values, although its value in the limit as rx -> 1 can be seen from the graph to be 
the employment outcome which arises under atomistic unions, while its value in the 
Tj -> [a + ^ ( l - « ) ] / r ( l - a )  limiting case is shown by the graph to be the efficient 
outcome. Figure II.4 clearly reveals that for the set of cases in which lu < c'u (1 - a ) , if 
rx is such that t x < t x < tx , equilibrium employment exceeds the market-clearing 
level (zero), while if  rx < r, <[a + y ( l - a ) ] / / ( l - a )  equilibrium employment is 
inefficiently high from the point of view of unions. Equilibrium employment is too 
low for both unions and society when either rx < tx or [a + y(l -  a ) \ j y ( \  - a ) < r x is 
the case. (Although Figure II.4 relates to cases in which lu < c ' ( l - a ) , it should be 
noted that the function’s graph has much the same appearance for cases in which 
lu > c' (1 -  a ) . Regardless of the value taken by lu, the function always has a
discontinuity at r, = i x, is always concave (from below) for rx < tx, and is always 
convex (from below) for rx > tx .)
II.3.3.(iv) Economic Explanation for the Key Results
The key results reported above can be explained in terms o f the influence exerted by 
the rule parameter t x on the trade-off between real wage and employment faced by 
the individual non-atomistic union when setting its nominal wage simultaneously with 
other unions. As in the case o f the simple rule, the marginal effect of uniony’s wage 
on its employment outcome, with every other union’s wage choice treated as given, 
involves two channels, namely the real wage channel and the aggregate demand 
channel, with the latter involving an induced change in real money balances. Under 
the simple rule, the absence o f a monetary response to the contribution made by wy to 
the aggregate wage, w, and hence to p  also, means that the effect of a marginal 
increase in Wj on the real wage is positive, while its effect on real money balances is
negative. As previously discussed, union f  s labour demand equation, (7), therefore
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Figure II.4
Equilibrium employment as a function of the price level rule param eter
r
/
>  -
Notes:
1. It is assumed that 1 < n  < oo and that lu < c'u (1 -  a ) . (The latter assum ption is innocuous.)
n . _  (ya + sA)Z% T | =
y[a + k i e { \  -  a)]
♦ r n c'u [a + e (1 -  a ) ]A  -  (ya + sA)lu
r l =
J j -  a)[a + e (  1 -  a ) ] - [ a  + n s ( \  -  a)]lu j
4. l\w_w is undefined when r t = 1 and r, = [a + y(\ - c r ) ] /y ( l - a ) .
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implies that under the simple rule union j ,  by increasing its nominal wage, can obtain 
a higher real wage in return for lower employment occasioned both by the higher real 
wage itself, and (if n < oo) by the reduction in aggregate demand caused by the 
increase in Wj . The trade-off between real wage and employment associated with a
marginal increase in w . is therefore unambiguously inverse in nature under the simple
rule, and this trade-off is more favourable to union j  the larger is n and the lower is s . 
As will become apparent below, when xx ^  0 , so that the money supply is not kept 
fixed but is responsive to p  (and hence to w), union / s  trade-off may, depending on 
xx, be such that a marginal adjustment in Wj can increase both its real wage and its
employment. Thus whereas under the simple rule the individual union’s perceived 
labour demand curve is negatively sloped, this is not necessarily the case under the 
price level rule: certain settings of xx can cause this curve to be positively sloped. 
These considerations will play a central role in the economic interpretations provided 
below of our key results.
The marginal effect o f Wj on non-atomistic union f  s real wage, W j - p , can itself be
decomposed into the direct effect of an increase in Wj and an indirect effect working 
via the induced change in p . This indirect effect involves a causal chain whereby Wj 
contributes to determine w, and w in turn contributes to the simultaneous 
determination o f m and p.  Denoting the full marginal effect of Wj on Wj -  p  by
d(Wj -  p ) / d w j , we therefore have:
where dw/ dwj = \ / n .
Clearly, the direct effect is always equal to unity regardless of xx. The indirect 
effect, by contrast, can be positive, or negative (or zero), and depends on both xx and 
n. xl is central to the strength and sign of the indirect effect, since it is this degree of 
monetary accommodation of prices which determines whether the price level 
increases or decreases in response to a marginal change in the aggregate nominal 
wage w. Using (15) it is apparent that:
d ( W j - p )
dwj
dp dw 
dw ^ dwj j
(73)
D irect Effect Indirect Effect
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dP a --P [« + K 1 _ «)] in a \—  > 0 if x, <  -----— — (74a)
d w  1 r ( l ~ c t )
lim
. Ja+x( 1-a)] £ ) = "  (74b)
—  < 0 if z\ > ±----- —------— (74c)
dw 1 y(l -  a)
f
lim
T .  —>±00
dp_
\  dw j
= 0 (74d)
Equations (15) and (73) together imply:
d(w, -  p)  , a
dwj n[a + y(l -  a)(  1 -  xx)]
^  v  " ^  v  ^
Direct EfiFect Indirect Effect
(75)
Whether the direct effect outweighs, or is outweighed by, or works in the same 
direction as the indirect effect, and hence whether a marginal increase in w . occasions
an increase or a decrease in W j - p ,  depends on r] and n. Specifically, we have:
d { w j - p ) A [a + ^ l - a ) ]  _
  ^ > 0  if r, < ------------  or r, > 1----- —------— (76a)
dwj n y ( \ - a )  y(l - a )
d ( w , - p ) A
- - - J- -~ J =0  if  r . = -----   (76b)
dwj ny(\ -  a)
d { w j - p )  A [a + y ( l - a ) ]
 1--------< 0  if  < r, <  ----- —------ — (76c)
dwj n y ( \ - a )  y ( \ - a )
lim d j w j - p )
1 y ( l - a )  U W j
= -oo (76d)
(76c) indicates there is a range of r, values which cause the indirect effect of a 
marginal change in w . working through w and p  to outweigh the direct effect, so that 
a fall in union f  s real wage results when Wj is marginally increased. We know from 
(74a) that when xx is in the range stated above in (76c) a marginal increase in wj will,
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with other unions’ wages taken as given, cause an increase in the price level. 
Furthermore, when r l is in this range the eroding effect of this price level increase on 
union f s  real wage exceeds the augmenting impact of the marginal increase in Wj
itself. In other words, the direct effect is outweighed by the indirect effect working 
against it. When zx < A/ny( l  -  a ) , the indirect effect is the weaker of the two, so that 
a marginal increase in w . causes an increase in the real wage, while rx = A /ny( l  -  a )
is the special case in which the opposing direct and indirect effects precisely cancel. 
From (74c) we know that when the monetary rule is sufficiently accommodating 
(specifically, when rx > [a + y(l -  a)]/y(  1 -  a ) ), a marginal increase in Wj will
occasion a fall in the price level, so that the indirect effect is not counteracting the 
direct effect but on the contrary is augmenting it. Unsurprisingly, (76a) indicates that 
the marginal effect o f an increase in w} on w. -  p  is positive when
r, > [a + /(1 - a)] /r (  1 - a ) . 32
A  final noteworthy aspect of this analysis of the marginal effect of Wj on union f s  
real wage is that the r, value which happens to ensure that d{wj - p ) / d w J = 0 , 
namely rx = A/ny{  1 -  a ) , turns out, when lu = 0 , to be r *, the socially optimal ty 
value which brings about labour-market clearing, as can be seen from equation (71'). 
We shall have occasion to refer to this result again shortly.
We now turn to analyse similarly the marginal effect o f Wj on real money balances,
which will be denoted here by d { m -  p ) / d w j , where m is given by (14), i.e. 
m = rxp  . Using (15) and (16), we have:
d { m - p )  = a{  1 -  r,)
dwj n[a + y (1 -  a)(  1 -  r ,)]
Clearly, the marginal effect of w. on real money balances is smaller, in absolute
terms, the larger is n, and is zero in the case of atomistic unions. Scrutiny o f (77) 
reveals that for a non-atomistic union:
32 Result (76d) is attributable to the fact that the price level is undefined when 
r, = [ a  + y(l  - c t ) \ / y ( \  - a ) .
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d{m -  p) [a + /(1 - a ) ]
— ----- —  < 0 if  r, < 1 or r, >  -----—------ — (78a)
dwj 1 1 r ( l - a )
= 0 (78b)
dWj
0 i f ’ l < r | < t o ( .l r .a )J (78c)
<Avy r ( l - a )
lim d { m - p )
.lz±r!h2)l ^
y ( l - a )
= oo (78d)
The explanation for these results is straightforward, since the marginal effect of w . on 
(m -  p)  can be expressed as follows:
d ( m - p )  _ (t, -1 ) dp 
dwj n dw
where the sign o f dp/'dw depends on xx , as previously analysed in expressions (74a) 
to (74d). This expression shows clearly that the influence of a marginal increase in Wj
on real money balances, with all other unions’ wages taken as given, depends on the 
interaction of the resulting change in the price level (which depends o f course on r , ) 
with the induced movement in the money supply in response to that price level 
change. When xx < 1 the rule is such that a wage increase leads to an increase in the 
price level, and the monetary response to the price level increase is insufficient to 
prevent a reduction in real money balances. In the limiting xx —»1 case, the rule 
operates to keep real money balances equal to a fixed value regardless o f price level 
movements, and hence the marginal effect (78b) is also zero. In the case represented 
by (78c) the rule parameter is still within the range of values which result in 
dp/dw >0,  but the monetary response to the increase in p  caused by an increase in w 
is positive and sufficiently elastic to ensure that the price level increase is 
accompanied by an increase in, rather than a reduction of, real money balances. If 
x} > [a + y {1 - cl) \ /y ( 1 - a ) ,  a marginal increase in w. leads to a fall in the price level,
33 In order to provide an intuitive explanation, m has been envisaged here as responding to p.  Within 
the model, o f  course, m and p  are simultaneously determined.
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while the rule here prescribes a monetary response of the same sign as the price level 
movement. The price level fall occasioned by a marginal increase in w . therefore
induces a contraction of the money supply, and the latter is strong enough to ensure 
that real money balances fall, despite the fall in the price level.
Next, we consider how the marginal effect of on w . -  p  and m -  p  combine to
determine the impact of a marginal increase in w. on union f s  employment. Using
(7) together with our assumption of demand-determined employment, we have:
dl. 1
7
d ( m -  p )  d { W j - p )
dw;
- e
dW;
(80)
It is apparent that the sign of dlj/dwj  will depend upon how the aggregate demand 
channel, (yj[a + e ( l - a y ^ d { m - p ) j d w j ) ,  compares with the real wage channel, 
- { s f a  £ { l - a y ^ d { W j - p ) / d w j ) .  Using (75), (77) and (80) we have:
dlj _ { - ( j a  + £K) + y[a + n £ ( [ - a ) \ T x} 
dwf n [a  + £ ( 1 -  a)] [a + -T j ) ]
(81)
This expression implies that: 34
d l  a [a + y ( l - a ) ]— — < 0  if r,-< r, or t, >  -----—------—
dw, '
dl
dw.
J _ 0 if zl -  fj
0 if  f , < r , < [a  + y(1- g)]
dw. r (  i - « )
lim £ i
dw.
=  00
(82a)
(82b)
(82c)
(82d)
34 Note that f, = ( ya + s A ) / y [ a  + n s { \ . - a ) \
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Result (82a) is attributable to the fact that when tx satisfies one o f these two 
inequalities, it is either the case that the aggregate demand and real wage channels are 
both negative, or if  the former is non-negative, the latter is sufficiently negative to 
outweigh it. In other words, if tx < rx or r, > [a + y(\  -  a)]/y(\  - a ) ,  a marginal
k
increase in both increases the real wage and leads to a fall in labour demand, 
irrespective of whether the Wj increase causes aggregate demand also to fall (which is 
the case when rx < 1 or r, > [a + y(l -  a)]/y(\  -  a)  ), or to increase (which is the case 
when 1 < zx < f j ). When rx -  rx the aggregate demand channel is positive and has 
exactly the same absolute value as the negative real wage channel, so that the net 
effect on union f s  employment of a marginal increase in its wage is zero: hence result 
(82b). The result stated in (82c) is attributable to the aggregate demand channel being 
positive for the stated range of rx values, with the real wage channel either negative 
but insufficiently strong to outweigh it (which is the case when f, < tx < A / n y ( l - a ) ) ,  
or positive and hence working in the same direction as the aggregate demand channel 
(the case when A /ny  (1 -  a)  < r, < [a + y( 1 -  a)]/y(  1 -  a ) ). The fact that p  is undefined 
when rx = [a  + y ( l - a ) ] / y ( l - a )  underlies (82d). Table II. 1 summarises how the 
relative strength and sign of the aggregate demand and real wage channels determine 
the sign of d l j / d w j , and also indicates the sign of dlj/d(Wj -  p ) , to the discussion of
which we now turn.
Union f s  perceived trad eo ff between its employment and real wage as a result of 
marginal increases in its nominal wage is given by J /y/J (w y -  p ) , and this is also the
slope o f union f s  perceived labour demand curve. Using (75) and (80), together with 
the fact that dljjdiyVj -  p)  = (dlj /dwJ)/[d(wj -  p)/dwj) ,  this trade-off is found to be:
dh  = { - ( / a  + gA) + y[a + ns(  1 -  a)] tx}
d ( W j - p )  [a + f ( l - a ) ] [ A - « y ( l - c i ') r 1]
It is apparent from (83) that:
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< 0 if t, < f, or r, >
A (84a)
n y ( l - a )
= 0 if r, = f, (84b)
> 0 if f, < r, < A (84c)
ny(  1 -  or)
-  p)
=  00
« /( l - o r )
(84d)
Results (84a) to (84d) relating to the sign of union f  s perceived trade-off are 
unaffected by the value of lu . Because the economic explanation for why t*  induces 
non-atomistic unions to set the market-clearing nominal wage is straightforward when 
lu = 0 , we will focus here on this case, and the not particularly interesting
complications which arise when lu ^  0 will be dealt with briefly later. Expressions 
(84a) to (84d) reveal that when n>  1, the slope of the perceived labour demand curve 
of a non-atomistic union can, by appropriate choice o f r, be assigned almost any 
value, whether positive, negative, or zero. The sole exceptions are the slopes 
associated with the two r, values which render the price level indeterminate, and 
which are therefore inadmissible, namely r, =1 and zx = [a + y(l -  a)] /y(l -  a ) . To 
appreciate the influence of t ] on the perceived trade-off it is instructive to note that, 
firstly, the trade-off which arises under strict price level targeting (the limiting 
Tj —» ±oo cases) is steeper (more negative) than that faced by an atomistic union, and 
secondly, an increase in rx causes the perceived labour demand curve to rotate in an 
anticlockwise direction:
The right-hand side of (85) is strictly positive for all finite n > 1. Thus as rx increases 
from negative values the perceived labour demand curve rotates anticlockwise,
d[d! j/d(Wj-p)]  ^ _________ ( n - l ) y a 2
dxx [cx + f ( l — cc)] [A — ny(\  — oc)tx ]
(85)
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assumes the slope associated with the simple rule when r, = 0, and approaches the 
atomistic union’s perceived labour demand curve as r, approaches unity from below. 
Formally we find that:
lim 
r. ->1
dlj
d ( w , - p )
* (86)
[a + s (1 -  a)]
The economic explanation for this result is that in the limit as xx —> 1, real money 
balances are constant and independent of w. Hence the aggregate demand channel 
becomes irrelevant to the non-atomistic union’s wage decision. Although the price 
level itself remains responsive, via w, to union f  s choice of w; , and this
responsiveness is taken into account by union j  when choosing w ., the fact that the
aggregate demand channel is completely nullified deprives the union o f any incentive 
to exercise wage restraint. Since Wj cannot adversely affect labour demand via
aggregate demand, each non-atomistic union when setting its wage acts in the same 
way as would an atomistic union.
As explained earlier, when xx is such that 1 < tx < r lt the monetary response to p  is 
sufficiently elastic to cause an increase in Wj to induce an increase in real money 
balances, so that the aggregate demand channel whereby a marginal increase in Wj
influences union f  s labour demand is positive and counteracts the negative real wage 
channel. As r, increases gradually from unity the aggregate demand channel 
strengthens relative to the real wage channel, and union f  s perceived labour demand 
curve, while still negative in slope, becomes flatter, and indeed is horizontal when 
Tj = f j . As previously explained, as r, -> i x the two channels come ever closer to 
counterbalancing each other, and the marginal effect of Wj on /  s labour demand 
approaches zero. The marginal effect of w . on f  s real wage remains positive
however. Consequently as r l -»  i l from below the restraining influence on union j  of 
a marginal increase in its wage having a negative impact on its employment 
diminishes, and the pursuit of a higher real wage plays a greater part in union f  s wage 
choice. This circumstance renders the externality particularly acute as r, -»  f , , with
93
the equilibrium real wage higher and less efficient, the closer is r, to tx . When r, = r, 
every union has an incentive to pursue as high a real wage as possible, with the result 
that w, p,  and real outcomes are all undefined.
A positive perceived labour demand curve results when xx satisfies 
fj < fj < A / n y ( \ - a ) ,  and the perceived labour demand curve is vertical when 
Tj = A / n y ^ l - a ) . In the lu = 0 case this setting of xx turns out to be socially optimal:
Tj* = A /«y(l -  a ) . The reason has to do with the fact that when lu = 0 the axis of
symmetry of union y’ s isoloss contours coincides with the horizontal axis, and hence a 
vertical perceived labour demand curve will cause union j  to set its wage so as to 
attempt to achieve a tangency point on the horizontal axis, which implies an 
individual employment outcome equal to the market-clearing outcome. O f course, the 
union’s wage choice also involves an attempt to secure a real wage in excess of the
'j C
market-clearing wage , but the working of the externality is such that the real wage 
outcome is inefficiently low from unions’ collective viewpoint, but is equal to the 
socially optimal real wage which clears the labour market. In economic terms 
Tj = A/ny( \  -  a )  causes the marginal effect of vv; on uniony’s real wage to be zero.
Powerless to influence its real wage, the individual union’s optimal strategy is then to 
set its wage so as to bring about, via the induced change in aggregate demand, its 
desired employment level o f lu . If it so happens that lu is the market-clearing level of
employment, it then follows directly that this value of zl must be socially optimal:
hence t,*| = A /ny{ 1 -  a ) .
If ^  > A / n y ( l - a ) ,  the perceived labour demand curve of union j  will once again 
be negatively sloped, and while [a + y(l -  a)]/y(  1 -  ol) is an inadmissible value for 
t, , it is nevertheless the case that as r, approaches [a  + / ( l - a ) ] / / ( l - o ' )  the slope 
of the perceived labour demand curve approaches that o f the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve, i.e. union y’s perceived trade-off between its real wage and 
employment approaches that prevailing at the aggregate level:
35 When / = 0 and r, = r, | , the real wage union j  would achieve, by its optimal w , , were every
l/„ =o  1
other union to abide by the efficient wage, is the efficient real wage itself, together with employment o f  
zero, which for union j  is preferable to the (negative) efficient employment outcome.
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lim
[a + rO-a)]
Y(\-a)
dL
d ( w . - p )
-1
(1 -a )
(87)
Hence in the limiting r, —> [a + y(  1 -  « )] /y( 1 -  a )  case the rule induces efficient 
wage-setting by non-atomistic unions. It can be shown that were 
[a  + 7 ( l - « ) ] / y ( l - a )  an admissible value for r 1? it would be the only rY value 
which equates both the marginal effect of w . on real money balances and the 
marginal effect o f w. on the real wage to the marginal effects o f their aggregate 
counterparts. In other words, only the limiting -> [a + y(l  -  a ) \ / y ( \  -  a)  case
ensures both d ( m -  p)/dWj  = d ( m -  p)/dw  and d(\Vj -  p)ld\Vj = d ( w -  p ) /dw  .36
II.3.3.(v) Influence o f Goods-Market Competition and Wage-Bargaining Structure on 
the Wage-Setting Externality 
We have yet to discuss the influence of the parameters £ and n on the wage-setting 
externality, and hence on equilibrium outcomes, under the general price level rule 
given by (14). We saw earlier that under the simple rule (i.e. when = 0) a higher s 
mitigated the externality by reducing the scope for union f  s employer firms’ prices to 
depart from the average price, while a higher n, by reducing union y’s incentive to 
internalise the full price level repercussions of its wage decision, exacerbated it. 
Things are not as straightforward when r, is not restricted to be zero: for certain 
values of r , , a marginal increase in s  can actually worsen the adverse externality, 
while a marginal increase in n can reduce its severity, the very reverse of our findings 
for the case of the simple rule. To demonstrate this, we examine the derivatives of the 
equilibrium real wage, as given by (67a), with respect to n and s  :
36 The limiting case in which r, ->  1 is the only other ‘setting’ o f  r, which ensures 
d im  -  p ) /d w j  = d (m -  p ) / d w  . However, ^  d(Wj  -  p ) j d w } - { n - \ ) / n >  r|™, d ( w  -  p ) / d w  = 0 ,  and 
therefore the limiting r, -» 1  case cannot induce efficient wage setting. Although the limiting 
t, - > [ a  + y ( l - a ) ] / y ( l - a )  case is the only instance o f  a finite r, which can ensure 
d(Wj -  p ) / d w j  = d ( w - p ) / d w ,  strict price level targeting can also ensure this, since 
- P ) jd w t  = w -  p ) j d w  = 1. However, if n > 1, strict price level targeting cannot
ensure the equality o f  individual and aggregate marginal wage effects on real money balances: 
r^ ± * d (m -  P)/dWj  = -  a / n y i l  - a ) >  T^ ±aod(m - p ) / d w  = - a / y (  1 -  a )  .
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3 0  P)\w=Wm _ c'uya(\ -  a)[a  + e(1 -  a)]( 1 -  rx)[a + y{ 1 -  a){  1 -  r,)]
dn {ya + e A -  y[a + j i e ( \  -  a)]r] }2
(88)
It is apparent that:
d( v - p )  L , ^  [a + y ( l - a ) ]
— > 0 if rx < 1 or Tj >
dn y { \ - a )
(89a)
S(W--P)L .„ A . , .  . . [a + y ( \ -a) }— < 0 if 1 < Tj < Tx or Tj < Tj <
r ( l - a )
(89b)
lira
r. ->1
d(w -  p)  I 
dn
lim
d(w -  p)  I 
dn
=  0 (89c)
lira
=  00 (89d)
To gain intuition regarding these results, it is helpful to examine the derivative o f the 
perceived labour demand curve’s slope with respect to n. Using (83) we have:
d[dlj/d(Wj -  p)] _ yg(\  -  rx)[a + y(l -  a)(  1 -  r t)] 
dn [a + £ ( l - a ) ]  [ A -  n y { [ - a ) r ^ f
(90)
It is apparent that:
at a j d i w j  - p n > 0 i f h < l o i h >  [«+r(i-«)]
dn y ( l - a )
(91a)
Sldlj/diWj - p J i <0  i f  1 < r i < _ A _ _  or + (9 ib)
dn n y ( l - a )  n y { \ - a ) y ( l - a )
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Ira 8[dlJl d { W j- p ) } ' \ _  llnl ( W j / t K w j - p ) ]
r , -> l
v 8n j
[a + y ( \ - a )]
r ( l -a )  V dn
= 0 (91c)
lim
Ari '
didijdjWi-p)]-)
n y ( l - a )  V dn
oo (9 Id)
The two pairs of results {(89c), (91c)} and {(89d), (9 Id)} are the most 
straightforward to explain. It has already been established that as xl ->\  and 
xx -^-[a + y ( \ -  a ) ] / y ( \ - a )  in the limit, each non-atomistic union’s perceived real 
wage-employment trade-off tends to one or the other of the trade-offs which arise 
under the two extremes of wage-bargaining structure. It is therefore unsurprising that 
the equilibrium real wage and the perceived trade-off should be invariant to n in these 
cases (results (89c) and (91c)). In the limiting xx case the perceived labour 
demand curve becomes horizontal and the real wage is undefined, regardless of n: it is 
this indeterminacy o f the real wage which explains (89d). When xx = A / n y ( \ - a ) , by 
contrast, the real wage is defined, but is beyond each non-atomistic union’s influence, 
regardless of the value of n (provided n > 1 of course). This is a consequence of the 
perceived labour demand curve being vertical when xx = A / n y i l - a ) , and the fact 
that its slope is infinite explains result (9Id).
To appreciate the full significance o f result (89a) it is useful to bear in mind that 
when xx <1 or rx >[a + y ( l -  a ) ] / y ( \ -  a ) , the equilibrium real wage is inefficiently 
high: result (89a) therefore tells us that a marginal increase in n here worsens the 
externality, just as it does under the simple rule. To understand why, recall that 
when Tj <1 or r, > [a + y ( l - a ) \ / y ( l - a )  the perceived labour demand curve is 
negatively sloped, flatter than the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, but steeper 
(more negative in slope) than the perceived labour demand curve of an atomistic 
union. Result (91a) therefore reveals that, in these cases, as n increases the perceived 
labour demand curve of a non-atomistic union becomes flatter, and its perceived 
trade-off more favourable, for the straightforward reason that the individual union’s 
wage makes a smaller contribution to w and hence to p. This worsens the externality, 
and increases the inefficiently high real wage.
37 Note that the simple rule, i.e. the tx = 0 case, is subsumed by result (89a).
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Result (89b) is the least straightforward of the four. It is in fact divisible into four 
subsets of cases: for three o f these subsets result (91b) indicates that the perceived 
labour demand curve rotates in an anticlockwise direction as n increases.
(i) The first subset o f r, cases encompassed by result (89b) is that for which
A /ny(  1 -  a)  < zx < \a  + y  (1 -  a )] /y (1 -  a ) . When tx lies in this interval and lu = 0 the
equilibrium real wage is inefficiently low, although it does exceed its market-clearing 
value of zero. Result (89b) therefore reveals that a higher n here worsens the 
externality: the inefficiently low real wage becomes lower still as n increases. The 
explanation lies in terms of the fact that the perceived labour demand curve is here 
more negatively sloped than the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, while (91b) 
tells us that as n increases its slope departs further from that of the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve. Hence for this subset of cases the aggravation of the externality 
caused by an increase in n is attributable to an increase in the departure of the 
individual union’s perceived trade-off from that prevailing at the aggregate level.
(ii) The second subset of cases contains only a single rx value, namely 
r, = A /« y ( l-  a ) , the setting o f rx which renders the perceived labour demand curve 
of each non-atomistic union vertical, and which induces unions to set the market- 
clearing nominal wage in the lu = 0 case. (Note that if lu = 0 the equilibrium real
wage, when rx = A /«y(l - a )  , is inefficiently low from unions’ perspective so that the 
adverse wage-setting externality is present.) It turns out that, regardless o f lu , a
marginal increase in n has no impact on the slope of the perceived labour demand 
curve, nor on the equilibrium real wage, nor on the strength o f the externality, when 
rx = A /« y ( l - a ) .  This is not immediately obvious from (88) and (90) since those 
derivatives implicitly treat r, as fixed. In this special case, allowance must be made 
for the indirect impact o f n, working via the induced change in A /« y ( l - a ) , on the 
equilibrium real wage when t x = A / n y ( l - a ) . The following total derivative is 
therefore relevant:
d ( w - p )  I d ( w - p )  Iv '\W = M>x]P K r  =
dn dn rx fixed
+
d ( w - p )  L
dr , I
(92)
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Evaluating the two terms on the right-hand side of (92) for rx = A / n y i l - a ) , they are 
found to be equal in magnitude but of opposite sign:
d(w -  p)  1 - c l Q - a ) 2[a + e ( l - a ) ]
dn r, =A/n/(l- a ) (n -1  )a
f  d ( w - p )  1 (  d ( A / n y ( l - a ) y _ < ( 1 - a ) 2[a + s ( \ - a ) ]
dr,
V
r, =A//?y(l-a) I  dn J (n -1  )a
(92')
(92")
It follows that [d(w -  p)\w=w j  dn) =  0 .
r, = A/ n y ( l - a )
(iii) The third subset o f cases encompassed by result (89b) involves rY values such 
that f, < Tj < A / n y ( \ - a ) .  For this subset, when lu = 0 the equilibrium real wage is 
inefficiently low, so low in fact that it lies below its market-clearing value of zero. 
Thus our finding that d ( w - p )I _ /dn<  0 when r, is in this range of valuesI W - W NE /
indicates that a marginal increase in n exacerbates the externality. This is because the 
slope of the perceived labour demand curve (which is positive for this subset of cases) 
is falling in n. Hence the greater the number o f unions, the more favourable is the 
individual non-atomistic union’s perceived trade-off between real wage and 
employment when zx belongs to this subset.
(iv) Finally, we come to the sole subset of cases for which a marginal increase in n 
actually has the effect o f mitigating the externality. This subset involves r, being in 
the interval 1 < r, < tx , so that the equilibrium real wage is inefficiently high, and the 
perceived labour demand curve of each non-atomistic union is negatively sloped but 
flatter than that of an atomistic union. The fact that d(w -  p )I /dn<  0 for thisv ^'1 w=wne/
subset of cases indicates that a marginal increase in n here brings the equilibrium real 
wage closer to its efficient value. The derivative (91b) indicates that an increase in n 
here steepens the perceived labour demand curve and hence reduces the extent of its 
departure from the symmetric-wage labour demand curve. However, a deeper
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economic explanation for the result can be provided by decomposing the marginal 
impact of union f  s wage on its employment into effects working via the real wage 
and aggregate demand channels. For this subset of cases, d { w j - p ) j d w j  > 0  and
d { m  - p ) / d w j  > 0 , but, as revealed by Table II. 1, the negative real wage channel
outweighs the positive aggregate demand channel. The real wage channel is stronger 
the larger is n since this reduces the contribution made by w . to w  and p ,  and hence
increases the extent to which the direct effect of an increase in Wj on the real wage
outweighs its indirect effect working via the induced change in p .  However, for this 
subset of cases the aggregate demand channel is weaker the larger is n. Thus the effect 
of a marginal increase in on union f  s employment must be stronger, the larger is
n. It follows that a marginal increase in n renders the individual (non-atomistic) 
union’s perceived trade-off less favourable, and hence mitigates the externality.
Proceeding now to analyse the effect o f a marginal increase in e on the equilibrium 
real wage, we have, using (67a):
d p  P ) = -  pi -  l ) c > ( l  -  a)[a  + r(  1 ~ Qp(l -  t, )] [A -  ny(  1 -  a)r, ]
de {ya + £ h - y [ a  + n£().-d)]Tl}2
Provided 1 < n < oo, it is apparent that:
d(w P)\w=Wne A [a + y ( l - a ) ]
----------------— < 0  if t , < -------------  or t, >   —---— (94a)
d£ n y ( \ - a )  y ( \ - a )
>0 if - J L _ < r, < [ « * r d - ) ]  (94b)
d£ n y ( l - a )  y ( \ - a )
d ( w - p )  I
d£
lim
d{w -  p)  I
[ a +y ( ] - a ) ]  ^Ti=\/ny{]-a) r\-> r(]_a) 0£
0 (94c)
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The marginal effect o f s  on the slope of the perceived labour demand curve o f a non- 
atomistic union is:
d[dlj / d{\Vj - p ) ]  _  - ( n - 1 )a[a + y{ 1 -  a)(  1 -  rx)]
ds [a + £•(!- a)] [A -w ^ l-a O r ,]
(95)
It is apparent that, provided 1 < n < oo :
d[d l j /d (W j-p )]  A [a + r ( \ - a ) ]  .
 - ------ --------- < 0  if t, < ------------  or t. >   —-- — (96a)
ds n y ( l - a )  y ( \ - a )
5|\dJ/d (w J - p y \ >Q ,f  A < [a + r ( l -a ) ]
ds n y ( \ - a )  y(l - a )
(96b)
lim d[dlj/d(Wj -  p )]
ds
=  0
lim d[dlJ/d{w j -  p)\ _ 
ds
=  00
(96c)
(96d)
When Tj is in the range of values mentioned in (94b) the equilibrium real wage 
exceeds the market-clearing value, but is nevertheless inefficiently low from the point 
of view of unions. Result (94b) therefore indicates that when rv is in this interval, an 
increase in s  has the effect of mitigating the externality just as it does in the case of 
the simple rule. The reason is the straightforward one that greater goods-market 
competition here renders the individual perceived trade-off less favourable: for this 
subset of t x values, the perceived labour demand curve o f a non-atomistic union is 
more negative in slope than the symmetric-wage labour demand curve. (96b) reveals 
that as s  increases marginally the perceived labour demand curve becomes flatter and 
rotates towards the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, so that the perceived trade-
off between real wage and employment more closely approximates the aggregate- 
level trade-off.
The results in (94c) are also easily explained: in these cases xx causes the perceived
labour demand curve to be independent of s , either by depriving the individual union
*
of influence over its real wage (the xx = A /ny(  1 -  a)  case), or by inducing efficient 
wage-setting by every union (the limiting xx -> [a  + ^ ( l - a ) ] / ^ ( l - a )  case). As for 
(94d), this result is due to the real wage not being defined when t x - t x.
Result (94a) covers three subsets of cases:
(i) When xx >[a + y(  1 -  a )]/y{ 1 -  a ) , the equilibrium real wage is inefficiently high 
and result (94a) therefore indicates that an increase in s  mitigates the externality. In 
this subset of cases the perceived labour demand curve of a non-atomistic union is 
negatively sloped, and while steeper than the perceived labour demand curve of an 
atomistic union, it is flatter than the symmetric-wage labour demand curve: result 
(96a) therefore reveals that a marginal increase in s  here causes the departure of the 
perceived labour demand curve’s slope from that of the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve to diminish.
(ii) The second subset of cases is that for which and this subset is also 
characterised by an inefficiently high real wage, so that as for subset (i) the externality 
is mitigated by greater goods-market competition. The perceived labour demand curve 
of each non-atomistic union is negatively sloped but flatter than the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve. Result (96a) indicates that the perceived labour demand curve 
steepens (becomes more negative in slope) as s  rises marginally when xx <xx, so that 
the disparity between its slope and that of the symmetric-wage labour demand curve is 
falling in s .
(iii) The third subset is that for which xx <xx< K jn y i ] . -d ) ,  and this subset is 
characterised by an equilibrium real wage below the market-clearing value, and which 
consequently is inefficiently low. Result (94a) therefore tells us that, unlike all the 
other cases discussed previously, for this subset of cases an increase in s  worsens the 
externality. The perceived labour demand curve of each non-atomistic union is 
positively sloped, and (96a) indicates that the slope is falling in s ,  which here
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amounts to an improvement in the union’s perceived trade-off. Economic intuition for 
this result can be provided in terms of the relative strength of the aggregate demand 
and real wage channels via which a marginal increase in the individual nominal wage, 
Wj, influences employment. For this subset of rx cases, a marginal increase in
does increase the real wage, and consequently the real wage channel is negative, and 
operates to counteract the aggregate demand channel, which for this subset of cases is 
positive. The positive aggregate demand channel outweighs the negative real wage 
channel, so that a marginal increase in w . has the effect of increasing both the real
wage and employment: this is why the perceived labour demand curve is positively 
sloped. The key point is that whereas a marginal increase in s  weakens the positive 
aggregate demand channel, y ( m - p ) / [ a  + s ( \ - a ) ] ,  it strengthens the negative real 
wage channel, -  £(wj -  p) /[a  + £(1 -  a ) ] . Consequently, the higher is £ , the smaller
the perceived cost, in terms of the increased departure of employment from its desired 
value of lu, of the increase in the real wage which results from a marginal increase in
Wj . In other words the nature o f the aggregate demand and real wage channels in this
subset o f cases is such that a marginal increase in £ renders the perceived trade-off 
faced by each non-atomistic union more favourable, which therefore exacerbates the 
externality.
II.3.3.(vi) Final Comments relating to Equilibrium Wage-Setting under the Price 
Level Rule
The most interesting aspects of the equilibrium outcomes relating to the general 
price level rule mr -  rxp  have now been discussed. For the sake of completeness, 
however, we briefly consider the implications of relaxing our assumption, made in 
much o f the above, that the union’s notional employment objective of lu coincides
with market-clearing employment. The first thing to note is that lu plays no part in 
determining the slope of the perceived labour demand curve, and hence all the 
previous arguments relating to the influence of r , , n, and £ on the perceived trade-off 
continue to apply. The principal consequence of lu being non-zero is that the efficient 
outcome may be located anywhere on the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, and
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does not necessarily involve (as it does in the lu = 0 case) an efficient real wage in
excess of the market-clearing real wage of zero. The value taken by lu determines the
position of the efficient outcome on the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, and 
consequently also determines which of union /  s infinite set of possible perceived 
labour demand curves is the one which passes through the efficient outcome. 
However, these diagrammatic changes merely complicate the economic interpretation 
to be assigned to the equilibrium expressions, and do not really lead to any great 
advance in insight. The most important point relating to lu *  0 has already been made
when first discussing (71), namely that regardless of the value taken by lu, there 
exists a setting for rx which can induce non-atomistic unions to set their wages in 
such a way that the market-clearing real wage is (inadvertently, in the eyes of unions) 
brought about. In the lu = 0 case this socially optimal setting, = A /« ^ ( l - c r ) ?
works by rendering the perceived labour demand curve vertical, so that each union 
perceives its real wage to be beyond its influence and consequently sets wy in order to
ensure that /y - l u . However, if lu * 0 setting r, = A / n y ( l - a )  will induce unions to
set their wages so as to bring about an employment outcome which is socially 
suboptimal. Clearly, when lu ^  0 a non-vertical perceived labour demand curve is
desirable, and the precise value of its slope will depend on lu as well as the structural
parameters. The point is that by taking into account the incentives facing each non- 
atomistic union, together with the workings of the externality, the design o f the policy 
rule can bring about socially optimal employment and price level outcomes regardless 
of the unions’ notional objective lu.
Before ending our discussion of the price level rule, two comments regarding our 
principal results are in order. The first concerns the practical policy relevance of our 
key result that appropriate setting o f the rule parameter can induce non-atomistic 
unions to set the market-clearing nominal wage. The practicality o f this may be 
questioned because o f the potentially close proximity o f r*, the socially optimal 
setting of the rule parameter, to f , , the value o f r, at which employment and the price 
level are undefined. The greater this proximity, the greater the risk that inaccurate 
estimation of the values o f the structural parameters y, s,  and a  (and perhaps n too)
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will lead to the true value of r* being inaccurately estimated. In the lu = 0 case, for 
example, underestimation of the true t\ could result in r, being set undesirably close 
to f j , leading to equilibrium employment being substantially below its socially 
optimal level. The danger that an inaccurate estimate o f r* may lead to a disastrous 
choice of r, seems to be more acute the larger is n and/or the larger is s  .38 For an 
economy with only a handful of unions and a low degree o f goods-market 
competition, however, the gap between f, and t* appears to be sufficiently large in 
the lu -  0 case, to suggest that the key findings of this chapter may have some policy 
relevance. For example, if we assume, in line with widespread opinion, that y  = 1 and 
a  = 0 • 7 are reasonably accurate estimates for these two parameters, then with s  = 2
and n = 2 , we have r,* = 2-167 versus f, =1-737. This seems a significant
10difference, since is, after all, an elasticity.
The second comment relates to the model’s assumptions regarding the timing of 
moves. As mentioned earlier, if  the rule prescribes a monetary response to the price 
level, or any other aggregate variable which is necessarily realised after w has been 
determined, then it is only practicable in an economy in which m can indeed be set 
after the relevant aggregate variable has been realised. This means that if  the 
monetary transmission mechanism or technological constraints are such that m must 
be set simultaneously with, or earlier than w, formulating the rule as a response to p  
(or to nominal income or employment realisations) is futile, since regardless o f n the 
individual union will treat m as beyond its influence when setting its wage, and the 
employment outcome will be independent of the rule parameter and identical to that 
which arises in the case o f the simple rule, namely (46b).
38 Note that for the lu = 0 case, f , is less than t * provided 1 < h < o o ,  and that 
d(r  * - f , ) ^  oy^5«<OV n > \ . Furthermore, <9(r* ~ f , )|; o j d s  < 0 as well.
39 A great many purely theoretical papers implicitly assume y  = 1 in specifying an equation for 
aggregate demand (for example: Gray, 1976; Waller and VanHoose, 1992; Duca and VanHoose, 2001), 
while papers which undertake simulation studies o f  monetary policy also generally assume a value o f  
unity for this parameter: examples include Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Drudi and Giordano 
(2000). In the latter two papers, as well as in Jerger (2002), a  is assigned a value o f  0-7. Papers which 
assign a specific value to s  are rather thinner on the ground. However, Jerger (2002, p.770) assumes 
its value to be 2, while A cocella et al. (2005), drawing in turn on Gordi (1995), argue that s  “is 
generally unlikely to exceed 1 - 5 , and only infrequently to exceed 2 - 0 ” (Acocella et al., 2005, p. 16).
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II.4 W age-Setting under the Nominal Income and Employment Rules
Having completed our discussion of the price level rule, we now proceed to give a 
relatively brief account of the outcomes associated with equilibrium wage-setting 
under the two remaining rules, namely the nominal income rule, mr = T2(y + p ) , and 
the employment rule, mr = r 3/ . In both cases the qualitative results are very similar to
those for the price level rule, so that a brief treatment is justified.
For the nominal income rule, as given by (17), the relevant semi-reduced forms are 
given by equations (18), (19) and (20). It is immediately apparent from these 
expressions that [a + y(l - a ) ] / y  is an inadmissible value for the nominal income rule 
parameter r 2, just as we earlier found [a + y(l -  ct)]/y (1 -  a )  to be an inadmissible 
value for the price level rule parameter r , . The reason is the same: namely that if 
t2 = [a + y(l  -  a ) ] / y , w = 0 is then a necessary condition for the price level to be able 
to adjust to bring aggregate supply into equality with aggregate demand and hence 
ensure goods-market clearing. However if w = 0 does happen to be the case, any 
realisation of p  will then ensure aggregate demand is equal to aggregate supply. 
Hence p  is indeterminate when r 2 = [a + y(l -  a)] /y  .40
If we proceed, on the assumption that r2 ^  [a + y(l -  a ) \ / y , to derive the 
equilibrium nominal wage for the nominal income rule (by following a similar 
procedure to that described earlier for the price level rule), it is found to be:
It is apparent from this expression that a setting of unity is inadmissible for r 2, just as 
we earlier found it to be inadmissible for tx , and indeed for the same reason: in both 
cases a rule parameter o f unity implies that prices will adjust to ensure the aggregate
[a + y j X - a - T ^ ]  < [ a  + g ( l - « ) ] [ A - K » - « K ]  ;
y ( l - r 2) {ya + £ h - y [ a  + £ { n - a ) ] r 2}
(97)
real wage is zero41, which in turn implies that no individual union will find it optimal
40 Aggregate supply and aggregate demand when t2 = [ a  + y{  1 -  a)]/y.  are given by:
/ L  , “ [a/O-aOKp-W^ + aO-r)]} and / L =, = «/>/(!-«) •
41 Aggregate supply and aggregate demand when r2 = 1 are given by: 
j / l  = - s a ( w -  p ) / \ s ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - y ) ]  and y D\ = 0 .  .
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to set its wage equal to the aggregate nominal wage. This prevents symmetric wage- 
setting and causes the equilibrium nominal wage (and consequently the price level 
also) to be undefined when r 2 = 1.
Assuming that r2 * [ a  + y(\  -  a)]/y  and that x2 * 1, the equilibrium price level and 
employment outcomes are then found to be:
It is evident from (98) and (99) that when y = 1 both the equilibrium price level and 
employment are independent o f r 2. This is because when y -1  the aggregate demand 
equation (4) necessarily implies that nominal income is equal to the money supply, so 
that the responsiveness of the money supply to nominal income is irrelevant. The 
implication is that when y = 1 equilibrium outcomes under the nominal income rule 
are exactly the same as under the simple rule, and the socially optimal design of the 
rule involves setting its constant value, m , so as to ensure inflation is zero.42
The nominal income rule does differ in one subtle respect from the price level rule, 
therefore, since the conclusions previously arrived at regarding the latter are not 
dependent at all on y  being the case. Nevertheless, comparing the equilibrium 
price level and employment outcomes for the nominal income rule, (98) and (99), 
with their counterparts for the price level rule, (63) and (67b), we find that all the key 
features of the wage-setting equilibrium under the price level rule also arise in the 
case o f the nominal income rule. In particular, it is noteworthy that neither rule can 
influence equilibrium employment when there is either a single union or unions are 
atomistic: setting n = 1 in (99), yields the efficient outcome, while taking the limit of 
(99) as n -> oo yields the outcome for the case of atomistic unions. In these extreme 
cases the socially optimal setting of r2 is that which ensures the price level outcome 
is zero, namely t2 = \ / y  .
42 The constant m has been omitted from (17) purely for expositional convenience.
P\
«(1 -  r*i) <[a + g ( l -a ) ] [A -K »-«K ] i
y(\  -  r 2) {ya + s A -  y[a + s{n -  a ) ] r2} ‘
(98)
/ c'u[a + s(  1 -  a )][A -  y(n - a ) r 2] 
{ya + £ A - y [ a  + £( n- a ) ]T 2}
(99)
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The strong affinity between the two rules’ equilibrium outcomes also extends to the 
case of multiple non-atomistic unions. Provided 1 < n < oo, equilibrium employment 
considered as a function of t 2 , is discontinuous at one particular value of t 2, namely 
t 2 = (ya + sK)/y[a + s ( n - a ) ] ,  while as r 2 approaches in the limit either of its
t
inadmissible values equilibrium employment tends to either its efficient value or the 
atomistic-unions outcome. Most significantly of all, there is one particular setting of 
t2 which induces each union to set the market-clearing nominal wage, and therefore 
ensures both equilibrium employment and the price level attain their socially optimal 
values of zero. We denote this optimal setting of r 2 by r 2 :
As in the case o f the price level rule, evaluating r 2 for the extremes o f wage- 
bargaining structure yields inadmissible values for this parameter: we find that
One difference between the equilibrium outcomes under the two rules, when 
1 < n < oo, is that whereas equilibrium employment is a decreasing function of zx in 
the case of the price level rule, under the nominal income rule it is decreasing in r 2 if 
y <  1, but is increasing in r 2 if  y > 1:
The graph of equilibrium employment as a function of t 2 therefore resembles Figure
Y > 1 is depicted below as Figure II.5.
Before moving on to discuss the employment targeting rule, we will compare 
equilibrium employment under strict nominal income targeting, as given by equation 
(102) below, with its counterparts under the simple rule (equation (46b)) and strict
T. (100)
h  = 1 >while 2* = + r (  1 -  a ) V r  ■
5(/L,»m ) (n -  l X r ( r  -1  )<x2[a + g(l -  a )] (101)
dr2 {ya + s A - y [ a  + n e ( \ -  a)\u2}2
II.4 only for cases in which y < 1. This functional relationship for cases in which
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Figure II.5
Equilibrium employment as a function of the nominal income rule param eter
( y a  + e \  )
Notes:
1. It is assumed that y > 1, that 1 < n < oo and that lu < c'u (1 -  a ) .
0 . (ya + e A)Z. T2 =
y [a + e{n -  a)]
3 T * = (  O f  c 'u la  +  g (! ~ QQ]a  ~ ( Y a  +  s A ) l u |
2 \ Y j [ c u ( n - a ) [ a  + £ Q - a ) \ - [ a  + E(j i -a)] lu \
4. l\w_w is undefined when r 2 = 1 and r 2 = [a + y(\ -  a)]/y .
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price level targeting (equation (68)).43
iim , c’u( n - a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ]
r2->±oo L ^ ne » [a  + g ( / i -a ) ]
>
The comparison with (46b) and (68) is most straightforward for the lu = 0 case, and 
we will focus on this case here. It is apparent that the simple (i.e. t 2 = 0 ) rule results 
in lower employment than strict nominal income targeting if  y < 1, whereas if  y  > 1 
the simple rule yields a superior outcome which is less negative (i.e. closer to the 
social optimum of zero).44 This indicates that the wage-setting externality is more 
severe under the simple rule than under strict nominal income targeting when y < 1, 
and less severe when y  > 1,45 The first step to understanding why this is so is to note 
that when y = 1 any rule which involves a response to nominal income merely 
replicates the simple rule: hence the externality must have the same strength in the 
simple r 2 = 0 case as in the strict r 2 -> ± co  case. The second step is to note that (18)
implies that ^™±00 Pmruie~(XW'> while (18) and (20) together imply that 
T2l™±oo7(.mr ~ p')nirule = ~a  w • h  follows that the impact of a marginal increase in union
/ s  nominal wage on its real wage and its impact on aggregate demand must both be 
independent of y, under the strict nominal income rule. This is not the case under the 
simple rule, however, since the lower is y ,  the weaker is the aggregate demand 
channel whereby marginal increases in union/ s wage reduce the derived demand for 
its labour. Hence a marginal decrease (increase) in y  from unity must render union /  s 
perceived trade-off more (less) favourable under the simple rule, which consequently 
worsens (ameliorates) the externality.
Comparing the strict nominal income rule with the strict price level rule, it is 
apparent that, provided 1 < n <  o o , equilibrium employment is lower under the former.
43 Comparison o f  the price level outcomes for these regimes is not o f  great interest since we have 
assumed the constant m is set to zero under the state-contingent rules.
44 In fact, this statement that, when y  > 1, the departure o f  equilibrium employment from the market- 
clearing level o f  zero is smaller under the simple rule than under the strict nominal income rule, is true 
not only for the lu = 0 case but for all lu < 0 , while it is also true for sufficiently low  positive values o f  
lu . If lu is sufficiently high and positive, however, the departure o f  equilibrium employment from zero 
is, when y > 1, larger under the simple rule than under the strict nominal income rule.
45 This statement is true regardless o f  the value o f  lu (provided 1 < n < oo , o f  course).
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Therefore, for the lu -  0 case the strict price level rule unambiguously outperforms
the strict nominal income rule as regards employment.46 The explanation for this is 
that union /  s perceived trade-off between employment and the real wage is more 
favourable under the strict nominal income rule than under the strict price level ru le47 
The relevant expressions are:
lim 
r, ->±oo
'  dlj
^ d ( w .i - p )
[« + * * (! -« ) ]
n ( \ - a )
lim 
r ,—>±oo
^ d l . 1 -  [a + s(n -  a)]_____ i
Kd(w i - p ) ( n - a ) [ a  + s ( \ - a ) ]
(103b)
It is straightforward to show that (103b) is strictly greater than (103a), implying that 
union f  s perceived labour demand curve is flatter (less negative in slope) under the 
strict nominal income rule than under the strict price level rule, which leads to a more 
severe externality under the former.
The fact that when 1 < n < oo the functional relationship between equilibrium 
employment and the nominal income rule parameter r 2 has many similarities to the 
relationship between equilibrium employment and the price level rule parameter is 
not entirely surprising. The reason for the similarity is that a particular setting of 
either r, or r2 implies a particular monetary response to the aggregate nominal wage. 
Both the price level and nominal income rules are respectively equivalent to rules of 
the form mr = txk xw  and mr = t2k 2w , where at, and k 2 are composite parameters. 
Indeed, in Appendix II.4 it is shown that for the rule mr = p w  there is a particular 
setting of the response parameter p  which induces non-atomistic unions to set the 
market-clearing nominal wage. The socially optimal such rule is:
„j‘ _ ^ °  + gQ ~ ~ + gA-)/^ 14' (104)
r[a + e ( l - a ) }  [ < ( ! - « ) - / „ ]
46 This is the case for lu < 0 also, as well as for some low positive values o f  lu .
47 This is the case regardless o f  .
I l l
This optimal rule can be reformulated to yield the optimal price level rule, (71), or the 
optimal nominal income rule, (100). Another alternative formulation would involve 
the optimal setting of r3 in the employment rule, (21), and this is stated below as
(108), together with expressions for the equilibrium nominal wage, price level and
*
employment which can be derived by applying to the semi-reduced forms (22), (23) 
and (24), an analogous procedure to that which has been described for the other rules:
W NE ~
[a + r Q - a - n ) ]
r
<  [a + g(l -  a)} [A -  Q  -  l)yr, ]
{{n -  l)s[a + y ( l - a - r 3)] + y[a + s(l -  a )]}
(105)
p\1 I w=w-
_ ( a - r h i)]
r
c'u [a + g(l -  a)] [A -  (n -1  )yr3 ]
{(« -1  )s[a  + y(\ -  a  -  r 3)] + y\a  + s{\ -  a )]}
(106)
l \ = 1U ~lw =  V V „r U
c'u [a + g(l -  a )] [A -  (n -  l)yr3 ]
{{n -  l)s[a + y(\ -  a  -  t3 )] + y[a + f( l -  a )]}
(107)
c'[a  + g(l -  q)]A -  (ya + eA)/,
3
( 108)
We shall refrain from discussing in detail the correspondence between these 
expressions and their counterparts for the price level and nominal income rules. The 
graph of equilibrium employment as a function of r 3 is very similar, in the lu = 0 
case, to the equivalent graph for the nominal income rule when y > 1, namely Figure 
II.5, since provided 1 < « < oo equilibrium employment is an increasing function of
TP
5(/|- « ) = ------------- ( n - l ) c ' y a [ a  + s ( \ - a ) ] ----------- ^ > 0 V „ > 1  (109)
d z 3 { { n - \ ) s [ a  + y ( l - a  - t 3 ) ]  + y[a + s(l - a ) ] }
One point worth making, however, is that (105) indicates strict employment targeting 
is inadmissible in this model, since r]^ ±00%  =°o. (Note also that (107) implies that
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r Z±J\w-w = ^u~ {< la  + £(1 “  a )]/£) • This significant, since for the price level and
nominal income rules when 1 < n < co is the case, only the substitution of an 
inadmissible value for the rule parameter, specifically rx = 1 or r 2 = 1, into the 
expression for equilibrium employment can cause the latter to take the value it has 
under atomistic unions.) The inadmissibility of strict employment targeting in the 
present model raises questions about Bratsiotis and Martin’s (1999, p.252) assumption 
that strict employment targeting is a feasible policy rule in their model.
II.5 Wage-Setting under the Discretionary Monetary Regime
We have found that for each of the regimes analysed above which implicitly 
prescribe an indirect monetary response to the aggregate nominal wage, there exists a 
setting of the rule parameter which, when there are multiple non-atomistic unions, 
brings about the social optimum of full employment (i.e. labour-market clearing) and 
zero inflation. Such rules are therefore fully credible and render irrelevant the time- 
inconsistency problem alleged to be inherent to discretionary monetary regimes. 
These findings obviously need to be reconciled with those of Coricelli et al. (2004a, 
2006), who investigate discretionary monetary policy and optimal delegation in the 
context of the model considered here. As already mentioned these authors also allow 
for inflation-aversion on the part of unions: however, for the version of their model in 
which the union loss function lacks a term in inflation, so that the loss function is 
given by our equation (29) with lu = 0 , Coricelli et al. find that an ultra-conservative
central banker is socially optimal, so that inflation is eliminated but at the cost of 
some unemployment in equilibrium. Our finding that an appropriately specified rule 
can improve upon this outcome suggests there may be some specification of the 
monetary reaction function implicitly assigned to the discretionary central banker (i.e. 
some setting of the key delegation parameter, the relative weight on the inflation term 
in the central bank’s loss function (10a)) which is superior to that identified as optimal 
by Coricelli et al. It will emerge below that an important assumption implicitly made 
by these authors in arriving at this recommendation is that this weight, cb, must be
48 It is noteworthy that Bratsiotis and Martin’s, expression for the equilibrium price level (equation (19) 
on page 251 o f  their paper) does appear to be undefined as the degree o f  monetary accommodation o f  
price level movements tends in the limit to unity, which corresponds in their model to a strict 
employment-targeting regime.
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positive. As hinted in our earlier discussion of (10a) and (10'), our analysis departs 
from Coricelli et al. by relaxing this restriction on the sign of this delegation 
parameter.
The extent to which this restriction can be relaxed turns out to depend upon the 
precise nature of the delegation. It is useful to remind the reader at this point of the 
two alternative interpretations of monetary-policy delegation introduced to the 
literature by Rogoff (1985), and which have already been briefly discussed in Chapter
I. The first interpretation implicitly assumes that only instrument independence is 
conferred on the central bank. It views delegation as the assignment of a particular 
objective function to the central bank’s staff, whose professionalism is such that their 
personal views on policy objectives exercise no influence over their discretionary 
settings of the policy instrument, and who obediently conduct monetary policy purely 
in respect of the objective function that has been assigned to them. Under this 
interpretation, the assignment of an objective function to the central bank is equivalent 
to the choice o f a value for the response-to-wages parameter p  in the monetary 
reaction function m = p w  .49 Note that the foregoing sentences are not specific as to 
whether the quadratic ‘objective function’ is a loss or utility function. This is because 
when delegation solely involves instrument independence, it is irrelevant whether the 
resulting objective, considered as a function of the instrument m, involves a unique 
minimum (and therefore may be regarded as a loss function), or a unique maximum (a 
utility function). The essential point is that with this type of delegation, central bank 
staff routinely set m equal to the value which solves the first-order condition 
8 n cb/dm = 0 .
The alternative interpretation of the delegation decision assumes that the relative 
weight placed on inflation stabilisation by each o f the candidates to head the central 
bank is observable, and that society appoints that candidate whose preferences will 
result in the best attainable outcomes from society’s viewpoint when that person is 
endowed with the discretionary power to conduct monetary policy entirely in
49 An equivalence consequently arises between choosing the delegation parameter cb in an assigned 
loss function, and choosing the response parameter in a monetary rule to which the central bank is 
required to adhere, such as the price level rule, mr = r xp . This becomes readily apparent from 
comparison o f  the expressions for mdiscrelion and mpricelevelrule, as given by (26) and (16) respectively.
Equating the right hand sides o f  these equations, and solving for r ,, we have r, = l - c ba ( l - a ) y ~l . 
Hence if  monetary policy can be delegated without the concession o f  goal independence to the central 
bank, a particular cb choice is equivalent to the choice o f  a particular value for the rule parameter r , .
114
accordance with his or her personal predilections. This second interpretation 
implicitly assumes that appointing someone to head the central bank involves 
conferring not only instrument independence, but also goal independence, on the 
appointee. Since the objective function (10') has a unique minimum not only for all
positive values o f cb, but also for all values of this parameter which are sufficiently 
large in numerical terms (specifically, for all cb > - l / ( l - a ) 2 ), it clearly makes sense 
to regard all potential central-banker candidates as having a loss function, rather than 
a utility function, including those for which cb < — l / ( l - a ) 2 . An immediate
implication of doing so, however, is that only candidates for which ck > - l / ( l - a ) 2
will set m in accordance with equation (26), since only for this subset o f candidates is 
the second-order condition for a minimum satisfied by this setting of m. For those 
persons whose weight parameter cb is more negative than — l/( l -  a )2 , setting m
equal to the right-hand side of (26) will maximise their personal loss, and indeed there 
is no choice of m which minimises the loss for a central banker who belongs to this 
category. Hence in equilibrium m is undefined for this subset o f candidates, and we 
therefore henceforth treat cb values which are less than -  l/( l -  a ) 2 as inadmissible
when delegation involves goal independence.50 Consequently, for this kind of 
delegation, the equivalence between choosing a central banker and choosing the 
response coefficient p  in m = p w  is somewhat less general than when central 
bankers lack the power to formulate policy goals.51 
Since our key result only involves the weight cb, and is independent of the other
delegation parameters in (10a), it suffices here to use the simpler central bank loss 
function (10') instead. The relevant semi-reduced forms for the money supply and 
price level are therefore given by (26) and (27). These expressions immediately reveal
50 The second derivative o f  the central bank’s objective function with respect to m is 
d 2Q cb/ d m 2 = 2^ 2[1 + ca(1 - a ) 2] / [a  + y ( l - a ) ] 2 . One way around the difficult identified in this 
passage would be to define the objective function (10') to be a loss function if  cb >  - l / ( l  - a ) 2 , and to 
be a utility function if  cb < — l / ( l - a ) 2 , so that every potential central banker would set m in 
accordance with equation (26) if  appointed. However, proceeding in this way would introduce an 
element o f  arbitrariness to our definitions which is not easily justifiable.
51 For the price level rule mr = r lp , the equivalence between appointing a particular goal-independent 
central banker, and setting r, equal to a particular value, only extends to r, values which are less than 
[a y i } -  a ) ] / a ) . (In other words, there is no choice o f  goal-independent central banker which 
can replicate the outcomes associated with a value for r, such that r, > [ a + y( l  -  « ) ] / / ( !  -  a ) .)
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that, regardless of n, cb = - l / ( l - a ) 2 is an inadmissible value for the weight 
parameter, and it turns out, for the same reason that xx =[a + y ( \ - a ) y y ( \ - a )  is 
inadmissible under the price level rule, namely that it renders the price level 
indeterminate. The parallel between discretion and the rules also extends to a second 
setting of cb which is inadmissible regardless of n, namely cb = 0 , which, like r, = 1
in the case of the price level rule, necessarily results in real money balances being 
maintained constant regardless of w, and which consequently implies that were 
symmetric wage-setting to occur, prices would then adjust in such a way as to cause 
the market-clearing real wage to prevail at every firm, thus depriving each union of an 
incentive to set any particular nominal wage.
Assuming cb > —l/(l — a ) 2 and cb *  0 , the individual union’s optimisation problem
can be solved in an analogous fashion to that described for the rule-based regimes, 
which in turn leads to the following expressions for the equilibrium nominal wage, 
price level, real wage, and employment:
D + c . q - q ) » ]  k [ a  + £( l-a )]P
cb( \ - a )  l [ c. a O - a )  + «®] I
where <D = «[1 + cb (1 -  a ) 2 ] -1
*| = _ L _ K f r + * Q -* > N >. / l  (m )
WtiE cb( l - a )  I [cba ( l - a )  + £®] J
(w ~ p V „  (112a)"£ [[cAa ( l - a )  + £ 0 ] J
52 Because o f  the adopted normalisations, the fixed value o f  real money balances when cb = 0 is zero, 
as is apparent from equations (26) and (27).
53 Once again, it is convenient to simplify the notation by dropping the ‘discretion’ appendage used in 
(26) and (27). Note that had w e conducted the analysis using the more general loss function given by 
(10a), the equilibrium expressions for w  and p  would then be functions not only o f  cb but also o f  the 
additional delegation parameters lb, 7tb and c 'b . The important point, however, is that the counterpart 
expressions for the real wage and employment would be exactly the same as those reported here, 
namely (1 12a) and (1 12b).
116
l cfu[a + £(l-a)]<3> 
u [cba ( l - a )  + eO]
(112b)
As one might expect, evaluating (112a) and (112b) for n = 1 yields the efficient real
(112a) and (112b) as n->  go are found to be the inefficient real outcomes under 
atomistic unions. In other words, real outcomes in these extreme cases o f goods and 
labour-market structure are independent of the parameter cb, confirming once again
that the characteristics o f the monetary regime, whether discretionary or rule-based, 
cannot influence equilibrium employment in these extreme cases. For the more 
interesting intermediate cases for which 1 < n < o o , however, (112b) indicates that the 
discretionary regime parameter cb closely parallels the rule parameters in its ability to
influence equilibrium employment. Unsurprisingly, an ultraconservative central 
banker is found to yield the same employment and price level outcomes as a strict 
price level rule:
This is (with lu = 0 o f course) the result found by Coricelli et al., who emphasise the 
following derivative when discussing the policy implications of their model:
If cb is restricted to be positive, it follows directly from (114) that an ultra­
conservative central banker not only eliminates inflation but also brings about the best 
possible employment outcome. Relaxing this sign restriction on cb, however, reveals 
numerous affinities with the rules analysed earlier. It is noteworthy, for example, that 
if delegation does not involve goal independence, the extreme case in which cb —» - o o  
yields precisely the same employment and price level outcomes as that in which 
ch —> o o : lim l\ = hm /I . Another parallel with the rules is that, provided
0  C l —¥  —00 lw =w „r C l —► 00 IW=H\«r X X
outcomes, as does taking the limit of (112a) and (112b) as s  -»  oo , while the limits of
iim ji «c '(l - a ) [ a  + f( l -  a)]
c„->co lw=w„£ -  u [cc + n £ ( \ - a ) ] (113)
d(A»=y,m) = (n -  l)c'ua(\  -  a)[a  + g(l -  a )] 
dcb [c6a ( l - a )  + £ 0 ]2
> OVrt > 1 (114)
cb- > -  o \w=wNE
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1 < n < oo, equilibrium employment is a discontinuous function of the regime 
parameter: the discontinuity is independent of lu and occurs at
cb = cb = - ( n - V ) £ / ( \ - a ) [ a +  n s ( \ - a ) ]  and is analogous to the discontinuity at 
t] = f, in the case of the price leyel rule. (Note that cb > — l / ( l - a ) 2 , so that the 
discontinuity exists regardless of the nature of monetary-policy delegation.) 
Furthermore, as cb —> -  l/(l -  a ) 2 and cb -»  0, equilibrium employment approaches 
its value under efficient wage-setting and atomistic unions respectively, which 
obviously parallels what happens under the price level rule as xx approaches its two 
inadmissible values o f  unity and [a + y ( \ - a ) \ / y ( \ - a ) . The important point, 
however, is that (112b) reveals that there is one particular setting of cb which induces 
non-atomistic unions to set the market-clearing nominal wage, and which therefore 
ensures that society’s bliss point is achieved. We will use cb to denote this cb value:54
c* 0 - 1 )  [_________c’u[a + £ { \ - a ) \ - £ l u_________
b (1 -  a)  \  nc'u (1 -  a)[a + £*(1 -  a)] ~[a + ns{  1 -  a)]lu
If delegation merely involves assigning an objective function to an instrument- 
independent central bank, equation (115) tells us the optimal weight for that objective 
function. However, if  delegation also involves goal independence, and thus 
necessitates the choice of a central banker with particular preferences, the social 
optimum will not be attainable if cb < - l / ( l - « ) 2 . Substituting the right-hand side of 
(115) into this inequality condition reveals that if  the representative union’s 
preference parameters lu and c' are such that both the inequalities
nc'u (1 -  a)[a + s{ 1 -  a)]/[a  + ns{  1 -  a )] >lu > c'u (1 -  a)  hold, it will not be possible to
choose an inflation-loving central banker whose fondness for inflation is sufficiently 
strong to induce each union to set the market-clearing nominal wage. However, if 
either lu > nc'u (1 -  a)[a  + £(1 -  a)]/[a + ns(  1 -  a )] or lu < c'u (1 -  a)  holds, then
c*b > -  i / a  -  a ) 2 is found to be the case, and the optimum is attainable even when the
54 The fact that cb = c*b achieves socially optimal price level stabilization when 1 < n < oo implies that
the additional delegation parameters in (10a) are redundant (i.e. given cb =c*b , when unions are non- 
atomistic the socially optimal value o f  each o f  them is zero).
(115)
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Figure II.6
Equilibrium employment as a function of the central bank ’s weight parameter
(1 - a)
nc'u ( l - a ) [ a  + £ - ( l - a ) ]
\a  + ne( l  -  a )]
( y a  + e A )
Notes:
1. It is assumed that 1 < n < oo and that lu < cu (1 -  a ) .
2. cb =-----------------------
(1 - a ) [ a  + ns(\ -  a)]
3 __________ Cu[a + s { \ - a ) } - £ l u__________
(1 -  a)  | nc'u (1 - a)[a + £-(1 -  a)] ~[a + ne( 1 -  a)]lu
4. /1 is undefined when ch = —1/(1 — a ) 2 and when ch = 0 .I w=wNE U
5. The graph o f  l\w_w is shown as a dashed line for cb < — l / ( l - a ) 2 , since for these ch values
equilibrium employment is not defined if delegation involves appointing a goal-independent central 
banker.
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central banker is goal independent. The scenario in which lu <c’u( 1 -  a)  is depicted in 
Figure II.6 above. Note that this encompasses the most plausible case of union 
preferences which might be considered, namely that in which lu coincides with the
market-clearing level o f employment. For this lu = 0 case, we find that:
= - J = z ! L  (u s-)
n ( l - a ) 2
Just as in the case o f the price level rule, these results for the discretionary regime 
can be explained in terms o f the influence of the regime parameter on the trade-off 
between real wage and employment perceived by a non-atomistic union. Using (7), 
(26) and (27), the marginal effects of union f s  wage on its real wage and 
employment, and the slope o f its perceived labour demand curve are as follows:
d fW ' . - p )  ®
- - - 7 /V. = — (116)
dwj (1 + 0)
dwj [or + £‘(l-a )](l + ®)
dlj _  [cba ( l - a )  + £<&] 
d(Wj ~ p)  [<* + £(1 -  a)]®
(117)
(118)
Evaluating (117) for cb = cb reveals that this setting of the weight parameter causes 
the real wage and aggregate demand channels to neutralise each other exactly, so that 
(dlj/d(Wj -  /?))| . = 0 , and each union perceives the employment cost of its wage
decision to be zero, and hence pursues as high a real wage as possible. When cb - c b , 
therefore, the union’s circumstances are the same as under the price level rule when 
Tj = f j . Using (118) it is similarly straightforward to show that non-atomistic union f s  
perceived trade-off approaches, respectively, that of a single union as 
cb —> — l/(l — a )2 , and that of an atomistic union as cb —» 0. Finally,
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c b - ~ { p - 1)/n(l -  a ) 2 is revealed by (116) to have the effect of rendering the real 
wage channel inoperative (the perceived labour demand curve is vertical), so that each 
union then sets w . so as to bring about its employment objective o f lu . If lu = 0 it
then follows directly that this cb induces non-atomistic unions to set the market-
clearing nominal wage and hence is socially optimal. If lu * 0 the explanation is more
complicated, but the essential point remains that in the absence of goal independence, 
market-clearing wage-setting can be induced by setting the central bank’s weight 
parameter appropriately, while if delegation does involve goal independence an 
appropriate choice o f central banker can bring about the socially optimal outcome for 
many, but not all, cases o f union preferences.
It seems appropriate at this point to suggest that caution be exercised in interpreting 
this result before arriving at a policy recommendation on the basis of it. This is 
because the argument put forward in the preceding paragraphs is rather more firmly 
grounded in the first, rather than the second, of the two aforementioned possible 
interpretations o f society’s delegation decision in respect of the discretionary 
monetary regime. If the appointed central banker enjoys some degree of goal 
independence, so that the second interpretation must be considered the more 
persuasive, it then follows that the real-world relevance of the result identified in this 
section crucially hinges upon the assumptions that inflation-loving candidate central 
bankers exist, that the extent to which each such person is fond of inflation is 
accurately discernible, and that the appointment o f the most suitable such candidate 
will be viewed as credible by private-sector agents. All o f these assumptions are 
questionable, of course, and for these reasons when the institutional framework 
involves goal independence being conferred on the head of the central bank, the key 
result o f this section ought then to be regarded as a theoretical curiosity rather than a 
serious proposal for the design o f the monetary regime.
Finally, it seems fitting to end our discussion of the discretionary monetary regime 
by emphasising the importance o f our assumption that the central bank sets m after w 
has been determined. As mentioned in Chapter I, several papers have shown that in a 
game of simultaneous moves by the authorities and the unions, the employment 
outcome is independent of the central bank’s weight parameter. The reason is the 
straightforward one that, since the central bank cannot observe w at the time it sets its 
instrument, each union, regardless of n, perceives m to be beyond its influence, and
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treats it as given in choosing its individually optimal wage. The scenario therefore 
corresponds very closely to that of the simple rule, and indeed the equilibrium 
employment outcome under discretionary monetary policy when the central bank sets 
m at the same time as w is determined is given by (46b), the outcome under the simple 
rule.55
II.6 Wage-Setting when the Union Loss Features a Quadratic Real-Wage Term
This final section compares the results described above for the case in which the 
union loss function is given by (29) (i.e. features a linear term, and no quadratic term 
in the real wage), with the results which arise when the quadratic real wage term is 
present, as in union loss functions (28) and (30). Since all the key points of the 
argument can be made by referring to the simpler specification given by (30), we will 
concentrate on this specification, and only briefly comment on the implications of
(28). Only the price level rule will be examined here: needless to say, very similar 
conclusions arise in respect o f the nominal income and employment rules.
When the analytical procedures described in our previous section on the price level 
rule are applied to union loss function (30), the efficient nominal wage is found to be:
. [ a  + r (  1 - « ) ( ! -  *i)] [c. (1 -  -  /. ] m 9 )
r ( l -^ i ) [ l  + c „ ( l - a ) 2]
Combining (119) with (15) yields the efficient real wage, which in turn can be 
substituted into the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, (34b), in order to derive 
the efficient employment outcome:
J \wJ=w y/ [l + cu( l - a )  ]
(120a)
55 Acocella et al. (2005) investigate the importance o f  timing assumptions in the Coricelli et al. model 
when unions are inflation-indifferent. For the scenario in which m and w  are simultaneously 
determined, the expression for equilibrium unemployment obtained by Acocella et al. (2005, p. 11, 
equation (18)), can be shown, after accounting for differences in notation and for the value (unity) 
assigned by them to the aggregate demand elasticity, to imply equilibrium employment equal to 
equation (46b) o f  this chapter.
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real
l \  = 1“ - C“Q— (120b)
j|w,=w*Vy [1 + (1 — or) ]
Note that in general these efficient outcomes differ from the individual union’s 
notional objectives, w[eaI and lu. The exception to this general finding is the special
case in which wrueal and lu are consistent with one another, i.e. represent a point 
(union f s  bliss point) on the symmetric-wage labour demand curve. This special case 
is that in which wrueal = -(1 -cc)lu, and when wrueal and !u are restricted to satisfy this
equation, (120a) and (120b) reveal that these notional objectives are indeed attained 
under efficient wage-setting:
-v. -  „ v = < ° ‘ (121a)J \wj = w V /, wu = - ( I - a ) l u
. =K (121b)J \w j  = w V/, w " a = -(1 - a ) l u
The equilibrium nominal wage, real wage and employment in this scenario are as 
follows:
[a + Kl-a)(l-r,)]|V
w n e  ~  7 .  :r ( l - r , ) J ( 122)
(w . -  p)\ = (1 -  a) (123a)
/ , .  = — (123b)
\w  =  w N E I
where: S, =cu[a + s(  1 -  a )][A -  ny( 1 -  a)zx]wrueal -  {ya + s A -  y[a + ns(  1 -  
E2 = ya(l  -  r ,) + {s + cu (1 -  cc)[a + £(1 -  a )]} [A -  ny(  1 -  a)rx ].
Evaluating these expressions for n = 1 reveals that equilibrium wage-setting is 
efficient when there is a single union. For n>  1, however, the equilibrium real
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outcomes (123a) and (123b), differ in general from the efficient outcomes (120a) and 
(120b). It is evident that the loss function (30) gives rise to an adverse wage-setting 
externality in much the same way as (29). While it would be inappropriate to discuss 
in depth the externality arising from (30), given the exhaustive account o f its source 
and nature provided earlier for the case of (29), it is worth pointing out that whereas 
with (29) the externality does not depend on lu and for most values of rx leads to an 
inefficiently high real wage, in the case of (30) the direction of the externality depends 
not only on r, but also on how wrueal and lu relate to one another. In the simple rule 
(r, = 0 ) case, for example, the fact that (29) implies that the efficient employment 
outcome is necessarily less than lu causes the real wage to be inefficiently high in
equilibrium. When union preferences are given by (30), however, this will only be the 
case under the simple rule if the individual union’s bliss point is located to the right of 
the symmetric-wage labour demand curve (in algebraic terms this will be so if 
lu > - w rveal / ( I - a )  ). If  lu < - w r*al j  ( \ - a )  so that the bliss point is to the left of the
symmetric-wage labour demand curve, the simple rule will be characterised by an 
inefficiently low real wage in equilibrium. Hence in the case o f (30) the direction of 
the externality is sensitive to the union’s preference parameters, as well as to the 
monetary rule parameter, whereas in the case of (29) it is only sensitive to the latter.56
It is clear from (122) that, as in the case of loss function (29), there exists a setting 
of r, which can induce non-atomistic unions to set the market-clearing nominal wage. 
Setting the right-hand side of (122) equal to zero, and solving for t x , the socially 
optimal setting of this parameter is found to be:
( 1V  c J a  + g(l -  g )]A < “ ' -  (ya  + e h )/„ |
y r ncu(1 - a)[a + £-(1 - a)]wruea ~[a + n s ( \ - a)]lu
The key finding o f our earlier analysis therefore appears also to arise when the
en
union loss function is given by (30) rather than (29). However, there is an important
56 Note again that imperfect competition is essential for the existence o f  the externality, since it is 
apparent from (122) that w NE = .
57 Note that Bratsiotis and Martin’s expression for mean equilibrium unemployment (their equation 
(16) on p.249 o f  their paper) also appears to imply that in their model there is a particular value o f  their
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difference between the cases. Whereas with loss function (29) t * exists (provided 
1 < n < co) regardless o f the value taken by lu, with loss function (30) only exists if 
lu and wrueal are inconsistent with one another. Setting lu = -w™al / ( } - a )  in (122), 
(123a) and (123b), we find that the'equilibrium outcomes are efficient and that union
r o
f s  bliss point is achieved regardless of n, s , and the rule parameter t] :
w» L r ,_0_o)/. = w ' (125>
( w . - p )  I ~ wual (126a)v J ^  \v/=wm ,w ™ ‘ = - ( \ - a ) l u “ V '
l,\ I = lu (126b)j \w=w„e,K°' = -(!-«)/„ " V J
This result that the wage-setting externality only exists if  the individual union’s real 
wage and employment objectives are consistent with one another appears to be 
implicit in Bratsiotis and Martin’s own expressions,59 and also arises for the more 
general specification o f the union loss function, namely (28). As explained in an 
earlier section o f this chapter, the linear real wage term in (28) has the effect of 
displacing the bliss point of the isoloss map away from the point whose coordinates 
are the notional objectives of lu and wrueal, so that the true desired real wage
accompanying the employment objective of lu becomes (c'u/cu) + w rueal. However, if 
these true objectives are consistent with one another, in other words if lu and 
(c'u/cu) + w7al satisfy the equation lu = ~[c'u +cuwrueal]/cu( l - a ) , uniony’s true bliss
monetary accommodation parameter (the equivalent o f  this chapter’s r , ) which causes equilibrium 
unemployment to be zero.
58 Except, o f  course, for the two inadmissible values for r, o f  unity and [a  + / ( I  -  a ) ] / y ( \  - a ) , which 
result in indeterminacy o f  both nominal and real variables. Note also that while the right-hand side o f  
(124) appears to be defined when lu = - w f ‘ / ( I - a ) , this is illusory since r,* has been derived on the 
assumption that lu *  -  w[eal /(I -  a ) .
59 In the non-stochastic version o f  Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), if  the trouble is taken to work out the 
individual union’s employment target which is consistent with its real wage target, and this 
employment target is then substituted into their expression for equilibrium unemployment (their 
equation (16) on p.249 o f  their paper), equilibrium unemployment is found to be zero in their model 
when union objectives are consistent.
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point will lie on the symmetric-wage labour demand curve and equilibrium wage- 
setting will then be efficient and beyond the monetary regime’s influence.60
The sensitivity of equilibrium outcomes to the assumption that each union’s 
notional objectives are inconsistent with one another has previously been commented 
upon by Cubitt (1997). His remarks, however, concern models of strategic interaction 
between a policymaker and a single economy-wide union. This chapter is 
consequently the first contribution to the literature to point out that Cubitt’s critique 
also extends to models which feature multiple unions, and which are therefore 
potentially characterised by wage-setting externalities. Cubitt’s principal point is that 
when the single union’s loss function has quadratic terms in both employment and the 
real wage, a necessary condition for stagflation to be an equilibrium outcome is that 
the union’s objectives be formulated without account being taken o f the feasibility of 
simultaneously attaining both these objectives given the economy’s known structure, 
so that the resulting bliss point is not on the labour demand curve, and consequently is 
unfeasible.
The extension of Cubitt’s critique to the multiple-union model of Bratsiotis and 
Martin seems straightforward, since in that model every union recognises that in the 
rational-expectations equilibrium the outcome must lie on the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve. Given the centrality of this to the results o f Bratsiotis and Martin, a 
compelling argument exists for constraining the individual union’s objectives lu and
wrueal to be consistent with the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, so that the
resulting bliss point lies on that curve. Note that if  we extend the model with loss 
function (30) by endogenising each union’s choice of real wage objective, in the 
resulting Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game each union does choose 
this real wage objective wruea‘ to be consistent with lu, so that the wage-setting
externality is absent from the subsequent simultaneous-move wage-setting game. This 
extension to the model is described in Appendix II.5.
Although Cubitt (1997) does not discuss the case of a union objective function 
which features a linear rather than quadratic term in the real wage, it is nevertheless 
clear that a variant of the Cubitt critique can be applied to the results relating to loss 
function (29) reported earlier in this chapter. As mentioned earlier, the key point about
60 Once again, this is subject to the proviso that r, ^ 1 and r, *  [a + y( \  -  a ) ] / y {  1 -  a ) .
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(29) is that it does not feature a notional real wage objective and therefore lacks a
bliss point.61 This feature of (29) suggests that an argument along the following lines
can be constructed in its defence: ‘Union j  may formulate a particular employment
objective lu (and it seems most plausible to assume at this point, as Coricelli et al. do,
>
that lu = 0 , so that union j  desires employment to be at its market-clearing level), but
given lu = 0 is achieved, union j  must be better off if it so happens that its members
also receive a higher real wage than the market-clearing real wage’. This corresponds 
closely to the notion underlying standard utility functions that if  an individual agent 
does attain her ideal leisure outcome, her utility must then necessarily be increasing in 
her goods consumption. While this defence o f (29) obviously has considerable 
intuitive appeal, there is a notable objection to it, namely that it abstracts from the 
possibility that the union’s objective function may differ from that of its members, 
and that it may be necessary to distinguish between their respective objective
A9functions even when the union’s sole concern is to maximise its members’ welfare. 
Therefore, while (29) has the apparent merit of being based on plausible primitive 
assumptions regarding the preferences of union f s  members, it nevertheless may be 
objected to on the grounds that it precludes the possibility that union j  may formulate 
a specific real wage objective to accompany its notional employment objective o f lu.
As discussed earlier, given the constraint of a downwardly sloped labour demand 
curve, the presence o f the linear real-wage term in (29) means that the notional 
employment objective lu cannot ever be the employment outcome under either 
equilibrium or (perhaps more significantly) efficient wage-setting. Thus an element of 
artificiality appertains to lu in (29), which appears awkward alongside the assumption
61 Note that when (29) is the loss function one cannot easily extend the model by endogenising the 
union preference parameter which is at the root o f the externality, namely the weight c 'u , since it is 
difficult not to treat c[ as anything other than ‘primitive’, i.e. a fundamental structural building-block 
o f the model. With loss function (29), for instance, the externality will disappear if  c'u = 0 (this would 
cause the isoloss map to consist o f  parallel straight lines, with the line at lj = lu representing an infinite
set o f  bliss points). However, since a key aspect o f  the loss function itself is in this case being adjusted, 
we lack a criterion for the evaluation o f  the impact o f  such a parameter change on union welfare: in 
effect, an adjustment in c' amounts to a modification o f  the union welfare criterion itself. Modifying
w f 1 in (28) and (30) is not vulnerable to this criticism, since given lu, consistency with the
symmetric-wage labour demand curve implies a unique corresponding wrf ' .
62 As pointed out by Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004, p.702), (29) also has the drawback o f  
implausibly assuming that for any given employment level the marginal rate o f  substitution between 
employment and the real wage (i.e. the slope o f  the isoloss contours at that employment level) is 
constant and does not vary with the real wage.
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that each union, given its objective function, forms its expectations rationally and sets 
its wage in an optimising fashion. It is then only a short step to arguing that since each 
union is assumed to be rational (i.e. endeavours to minimise its loss function and 
forms rational expectations) when setting its wage, it ought to be assumed to be 
rational, and hence ought to be assumed to take structural constraints into account, 
when formulating its objectives.
The Cubitt critique, suitably adapted, therefore appears to imply that (28), together 
with consistency between lu and w[eal, may be preferable to (29) as a specification of
union objectives. The validity of this argument depends, of course, on whether or not 
those responsible for formulating union objectives can specify targets for both 
employment and the real wage. Clearly, if union f s  leaders are ‘weak’, in the sense of 
being unable to disregard the clamour of militant members who are concerned to push 
up the real wage, such a circumstance may in fact make (29) a more realistic 
specification for the modeller to adopt.
II.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated various issues relating to the design of monetary 
institutions for a non-stochastic economy which features monopolistically competitive 
firms and inflation-indifferent monopoly unions. It has been found that union wage- 
setting decisions are characterised by a macroeconomic externality involving the price 
level, with this externality absent in the limiting case of a perfectly competitive goods 
market, or when there is a single economy-wide union. Equilibrium employment has 
been found to be independent o f parameters relating to the monetary regime in the 
extreme cases of wage-bargaining structure, or when the money supply is set 
simultaneously with wages. The chapter’s principal findings of importance, however, 
relate to economies with multiple non-atomistic unions, when the regime involves a 
monetary response to either the aggregate nominal wage or to a variable dependent 
upon that wage. Three monetary rules were analysed and shown to be equivalent in 
the sense that, with the exception of a few special cases, any particular employment 
outcome can be brought about by an appropriate setting of the monetary response 
parameter in each of these rules. An economic explanation for this was provided in 
terms of how the rule parameter affects the externality via its influence on the
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individual wage decisions of non-atomistic unions. The most interesting finding of all, 
however, was that appropriate design of each of these rules can induce non-atomistic 
unions to set the nominal wage associated with labour-market clearing. A parallel set 
of results was shown to arise under a discretionary regime: in particular, it was found 
that a central bank whose loss function features a negative relative weight on inflation 
can completely eliminate both unemployment and the mean inflation bias. This 
theoretical curiosity was not identified by Coricelli et al. (2004a, 2006) in their 
investigation of the optimal delegation issue on account of their plausibly restricting 
this relative weight to be positive.
The chapter’s secondary finding of importance is that the wage-setting externality 
which typically arises in this framework is sensitive to the specification of the union’s 
loss function. In particular, specifications which involve a quadratic term in the real 
wage, as adopted by Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), are vulnerable to the Cubitt (1997) 
critique, namely that such specifications ignore the possibility that unions may, in 
formulating their objectives, take into account the constraints facing them. Although 
Cubitt did not apply his critique to the specification adopted by Coricelli et al. (2004a, 
2006), and which features a linear rather than quadratic term in the real wage, 
arguments were provided for a variant o f the critique being similarly valid in respect 
of this linear-term specification, since this linear element entirely precludes the 
possibility that unions might devise a specific real wage target to accompany their 
notional employment objective. Ultimately, however, the chapter is compelled, like 
Cubitt, to conclude on a non-committal note as regards this issue, since it is far from 
clear whether or not each individual union in formulating its objectives, assesses their 
feasibility by taking into account the available information regarding the economy’s 
structure.
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Chapter III 
Union Wage-Setting, Monopolistically 
Competitive Firms and Stochastic Shocks
>
I I I .l  Introduction
Whereas Chapter II has investigated in depth the nature o f the wage-setting 
externalities which arise in a non-stochastic unionised economy when firms are 
monopolistically competitive, and has pinpointed and explained several noteworthy 
results which, although unnoticed, are implicit in existing published papers, this 
second chapter will endeavour to extend this literature by introducing stochastic 
shocks into the basic model outlined previously. As explained in Chapter I, an initial 
foray in this direction has been undertaken by Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), who study 
how the strategic wage-setting behaviour of non-atomistic unions affects the 
performance of a variety of monetary regimes, both rule-based and discretionary, 
when both aggregate demand and productivity are subject to stochastic shocks. This 
chapter differs from Bratsiotis and Martin in several respects. Firstly, whereas 
Bratsiotis and Martin only rather tersely describe equilibrium outcomes for a variety 
of regimes, including several varieties of targeting rule, this chapter provides a 
detailed analysis o f three basic regimes, those of a fixed money supply, the optimal 
state-contingent rule, and a discretionary regime.1 Secondly, we utilise a more 
intuitively justifiable specification of the union loss function than that adopted by 
Bratsiotis and Martin. Thirdly, and most importantly, the chapter departs from 
Bratsiotis and Martin by adopting the assumption of Herrendorf and Lockwood 
(1997) that each union possesses, at the time it concludes its wage agreement with its 
employer firm(s), some information concerning the realised value of the productivity 
shock relating to the period covered by the wage agreement. (Bratsiotis and Martin by 
contrast assume unions possess no such information, while Herrendorf and Lockwood 
assume atomistic unions and perfectly competitive firms.) As will be seen below, this 
third departure from Bratsiotis and Martin is especially significant since it represents 
the first attempt in the literature to investigate the implications of union wage-setting
1 Although Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) briefly analyse the simple rule and discretion, this chapter does 
not reproduce their results because o f  differences in assumptions regarding information structure and 
union preferences. Note also that Bratsiotis and Martin differ from this chapter by allowing for non- 
atomistic firms.
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behaviour for economic transparency. In other words, insofar as a central bank enjoys 
an informational advantage over unions as regards the realised values of 
macroeconomic shocks, to what extent should the central bank relinquish this 
advantage by disclosing some or all of its information to the unions, and what are the 
associated implications for optimal delegation arrangements? As mentioned in 
Chapter I, these issues have not hitherto been investigated in the context of a 
unionised economy.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section III.2 sets out the structural equations 
common to the three monetary regime scenarios considered subsequently, and in 
particular discusses the adopted version of the union loss function. Section III.3 
analyses the fixed money supply regime, which, following the practice of Chapter II, 
will for convenience be referred to as the simple rule, while Section III.4 derives the 
optimal state-contingent rule for the extremes of wage bargaining structure. Section
III.5 is devoted to the discretionary monetary policy regime: the section initially 
conducts the analysis with the quality o f union information assumed to be exogenous, 
and then proceeds to endogenise information quality in order to study the issues of 
optimal economic transparency and optimal regime design.
III.2 The Model
The structural equations for this chapter’s model appear below as expressions (I) to 
(12b). These are largely familiar from Chapter II, and will only be discussed insofar 
as they differ from their counterparts presented previously.
y f  =a l ,  + 0,  0 < a  < 1 (1)
where 0 ~ N(0,crj)
/  = j‘/ A '  (2)
0
y f  - y D = - e ( p , - P), s >  l (3)
1
where p  = Jp td i .
/=0
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y D = y ( m -  p  + f) ,  
where <j> ~ N {0,<x^).
(4)
I- = 0 (5)
j / n  I j l n
/ ? =  \ l f &  \di  (6)
U~ l)/n /
s = 6 + u (7)
where u ~ N(0,cr2) and E(9u) = 0 .
Q s = ( I - l m) 2 + cs(tt-7T*)2 (8)
Q cb = l 2 +cb7t2 (9)
,=o « y-i
nyi^+c^Wj-p)2 (10)
The individual firm’s production function, (1), now features a productivity shock, 
6 , while the aggregate demand equation, (4), has been modified to allow for a 
stochastic aggregate demand or velocity shock, ^ . Both o f these shocks are assumed 
to be normally distributed with finite variance, and the mean value of each has been 
normalised for convenience at zero. Note that the 6 shock is assumed to be common 
to all firms, and furthermore that its value is known to them when making their 
output, pricing, and labour demand decisions. This is entirely in accordance with the
2 The aggregate demand shock, (f>, can alternatively be thought o f  as a random additive disturbance to 
the money supply itself.
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assumptions made by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), as is the implicit assumption 
that there are no firm-specific demand shocks.
As well as introducing stochastic shocks into the model, we also follow Herrendorf 
and Lockwood (1997) in assuming that unions receive a common noisy signal, s, of
where u is the noise term which is uncorrelated with 0 , so that E{0u) = 0 . It follows 
that the variance of the signal, a 2, is given by:
Initially it is assumed that cr2, like <j 29 , is an exogenous parameter. However, in a 
later section of this chapter concerned with economic transparency, cr2 is made a 
choice variable of the central bank.
It is assumed that the variances of #and u, crj and cr2, are public knowledge: thus
cr2 is also commonly known. As in Herrendorf and Lockwood, the information
structure is such that each union’s rational expectation of 0 ,  conditional on s, is 
formed using the ordinary least-squares population regression line slope. Denoting 
this slope by /?, we therefore have:
Two extreme cases of information structure are captured by (12a) and (12b). Firstly, 
there is the full-information case in which every union receives a perfect signal of 0 
and therefore is perfectly informed of the state of productivity at the time it sets its
item o f information received by the individual union (or, more generally, by a private-sector agent), on 
the basis o f  which that union or agent forms a forecast o f  the relevant aggregate variable. Note that this 
use o f  the word differs from that o f  the signal-extraction literature stemming from Lucas (1972), where 
‘signal’ denotes not the item o f  information but rather the unobserved variable which the individual 
agent attempts to forecast on the basis o f  its available information.
the productivity shock. The relationship between s and 8 is given by equation (7),
a ] ^ E { s 1) = a l + a l (11)
E (0 \ s )  = p s (12a)
(12b)
wage: this is the case in which cr2 = 0 , so that fi\ i =Q =1 and s = 0 , and hence
3 Throughout the thesis the word ‘signal’ is used, as in Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), to refer to the
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E{6\s ) = 6 .  The second extreme is the limiting case in which cr2 -> co, so that the
signals are so noisy as to be worthless to unions. In this case we have = 0 , so
that E { 6 1 s) = 0 , and each union’s best forecast (i.e. its rational expectation) of 6  is 
this shock’s unconditional mean vahxe of zero, with the signal being entirely ignored. 
For intermediate degrees of signal quality between these two extremes we have 
0 < <r2 < oo, so that 0 < / ? < l ,  with /? being closer to unity the smaller is cr2.
Apart from the introduction of stochastic shocks and a common signal, the only 
difference between the structural equations set out above and their counterparts in 
Chapter II is the specification of the union loss function, equation (10). The latter is a 
version of Chapter II’s equation (30), with the employment and real wage objectives, 
lu and w rueal, both set equal to zero. The adopted normalisations imply that the
unconditional mean market-clearing values of the real wage and employment are both 
zero. Hence the quadratic union loss function, (10), embodies the idea that unions 
regard departures of the real wage and employment from their (unconditional) 
expected values as inherently undesirable. In other words, this loss function 
specification assumes that the representative union is averse to variability in both its 
real wage and employment.
It is worthwhile comparing the specification of the union loss function adopted here 
with the specifications used by the two papers most closely related to the model of 
this chapter, namely Bratsiotis and Martin (1999) and Herrendorf and Lockwood 
(1997). In Bratsiotis and Martin (1999), the union’s objective function4 is specified to 
be quadratic in deviations o f the real wage from a desired or target value which varies 
with the productivity shock (note that this target value of the real wage is not 
necessarily the real wage which clears the labour market, since, as pointed out in 
Chapter II, Bratsiotis and Martin do not restrict the union’s notional real wage and 
employment objectives to be consistent). Bratsiotis and Martin do not provide a 
rationale for this specification, which amounts to assuming, somewhat implausibly, 
that the union regards a certain degree of variability in the real wage as intrinsically 
desirable. However, the fact that Bratsiotis and Martin also assume that unions are 
entirely ignorant of the productivity shock’s value at the time the nominal wages are 
set, means that their assumption that each union’s desired real wage is stochastic does
4 The relevant equation is equation (10) on p.247 o f  Bratsiotis and Martin (1999).
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not affect their reported results. The key feature of Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), 
of course, is the assumption that unions do possess noisy information about the 
productivity shock when setting wages. Sure enough, their union objective function5 
assumes fixed values for the notional real wage and employment objectives, and 
differs from this chapter’s specification, equation (10), only by allowing these 
objectives, lu and w[eal (in our notation), respectively to fall short o f and exceed their
mean market-clearing values. The purpose of this assumption in Herrendorf and 
Lockwood’s model is to endogenously generate a mean inflation bias when the central 
bank’s delegated employment target is the socially optimal value associated with 
labour-market clearing. Were we also to specify lu < 0 and wrueal > 0 appropriately,
the model of this chapter would, when the monetary-regime scenario is that of 
discretion, also exhibit a mean inflation bias. This phenomenon is o f little interest to 
us, however, since Coricelli et al. (2004a, 2006) have already investigated the issue in 
a non-stochastic model featuring non-atomistic unions and a monopolistically 
competitive goods market. Our interest lies in combining these ingredients with the 
stochastic framework and information structure of Herrendorf and Lockwood, and to 
this end it is entirely satisfactory to adopt (10) as our specification o f union objectives, 
since none of the results reported below would change were we to specify the notional 
objectives in (10) to differ from the mean market-clearing values.
Having concluded our discussion of the structural equations, we now state the 
profit-maximising labour demand of the individual firm implied by them. We assume 
that firm i in working out its profit-maximising price and associated labour demand, is 
fully informed about the productivity shock. The firm’s profit-maximisation exercise 
in the presence o f stochastic shocks is described in Appendix II. 1, and without further 
ado we present firm /’s optimal labour demand as a function o f p  and the shocks, and 
for given settings o f the money supply, m, and of the nominal wage, wf, specified in 
its contract with its associated union:6
jd _ r(.m + ^ - p ) - £ ( w i - p )  + ( s - i ) e  
[cc + £ ( l - a ) ]
5 Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) equation (2), p.480.
6 Equation (13) is equation (A.II.1.8) from Appendix II. 1, appropriately renumbered.
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Although the trouble has been taken to allow for the velocity shock in deriving (13), 
this disturbance is of little interest in the context of this chapter, since were the 
individual union to posses any information regarding (j) , an appropriate adjustment of
its wage in the light of this information would enable it to stabilise both its real wage
/
and its employment perfectly in relation to this shock’s anticipated component (i.e. 
the union’s forecast of it). The nature o f velocity shocks is such that they do not give 
rise to a trade-off, either for an individual union or for unions collectively, between 
stabilising the real wage and stabilising employment: adjusting the nominal wage to 
neutralise a velocity shock’s potential impact on the real wage necessarily also 
neutralises its potential impact on employment. For this reason wage-setting 
externalities do not arise in respect of velocity shocks, or union forecasts of them, and 
consequently little of substance is gained for this chapter by including them in the 
model. We therefore simplify matters by assuming that the variance of the ^ shock is 
zero, so that this shock is always equal to its unconditional mean o f zero:
= r ( m - p ) - e ( w i - p )  + ( £ - 1)0 
[a + s ( \ - a ) ]
During the course o f the discussion it will be useful as well to refer to the equation of 
the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, that is, the labour demand curve which 
prevails when there is symmetric wage-setting (and hence symmetric price-setting 
too). This equation has already been derived for the model with stochastic shocks in 
Appendix II.2. It is:
i "  (w, -  p) + 0
1j \  =  ■■■- £ - - <—  0 4( I - a )
Since unions generally lack perfect information about 0  (the sole exception is the 
a l  = 0 special case), a distinction needs to be drawn between the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve and the expectation of it conditional on s:
7 Equation (14) is equation (A.II.2.9) from Appendix II.2. Note that since the symmetric-wage labour ; 
demand curve is a special case o f  the aggregate-level labour demand curve, (14) may be rewritten with 
/ in place o f  I .,  and w  in place o f  W j .
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(14')
The next step in the analysis is to derive a semi-reduced form for the aggregate price 
level. With demand-determined employment, the substitution of /„ as given by
equation (13'), into the production function, (1), followed by aggregation across 
firms, and the equating o f the resulting expression for aggregate supply with
With symmetric wage-setting, wt = w\/ i ,  every firm will have the same profit- 
maximising price, and a symmetric price-setting (/?, = pVz) equilibrium will result in 
the goods market.
In the interests o f clarity, we complete our description of the model with time-line 
diagrams which describe two alternative scenarios, both of which are captured by our 
model. Although the scenarios differ as regards the timing o f the realisation of 0, 
they are nevertheless identical as regards the model’s crucial aspect, namely the 
structure o f information regarding the productivity shock. In Time Line III. 1, the 
realisation o f 0 occurs before uilions observe the common signal s, whereas in Time 
Line III.2 it occurs after the unions’ simultaneous-move wage-setting game. In fact, 
the realisation of 0 may occur at any point in the time line, provided unions observe a 
noisy signal of it prior to setting their wages, and provided firms have full information 
about this shock when making their pricing and labour-demand decisions. Note that 
the time lines also assume that the money supply is set at the same time as the price 
level is determined. This assumption is made so as to encompass all three of the 
monetary regime scenarios considered below, since two of these scenarios assume the 
central bank has full information regarding the productivity shock and/or the 
aggregate wage (or price level) at the time the money supply is set. This informational 
assumption is irrelevant to the other monetary scenario, namely the simple rule, for 
which the realisation o f the money supply may occur at any point in the depicted time
f 1 "aggregate demand, allows p  to be solved for as a function of m, w = \wtdi = — V  w.-,
Jo
and 0:
y (1 -  a)m  + a w - 6  
[a + y { \ - a ) \ (15)
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lines, provided unions and firms are fully informed about it at the time of making their 
individual moves. As in Chapter II, it is assumed that unions are always fully 
informed regarding the nature of the monetary regime.
III.3 Wage-Setting under the Simple Rule
III. 3.1 Efficient Wage-Setting
III.3.1.(i) Derivation of the Efficient Nominal Wage 
Having completed the requisite preliminary discussions, we are now in a position to
study the macroeconomic repercussions of union wage-setting decisions when unions 
possess noisy information about the productivity shock. The first scenario we will 
consider is that of the simple rule according to which the money supply is kept fixed 
at a constant value, m , regardless of the realised value of 0 or of any of the aggregate 
variables. It is convenient to normalise m at zero, so that m = m = 0 can be
o
substituted into (13 ') and (15) to simplify these expressions further. (Throughout the 
remainder o f this section m = m = 0 is assumed, as is cr  ^ = 0 , and subscripts denoting
these assumptions are dropped to avoid excessive notational clutter.)
Our first task must be to derive the nominal wage that is efficient from the collective 
viewpoint of unions. The efficient wage, w*, is that which minimises union f s  
expected loss, conditional on the signal, given that every union in the economy does 
set this particular wage. Combining (6), (10), (13') and (15), we obtain:
restriction that every union does set the same wage, i.e. w. = w V /, obtaining the
2
E ( y - 1)0-
s[a  + y(  1 -  a)]wj + a{y  -  s)w
[a + s(l -  a)]
+ cu{6 + [a + y ( l - a ) ] w j - a w } 2 s (16)
The efficient wage is the solution to dE(Qu, | s) dw = 0. Imposing on (16) the
J w . =  w V  i 1
As in Chapter II, throughout this chapter the price level for the previous period is normalised at zero, 
/?_, = 0 , so that n  = p  is once again the case.
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derivative with respect to w of the resulting expression9, applying the rational 
expectations operator (so that E{6 \ s) = J3s), and solving the first-order condition, the 
efficient wage is found to be:
w =
\ 7 ; [l + cu( l - a ) 2]
(17)
III.3.1 .(ii) Discussion o f the Efficient Nominal Wage
A noteworthy point about the efficient wage is that the coefficient on /fc is 
ambiguous in sign: it is not necessarily the case that the efficient response to a 
positive signal is to reduce the wage nominal wage. A positive signal indicates the 
real wage may potentially increase, as a result o f the negative impact on the price 
level o f the shock’s anticipated component. While this undesirable movement in the 
real wage away from its unconditional mean (zero) can be dampened by a negative 
adjustment in the nominal wage,10 it is nevertheless efficient in certain circumstances 
for the unions to respond to a positive signal by increasing the nominal wage above its 
unconditional mean efficient value of zero, an adjustment which exacerbates the real- 
wage impact o f the anticipated component o f the shock. The reason for this is that 
unions’ relative aversion to employment variability may be sufficiently strong for it to 
be efficient for them to divert the brunt of the impact of the anticipated component on 
to the real wage, so that the expected impact of 6 on employment is relatively mild. 
Sure enough, it is evident from (17) that the efficient wage response to a positive 
signal is positive only if  the relative weight attached to real wage variability, cu, is
below a certain threshold value: specifically, w* > 0 when s > 0 if (and only if) 
cu < { y - 1)/(1 -  a ) . (Note that since cu > 0 this possibility can be precluded if y < 1.)
9 The resulting expression w ill simply be (16) with every Wj replaced with w.
10 From (15) it is evident that a negative adjustment in w will, like the positive anticipated component 
o f  the shock, cause the price level to fall. However, the effect on the expected real wage o f  a negative 
adjustment in w in response to s  > 0 is unambiguously negative (i.e. it unambiguously dampens the 
anticipated component o f  the shock’s impact on the real wage). This is readily apparent from the fact 
that, using (15), we have (w  -  p ) | ,^ =Q = [ / ( l  - a ) w  + 6 ] j [a  + y(l -  a ) ] .
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The price level under efficient wage-setting is obtained by substituting (17) into 
(15). It is convenient to write it in terms of the union forecast, J3s, and forecast error, 
6 -  J3s, of the shock, since the covariance of these terms is zero, E[/3s(0 -  J3s)] = 0 :n
[\ + cu( \ - a ) ] P s  (i9 - p s )
y[l + cu( l - a ) 2] [a + y ( \ - a ) ]
(18)
Comparing (17) and (18), it is apparent the efficient nominal wage can be written as 
follows:
(19)
Using (17) and (18), the efficient real wage is:
(20a)
Substituting (20a) for (wy -  p)  in the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, (14), the
It is also o f interest to consider the variances of the real wage and of employment 
under efficient wage-setting:
" Using (7) and (12b) we find that: E[/3s(0 - /3s)\ = / 3 E [ s 0 -  J3s2] = /3 [ a j  -  fi(cT2d + ct2u)]
= f5{p\  -  ) = 0 ,  where the expectation E  is unconditional.
12 Note that and I are interchangeable when considering efficient wage-setting (as also are -  p  
and w -  p ) ,  since with every union abiding by the efficient wage, individual real outcomes must be 
identical across all unions.
• 12 efficient employment outcome is found to be:
l\ cu{\ -a) /3s  t
w=w' [l + cu( l - a ) 2] l> + r 0 - a ) ]
(20b)
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(21a)
, , c l { \ - a fp< j ]  { y - \ f P a l
l w  [l + c„ '(l-ct)2J2 [a + y ( l - a ) f
(21b)
In these expressions E  denotes the unconditional expectation, while use has also been 
made of the variances o f the forecast, /3s, and of the forecast error, 6 -  /3s, which are
Substituting (21a) and (21b) into the unconditional expectation of the union loss 
function, (10), yields the unconditional expected loss of each union under efficient 
wage-setting:
Expressions (20a) and (20b) decompose the realised value of the real wage and 
employment into a term in /3s, the forecast (or anticipated component) of the shock, 
and a term in 0 -  /3s, the forecast error or unanticipated component. Under efficient 
wage-setting the apportionment of the anticipated component of the shock between 
the real wage and employment is the best that can possibly be achieved given 
symmetric wage-setting (i.e. Wj = w \ / j ). Note that while the coefficients of the terms
in f3s in (20a) and (20b) are functions of the representative union’s weight parameter
cu (which, of course, measures the union’s preference for real wage stability, relative
to employment stability), and of the productivity-related parameter a , they do not 
feature the aggregate demand elasticity y . The reason for this is that fully coordinated
1 \respectively given by the following expressions:
E(/3s)2 =/32( * 20 +cr2) = /3a20 (22a)
E { 9 - P s f = { \ - p ? C T l + p W u = p a l (22b)
E(€lu ) | K + ( r - 1)2F ° '.2
j [l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] [a + y ( \ - a ) f
(23)
13 Note that E { 6 - / 3 s ) 2 = E [ { \ -  /3)6 -  J3u]2.
143
wage-setting takes full account of the price-level and aggregate-demand repercussions
of the aggregate nominal wage and hence ensures that y does not influence the
impact of the shock’s anticipated component on real outcomes. Since unions, by
definition, possess no information about the unanticipated component of the shock at
*
the time the efficient wage is chosen, the unions’ preferences cannot influence how 
this component is divided between real wage and employment: hence the absence of 
cu from the coefficients o f the terms in 9 -  (5s in (20a) and (20b). Their ignorance of 
6 -  (5s also means, o f course, that y influences real outcomes relating to this 
unanticipated component o f the shock. The presence of noise in the unions’ signal of 
9 (i.e. the fact that they are not perfectly informed about it) generally prevents 
efficient wage-setting from being able to bring about the ideal outcome, namely the 
apportionment of the entire shock, 9 ,  between the real wage and employment in 
accordance with the preferences of unions. This ideal outcome is a real wage of 
0 /[l + c„(l - a ) 2], together with employment o f cu( \ - a ) 9 / \ \  + cu( \ - a ) 2]. It is 
readily apparent from (20a) and (20b) that under perfect information regarding 9 (the 
cr2 = 0 case, so that (5 = 1 and s = 9 at all times) this ideal outcome is achieved by
the efficient nominal wage. If information is imperfect ( a 2 > 0), the ideal outcome 
only ever arises in any particular period if the forecast happens by pure chance to be 
completely accurate (i.e. if  J3s = 9 ). (Of course, when a 2 > 0 is the case a lucky
circumstance of this kind cannot occur systematically.) As scrutiny o f (20a) and (20b) 
makes clear, in general when signals are noisy and wage-setting is efficient, it is only 
the anticipated component of the shock that is ideally apportioned between the real 
wage and employment. The reason for the qualifying phrase ‘in general’ in this 
explanation is that there is one special case of union preferences (a particular value 
which the weight cu may take) which results in the ideal distribution of the shock
itself, rather than just its anticipated component, between the real wage and 
employment, and this is so irrespective of the quality of unions’ information (i.e. the 
amount of signal noise). This special case is that in which cu has the value
= (r — i)/(i — « ) *
Rather more will be said about this special case in a little while. For the moment we 
abstract from this case by assuming cu ^ c u , since we need first o f all to discuss
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another aspect o f (20a) and (20b), namely the fact that y plays an important role in 
determining how the impact of the unanticipated component of the shock is divided 
between the real wage and employment. Note that whereas a positive forecast error 
regarding the shock always increases the real wage, irrespective of y , the sign of its
k
impact on employment is ambiguous and depends on y . The reader at this point is 
referred to Figure III. 1, which depicts the case in which unions set the wage 
efficiently following a positive signal, s > 0 , and the forecast error turns out to be 
positive, 6 - p s >  0 . The unions’ expectation of the aggregate-level labour demand 
curve, conditional on the signal, is in this case above and to the right of the origin, but 
below and to the left o f the aggregate-level labour demand curve itself. Efficient 
wage-setting ensures the real wage and employment outcome combination relating to 
the anticipated component o f the shock is given by the coordinates o f the tangency 
point (labelled a in Figure III. 1) between the unions’ expectation, conditional on s , o f 
the aggregate-level labour demand curve and the isoloss map, the bliss point of which 
is located at the origin. For a non-zero realisation of the forecast error, of course, the 
aggregate-level labour demand curve differs from unions’ conditional expectation of 
it, and the actual outcome (the diagram coordinates of which will be given by 
equations (20a) and (20b)) in general does not occur at a tangency point between the 
isoloss map and the aggregate-level labour demand curve. If y  > 1 the forecast error 
has a positive impact on both real wage and employment: the outcome may be at the 
tangency point e, but in general is not and instead is at a point such as b. If y = 1 the 
outcome is at c, with the real wage solely bearing the impact of the forecast error and 
the employment outcome under efficient wage-setting equal to the value unions 
intended collectively to bring about. Finally, if y < 1 a positive forecast error has a 
negative impact on employment, and the real wage increases by more than this 
unanticipated component of the shock14, with the outcome being lower down the 
aggregate-level labour demand curve at a point such as d.
Thus the strength of the impact of the unions’ forecast error on the real wage 
relative to its impact on employment depends on y rather than on cu . The irrelevance
14 As is apparent from (20a), whether a positive forecast error regarding 6  has a-full, less-than-full, or 
more-than-full impact on the real wage depends on how its coefficient, [a  + y (  1 -  a ) ] -1, compares with
unity. Note that [a + y( l  -  a ) ] -1 > (<)1 when y  < (>)1, and that [a  + y (  1 -  a ) ] -1 = 1.V = 1
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Figure III.l
Actual and expected outcomes from efficient wage-setting
(1 - a )
(1 - a )
, {O-Ps)
[a + y ( l - a ) ]
Notes:
1. The diagram ignores velocity shocks, and assumes for illustrative purposes that 0 >  J3s> 0 .
2. The upper o f  the two diagonal lines is the symmetric-wage and aggregate-level labour demand 
curve. The lower diagonal line is the expectation, conditional on s, o f  the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve.
3. The expected outcome conditional on s is at a, while the actual efficient outcome is at b. It is 
therefore implicitly assumed that y  > 1 and that 0 < c u < (y - 1)/(1 -  a )  .
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of the unions’ weight parameter in this context ought not to surprise since unions are
uninformed about 6 -  fis when setting the efficient wage and therefore cannot
influence its impact on real outcomes. While the slope and position of the aggregate-
level labour demand curve (and of unions’ conditional expectation of this curve) are
*
independent o f y , y plays a key role in determining the location of the outcome on 
the aggregate-level labour demand curve whenever there is a non-zero forecast error. 
(Similarly, had we allowed for velocity shocks, and union forecasts thereof, these 
would be found to have no effect on the slope and position o f the curves depicted in 
Figure III. 1, and would only affect the position of the outcome on the aggregate-level 
labour demand curve if the unions’ forecast error regarding the velocity shock 
happened to be non-zero.) The reason why y  exerts a major influence over the real 
impact of forecast errors is because it is central to the profit-maximising pricing 
decision of the individual firm once the nominal wage and the state of productivity 
have been realised. Insight into this can be gained by considering the following 
version of the semi-reduced form for the price level, obtained by setting m = 0 in (15) 
and decomposing 9 into forecast and forecast error:
I a w - / 3 s - ( 6 - p s )  ,
a  + y ( l - a )
This equation reveals that when y <  1, firm pricing behaviour is such that the price 
level falls by more than the value of the positive forecast error itself.15 (In other 
words, when y < 1 the price level is relatively elastic with respect to the forecast 
error.) Since the nominal wage does not respond at all to the forecast error, it follows 
that when y.< 1 the real wage must also be relatively elastic with respect to it. In the 
y -1  case the price level, and hence the real wage also, has unit elasticity with respect 
to the forecast error, while when y > 1 the price level falls, and the real wage 
increases, by less than the full extent of a positive error. The associated impact of the 
error on employment involves both a direct effect, and an indirect effect working via 
the induced change in the real wage, as is evident from the following version of (14), 
the equation of the symmetric-wage labour demand curve:
15 Note that we cannot make a similar inference from (1 5 ')  regarding the impact o f  the forecast itself 
( f i s ) on p,  since w is a function o f  Ps  .
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- { w t - p )  + Ps + ( P - p s )
J Wj=wVj ( l - « )
The impact of 0 -  J3s on employment is therefore:16
dlj dlj dlj d(wj -  p)
(14")
d{6 -  ps) d{9 -  Ps) d(Wj -  p)  d{6 -  ps)
+  J--------- —^— —— (24)
d(w -  p)  1
w h ere  --------= ----------------- , and hence:
d(6~Ps)  a  + y ( l - a )
dL ( r - i )
d { 0 - p s )  [a + y ( \ - a ) ]
(24 ')
This last equation reveals that when y  = 1 and the forecast error is positive, the fact 
that the real wage increases by the full amount of the error means that employment is 
fully insulated from its impact, while if y < (>)1 the fact that the real wage increases 
by more (less) than the error implies that some of the impact of this unanticipated 
component of the shock must also be transmitted to employment.
One further aspect o f Figure III.l remains to be discussed, namely the tangency 
point at e between the representative union’s isoloss map and the aggregate-level 
labour demand curve. The existence of such a tangency point implies that there is 
some y  value which results in the movement of the price level in response to the 
unanticipated component of the shock being exactly what is required to bring about 
the ideal distribution of the impact of this component (the forecast error) between the 
real wage and employment. It is clear from Figure III.l that since point e is further up 
the aggregate-level labour demand curve than point c, it must involve a y value 
greater than unity. This is indeed the case, since the y  value which ensures efficient 
wage-setting always results in the outcome being at a tangency point is 
y  = 1 + cu (1 -  a ) . This equation can be written as cu = (y - 1)/(1 -  a ) , or as cu = cu, the
To reduce the notational burden at this point, the ‘ Wj = wV/ ’ subscript is temporarily omitted.
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special case mentioned earlier. To see why this y value is of particular interest, note 
that equations (20a) and (20b) in this special case are as follows:
(25a)
l \ ■w = w , cu
O'- 1 ) 0 (25b)
~(r 1)/(1 «) [a  + y( \
The coefficient o f the term in ps in (20a), l/[l + cu( l - c r )2], and the corresponding
coefficient in (20b), cu( 1 -  a)/[  1 + cu( 1 -  a )1] , comprise the optimal apportionment of 
the productivity shock’s impact between the real wage and employment. In general, 
the coefficient on Ps differs from that on 0 -  Ps in (20a), and a similar point can be 
made about the two coefficients in (20b). In other words, efficient wage-setting can in 
general only achieve the optimal allocation of the anticipated component of the shock, 
and in general fails to allocate optimally the unanticipated component. However, 
when y  = 1 + cu (1 -  a ) , the two coefficients in (20a) take the same value, implying
that the adjustment in the price level occasioned by the unanticipated component of 
the shock is precisely what is required to bring about the most desirable adjustment in 
the real wage (and hence in employment too) in relation to that unanticipated 
component. This is a significant finding, since it implies that the signal, regardless of 
its quality, is o f no value to unions in this special case! When y = 1 + cu (1 -  a ) , unions
can achieve collective efficiency in wage-setting, irrespective of the magnitude of 
their forecast error, by entirely disregarding the signal and simply setting the nominal 
wage equal to its unconditional mean efficient value of zero, since the movement in 
the price level occasioned by the realisation of the shock then exactly suffices to 
distribute the entire shock’s impact between the real wage and employment in the 
most desirable way from the unions’ viewpoint. Sure enough, equation (17) for the 
efficient wage confirms this intuition:
w
Y  = \ + cu (1 -a )
= 0 (26)
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We conclude our discussion of the outcomes from efficient wage-setting under the 
simple rule by briefly commenting upon the unconditional expectation of each union’s 
loss as given by equation (23). The first noteworthy point about this expression 
concerns the extreme cu = 0 case of union relative preferences, which corresponds to
the representative union being indifferent to real wage variability. For this extreme 
case we find that the component of the union’s expected loss relating to the 
anticipated component o f 6 shocks is zero:
£(0 “| , ) = JL Jli£ L  (27)
w=w , cH =0 [ a  +  y ( l - a ) ]
The reason for this is straightforward: unions can always, by means of an appropriate 
adjustment of the nominal wage, fully insulate either one of the two of real wage and
1 7employment from the anticipated component of the shock. However, since 
productivity shocks must have an effect on either the real wage or employment, it is 
impossible for efficient wage-setting to prevent the anticipated component of shocks 
having an impact on union welfare when the union loss function features quadratic 
terms in both the real wage and employment (i.e. when cu is positive and finite).
The second aspect of (23) which calls for comment is the nature of the functional 
dependence of its two component terms on the variance of the signal noise term, 
which is an obvious measure of the quality of unions’ information about the 6 shock. 
It is readily apparent from the following derivatives that whereas a marginal increase 
in cr2 (i.e. a marginal deterioration in signal quality) has a beneficial (i.e. negative) 
impact on the term in the variance of the unions’ forecasts in (23), 
namelyE(f32s2) = /?cr2, this is counterbalanced by its positive and therefore
17 This reasoning suggests that, under efficient wage-setting, the part o f  the expected union loss relating 
to the anticipated component o f  6  shocks ought also to be zero in the converse extreme case in which 
each union’s sole concern is to achieve real wage stability. This corresponds to the limiting cu -»oo
case o f our model, and yet using (23) we find that '‘^ . £ ( 0 “ .)  = °°- This result is solely a" J\w = W*
consequence o f  the way the loss function is formulated, however, and in particular arises because cu is 
a relative weight parameter. Were we alternatively to specify the loss function as 
^  = c J 2i + (w i ~ P ) 2 > then ^ would be found that c £(Q "| . )  = B<j 2 / [ a  + v(  1 -  a ) ] 2 . The fact
J  "  J  J  U J  =w
that this expression lacks a term in P a 2d , confirms the intuition that, under efficient wage-setting, the 
anticipated component o f  a 6  shock has a zero impact on the union loss when unions are indifferent to 
variability o f  either employment or the real wage.
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detrimental impact on the term in the variance of the unions’ forecast errors, 
E[(6 -  /3sf  ] = E[( 1 -  P f  6 2 + /?V  ] = (1 -  p f  a \  + p 2a 2u .
(28a)
d E { { 9 - P s f ]  _  d E [ { 9 - P s f ] (28b)
Direct Effect Indirect Effect
Note that in (28b) the indirect effect of a marginal increase in a 2 on the forecast-error 
variance, i.e. the effect working via the induced change in p , is zero:
dE[{0-ps )2}
dp
= -2 (1 - / ? ) ct,2+ 2 / ^ = 0 (28c)
The reason for this is the straightforward one that the population regression line slope, 
p , is by definition the line of best fit through the scatterplot of points in (0,s) space, 
and hence must be the best coefficient which can possibly be chosen for the 
forecasting equation 6 e \ s = Coefficien t x s , where 9e \ s denotes the expectation 
conditional on j . 18 In other words, considering E [ ( 9 - ( 0 e | s ) )2], where the 
expectation E  is unconditional, as a function of the forecasting equation coefficient, 
this forecast-error variance is (globally) minimised when the coefficient is set equal to 
P . Since the first-order condition for the optimal coefficient choice is satisfied, a
marginal change in <j 2 which induces a change in that minimand (i.e. P ) necessarily
has a zero impact on the minimised variable, the forecast-error variance. The indirect 
effect given by (28c) is therefore zero, and with the direct effect in (28b) positive, a 
marginal increase in the signal noise variance necessarily worsens the variance of 
forecast errors.
18 6 e | s is used here rather than E{6 \  s)  since the latter is the mathematical conditional expectation 
which exploits all available information.
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Using (28a) and (28b) in conjunction with our expression for the representative 
union’s expected loss under efficient wage-setting, (23), we find that with only a 
single exception, the beneficial effect of a marginal increase in erf on the term in (23)
in the variance of the forecasts is always outweighed by its detrimental effect on the 
term in the variance of the forecast errors:
dE(Cl ,) r rJ Wj=w=w _ j  cu | Lcu + ( j  i) \ \ 2 £29)
d ( J u l [ l  +  c B( l - a )  ] [ a  +  r ( l - a ) Y
It is easily shown that the right-hand side of (29) is positive for all values o f cu , other 
than cu =cu .19 The latter is the special case in which signals can be disregarded by 
unions engaged in efficient wage-setting, since price level movements associated with 
forecast errors regarding 0 bring about the most desirable outcome from unions’ 
collective viewpoint. Since the signals are of no intrinsic value in this special case, it 
is hardly surprising that it is the only one for which the marginal effect o f a 
deterioration in signal quality on unions’ expected loss under efficient wage-setting is 
zero rather than positive.
III. 3.2 Equilibrium Wage-Setting under the Simple Rule
III.3.2.(i) Derivation of the Equilibrium Nominal Wage 
We now turn to the derivation of the equilibrium nominal wage under the simple 
monetary rule. This involves each union setting its individually optimal nominal 
wage, conditional on the common signal, s, with the wage decisions of other unions 
taken as given. The relevant expression for the individual union’s conditional 
expected loss is once again given by equation (16). The total derivative o f (16) with 
respect to Wj takes account of the fact that for a non-atomistic union, dw/dwj = l / n ,
so that dE(QUj \ s)/dwj = dE(QUj \ s)/dWj + (l/nfidE(Q.Uj | j)/5w )=  0 is union y’s flrst-
19 The necessary and sufficient condition for the right-hand side o f  (29) to be positive is that 
[c„ + 0  ~ b 21 [1 + (1 ~ a f  1 > cu[a  + r(l “ a ) f  > or f ( cu) > 0 » where
f { c u) = { \ - a ) 2cl  - 2 ( l - a ) ( r - l ) c u + ( y - l ) 2 . Since d 2f ( c u) / d c 2u > 0 ,  and since the equation 
/ ( cu) = 0 has a single repeated root (i.e. a unique solution) at cu = c u = ( / -1 )/(1  - a ) ,  it follows that 
f ( c tt) >  0Vcu *  cu , and that f { c u) evaluated at cu = cu is zero.
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order condition for its individually optimal wage, w**. Obtaining this total derivative, 
imposing the symmetric Nash equilibrium condition that wj* = E(w \ s ) = wNEV j , and 
solving for the resulting symmetric Nash equilibrium wage, yields:
W NE ~
Vs
f (r  - 1 )(ya  + sA.) -  c„ [a + g(l -  g)]A j 
[ ya  + fA + cu (1 -  a)[a + 1 -  a)]A  J
(30)
where A = (n -1  )a  + ny( 1 -  a )  .
Substituting (30) into (15) yields the price level under equilibrium wage-setting:
P\1 I»v = m'a
_ ^ 0 1  ya + sA + cu[a + s ( \ - a ) ] A  1 ( 0 -  /5s)
Ky j [ y a  + £A + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + € ( \ - a ) ] A J [a + y ( l - a ) ]
'-------------------------------------- V-------------------------------------- '
E(p\„=v ■ lJ)
(31)
Comparing (30) and (31), it is evident that the equilibrium nominal wage can be 
written as follows:
wNE = E ( A „ - . J s ) +
(ya + sA )ps
NE {ya + £A +cu( \ - a ) [ a  + e ( \ - a ) ] A }
(32)
The equilibrium nominal wages for the extremes of wage-bargaining structure are as 
follows:
wN E \n = 1 ^ -1
Vs
[ y - 1 - c . Q - a ) ]
[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] P
(33)
lim WkTC = Q f £(r-i)-cja+g(i-q)]1L
[£  + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + f ( l - a ) ] J\ V j
(34)
By taking the limit of (30) as s  - » co, the equilibrium nominal wage when the goods 
market is perfectly competitive is found to be:
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lim w£•->□0 W NE
kT
I r - i - c . O - a ) ]
[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2]
Ps (35)
9 0The effects of marginal increases in n and e on wNE are given by:
dw -  cua[a  + y (1 -  a)]2[a + £-(1 -  a)]j3s 
dn {ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £*(1 -  a)]A}2
NE _ < 0 when s > 0 (36)
^  =  ("  ~ 1)c“a [ a  + y(1 ~ a ) f K P s  2 > 0 V „ > 1 when ,  > 0 (37)
de y{ya  + eA + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £-(1 -  a)]A}
Using (30) and (31) together with (14), the real wage and employment under 
equilibrium wage-setting are found to be:
( w - p )  I------- = --------------- (ra  + sA^ s--------------- + _ i ^ L _  (38a)
W~W"E + £A + (1 -  a  )[a + s { l - a ) ]  A} [a + y ( \ - a ) ]
a =  cu[a + s ( \ - a ) \ K p s ________ | (y - V ) { 9 - P s )
{ya + £A + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £■(!- a)]A} [a + y ( l - a ) ]
If there is a single union, and/or the goods market is perfectly competitive, real 
outcomes are as follows:
*=*ne [1 + cu (1 -  a)  ] [a + y{ 1 -  a)]
(39a)
/ I  =  l i m  /lw = H'„t.,n = l £~>C0
c„ (1 - a ) P s  + O  - 1)(<9 -  ps)
[l + c „ ( l - a )  ] [a  + y { \ - a )]
(39b)
For the case o f atomistic unions, the corresponding pair o f expressions is:
20 In stating certain expressions which occur in this section to be positive or negative, it is generally 
assumed that cu > 0 .
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efts + { 6 - /3s)
vne {s + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + s ( \ - a ) ] }  [a  + y ( l - a )]
(40a)
lim
77—>00
cu[a + s  (1 -  a)\fis + ( y - 1 )(6 -  fis)
»=»ne {£ + cu( \ - a ) [ a ± £ ( l - a ) ] }  [a + y ( l - a ) ]
(40b)
The variances o f the real wage and employment are obtained by squaring and taking 
the unconditional expectations of (38a) and (38b), and making use in so doing of 
results (22a) and (22b):
(ya + £/\.)2/?ct2
E[(w ~p)  I ■ ]2 = + P ° \*-»ne {ya + £A + cu( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( \ - a ) ] A }  [a + y(\ -  a ) \
(41a)
E(l\ )2 c‘[a + e(l -  a)]2A?ftcrj | { y - \ f  P o 2u
'»-»« {ya  + £a  + c„ (1 -  a)[a  + £(1 -  a)]A}2 [a + y ( l - a ) f
Differentiating (41a) and (41b) with respect to n, we find that these derivatives can be 
unambiguously signed:
dE[{w -  p)\9mytxs ]2 _  -  2cuya(l -  a )[a  + y (1 -  a ) ] [a  + s(  1 -  a) ] ( / a  + eA),Oa] ; Q 
8n {ya + e k  + c„(l- a ) [ a  + s(\  -a ) ]A } 3
(42a)
dE(-lL » „  ?  2c\ya\a  + y(l -  a)][a + e(\  -  a)]2Kfia]  ; Q
dn {ya + £A + cu (1 -  a)[a  + f( l -  «)]A}3
The derivatives of (41a) and (41b) with respect to £ are unambiguous in sign for all 
n > 1, but are zero for n = 1:
d E [ ™ -P ) l ,wJ  _ 2 ( n - l ) c lla ( l - a ) [ a  + rO.-a)] (ra  + eA)Aj3cTg ; 0 V n ; t 
d£ {ya + £A + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £-(1 -  «)]A}3
(43a)
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dE(!l .w „ ) 2 ... -  2(» -1  )cla[a  + y{ 1 - g )][g  + g(l -  «)]A20aj; . Q y„ .  j (43b)
de {ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a + e(\ -  a)]A}3
Before embarking on a discussion of these numerous expressions, it is useful to state
*
as well the representative union’s unconditional expected loss under equilibrium 
wage-setting. This is obtained by combining (41a) and (41b) with the unconditional 
expectation of (10):
E(C1U ' cu{(ra + sA)2+cu[a + e ( l - a ) f A 2}/3al  ^ [cu + Q - l ) 2]/7cr„2 
‘ ”■"«£ {ya + £A + c„(l -  a)[a + s(l -  a)]A}2 [a + y(l -  a)]2
This expected loss is found to have the same value when there is a single union as 
when the economy has multiple unions and a perfectly competitive goods market:
m “ \ )J W =  V
lim
I ) =  Cu^ e 2 + -'C“+('r  (45)».i ‘ [l + c „ ( l - a )  ] la + y ( \ - a ) f
The expected loss o f atomistic unions is:
lim E ( n u s  .. C ^ e 1+ctl[a + e { \ -a ) f } P < j l  | [ c „ + ( r ~ l ) 2])?cr„2 
"■*” '  »-*« {s + cu(l -  a)[a + e(\ -  a)]}2 [a + y ( l - a ) f
The derivatives o f (44) with respect to n and e are as follows:
dE(Qj w=Wne ) = 2 ( n - 1 )c2uy a 2[a + y(l -  a ) f [ a  + s(l -a)]j3<J? 
dn {ya + £/Y + cu(l - a ) [ a  + £ ( \ - a ) ]  A}
3 — > OVn > 1 (47)
) _ 2 (n -1  )2c l a 2[a + y{ 1 -  a)YAj3crl
ds {ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a + £-(1 -  a)]A}'
< 0V« >1 (48)
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III.3.2.(ii) Discussion o f  the Wage-Setting Externality
Expressions (30) to (48) reveal that when there are multiple unions and the goods 
market is monopolistically competitive, the wage-setting decision of the individual
union is characterised by an adverse externality which results in the departure of the
* • 01
symmetric Nash equilibrium nominal wage from its efficient value. Comparing (30),
(33) and (35) with (17), we find that save when there is a single union and/or perfect
goods-market competition, the equilibrium nominal wage differs from the efficient
wage. To be a little more specific: if firms are not perfect competitors then in
equilibrium the wage set by unions in reaction to a positive (negative) signal is always
less (more) than the efficient wage, with the latter only being set if  there is a single
99economy-wide union. As mentioned earlier, whether the efficient nominal wage 
response to a positive signal is positive or negative is ambiguous and depends on 
whether the union’s weight cu is less than or greater than a critical value, namely cu.
Despite the ambiguity regarding the sign of the efficient nominal wage, there is no 
ambiguity as regards the implications for the real wage of the equilibrium nominal 
wage response to a positive signal being numerically lower than the efficient 
response: the increase in the real wage associated with the shock’s anticipated 
component must be unambiguously smaller as a result o f the inefficiency in wage-
91setting. A parallel argument exists for the case of a negative signal: the efficient 
nominal wage response is ambiguous in sign, but the externality always results in the 
equilibrium nominal wage being numerically too high, with the consequence that in 
relation to the shock’s anticipated component the equilibrium real wage does not 
decrease by as much as efficiency requires. In summary, the consequence of each 
union setting a lower-than-efficient (higher-than-efficient) wage in response to a 
positive (negative) signal is, in absolute terms, a smaller-than-efficient movement in 
the real wage, together with a larger-than-efficient movement in employment, in 
relation to the shock’s anticipated component. The inefficiently low absolute 
magnitude o f movements in the real wage in response to (non-zero) signals depresses
21 Note that the presence o f  y  in the coefficients on /3s in (38a) and (38b) is an immediate indication 
o f inefficiency.
22 That wNE < w* is the case when s  > 0 (provided n > 1), and that wNE > w * when s < 0 (again 
provided n > 1), follows straightforwardly from manipulation o f  this wNE < w * inequality, where the 
appropriate expressions are given by (30) and (17).
23 This follows immediately from the fact that under the simple rule and in the absence o f  velocity 
shocks, ( w -  p )  = [y(  1 -  a ) w  + 6 ] / [a  + y{  1 -  a ) ] .
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the variance of the real wage, as given by equation (41a), below its efficient value.
Concomitantly, the absolute magnitude of the movements in employment caused by
equilibrium wage responses to non-zero signals is inefficiently high, and this shows
up as inefficiently high employment variability, as described by equation (41b).
*
The source of the adverse externality is the individual union’s failure to take full 
account of the price-level repercussions of its wage decision. If the signal happens to 
be non-zero, there arises a trade-off between stabilising the impact of the resulting 
non-zero anticipated component of the shock on the real wage and stabilising its 
impact on employment. Unless the union is the sole supplier o f labour services in the 
economy, the trade-off faced by the individual union differs from that which exists at 
the aggregate level, and depends on the influence its wage has on the price level and 
thus, indirectly via real money balances and aggregate demand, on the labour demand 
of its employer firms, as given by equation (13). As in Chapter II, therefore, the 
impact of union f  s nominal wage on its employment outcome can be decomposed 
into a real wage channel and an aggregate demand channel. The real wage channel is 
the ultimate source o f the externality: under the simple rule the aggregate demand 
channel is negative and operates to reduce the externality’s severity.
Intuitive explanation o f the externality is facilitated by couching the discussion in 
terms of the individual union’s optimal wage decision, given that every other union 
sets its wage equal to the efficient wage. (Note, however, that efficient wage-setting 
by other unions is not in any way essential to the engendering of the externality, 
which merely requires that each union takes the wage decisions o f other unions as 
given when setting its wage.) For concreteness the discussion also focuses on the case 
of a positive signal: needless to say, a parallel argument exists for the case o f a 
negative signal. The key point is that if every other union sets its wage in response to 
s > 0 equal to w* (as given by (17)), union j  can secure, in relation to the positive 
anticipated component o f the shock, a smaller deviation of its real wage from the 
mean real wage outcome of zero, by setting a lower wage than w*. This necessarily 
entails a larger deviation of union f  s employment from its mean of zero, but this 
exacerbation of the impact of the shock’s anticipated component on employment is 
worthwhile incurring in return for the dampening of its impact on union/ s real wage.
It is helpful at this point to refer to a concept which will be familiar from Chapter II, 
namely the individual union’s perceived labour demand curve (as distinct from the
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symmetric-wage labour demand curve, itself a special case of the aggregate-level
labour demand curve). As in Chapter II, there is an infinite set of possible perceived
labour demand curves, with one such perceived curve for every wage on which the
( n - 1) unions other than union j  could coordinate their wage setting. Two members of
>
this set are of particular interest, however, namely the perceived labour demand curve 
which prevails when every other union apart from union j  sets the efficient wage, and 
its counterpart for the case in which every other union sets the equilibrium wage. 
Since each perceived labour demand curve’s slope is entirely independent of both the 
signal and the realised value of the shock, and furthermore does not depend in any 
way on the specification of the union’s loss function, it must be the same, for a given 
monetary regime, as in the non-stochastic scenario of Chapter II. In fact, under the 
simple rule the equations of the two perceived labour demand curves which are of 
interest differ from the equations of their Chapter II counterparts only in respect of 
their intercepts. The perceived labour demand curve which prevails were every other 
union to set the efficient wage (and which therefore passes through the efficient 
outcome) is stated below as equation (49a): its derivation for the version of the model 
with stochastic shocks and the union loss function of this chapter is to be found in 
Appendix III.l, as is the derivation of union f  s equilibrium perceived labour demand 
curve (i.e. that which prevails when every other union sets the equilibrium wage), the 
equation for which appears below as (49b):
E(l j k )  =
{ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a  + e(\ -  «)]A) /fa
[a + £•(!- «)]A [l + c „ ( l - a ) 2]
-  (ya  + eK)E[{Wj -  p) (49a)
E(fj
1 {(ya + sA)2+c„[a + £ ( l - a ) ] 2 f^}/3s
(ya + sA)E[(Wj-p)\ (49b)
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These perceived labour demand curves for the s > 0 case, together with the 
symmetric-wage labour demand curve24, and its expectation (conditional on s), are 
depicted below as Figure III.2. The actual symmetric-wage labour demand curve is 
located to the right of its conditional expectation: the diagram consequently implicitly 
assumes a positive realisation of  the forecast error 0 -  J3s> 0 . The (expected) 
efficient outcome is at point a, and in the absence of a forecast error (i.e. if  p s - 0  
happens to be the case), this outcome would be achieved were every union to set the 
efficient wage. The (expected) outcome for union j , were it to set its individually 
optimal wage when all other unions set the efficient wage, is located at the tangency 
point between the lower perceived labour demand curve and the isoloss map at b. This 
can be shown for the depicted s > 0 case to involve (provided n > 1) both a lower real 
wage and lower employment for union j  than the symmetric Nash equilibrium at point
25 •c. The individual union recognises, of course, that its incentive to deviate from the 
efficient wage in order to attempt to attain point b is also faced by every other union. 
It follows that the only wage consistent with individually optimising behaviour and 
rational expectations-formation by every union is wNE, as given by (30). Hence the
equilibrium (expected) outcome will be at point c, and the actual outcome only differs 
from this on account of an expectational error regarding 0 . Note that c is the unique 
point in the diagram which satisfies the criteria for a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
outcome: it is both on the expected aggregate-level labour demand curve (i.e. it is a 
member of the set o f expected outcomes, conditional on s , which are attainable given 
symmetric wage-setting), and is at a tangency point between a perceived labour 
demand curve and the representative union’s isoloss map.
24 Recall that the symmetric-wage labour demand curve is a special case o f  the aggregate-level labour 
demand curve, and hence in diagrammatic terms the two are coincident, as are their conditionally 
expected counterparts.
25 The proof that, provided n > 1 , point b is to the left o f point c in Figure III.2 proceeds as follows. 
The slope o f  each o f  union/ s isoloss contours is - c u(Wj -  p ) / l j  , and at b this is equal to the slope o f  
union / s perceived labour demand curve. Hence the coordinates o f point b must simultaneously satisfy 
both the equation cu(Wj -  p ) / / ; = (ya  + eA) / [a  + s ( l - a ) \ A  and the equation o f  the perceived labour
demand curve. Substituting the right-hand side o f  (49a) for lj in the former equation allows point b ’s 
real-wage coordinate to be solved for as:
Wj -  p  = {ya + eA + cu ( \ - a ) [ a  + e(\  -  a ) \A} (ya  + £A)/fr/[l + ca( l - a ) 2]{ (ja  + sA)2 + cu[a + f ( l  -  a) ]2 A2}
Following some tedious algebra, the necessary and sufficient condition for this real wage, in the s > 0 
case, to be less than the expected equilibrium real wage (which is given by the first term on the right- 
hand side o f  (38a)), is found to be: { { \ - a ) ( y a + s A ) - [ a  + E ( } - a ) ] A } 2 > 0 ,  and this condition holds 
for all n > 1 . The left-hand side o f  this inequality is zero for n = 1, implying that for a single union 
points a, b, and c are all coincident.
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Figure III.2
L abour demand curves for the case of a positive 
productivity shock
( l - a )
U n ion  j ' s  eq u ilibrium  perceived  
labour dem and curve
U nion  j ’s p erceived  labour dem and  
cu rve p assin g  through the e ffic ien t  
ou tcom e
[1 +  c u (1 -  or)2
+  W j ~  p
{ y a  + s A  + c u ( \  - a ) [ a  +  £ • ( ! - « ) ] }
E xp ectation  o f  sym m etric - 
w a g e  labour dem and  
cu rve, con d ition a l on  5
S ym m etric -w age and
a ggrega te-leve l labour 
dem and curve
Notes:
1. The diagram assumes for illustrative purposes that 9 > /3s > 0 .
2. It is also assumed that 1 < n < 00 .
3. The vertical-axis coordinate of  point c is equal to: 
cu[a  + f ( l  -  a)\Kfis/ {ya + fA  + cu(\ -  a)[a  + f ( l  - a ) ] A } .
4. The expected equilibrium outcome, conditional on s, is at c, and the expected efficient outcome is at
a. The actual equilibrium outcome will lie on the aggregate-level labour demand curve, and its precise
position will depend on the value o f  y and on the realised value o f  the velocity shock. In the absence of  
a velocity shock it will be located on the aggregate-level curve to the right o f  a perpendicular line 
passing through c.
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As in Chapter II, under the simple rule the slope of union /  s perceived labour 
demand curve is more negative, the lower the number o f unions. This slope is 
intimately related to the strength of the aggregate demand channel, which is stronger 
the smaller is n. Under the simple rule the aggregate demand channel is negative for a
'j/r (
non-atomistic union , and works in the same direction as the real wage channel. 
Hence a strengthening o f the aggregate demand channel occasioned by a marginal 
decrease in n will raise the employment cost to union j  o f deviating from the efficient 
wage. In diagrammatic terms, the perceived labour demand curve rotates in a 
clockwise direction as n decreases, and the closer is n to unity, the better does the 
perceived labour demand curve approximate the (conditional expectation of) the
• t • 7 7symmetric-wage labour demand curve. It is these facts which underlie (36) : the 
departure of the equilibrium nominal wage from its efficient value is greater, the 
larger is n because of the weakening of the aggregate demand channel and resulting 
exacerbation of the externality. It is this effect which causes real wage variability to 
be decreasing in n, and employment variability to be increasing in n, as revealed by 
expressions (42a) and (42b). The externality-exacerbating effect of a marginal 
increase in n also explains result (47) relating to the unconditional expected union loss 
under equilibrium wage-setting. (Note that the derivative in (47) is zero when n - 1 
because a single union fully internalises the price-level repercussions of the wage it 
sets at every firm in the economy, and therefore achieves the minimum possible value
7Rof the expected loss. )
As in Chapter II, the slope o f union f  s perceived labour demand curve is shallower 
(less negative) under the simple rule, the lower is s . This is because the externality 
which arises in the stochastic context of this chapter when the union loss function is 
given by (10), is dependent on the possibility of the individual firm’s price exceeding 
the average price without such a disparity causing a total evaporation of its product
demand. It is clear from (35) and from (39a) and (39b) that when the goods market is
\
perfectly competitive, the externality is absent and each union finds it individually
26 In other words, controlling for the real wage channel, the effect o f  a marginal increase in union / s 
wage on employment, working via the aggregate demand channel, is negative for a non-atomistic union 
under the simple rule. For an atomistic union it is always zero irrespective o f the monetary regime.
27 In interpreting (36), bear in mind that for s > 0 , < w* is the case.
28 O f course, a marginal increase in n when n is currently unity does not have a sensible economic 
meaning, since in econom ic terms n must take integer values. It is clear from (47), however, that a 
(non-marginal) increase in the number o f  unions from n = 1 to n = 2 will certainly result in an 
increase in the expected loss under equilibrium wage-setting.
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optimal to set the collectively efficient wage. More generally, a marginal increase in 
e reduces the scope for the prices of union /  s employer firms to depart from the 
average price, and thus mitigates the externality. It is this effect which explains the 
sign of expressions (37), (43a), (43b) and (48), all of which are zero when n = 1 since
It is worthwhile stressing that it is crucial to the existence of the externality that 
unions are averse to both deviations of the real wage and of employment from their 
unconditional expected values (i.e. its existence depends on cu being positive and
finite). If the representative union’s sole concern is to stabilise only the real wage or 
only employment, the externality does not arise since the trade-off between these 
entities which exists whenever the anticipated component o f the shock is non-zero 
does not amount to a constraint on the individual union, which can achieve its sole 
objective (in respect of the shock’s anticipated component) by setting its nominal 
wage appropriately. The absence of the externality when either one o f the two terms 
on the right-hand side of (10) is zero is formally evident from the following 
expressions which make use of (17), (20a), (20b), (30), (38a) and (38b):
a single union achieves the efficient outcome regardless of goods-market conditions.
(50a)
„ 0 = ( W-.P)l (50b)
i ( r - w - m
»-»■»£.c.-o [ a + y ( l - a ) ] (50c)
- ps (51a)
y{ 1 -  a)
(51b)
I
163
lim Ti lim fis 1 { y - \ ) { e - p s )  
(1 - a )  [a + y (1 -  a)]
(51c)
Expressions (50a) to (50c) reveal that when unions are indifferent to real wage 
variability (the cu = 0 case), equilibrium wage-setting is efficient and ensures that
employment is fully insulated from the shock’s anticipated component, the full impact 
of which consequently falls on the real wage. In the converse extreme case in which 
cu - » co, which amounts to unions being indifferent to employment variability,
efficiency requires that the anticipated component’s impact be entirely borne by 
employment, with the real wage fully protected, and that this is indeed the case under 
equilibrium wage-setting is apparent from expressions (51a) to (51c).
An obvious measure of the strength of the externality is the amount by which the 
variance of the real wage under equilibrium wage-setting falls below its efficient 
value. (Clearly, an alternative measure one might adopt is the excess of equilibrium 
employment variability over its efficient value.) Hence the following expression, 
obtained by combining (21a) with (41a) will prove useful to the analysis:
Note that evaluating (52) for n - 1, or taking its limit as s  -»  oo causes its right-hand 
side to equal zero. This is to be expected, since the externality is known to be absent 
in these two special cases. By tedious algebra it can be shown that, provided n > 1, 
the right-hand side o f (52) is unambiguously negative for all positive cu values. We
variability is inefficiently low for all cu >0 ,  provided n > 1. More important for our 
present purposes is the nature of the functional relationship between the strength of 
the externality, as represented by (52), and the parameter cu. Since it is apparent from 
(21a) and (41a) that under both efficient and equilibrium wage-setting the variance of 
the real wage is a strictly convex function of cu for all cu > 0 , it is clear from (50b)
and (51b) that the strength of the externality rises initially as cu increases from zero,
P a ]  (52)
{ya + sA + cu(1 -  a)[a  + £-(1 -  a)]A}2 [1 + cu( 1 -  a )2]2
omit such a proof since this fact is implied by our earlier finding that real wage
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Figure III.3
Variances of employment and the real wage as 
functions of the union weight param eter
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and attains a maximum strength at some intermediate value, following which further 
increases in cu must cause a diminution of the severity of the externality. This
functional relationship between the externality’s strength and cu is evident from
Figure III.3, which for good measure also includes graphs of the variances of the 
real wage and of employment under the two wage-setting scenarios in order to 
emphasise the important point that the externality is strongest for intermediate values 
of the unions preference parameter, cu .
III.3.3.(iii) Signal Quality, Equilibrium Wage-Setting and Union Welfare 
There is another interesting aspect to the equilibrium nominal wage, as given by 
(30), and the associated real outcomes, as given by (38a) and (38b), which calls for 
comment. It will be recalled that under efficient wage-setting there is a special case, 
involving a particular combination o f values for the structural parameters, which 
renders the signal worthless to unions and makes it efficient to set the wage equal to 
its unconditional mean market-clearing value of zero, regardless of the particular 
realisation o f the signal or the quality of the information it embodies. Significantly, 
this special case has a parallel under equilibrium wage-setting, in which unions are led 
to disregard the signal and set a wage of zero. It will be recalled from our earlier 
discussion o f efficient wage-setting that this special case in that scenario involved 
the parameters a  and y  taking values such that the equation cu = cu, where
cu ={y - \ ) l ( \ - a ) , is satisfied. As is apparent from (30), the analogous special case 
under equilibrium wage-setting involves the values of a ,  y, s and n being such as to 
satisfy the equation cu =cu where cu = ( y - \ ) ( y a  + £A)/[a + £ ( l - a ) ] A . 29
There are two main points to note about cu and cu. Firstly, substituting cu for cu 
in (38a) and (38b), we find that the equilibrium real wage when cu =cu is 
8/[a + y(  1 -  a ) ] , and that equilibrium employment is (y -1 )9 /[a  + y(  1 -  a ) ] , and that 
these outcomes are the same as their counterparts under efficient wage-setting when 
cu =cu. This equivalence is hardly surprising since these special cu values in their
29 Note that just as it was pointed out earlier that the possibility o f  cu being equal to cu is precluded if  
y  < 1, so too is the possibility o f  cu being equal to cu precluded if  y  < 1.
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respective scenarios alike cause the wage at every firm to be zero, and hence a 
particular realisation of 0 must have the same impact on real outcomes in these two 
special cases. There is a significant difference between efficient wage-setting when
cu = cu and equilibrium wage-setting when cu = cu, however: whereas when cu =cu a 
real wage of #/[l + £ T ( l-a )2] = 6/[a + y ( \ - a ) ]  is the best possible outcome for 
unions, in the sense that both the shock’s anticipated component, J3s, and its 
unanticipated component, 6 -  f l s , are efficiently distributed between the real wage 
and employment, under equilibrium wage-setting this particular outcome comes about 
not when cu =cu, but rather when cu =cu, and hence for the latter case of union 
preferences cannot be efficient. In other words, although equilibrium wage-setting 
when cu = cu brings about the same real outcomes as efficient wage-setting when 
cu =cu, it does not achieve the most desirable distribution, from the point of view of 
unions, of either the anticipated or unanticipated component o f the shock between the
inreal wage and employment.
The second main point regarding cu and cu is that the difference between these two 
values is smaller, the higher the value of £ and the lower is n: in other words, cu and 
cu are closer the weaker the externality in wage-setting. Indeed, we find that for the 
extreme cases of the model in which the externality is absent, these two cu values
= cu. This observation regarding the proximity of cu to cucoincide: ^ c u = c
n = 1
when there are only a few unions in the economy and product-market competition 
between firms is strong will prove useful in interpreting some of the algebraic 
expressions which will arise below in the course of our investigation of the 
relationship between the expected union loss and the quality o f the information 
available to unions regarding the productivity shock. Before turning to this major
theme of the current chapter, however, it is best to explain first of all why cu and cu
30 Provided n > 1 and e  is finite, under equilibrium wage-setting the externality always prevents the 
achievement o f  the efficient distribution o f  the anticipated component o f  the shock between real wage
and employment, and this is just as true o f  the cu = cu case as o f  any other cu > 0 , including cu = cu .
(This statement presupposes that y  > 1, so that cu > cu > 0 is the case.) As for the unanticipated 
component o f  the shock, this is only ever apportioned in the most desirable way for unions when 
cu = cu, and this is so regardless o f  the wage-setting scenario.
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are highly pertinent to our exploration of the signal-quality issue. It will be recalled 
from our earlier discussion of efficient wage-setting that when cu = cu happens to be 
the case (and y  > 1 is a necessary condition for this to be possible), the expected 
union loss is independent of signal quality (as embodied in the noise variance, cr2),
since unions collectively achieve the most desirable outcome by always setting a 
wage of zero. It follows from this that if  each union sets its individually optimal wage 
when cu =cu, the most desirable outcome will only be achieved if the signal is 
completely uninformative and hence is ignored. If the signal is at all informative (i.e. 
if cr2 is finite), the equilibrium wage response to a non-zero signal will not be
efficient, and the apportionment of the anticipated component of the shock between 
the real wage and employment will consequently also be inefficient, with only the 
apportionment of the shock’s unanticipated component being in full accordance with 
union preferences. It is also intuitively clear that when cu = cu the inefficiency of 
equilibrium wage-setting must be worse, the better is signal quality (i.e. the lower is 
cr2 and hence the closer to unity is /?), since in this special case it is only the
anticipated component o f 6 that is inefficiently divided between the real wage and 
employment, and this component will generally be a larger proportion of 0 , the better
'X1 ^is signal quality. As for the other special case, namely that in which cu = cu, its key 
aspect is that the working of the externality is such that unions ignore the signal, so 
that the equilibrium nominal wage is zero regardless o f s. It follows that when cu = cu,
the expected union loss must be independent of signal quality.
Equipped with these intuitive insights regarding the relationship between the 
(unconditional) expected union loss and signal quality in these two special cases, we 
now undertake a more formal investigation of this relationship. The expression we 
need to consider is the unconditional expected loss of unions under efficient wage- 
setting, as given by (44). Bearing in mind that d(P<r29)/dcr] = - f t 2 and
31 The reason why this statement contains the qualifier ‘generally’ is because we are considering 
particular realisations o f  signal s and noise term u, and in any particular period u may be such as to 
cause 9  -  fis to be greater, in absolute terms, than J3s. However, the general truth o f  the statement is
readily apparent from the fact that the variance o f  the ratio o f  f3s to 6  is E[(J3s/0)2] = f t , which is
decreasing in cru2, while the variance o f  the ratio o f 0 -  /3s to 0  is E[(9 -  /3s)2/ 0 Z] = 1 - / 3 ,  which is
increasing in cr2 .
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d(P<j])ldcr] = (31, it follows that a marginal deterioration in signal quality (i.e. a 
marginal increase in cr2) will decrease the expected loss if  the coefficient of the first
term on the right-hand side of (44), the term in the variance of the unions’ forecast 
(i.e. the anticipated component of >the shock), exceeds the coefficient of the second 
term, the term in the variance of the unions’ forecast error (i.e. the unanticipated 
component of the shock).
dE(QUj )w = wNE _ -c„{(ya + £ A f +  cu[a + e ( \ - a ) f t f }  | [cu + ( y - l f ]i™ 
ab^3 {ya + eA + cu (1 -  a)[a  + s(  1 -  a)]A}2 [a + y( 1 -  a )]2
Thus under equilibrium wage-setting, the impact on unions’ welfare of a marginal 
increase in cr2 (working both directly, and indirectly, via the induced change in P ),
may be decomposed into two effects, one of which is beneficial and the other 
detrimental. The first effect is given by the first term within the square brackets on the 
right-hand side o f (53) and may be described as the beneficial externality-mitigating 
effect. A deterioration in signal quality induces a decrease in p , with the result that 
each union’s individual wage response to a non-zero signal is smaller in absolute 
terms: the departure of the equilibrium wage from its efficient value is therefore 
smaller as a result o f the increase in cr2. (That the externality’s strength is falling in
cr2 can alternatively be seen from (52), where the coefficient on Pa]  is
unambiguously negative: since d(P<jj)/da] = - p 2, it follows that the higher is <j2,
the weaker is the externality, as measured by (52).) The result is an improved 
distribution o f the anticipated component of the shock between the real wage and 
employment. The second effect is the detrimental forecast-error effect given by the 
second term within the square brackets on the right-hand side of (53). A marginal 
increase in cr2 necessarily increases the variance of the unanticipated component of
the shock (i.e. the forecast error), which in turn increases both real wage and 
employment variability and hence also the expected loss. Whether a marginal 
deterioration in signal quality is beneficial or detrimental to unions’ welfare therefore 
boils down to whether or not the externality-mitigating effect outweighs the forecast- 
error effect. Which of the two effects is the stronger depends in particular on two
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elements of the model. Firstly it will depend on the value of cu , since, as we saw 
earlier, the externality is stronger for intermediate values o f cu , and hence the 
externality-mitigating effect will have a larger beneficial impact the closer is cu to the 
value at which the externality is most severe. Secondly, it will depend on the value of 
y ,  since as mentioned earlier in our discussion of efficient wage-setting, it is this 
parameter which is crucial for determining how the unanticipated component of 6 is 
apportioned between the real wage and employment. Mindful of these points 
regarding cu and y , we now direct our attention once more to expression (53).
An immediate implication of (53) is the following necessary and sufficient 
condition for a marginal deterioration in signal quality to be beneficial (detrimental) 
to the welfare of non-atomistic unions:
dE{ Q “| )
 ^ ^ - < ( > ) 0  iff A© < (>) 0 (54)
d(ju
where A = (1 -  y)(ya  + sA) + cu [a + f( l -  a)] A
0  = - (n  - 1 )cua[a  + y(  1 -  a )]2 + [1 -  y + cu (1 -  a)] {ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a + s(l -  a)]A)
In interpreting (54) some insight is gained by noting that A is equal to minus one 
times the numerator of the coefficient on ps in the equilibrium nominal wage 
equation, (30). Interpretation of the result is also facilitated by referring to its 
graphical representation in Figure III.4 below, where A and © appear, respectively, 
as linear and quadratic functions of cu. The graph depicts the case in which y  = 1: the 
counterpart diagrams for the y < 1 and y > 1 cases are presented and discussed in
= 0 : thus in
r =l
Appendix III.2. An important aspect of the y -1  case is that cu\ = cu
Figure III.4 the graph of the linear function A passes through the origin. One 
implication of the fact that cu | = 0 is that it is not necessarily the case that a set of
admissible cu values exists for which unions’ welfare is falling in signal quality: with 
y — 1 the possibility arises that unions with positive weight cu are always made better
off by improvements in signal quality. As for the fact that cu = 0 , this implies that
y  = 1
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Figure III.4
Identification of the sign of the impact of a m arginal deterioration in 
signal quality on the expected union loss under the simple rule
( y  = 1 case)
A , 0
Range o f values for which
dE {S lu.I ) / dcr] < 0
Notes:
1. It is assumed that n > 1 and y = 1 . Note that when y = 1 , cu r=l = c, r =l = c„ \y = l =  0
2. It is assumed here that c. y = l
, the non-zero root o f the equation © = 0 , is positive. This is the case if
both £ < a / ( \ - a )  and n > a [ ( s - \ ) ( \ - a ) - X \ l [ s ( \ - a ) - a ]  (i.e. the diagram implicitly assumes that 
these two conditions hold).
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in the extreme case in which cu = 0 , union welfare will be independent of signal 
quality.
To aid the exposition we state explicitly the expression for © , as given in (54), for 
the y = 1 case:
©|r=1 = (« “  «)(! “  a f  la  + £(l ~ a )]cl  + {(1 -  a)[a + e(n -  a)] -  (n - 1 )a}cu (55)
It is readily apparent that, considered as an equation in cu , the equation ©| = 0 has
two real solutions, one o f which will be located at the origin in Figure III.4. We will 
denote this solution c l  : we therefore have c l  = 0 .  The non-zero solution,u \ y -  1 u \ y -  1
which we will denote c. , may be either positive or negative. If it is negative, the
r= i
product (A| )(©| ) will then be positive for all positive cu values, implying that
for all positive values o f cu, unions are made better off by improvements in signal 
quality. If, on the other hand, the non-zero solution is positive, cu
be the case that (A| =l )(©| =1) < (>)0 for all positive cu < (>)cw
> 0 , it will then
r -1
. In other words, if
r-1
it so happens that cu > 0 , there will be a range of positive cu values (specifically,
r- i
all positive cu values less than cu ) for which improvements in signal quality make
y =  1
unions worse off under equilibrium wage-setting. It is this situation in which 
> 0 that is depicted in Figure III.4. Solving the equation ©| = 0  for its non-
y= 1
zero solution, it is found to be:
{[a -  s{\ -  a)]n + a[(s - 1)(1 -  a ) - 1]} 
r-i ( r t - a ) ( l - a ) ! [a + £ ( l - a ) ]
It follows from (56) that in order for cu > 0 to be the case a pair of necessary
r=i
conditions must be satisfied, and that their simultaneous satisfaction is sufficient to
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ensure c. >
y=l
0 . This pair of conditions is as follows:
r= 1
> 0 iff both s  < ———  and n > —— ———— (57)
(1 - a )
Since the severity o f the wage-setting externality is decreasing in £ and increasing in 
n, the clear implication of (57) is that the externality’s severity must exceed a 
particular critical value for it to be possible for unions to be made worse off by an 
improvement in signal quality when y = 1. There is no need to state this critical value 
explicitly: what matters is that if (and only if) both the conditions in (57) hold, then 
this implies goods-market conditions and wage-bargaining structure are such that the 
resulting externality is sufficiently severe for the beneficial externality-mitigating 
effect of a marginal increase in signal noise to outweigh the detrimental forecast-error
effect for all positive cu values less than cu
r -1
Although this finding that, when y  = 1, deterioration in signal quality can improve 
union welfare only if  circumstances are such as to cause a sufficiently severe 
externality makes good intuitive sense, there is another aspect of this result which fits 
less comfortably with intuitive arguments advanced in earlier sections. In particular, 
reasons were given earlier for thinking that because the externality is more severe at 
intermediate values of cu , one would expect a worsening of signal quality not to be 
damaging to unions when cu takes very low positive values. This reasoning is 
obviously not supported by our findings for the y - 1 case. To explain why, when
A  /  _  A
cu > 0 , we have dE(Q" ) / dcr < 0 for all positive cu less than c„ ,
r= i J *=wNE / r=\
attention needs to be focused on a fact noted in our earlier discussion of efficient 
wage-setting, namely that when y = 1, employment is fully insulated from the shock’s
32 Note with regard to (57) that if  e  < a / ( l - a )  then a [ ( s  -  \)Q -  a )  -  -  a )  -  a ]  > 1 , so that in
order for cu > 0 to be the case there must be more than one union and goods-market competition
r= i
must be sufficiently low to ensure that e  < a / ( l  -  a ) . Note also that while manipulating the numerator
o f  c. , as given by (56), reveals that cu
r= i
> 0 can also be the case if  s  > a / (  1 -  a )  and
r= i
n < a [ ( s  - 1)(1 -  a )  -  l ] / [ f ( l  - a ) - a ] ,  this possibility can be precluded in the context o f  the model, 
since it would require n to take an inadmissible value o f  less than unity.
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unanticipated component (i.e. unions’ forecast error regarding 0),  and that this 
component solely affects the real wage. Thus, when y -1  the variance of forecast
errors, /?crj, only contributes to real wage variability, and does not contribute to
employment variability at all. It follow s that if cu is low, so that unions are
principally concerned to avoid employment variability, and are close to being 
indifferent to variability of the real wage, it must then be the case that when y  = 1 the 
forecast error variance is a decidedly minor component of unions’ expected loss. 
(With reference to equation (44), note that if y  = 1 and cu is close to zero, the
coefficient of the term in P a \  will be small compared to the coefficient of the term in 
!3a] .) The clear implication is that when y = 1, the detrimental forecast-error effect 
of a marginal increase in the signal noise variance must be weaker, the lower is cu. Of 
course, the beneficial externality-mitigating effect is also weaker, the lower is cu, but
it so happens that if  the conditions stated in (57) are satisfied, then for any cu <cu ,
r= i
the goods market is sufficiently uncompetitive and unions are sufficiently numerous 
for the externality to be strong enough for the mitigating effect upon it o f an increase 
in a]  to outweigh the forecast-error effect.
We have almost completed our investigation of the relationship between union 
welfare and signal quality when monetary policy is conducted according to the simple 
rule that the money supply be kept fixed regardless of the value of the productivity 
shock. The sole aspect o f the simple-rule scenario which still requires comment is the 
case of equilibrium wage-setting when unions are atomistic. Since expressions (53) 
and (54) are for finite n, their counterparts for the atomistic case have to be stated 
separately:
dE(  Q “
lim J
da!
From (58) it follows that:
-e„{£ +c„[a + e ( l -a ) ]  } + [c„+ (y -l)2]
{e + c„(l -  a)[a + £(1 -  a)]} [a + y( 1 -  a)]‘
(58)
I,
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lim dEiCT. )j  Vt> =  V
dal
<(>)0 iff A '0' < 0 )0  (59)
where A' = s(l -  y) + cu [a + £-(1 -  cdj]
0 ' = - c ua[a + y ( \ - a ) ]  + [ \ - y  + cu( \ - a ) ] { £  + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ] }
These expressions relating to the atomistic case have been stated purely for the sake 
of completeness, since all o f the previous passages discussing whether or not there 
exists a range of cu values for which the equilibrium expected loss of non-atomistic
unions is falling in a]  are equally relevant for the atomistic case. The chief point to 
note about the atomistic-unions case in the context of the simple-rule scenario of this 
section is that, for given values of cu, y, s  and a,  the wage-setting externality is 
more severe than when unions are non-atomistic. Consequently, where the values of 
the structural parameters y\ e  and a  are such as to give rise to a range of cu values
for which the expected union loss under equilibrium wage-setting is falling in a ] , this 
range of cu values is at its broadest in the atomistic case, since the more severe the 
externality, the larger the set of cu values for which the externality-mitigating effect 
of an increase in the signal-noise variance outweighs the forecast-error effect.
III.4 The Optimal State-Contingent Monetary Rule
This section derives the optimal rule for the extremes o f wage-bargaining structure, 
under the assumptions that the rule is fully credible to the private sector and is indeed 
adhered to by the monetary authorities, and that the signal-noise variance, c rj, and
hence the quality o f the signal received by unions, is exogenous. Our principal 
purpose is to ascertain the realised values of employment, the price level and the 
social loss under the optimal rule, in order to provide a standard against which to 
compare the performance of the discretionary monetary policy regime on which the 
analysis focuses in subsequent sections. Attention is confined here to the single-union
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and atomistic cases, since derivation of the optimal rule for the 1 <  n < co case would 
not yield any additional insights.
Before embarking on this task, however, a brief digression is required to explain 
why, throughout the remainder of the thesis, it is assumed that the monetary 
authorities are perfectly informed about 6 at the time monetary policy is 
implemented. This simplifying assumption is justified since were we to take the 
trouble to model the authorities as being imperfectly informed about 6 at the time 
they set their instrument, this would merely introduce terms in the authorities’ forecast 
error re 0 into our expressions for employment, the real wage, and the price level. 
The coefficients of these terms would in fact be the same as the coefficients of the 
terms in the unions’ forecast error in the relevant expressions (equations (31), (38a) 
and (38b)) for the simple-rule scenario analysed in the previous section. Hence, using 
ecb to denote the central bank’s forecast error, the employment expression (whether 
under efficient or equilibrium wage-setting) would feature the additional term 
(7 ~ V)eJ[a  + / ( l  -  a ) ] , the real wage expression the term ecb/ \ a  + 7(1 -  a )] , and the
price level expression the term -  ecbj[a + 7(1 -  a ) ] . The intuitive reason for this is 
that the simple-rule scenario can be thought of as one in which the central bank is 
completely uninformed about 6 when carrying out monetary policy, and therefore 
sets m at some fixed, rule-dictated value m . If the central bank does have some, albeit 
imperfect, information regarding 6 at the time m is set, it will, in general, adjust the 
money supply in response to the forecast of Q which it forms on the basis of this 
information. Since, however, at this date the central bank has yet to observe its 
forecast error, it will not adjust the money supply in reaction to it, and it is this lack of 
monetary response that gives rise to the parallel between the impact of this central 
bank forecast error on macroeconomic variables under this scenario, and the impact of 
the unions’ forecast error on these variables under the simple rule. The key point to 
note about the coefficients stated just above is that the only structural parameters 
which occur in them are a  and 7 . The absence of the parameters cb, cu and cr2 
from these coefficients is attributable to both the central bank and unions having no
i
| information regarding the central bank’s forecast error at the time these parties set
I
their choice variables, while s  and n are absent since these parameters only ever 
influence outcomes via the wage-setting externality, which, of course, can only arise 
in respect of the component of the shock anticipated by unions. Since our principal
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interest is in studying the macroeconomic implications of the design of the monetary 
regime (as represented by the delegation parameter cb), and of the quality of the
signal received by unions (as represented by cr]), it follows that no additional insights
regarding these issues can be gained by modelling the central bank as imperfectly 
informed about 0.  (Note that an implicit assumption underpinning this argument is 
that unions do not enjoy an informational advantage over the central bank as regards 
macroeconomic shocks. This assumption is plausible, however, if  the central bank 
sets its monetary instrument after, or at the same time as, unions set wages.)
The general form of the state-contingent rule is:
mr =m  + + A^s + A^w (60)
where m is a constant and A^  and A^  are the rule parameters. It so happens that
an alternative specification of the rule in terms of the aggregate wage (which will 
depend, of course, on the anticipated component of the shock, f i s ), and the 
unanticipated component of the shock, 6 -  p s , leads to precisely the same results as 
(60), but has an advantage over (60) in being mbre amenable to intuitive 
explanation.33 This alternative specification is:
mr - m  + p lw + p 2( 0 -  J3s) (61)
Since unions are entirely ignorant of Q-j3s  when setting their nominal wages, 
intuition suggests that the optimal setting of p 2 will bring about, in respect of this 
unanticipated component of the shock, society’s preferred impact pattern for 
employment and the price level. It will transpire below that for the single-union and 
atomistic cases on which we focus here, it is not possible to set p x so as to achieve the 
socially optimal pattern in respect of J3s.
!i
33 Note that (61) is less general than (60), since its formulation amounts to the imposition o f  a 
constraint on the rule parameters which appear in (60). To be specific, (61) is the version o f  (60) which 
arises when A, and A2 are constrained to satisfy the equation A, = - A 2/f3 .
I l l
Combining (61) with (6), (13 ') and (15), allows union f  s real wage and labour 
demand to be expressed as functions of the shock, the forecast error, and the 
individual and aggregate wage:
w M l  -« ) [» » +  Pi (9 -  ffi)] + W  -  a )A  + a ]  W -  g}
J 1 [a  + /(} ~ a )}
= 7-------^ r j    - ]  y[« + «0 - « ) ] P  + A ( f l - ^ ) ][a  + £ ( \ - a ) ] [a  + y ( \ - a )] [
+ (y -1  )[a + s{ 1 -  a)]6  + {y[a + £-(1 -  a)]px + a ( s  -  y)}w -  s[a  + y(l  -  a)]Wj j
(62b)
Union /  s loss as a function of the rule parameters, its individual wage and the 
aggregate wage is obtained by substituting (62a) and (62b) into (10). The efficient 
wage for given settings o f the rule parameters is derived by minimising the rational 
expectation, conditional on s , of this loss by choice of Wj, subject to the constraint
that wage-setting be symmetric, Wj = w V /. This, of course, is also the wage that
would be set by a single economy-wide union:
- [ ^ - r  + cu(\-a)]j3s  
y { \ - p x){\ + cu{ \ - a ) 2}
Proceeding similarly to minimise the same expected loss in the absence of a 
symmetric-wage constraint, and with the aggregate wage treated as given, allows 
atomistic union f  s individually optimal wage to be solved for as a function of the 
signal, the expected value o f the aggregate wage, E(w\ s ) , and the rule parameters. 
We shall not state this expression here, since our interest lies with the associated 
symmetric Nash equilibrium nominal wage, which may be solved for after imposing 
the condition that w . = E(w \ s) = wNE V y :
M l -  r )  + c, [a  + g(l -  « )] ? jfe 
r (  i -  a ){£ +c» 0  -  « ) [ « + £(i -  “ )] >
_ t o i^ (fish's
^ N E , atomistic case ^ % r x-i-. J  UJ
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Note that p 2 is absent from both (63a) and (63b) for the unsurprising reason that
since unions set wages in ignorance of their forecast error, the monetary response to
that error cannot be foreseen and hence cannot influence wage decisions. Another
noteworthy point is that these two expressions reveal unity to be an inadmissible value
>
for the wage-response rule parameter p x, a result which is familiar from our analysis 
of rules in the non-stochastic version o f the model. (No symmetric Nash equilibrium 
exists if  p x = 1 since, given symmetry in wages, the monetary response to w 
prescribed by the rule frustrates each union’s attempts to ensure that the anticipated 
component o f the shock is partly borne by the real wage, and thus deprives unions of 
an incentive to set wages symmetrically.)
The associated expressions for the equilibrium price level, real wage, and 
employment are obtained by substituting (63a) and (63b) into (15), (62a) and (62b) 
(with Wj = w = wNE, of course):
™ [ l-rA+c.O-«)]£* , [ y ^ - a ) p 2 - y \ { e - p s )
(1 - p ,)  y(l  -  + c„(l -  a ) ]  [a + y ( l - a ) ]
| m {g(l -  y f \ ) + c. [a + s(l -  a)} }/3s
( \ -  p Y) y(l -  p {){s + c j \ -  a)[a  + s(\  -  a)]}
+ W - a ^ P i - W -  Ps)  
[a + y(l -  a)]
(w _ p )| = ---------g _ _ ^ P - . r _ q f t )  (65a)
<• p  + Cii( i _ a )J] [a + y ( \ - a ) ]
cu(l-oQ /fc | [yQ. + p 2) - X \ ( 9 - Ps) 
[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] [a + y ( \ - a ) ]
l\ | L H2J Li\u (65b)
\w = WuK,n = \ n  i  ^ ^N2"1 r /■> si
(w - p ) |------------------ = -----------------S * ----------------------------------------------------- (66a)
j/\w = wNE, atomistic case +  ^  ^  +  £ (1  _  ^  }  [ a  +  ? ( !  -  a ) ]
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j\ c„[a + g ( l -a ) ] / fo   ^ [y{\ + p 2) - \ ] ( 0 - f i s )
L . w m ,c o n i s v c c s e  { e +  £ _ _ ( ! - a ) [ a  +  e ( l  _  « ) ] }  [ d  +  y ( l  -  « ) ]
The expressions for the expected social loss for the single-union and atomistic cases 
is found by taking the unconditional expectations of the squares of (65a), (65b), (66a) 
and (66b) in order to obtain the variances o f the price level and employment, and 
combining these appropriately with the unconditional expectation o f (8):34
  SCsm  , 1 J „2/l „N2 C .P -rA + C .O -® )],  + - - - - - - - - :- - - - - r d  c‘( 1 -  a )  + “v , 2J \ f i a i. . . . . . .  (1 _ A)2 p + c>( i - a ) > f |  r ( l - f l )  J
, { Ir  0 + P i )  -  ! ] 2  +  c s W  -  a ) P i  - 1]2 )P<t2u ( 6 7 a -,
[ a  + r d - a ) ] 2
EQs csm2  ^ {[yQ + p2) - l ] 2 +cs[ r d - a ) p 2 - \ } 2)P<jl
a to m is tic a s e  ( 1 - p , ) 2 [ a  +  / ( I  -  a ) ] 2
+ 7 ----------- 77— 77-------7.— 77771 c . [ a + £ P _ a )]  + - ----------------  2 , , " , 2------------------- \P<re{f + c „ ( l-d ) [d  + < l - a ) ] }  [ y  (1 -p .)  J
(67b)
The socially optimal monetary rule is given by the ( m , p }, p 2) combination which 
solves the following three simultaneous first-order conditions:
dEQs dEQs dEQ? .
 = ----------= ------------=  (J (6 o )
dm dp] dp2
There is little to be gained by explicitly expressing each o f the first-order conditions 
subsumed in (68) in terms of the structural parameters and rule coefficients, and 
consequently these expressions are omitted. For the n = 1 case, the relevant loss 
expression is given by (67a), and after obtaining the relevant derivatives and forming 
the first-order conditions, the solution is found to be:
34 As usual, we assume that society’s desired inflation rate is zero, n* = 0 , and that its desired level o f  
employment is the market-clearing level, so that in equation (8) /* = 0 is the case. Given the 
normalisation p_x = 0 , it* = 0 implies in turn that p* = 0 .
180
m* = 0 (69a)
. P + ^ 0 _ « M  (69b)
r
[ l - r  + ci(l - a ) ]
yP + ClO - a ) 1]
• * • 7 ^Society’s optimal monetary rule in the single-union case is therefore:
= [1 + c.  (1 -  a ) ] w P  - > -  m  
r  Y[\ + cs{ \ - a ? }
Our results for m * and p 2, namely expressions (69a) and (69c), have a 
straightforward explanation. The socially optimal setting of m is zero, since this 
ensures inflation is zero in the event that both signal and shock take their mean values 
of zero. The socially optimal setting of p 2, meanwhile, ensures that the impact of the 
shock’s unanticipated component on the price level and employment is that which is 
most desirable from society’s viewpoint. Substituting p 2, as given by (69c) into the 
coefficients on 6 -  /3s in (64a) and (65b), the impact of 6 -  /3s on the price level 
when p 2 = p \  is found to be - l / [ l  + c5( l - « ) 2], while its associated impact on 
employment is cs( \ -  a ) / \ \  + cs{ [ - a )1] . Another noteworthy point about expression 
(69d) is that it tells us that if  y and a  happen to take values such that 
cs = ( y - 1)/(1 -  a ) , the socially optimal monetary response to 9 is zero. The reason 
for this is that in this special case the movement in the price level occasioned by a 
non-zero realisation of 6 would, were w = 0 also the case, suffice by itself to bring 
about the optimal distribution of the shock’s impact between the price level and
35 Note that were we to allow for velocity shocks, with the central bank observing the particular 
realisation o f  this shock, (f>, prior to setting m, (69d) and every other optimal-rule equation in this 
section would then simply feature an additional term, -<f>, on the right-hand side. Neutralising </ by an 
appropriate adjustment o f  m fully insulates both employment and the price level from its impact. Note 
also that were we to derive society’s optimal state-contingent rule using the more general specification 
given by equation (60), the optimal values for the rule parameters in the n = 1 case would be m ' = 0 , 
= p \ , X2 = - p \ { 3  , and = p \ n=x, where p,*n=1 and p* are given by (69b) and (69c) respectively.
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employment. Note that this possibility is precluded if y < 1. This special case clearly 
parallels the special cu =cu = (y case of union preferences discussed in
Section III.3 on the simple rule. (Recall that if cu = cu happens to hold, unions can 
then afford to disregard signals entirely.)
As for society’s optimal setting of p, in the n = 1 case, the intuitive explanation for
p \ , as given by (69b) is obvious once it is noted that p, is absent from the expression 
for equilibrium employment, (65b), and is present in the coefficient on ps in the 
expression for the equilibrium price level, (64a). A single union fully internalises the 
price-level repercussions of the economy-wide wage it sets in response to the signal, 
and hence is able to bring about the most desirable apportionment, from its point of 
view, of the anticipated component of the shock between employment and the real 
wage. Furthermore, it is able to do this regardless of the rule parameters, the only 
exception being when p x takes the inadmissible value of unity. Hence the socially 
optimal setting o f p, is that which ensures that the anticipated component of the 
shock has no impact on the price level, so that price level variability solely arises from 
union forecast errors.
Proceeding similarly for the atomistic case, the m and p 2 solutions to (68) when
(67b) is the relevant expected social loss are identical to m* and p \  as given by (69a) 
and (69c) and therefore need not be repeated. The socially optimal setting of p x is:
{e + c„ [a  + £(l-oQ ]} :
r ] ,  atomistic case V \JO-Jys
Society’s optimal rule when unions are atomistic is therefore:
{s + cu[a + £ ( l - a ) ] } w  [ l - y  + cs( L - a ) ] ( 0 - f l s )
r, atomistic case ^  y[\ + Cs(l ~ a ) 2]
36 Note that the limit as s  -»  oo o f  (70b) is equal to (69d), confirming that in the absence o f  the 
externality the optimal rule would be given by (69d). The socially optimal settings o f  the rule 
parameters in the specification given by (60) would in the atomistic case be in* = 0 , = p \ ,
X2 = - p \ p  , and A; = p [ alomisliccase, where p*a(om„<lccaje is given by (70a).
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Central to intuitive explanation of (70a) is the fact that p x is absent from (66b), the
expression for equilibrium employment when unions are atomistic. This is
attributable, of course, to each atomistic union’s perception that its individual wage
decision has a negligible impact on w and hence on the monetary response, regardless
*
of this parameter’s value. Hence in the atomistic case, as in the single-union case, p x 
can only be used to eliminate the impact of the anticipated component of the shock on 
the price level.
The expected social loss under the optimal rule is divisible into a term in the 
variance of union forecasts, P a ] , and a term in the variance of union forecast errors,
Per] . For the two extremes of wage-bargaining structure, the representative union’s
weight parameter cu solely features in the term in Pcrj, while society’s weight cs is
to be found only in the term in p a 2:
c2u( } - a ? P ° 2e , csP ° l
I m=m'r ,n = \ '  [1 + (1 ~  a ) 2 ] 2 [1 + Cg (1 -  d f  ]£ (Q 1_ , ) = „ , y - 2 2 + r* „ s2n (71a)
£(Q*| ) = ------c. t a  + e Q a )l Pa e—  + ----- cj P ffu ... (71b)
\m = m'r ,atomistic case (1  _  « ) [ «  +  £-(1 -  « ) ]  }  [ l  +  C5 ( l - a )  ]
Since the wage-setting externality exacerbates employment variability, and price level 
variability under the optimal rule is the same for these two extreme cases, it follows 
that (71a) must be greater than (71b).37
III.5 Discretionary Monetary Policy
III 5.1 The Central Bank’s Optimal Setting o f  its Monetary Instrument 
This section modifies the basic model of this chapter by assuming that the monetary 
authorities are not constitutionally bound to conduct policy in accordance with a rule, 
and are instead endowed with the discretionary power to set the money supply as they 
see fit. As in previous sections, the information structure is as represented in Time
37 It is straightforward to show, using (71a) and (71b), that this is indeed the case.
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Lines III. 1 and III.2, with the central bank fully informed about both the shock and the 
aggregate wage when setting m. The central bank’s task is to minimise its assigned 
loss function, (9), by choice of m, and carrying out this optimisation exercise (which 
involves substituting (15) and the aggregate counterpart to (14) into (9)), the solution 
(denoted m*) to the first-order condition dQcb/dm = 0 ,38 is found to be as follows:
. [y -  cba{  1 -  a)]w + [ l - y  + cb( \ -  a)]0 ,n^m = -------------------------------- ----------------  (I I)
y[l + cb( l - a ) 2]
Note that for the erj = 0 case, which has Qt = 0 W , (72) simplifies to equation (26) of
Chapter II. Hence the degree of monetary accommodation of wages in the stochastic 
model of this chapter is the same as in the non-stochastic version, and indeed is the 
same as in Coricelli et al. (2004a, 2006). It will be useful for the subsequent 
discussion to state the price level as a function of w and 6 , given optimising central 
bank behaviour, and substituting (72) into (15), this p  is found to be:
I _ w — 0 
nm-m- = [l + c ( l _ a )2] (73)
111.5.2 Efficient Wage-Setting under Discretion 
Appropriate substitutions involving (6), (10), (13 '), (72) and (73) then yield the 
expected loss o f the representative union conditional on s:
E(Q“ | s) = E 2 i 2
P + ct ( l - a ) ‘] [a + f ( l  -  a)]
+ Cj
38 Note that dEQcb/dm  = d Q cb /dm  here. The version o f  the model with discretionary monetary policy 
captures both the scenario in which m is set prior to the simultaneous-move price-setting game between 
firms (i.e. prior to the determination o f  p ), and the scenario in which m is set simultaneously with the 
determination o f p.  The two scenarios are equivalent since even if  firms do not directly observe m they 
can perfectly predict its value: each firm knows 0 ,  w, and the econom y’s structure, including the 
central bank’s loss function, at the time it choose its price, and hence can predict the market-clearing 
price and central bank’s choice o f  m with complete accuracy. Similarly, the central bank’s information 
is such that it has perfect foresight regarding the market-clearing price which will result from its 
optimal setting o f m.
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( 0 - w )
+  Cu \ W j  +  n  . _ Z1 , . X2-D + ^ o - f l n
(74)
The unions’ collectively efficient wage, w*, is the solution to the first-order condition
dE(CTf | s)
Wj  = w v y
dw = 0 :
• _  (c» -c„)^s
>V  —  -----------------------------------------
c4[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2]
(75)
Combining (75) with (73) and the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, as given by 
(14), yields expressions for the price level, real wage, and employment under efficient 
wage-setting:
c j s  (O-Ps)
P l -"' c j l  + c „ ( l - a ) 2] [l + c4( l - a ) 2]
(76)
L „ -  =
Ps + • ( 9 - p s )
[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] [l + cs( l - a )  ]
(77a)
j  cu( \ - a ) P s  | cb( \ - a ) ( 6 - 0 s )
[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] [l + C j ( l - a ) 2]
(77b)
The variances of these expressions are as follows:
E(P\ _ . ) '  =
cl Perl
c2[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2]2 [l + C j(l-a r)2]
+ P<*1
2 n 2 (78)
g [ ( > v - p ) u . ] 2 = n , . y  o 12+
P ol
2 i 2[l + c« 0 - « )  ] [l + cs( l - a ) 2]
(79a)
F(!\ \2 c l ( l - a ? P a l  c l ( \ - a ) 2pcrl
[l + C„ ( l - a ) 2]2 [l + Cj(l-<2)2]2
(79b)
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The associated value of the unconditional expected union loss is:
c j e l  + [ c , + c l ( l - a ) 2]fi<Tl
[l + c„ ( l -a )2] [l + c4( l - a ) 2]‘E(  Q “ .)  = „  r, ,, 2 2 (8°)
Comparing (77a) and (77b) with their counterpart expressions for the case of 
efficient wage-setting under the simple rule, namely (20a) and (20b), reveals that the 
distribution of the impact of ps between the real wage and employment is the same 
under discretion as under the simple rule. This is not surprising: by taking into 
account the price-level implications of the central bank’s response to the aggregate 
wage, unions can, via fully coordinated wage-setting, bring about their preferred 
distribution o f J3s just as they can when m is fixed. However, in general discretion 
does differ from the simple rule as regards how the impact of the shock’s 
unanticipated component, 6 -  p s , is divided between the real wage and employment. 
Comparing (77a) and (77b) with (20a) and (20b), the sole exception to this general 
truth is found to be the special case in which cb = ( / - l ) / ( l - « ) . (Note that with
cb > 0 this case can only arise if y > 1.) Evaluating the central bank’s optimal
monetary response, as given by (72), for this special case, we find that it results in the 
central bank disregarding the productivity shock and only responding to w:
m w= -  (81)
cA= (r-1 ) /0 -« )  y
The reason for this is that in this special case the movement in the price level 
occasioned by the unanticipated component of the shock is sufficient in itself to bring 
about the central bank’s preferred apportionment of its impact between the price level 
and employment. Since the money supply is unresponsive to 0 — ps  (and, indeed, is 
only responsive to ps  indirectly via its response to w), the impact o f 0 — Ps must be 
the same under discretion when cb - { y - 1)/(1 -  a)  as under the simple rule.
A remaining noteworthy point regarding these results for the case o f efficient wage- 
setting under discretion is that the efficient nominal wage, as given by (75), is zero 
and unresponsive to the signal if cb = cu happens to be the case. The reason why
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efficiency requires unions to ignore signals when cb = cu is because in this special
case the central bank, in pursuing its optimal apportionment of both components of 
the shock between employment and the price level, necessarily brings about the most 
desirable apportionment of it between the real wage and employment from unions’ 
collective viewpoint. As we shall see, this special cb = cu case in which signals are of
no value to unions which are able to coordinate their wage-setting efficiently will 
figure prominently in subsequent sections of this chapter.
III. 5.3 Equilibrium Wage-Setting under Discretion
III.5.3.(i) Derivation of the Equilibrium Nominal Wage 
We now proceed to the case of equilibrium wage-setting, in which each union 
chooses its individual nominal wage, w}, to minimise its expectation, conditional on
5, of its loss, as given by (74). In doing so, union j  takes into account the fact that 
dw/dwj = \ j n , and treats the wage decisions of other unions as given. This leads to 
the following first-order condition for union f  s optimal wage:
where = «[l + c6( l - c r ) 2] - l .
The Wj solution to (82) is of little interest in itself, and we therefore omit this
expression, proceeding directly instead to the symmetric Nash equilibrium wage 
which is obtained by imposing Wj = E(w | s) = wNE in (82) and solving for wNE:
dE{Cl] | s)
d w .
{[cba { \ - c c ) - e } E { w \  s)
+ f[ l + cb (1 -  a ) 1 ]Wj -  cb (1 -  a)[a  + e (1 -  a)]/fe} +
+ c„ { -E (w  | s) + [1 + cb (1 -  a ) 2 ]Wj + /2s}® (82)
1 et2«(! ~ a ?  + {c»e(l -  a)  -  c, [a + g(l -  a )]
c4( l - a ) L  c4a ( l - a )  + {£ + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( l- a ) ]} O i, J
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It is apparent from (83) that zero is an inadmissible value for cb : throughout this 
chapter we in fact restrict cb to be positive. Substituting (83) into (73), the price level 
under discretion and equilibrium wage-setting is found to be:
*
j  = ______________-c „ [q  + g(l-a)]<D tfo ___________________ (O-Ps)
-* I W=w -  '■* \  f . S1 \  r  N 1 -k i  r - i  V /cb( \ - a ) [ c ba ( l - a )  + {e + cu( l - a ) [ a  + e ( l - a ) ] } Q b] [l + cA( l - a )  ]
Comparing (83) and (84), it is apparent that the equilibrium wage can be written as 
follows:
^ ne = e Vj \  ) l* ] + --------------- b a Q..r g ) +g<l>t ] ^ ---------------- (83’)
he [cbcc(\-a) + {e + cu( l - a ) [ a  + e(l-a)]}®„]
For the extremes o f wage-bargaining structure we have:
WNEL = i  r i  , n  \ 2 1ct [l + c „ ( l - a )  ]
ita {cte ( l - a ) - c . [ g  + gq-g)]}jfe ■
“  Ci(l- .a ){ f  + C„(l-a )[a  + £ (l-a )]}
For the limiting case in which the goods market is perfectly competitive, we find that:
Iim w  — ( Cb Cu ) P S  ( R l \£-*°° NE r-i \2i f 'cbW + cu( l - a )  ]
The real wage and employment are found by combining (83) with (84) and the 
aggregate version of (14):
( w - p )  I = ----------------lcba { \ - a )  + e<SbWs + _ ( * - £ )  (8g#)
[cba ( l - a )  + {s + cB( l - a ) [ a + £ ( l - a ) ] } O t ] [l + cb( \ - a )  ]
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ri =  c,[g + g(l-«)]<Dt ?^__________ , ct( l - g ) ( f l - f o )  b
“ [cta ( l - a )  + {fi + c„(l-a)[a + e(l-a)]}<I>j] [l + CjQ-a)2]
If there is a single union and/or the goods market is perfectly competitive (88a) and 
(88b) become:
(w -p ) \  = ,im [(w ~p)\  1 = -------- —-----2~ + — ——^  2 (89a)
[l + c .O -a )2] [l + c6( l - a ) 2]
;| = “” (/! ) =  + a O .- £ X g - ^ )  (89b)
- I  [ 1  +  C u ( l _ a ) 2 ]  [ l  +  c 4 ( l - g )  ]
Real outcomes in the atomistic case are:
( w - p )I------- = ---------------- ^ PS) (90a)
{£• +  c „ ( l  -  o r ) [ «  +  js:(1 - « ) ] }  [1 +  C j C l - g ) 2]  V '
i™ h c„[a + e { \ - a ) \ P s  [ cb(\-<x)(e - /3s)
{g + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + g ( l - a ) ]}  [l + c4( l - a ) 2]
The variances of the real wage and employment, and their derivatives with respect to 
n and s, are as follows:
E[{w-p)\  ]2 = --------------- [cta ( l  a )  + g<Kt ] /?<t„-------------- -------
[Cta ( l - a )  + {g + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + g ( l- a ) ]} ® 4]2 [l + ct ( l - a )  ]
(91a)
E(l\ \2   c2[a  + g ( l - q ) ] 2<D2^ o-2_________ | c2( l - a ) 2/?cr2
"■*» [cba { \ - a )  + {e + cu{ \ - a ) [ a  + e(\-a)]}<&bf  [l + c4( l - a ) 2]2
(91b)
8E[(w -  l ) ^  ]2 -  2cucba(l  -  q )2[g + g(l -  a)][l + cb (1 -  a ) 2][cta (l -  g ) + g<P4 ]ygo~2
8n [cba(  1 -  a) + {g + c„(l -  a)[a  + g(l -  a)]}®4]3
(92a)
(Note that dE[(w -  p)\w=w ]2/dn  < 0V« > 1.)
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aE(/U . ) *  2c lcM \-cc ){a  + 6 { l - a ) f [ \  + ch( \ - a f ^ hP a l  . 
dn [Cja(l -  a )  + {£• + e„ (1 -  a )[a  + s(l -  a)] }<!>,, ]3
(92b)
3^[(w />)LWaJ 2 _ 2 (rt-l)cu« ( l - « ) [ l  + c6( l - a ) 2][c6a ( l - « )  + f 0 J 0 6/? ^ (93a)
(Note that 3£[(w ~ ]2 /3 f  > OVn > 1.)
^ ( l - . , . ) 2 - 2 («-l)c„2a[a + £(l-g)][l + ctl( l - g ) 2]<D2)?o-2 . Qwn; , /93b)
d s  [ c ba (  1 - a )  +  { £  +  c u (  1 ~ « ) [«  + ^ 0  ~ « )] f
Union /  s unconditional expected loss under equilibrium wage-setting is obtained by 
combining (91a) and (91b) with the unconditional expectation of (10):
n _  cu{cu\.a  + £ ( \ - a ) f ® l + [ c ba Q - a )  + £®b)2} P v 2e , K  + c2b( l - a ) 2W<jt 
[cba (1 -  a)  + {s + c„ (1 -  a)[a  + s(\  -  a)]}<3>b f  [1 + c* (1 -  a ) 2]2
(94)
If there is a single union or the goods market is perfectly competitive, the expected 
loss is:
E(CT,
w = wNE, n = V
) = e'“ . [ £ ( n J" )] =
J  u i  — u t . ~ .
+ [c„+ c2( l - a ) 2]/?cr22 i 2[l + c« (l_cr) ] [l + ct ( l - a ) 2]
(95)
If unions are atomistic, the expected loss is:
i» E ( n » i c„{g2+c„[a  + g ( l- a O ]V (y 2  ^ [c„ + c , ( l - g ) 2]^o-2 
J * - « J  {2? + c „ ( l-a :) [a  + £ ( l - a ) ] } 2 [l + c6( l - a ) 2]2
v21 n _ 2
(96)
The derivatives of (94) with respect to n and £ are as follows:
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2 ( n - l ) c 2ucba 2( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( \ -a )] [ \  + cb( l - a ) 2]2 yffcr,
dn [cba (  1 -  a)  + {s + cu (1 - a ) [ a  + s{ 1 -  a)] }<D6]
- >  0V« >1
a^ (Q “ )
V N E  __ - l i n - X f c l a W  + c ^ - a y Y ® ^  
[cta (  1 -  a )  + {£ + c„ (1 -  a )[«  + f(l -  a )] }<D6]2
2 i 2 .
de
< 0V« >1
(97)
(98)
III.5.3.(ii) Discussion of the Wage-Setting Externality
Expressions (83) to (98) reveal that under discretion an adverse wage-setting 
externality arises when union wage decisions in response to a non-zero signal are 
uncoordinated, with the character of this externality being very similar to that which 
was earlier shown to be present under the simple-rule regime. Because of the 
closeness of the similarity, a detailed explanation of the externality’s source under 
discretion is not warranted, and we therefore confine our remarks to the most salient 
points. The externality results in the term in J3<j I in the variance of employment, i.e.
the term relating to the component o f each shock which is anticipated by unions, 
being inefficiently high, and also results in the corresponding term in the variance of 
the real wage being inefficiently low. The extent of the inefficiency is increasing in n 
and decreasing in s , and the externality is absent (and hence the efficient wage is set) 
if  there is a single union and/or perfect goods-market competition.
An important aspect o f the results reported above is the presence o f  the central 
bank’s weight parameter cb in the term in f i s , in the expressions for the real wage
and employment under equilibrium wage-setting, namely (88a) and (88b). This 
indicates that, in general, a parameter which is a design feature of the monetary 
regime does play a role in determining how the component of productivity shocks 
anticipated by unions impacts upon the real wage and employment. The exceptions to 
this general finding are revealed by expressions (89a), (89b), and (90a), (90b): if there 
is a single union, or unions are atomistic, then under equilibrium wage-setting the 
impact of the anticipated component of the shock on real outcomes is entirely 
independent o f cb, a result which is reminiscent of our Chapter II findings for the 
non-stochastic model. This contrast between society’s ability, via its delegation 
decision in respect of cb, to influence the real impact of the anticipated component of
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the shock when unions are non-atomistic, and its complete inability to do so in the 
two extreme cases o f n = 1 and n->  oo, can be explained in terms of the working of 
the wage-setting externality. If unions are non-atomistic, the monetary response 
consequences o f each individual union’s choice of wage are not negligible and hence 
are taken into account when making that wage decision insofar as they matter for its 
individual expected loss. However, the impact of on the welfare of other unions is
disregarded by union j ,  and it is the very fact that the macroeconomic impact o f the 
induced monetary response to Wj is only partially internalised that creates the
opportunity for the design of the discretionary regime to influence how the anticipated 
component of the shock is divided, via equilibrium wage-setting, between the real 
wage and employment. In the single-union case, of course, internalisation of the 
wage’s macroeconomic repercussions is complete, so that the regime’s designers are 
powerless to influence the impact of J3s on real outcomes. They are similarly 
powerless in this respect in the atomistic case, where the source of the neutrality result 
is the fact that each atomistic union always perceives the monetary-response and 
aggregate-demand repercussions of its wage decision to be negligible, regardless of 
the monetary regime.
This brings us to one o f the key results of this chapter. The result is concerned with 
the relationship between the variability of employment under equilibrium wage- 
setting, as given by (91b), and the central bank’s weight parameter cb. The first and
second derivatives o f (91b) with respect to cb are as follows:
- 2 (n - l)c2g (l - g )[g  + g(l - a )]2O t/?(j0 | 2cb{ \ - a f p c T l
8cb [c4a ( l - a )  + {* + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + * (l-a)]}< l>4]3 [l + c4( l - a )2]3
(99a)
)’ 2 ( n -  l)c2a ( l  -  a f  [a + g(l -  a )]2 X 3/7tT4
dc\ [c»a(l -  a )  + {e + c„(l -  a ) [a  + fi(l -  a)]}0 4]4
[ 2(1 -  a ) 2 [1 -  2ct (1 -  a ) 2 ]/fcr2 
[l + c4( l - a ) 2]4
where X 3 = a { n - \  + 2^>b) + 2 n ( } - a ) { s  + cu{ [ - a ) [ a  + £■(!-a)]}Oa .
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If we proceed on the assumption that 1 < n < oo, it follows directly from (99a) that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the variance of equilibrium employment to be a 
decreasing function o f cb is the following:
dE(l\ )2
 — "w— < 0 iff (100)
where ¥  = t1 ~ ~ + + ^  ~ + ~
(» -  l)c2a [ a  + e(l -  a )]2 [1 + c„ (1 -  a ) 2 ]3 <Dt
If it is the case that <j2g /c r2 < lF , then it necessarily follows that 8 E { l \ ^  )2 / 3cb > 0,
while the case in which crj /c r2 = *F is that in which a marginal increase in cb has no
impact on the variance of employment.
In interpreting (100), it is helpful to bear in mind that it has been derived on the 
assumption that cr2, £ and n are finite and positive, and that n exceeds unity. The 
composite parameter 'F has a limiting value of zero as ch —» 0, is a monotonic 
increasing function o f cb for all admissible values of cb (i.e. for all cb > 0), and has a 
positive finite asymptotic value as cb -> oo ,39 The ratio cr2 /<r2 , meanwhile, is a 
positive decreasing convex function of cr], and therefore may take any value on the
positive portion of the real line. Several important conclusions immediately follow 
from these facts. The principal conclusion is that when there are multiple non- 
atomistic unions and the goods market is monopolistically competitive, there must 
exist a range of cb values for which marginal increases in cb bring about a reduction
in employment variability. This range of cb values has a lower bound of zero and an 
upper bound at the cb value which solves the equation a j/c r l  = x¥ . A  secondary 
conclusion is that if  the quality of the unions’ signal is sufficiently high (in other 
words, if  the signal noise variance, cru2, is small enough), the ratio cr2/c r2 will be
large enough to ensure that <jj / cru2 > c!™ ^ , so that increases in the weight cb will 
then (provided 1 < n < o o ) result in lower employment variability regardless of the
39 These facts concerning T  are established in Appendix III.3.
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current value of cb .40 In other words, if  cr2/ cr2 > c,™aolF is the case, the variance of 
equilibrium employment is a monotonic decreasing function of cb for all cb > 0, and 
is therefore at its lowest under an ultraconservative central banker (i.e. in the limiting 
—» co case).
The significance o f these results is that they provide an alternative explanation to 
those cited in Chapter I for why empirical studies such as Alesina and Summers 
(1993) have not, in general, found evidence in support of the Rogoff (1985) model’s 
prediction that more conservative central banks will be associated with higher 
employment variability. The Rogoff model, it will be recalled, assumes that the 
economy consists o f atomistic private agents who do not possess any information 
regarding aggregate supply shocks at the time that they form their expectations of 
inflation. Its structure therefore abstracts entirely from the possible existence of 
externalities in union wage-setting decisions made in response to signals of supply 
shocks.
In order to gain a little more insight into the result, and how it is underpinned by the 
externality and the non-atomistic status of unions, it is useful to note that (99a) 
decomposes the derivative of the variance of equilibrium employment into a term in 
Pg \  (the variance o f union forecasts) and a term in /ter2 (the variance of union
forecast errors). The term in /ter2 is the externality-mitigating effect of a marginal 
increase in cb . Note that this term is zero if n = 1 and/or the goods market is perfectly 
competitive (the limiting e -> oo case), and/or signals provide no information 
regarding 6 (the limiting cr2 -» oo case). In all of these special cases the externality is 
absent, and consequently increased central bank conservatism cannot have an 
externality-mitigating effect. The term in /ter2 also disappears in the limiting n->  oo
case, since although the externality is very much present when unions are atomistic, 
the fact that the money supply is beyond each union’s individual influence renders the 
externality independent of cb . Provided 1 < n < co is the case, however, and provided
s  and cr2 are finite, the term in /ter] in (99a) is negative, so that the component of
40 Note that while (100) has been derived on the assumption that crj > 0 , it is nevertheless also the case 
that dE[(l\w v ) 2]! d c b < 0 when cr2 = 0 . This follows straightforwardly from (99a), the second term 
o f which is zero when cr2 = 0 .
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employment variability relating to unions’ forecasts (the term in flcr] in (91b)), is a
monotonic decreasing function of cb (indeed, (99b) reveals it to be convex in cb).
The reason why a higher value for cb mitigates the externality here is essentially the 
same as the reason why it does so in the non-stochastic model of Chapter II (when cb 
is restricted to be positive). The explanation has two parts to it. Firstly, the higher is 
cb, the less accommodating of the aggregate wage is the central bank, as is evident 
from the following derivative, which follows directly from (72):
Secondly, this in turn implies that the aggregate demand channel via which the 
individual non-atomistic union’s wage influences its labour demand is strengthened 
by an increase in cb. To see this, note that the aggregate demand channel,
(y /[a  + £ ( } - a )] ) (d (m -  p)ldw j) , is negative for cb > 0 , i.e. a marginal increase in
union f  s wage reduces real money balances and hence also aggregate demand, and 
causes a contraction in the demand for its labour. Furthermore, the aggregate demand 
channel is more negative, and hence stronger, the higher is cb, as is evident from the 
following expressions obtained by combining (72) and (73):
dctdw y[ l + ct ( l-o r )2]
(101)
r [l + c4( l - a ) 2]
(102a)
d ( m - p )  _ - c ba ( l - a )
(102b)
dwj ny{\ + cb( \ - a ) 2]
d [d (m -  p)/dWj] -  q (1 -  a)
dcb ny[\ + cb( } - a )2]2
(102c)
(102c) implies that the employment cost to union j  of marginally increasing its wage 
is larger, the more conservative the central bank, and consequently greater 
conservatism mitigates the externality.
III. 5.4 The Stochastic Inflation Bias and the Optimal Choice o f  Central Banker 
We have yet to derive an expression for the variance o f the price level under 
equilibrium wage-setting when the monetary regime is discretionary. Squaring the 
right-hand side of (84) and finding its unconditional expectation, this variance is 
found to be:
E(p\ f  = - ---------5 cl[a + e(\-a)f<S>lP<jl--------------------=
cb( \ - a )  [cba ( l - a )  + {s + c„(l- a)[a  + f ( l - a)]}®„]‘
P°l
[1 + cb( \ - a Y \
+ v. , 2l2 ( 103)
For the extreme cases o f a single union and atomistic unions, (103) reduces to:
£(/>| ,)2 = ^ — — r r + ---------— — 2~r (104>c%[l + cu(l -  a) ] [l + cb( l - a )  ]
t „ E ( p \  ? = — -cf a  + £(1—' ------------------- f  + ------- — _  (105)
—- 'J'l..*,.' Cj (1 -  a) {« + c„ (1 -  ar)[a + s  (1 -  a)]} [l + ct( l - a f f
We will comment initially on these two extreme cases since the case o f multiple 
non-atomistic unions, in respect o f which (103) is relevant, has several complicating 
aspects. The terms in P<j \  in (104) and (105) are examples of the stochastic inflation
bias which characterises this model. It will be recalled from the discussion of 
Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) in Chapter I that the stochastic inflation bias is the 
bias in the variance o f inflation which arises as a consequence of the assumption 
incorporated into the model that society’s optimal rule is not credible. As we saw 
earlier in Section III.4, rules, no matter how designed, cannot affect the employment 
impact o f ps  when wages are set by either a single union or by atomistic unions. 
Society’s optimal rule in these extreme cases therefore involves using m to neutralise 
completely the potential impact o f ps  on the price level. Given the model’s implicit 
assumptions, such a rule is not credible, however. Were a single union naively to 
expect the authorities to adhere to (69d), or were atomistic unions naively to expect 
adherence to (70b), the incorporation of these naive expectations into nominal wages
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would create the opportunity for the authorities to bring about, via a monetary 
surprise, a better distribution (from their point of view) of the impact of Ps between 
employment and the price level, than that which would result from adherence to the 
optimal rule, (69d) or (70b). In other words, while it is ex-ante optimal for the 
authorities to declare an intention to adhere to (69d) when n = 1, or to (70b) when 
unions are atomistic, once expectations have been formed, whether naively or 
rationally, the central bank’s ex-post optimal policy is to set the money supply in 
accordance with (72) rather than (69d) or (70b). Thus the time-inconsistency of the 
optimal rule when there is a single union or when unions are atomistic, causes unions’ 
rational expectation, conditional on s, of the impact of the shock on the price level to 
be non-zero whenever the signal happens to have a non-zero realisation. Given such a 
non-zero rational expectation of the price level, and the associated adjustment of 
nominal wage(s) by union(s), the optimising central bank cannot do better than to set 
m in reaction to w and ps  in the way that the union(s) expect it to do. O f course, 
union expectations o f m and p , conditional on s, may still prove incorrect, but only to 
the extent that their forecasts o f the shock turn out to be inaccurate (i.e. if  P s ^ O  
transpires to be the case), and not because of any error in predicting the realisations of 
m and p  which will occur in the absence of union forecast errors regarding the shock. 
The implication o f this is that when the variance o f the price level is decomposed into 
terms in the variances of the anticipated and unanticipated components of the shock, 
as has been done in (104) and (105), the term in Per] in that decomposition is
found to be positive, rather than zero, the value it would have were the rule fully 
credible and were the authorities always to abide by the rule. The extent by which 
the term in p<j2e in (104) and (105) differs from zero is the stochastic 
inflation bias. Using these expressions, it is straightforward to demonstrate that 
„™nE(p\w=w )2 > E(p\^=w n=1)2. In other words the stochastic inflation bias is larger
when unions are atomistic than when there is a single union. The reason for this is that 
the externality which arises under atomistic unions strengthens the employment 
impact of a given non-zero anticipated component of the shock, and therefore 
increases the authorities’ temptation to renege on the optimal rule. Thus the time- 
inconsistency problem is more severe when unions are atomistic, than when there is a
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single union, because the externality raises the marginal benefit of implementing a 
given monetary surprise without affecting that surprise’s marginal cost.
That the externality exacerbates the stochastic inflation bias is readily apparent from 
the following expressions:
*
- 2 c 2ua[a + e ( \ -a ) ]P c j l  
de c l ( l - a ) 2{£ + cu( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( \ - a ) ] } 3
= (107)
Since we already know that increases in s  mitigate the externality, (106) reveals that 
this mitigation effect is accompanied by a reduction in the stochastic inflation bias, 
while (107) tells us that under perfect goods-market competition, which is known to 
prevent the externality from arising, the stochastic inflation bias is the same when 
unions are atomistic as when there is a single union.
An important aspect o f the stochastic inflation bias is that it is a monotonic 
decreasing (indeed, convex) function of the central bank’s weight parameter cb. A
higher cb alleviates the time-inconsistency problem underlying the bias by increasing
the cost to the central bank of allowing the price level to deviate from zero, which in 
turn makes the bank less inclined to use monetary policy to offset the employment 
impact of a non-zero Ps . To work out the socially optimal choice of cb, however, we
must also consider how this parameter affects the apportionment o f the unanticipated 
component of the shock between employment and the price level. The optimal 
apportionment is brought about by a representative central banker (i.e. one such that 
cb =cs).\X follows immediately that a representative central banker cannot be socially
optimal since appointing someone marginally conservative must on the one hand 
result in only a negligibly small (‘second order’) increase in the part of the social loss 
relating to the stabilisation of the unanticipated component of the shock, but on the 
other hand cause a non-negligible (‘first order’) decrease in the stochastic inflation 
bias. Similar intuitive arguments rule out the possibility o f a liberal central banker (i.e. 
one such that cb <cs ) being socially optimal. If ch < cs is the case, a marginal
increase in cb both reduces the stochastic inflation bias and brings the stabilisation of
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6 -  ps carried out by the central bank into closer alignment with society’s
preferences in respect of it, so that the impact of both the anticipated and
unanticipated components of the shock on the social loss must be improved. It follows
that for the two extremes of wage-bargaining structure society’s optimal delegation
>
choice must be such that cb > cs , and hence must involve either a conservative or an
ultraconservative central banker.
To pursue this question more formally, we state society’s expected loss when there 
is a single union. (This loss is obtained by combining (91b) evaluated for n - 1 and 
(104) with the social loss function (8), with the socially optimal employment in the 
latter assumed to coincide with its market-clearing value of zero, while the socially 
optimal inflation rate is also assumed to be zero: hence /* = 0 and 7r* = 0 .)
E (Q S ) = C“ k  + Cb ^  a  ^ + C> A a  ^ (108)c4[l + c „ ( l - a )  ] [l + c4( l - a ) 2]2
Differentiating (108) with respect to cb yields:
d E ( °  - i f . - 2 cfilPo] 2(cb - c s) ( \ - a f p a l
8c„ C2[l + C„ ( l - a ) 2]2 [l + c4( l - a ) 2]3
This derivative is negative for all cb < cs , confirming the intuitive argument provided 
a moment ago that society’s optimal choice of central banker is neither a liberal nor 
one with representative preferences. It is apparent from (109) that when cb >cs a
trade-off arises between the beneficial effect on the stochastic inflation bias of an 
increase in conservatism, and its detrimental effect of making the distribution of 
6 -  Ps between employment and the price level depart still further from that 
preferred by society. Society’s optimal choice of central banker is that which 
exploits this trade-off to the full. In formal terms, identifying this choice involves 
examining the solution(s), which we denote by c*b, to the first-order condition
dE(Qs ) /d c b = 0. It turns out, however, that explicitly solving for c*b is
w = wNE, n  = 1 /
undesirable because o f the complexity of the resulting expression. Instead, following
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the procedure used by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997),41 we consider the following 
equation which is derived from the first-order condition, and which implicitly defines
c , :
(cb - c s) ( \ - a f a l
(C;)3p + c .( i -a )1]i p + c ; ( i - « n>212 2 t3
(110)
The second derivative of (108) with respect to cb is:
d2E(Q‘ 6 c / j a l
del 2i2c;p + c . p - a n
| 2(1 -  a f  p  + (3c, -  2ch XI -  a ) 2 W a l
2 i 4P + c4P - a )  ]
Substituting (110) into (111) we have:
d2E(Cl‘
dci
2(1 - d ) ‘ 1 + 3(<£-*,) .
[i+c; ( i - a )2]3 c;[i+c; a - a ) 2]
■Pa] > 0Vct' > cs
(112)
Since we have already established that there cannot be a solution to the first-order 
condition such that c*b <cs, it follows from (112) that all such solutions must be
minima, and that cb must therefore be a unique solution. Hence it must be the case
that cs < c*b < c o , so that the socially optimal choice of central banker when n = 1 is a
conservative who is not indifferent to employment stabilisation.
Following a similar procedure for the atomistic case reveals that for it too the 
socially optimal central banker is a conservative. In the atomistic case the expected 
social loss (obtained using (105) and the limiting oo case of (91b)), and its 
derivative with respect to cb, are found to be the following:
c ‘u[c, + c‘b{ 1 -  a y }[a  + e(l -  a)}2 P a l  , [c, + c2„( 1 -  a f ] p a ilim
rt—>00 £(CT + 212w=wNE,n=i cb( \ - a )  [£ + cu( l - a ) [ a  + s ( l - a ) ] }  [1 + cb( \ - a )  ]
(113)
As described in the Appendix to their paper, Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), pp.492-493.
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5 [ 'm”£ (Q - 2 c scl[a + e ( \ - a ) f p a ' l
8cb C j ( l - a ) 2{e +  c „ ( l - a ) [ a  +  e ( l - a ) ] } 2
2{cb - c s) ( \ ~ a f P <yl
[l +  c4( l - a ) 2]3
+ ^ -*  SA, (114)
The socially optimal cb, cb, is therefore the solution to the equation f(c*b,s )  = 0, 
where:
f ( c - ■) _  -  c ,c l  [a  + g(l ~ a ) ]2 , ( c ; - c , ) ( l - g ) 2g 2
■n *’ (C; ) 3( l - a ) 2{s + c „ ( l - « ) [ a  + f f ( l - a ) ] } 2 [l +  c ; ( l - a ) 2]3
Were we to obtain the second derivative of (113) with respect to cb, and, by making 
use of (115), evaluate it for cb = cb, we would find it to be unambiguously positive, 
indicating that cb is such that cs < c*b < °o. We shall refrain from stating this second-
order condition since the procedure has already been clearly set out for the n = 1 case. 
One point of interest regarding society’s optimal central banker for the atomistic case, 
however, is that since it is apparent from (115) that df(c*b,e ) /d £ >  0 and
df(cb,e)/dcl  > 0 ,42 it follows from the implicit function theorem that the socially
optimal degree of central bank conservatism is lower, the stronger is competition in 
the goods market:
de < i , 6 >p fldC b)
Since in the limiting case in which £ -> oo atomistic unions set the efficient wage and 
bring about the same outcome as a single union, it follows that when s  is finite the 
optimal degree o f central bank conservatism is greater when unions are atomistic than
42 The actual expression for the derivative d f {ch, e ) l d e  is:
5/ ( c l , e ) / d s  = 2csc 2ua [ a  + s (  1 -  a ) ] a j / (cA*)3 (1 -  a ) 2 {e + cu (1 -  a ) [ a  + e( l  -  a ) ] }3 > 0 
Since df(c*b,E)/dc*b must have the same sign as ( d 2{ ^ [ 2 s ( n , | _ )]}/dc'b
known to be positive, it follows that df(cl,E)/dc*b > 0 must be the case.
, and the latter is
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when there is a single union. Intuitively, the stronger is the externality which-
characterises the atomistic case, the higher is employment variability, which in turn
causes a higher stochastic inflation bias. This changes the trade-off faced by society
by raising the marginal benefit of an increase in cb, without affecting its marginal
*
cost.
Before moving on to discuss the optimal setting of cb when there are multiple non- 
atomistic unions, it seems fitting to mention how the above findings regarding cb
would be affected were we to modify the model to allow for a non-zero mean inflation 
bias. Such a bias could be generated by specifying the representative union’s desired 
mean real wage to exceed its mean market-clearing value o f zero, together with 
appropriate specification of its desired mean employment level. The mean inflation 
bias would be a monotonic decreasing function of ch, and therefore would merely
increase the socially optimal setting of cb without affecting the above conclusions
qualitatively (i.e. it would remain the case that ^ < ^ < 00). Furthermore, one of the
key insights of Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) would be applicable to our model, 
namely that the mean inflation bias can always be eliminated by assigning an 
appropriate value to an additional delegation parameter in the central bank’s loss 
function.43
We now turn to discuss the relationship between the expected social loss and the 
central bank’s weight cb when there are multiple non-atomistic unions. The 
expressions relevant to the 1 < n < 00 case are the variance of equilibrium 
employment, as given by (91b), and its first and second derivatives with respect to cb, 
namely (99a) and (99b), together with the variance of the price level, as given by 
(103). In what follows, the term in fieri in (103) will be referred to as the stochastic
inflation bias. This is slightly controversial, since it does not fully accord with the use 
made of the phrase by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), who conceive of the 
stochastic inflation bias as the difference between the variance o f inflation under
43 In other words, elimination o f  the mean inflation bias can be achieved by assigning the central bank 
the more general loss function mentioned in Chapter II, namely Qcb = (l- lb)2 + cb(7T-7rb)2 + 2c'bK , 
with any one o f  the additional delegation parameters lb, nb or c'b set appropriately.
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discretion and the corresponding variance under society’s optimal rule.44 Although the 
optimal rule for the 1 < n < oo case was not formally derived in Section III.4 above, it 
is nevertheless clear that not only the equilibrium price level, but also equilibrium 
employment will be a function of the rule’s wage-response parameter (either A, in
(60) or pj in (61)). It follows from this that the optimal rule when 1 < n < oo will not 
involve complete elimination of the impact of the anticipated component of the shock 
on the price level, and that price level variability under the rule will consist not only 
of a term in the variance of union forecast errors, per], but also of a term in the
variance of the shock’s anticipated component, per]. Arguably, therefore, only a part, 
rather than the whole, of the term in per] in (103) should be referred to as the 
stochastic inflation bias. Despite these reservations, a persuasive case can nevertheless 
be made for describing this term in p<r2e as a bias, provided it is borne in mind that 
this bias has its source in the incentives facing the discretionary central bank once it 
has been assigned its loss function and the weight cb has acquired a specific fixed
value. The use o f the word ‘bias’ is justified since the representative union’s 
perception o f the central bank’s incentives affects its rational expectation of the price 
level. Were monetary policy to be devoted to stabilising the price level perfectly with 
regard to the anticipated component of the shock (so that the terms in ps and p a 2e in,
respectively, (84) and (103) are zero), the equilibrium real wage and employment 
outcomes given by (88a) and (88b) could alternatively be brought, about by a 
particular adjustment in the aggregate nominal wage which would differ from (83).45 
A declared intent on the central bank’s part to follow such a policy would, in general, 
not be credible, however.46 Were the central bank publicly to promise to use the 
money supply solely to prevent Ps (when non-zero) from causing a movement in the
44 As noted in Chapter I, Herrendorf and Lockwood do not define an objective function for society, and 
use the assumed objective function o f the government as their reference point for deriving the optimal 
design o f the monetary regime (i.e. the optimal set o f  delegation parameters in the. central bank loss 
function). Since that government objective function is essentially the same as the social loss function o f  
this thesis, namely (8), it follows that Herrendorf and Lockwood’s definition o f  the stochastic inflation 
bias can be said to be the bias in inflation or price level variability which arises as a consequence o f  the 
entity which delegates monetary policy to the central bank not being able to precommit with full 
credibility to its optimal rule. In Herrendorf and Lockwood this entity is the government, whereas in 
our model it is society.
45 This particular adjustment in wNE would be given by the first term on the right-hand side o f  (88a), 
namely: [cba { \ - a )  +£<3>b]/3sl[cba ( \ - a )  + { e +  cu( \ - a ) [ a  + s { \ - a ) \ } < & b] .
46 It would only be credible in the limiting cb -> oo (i.e. ultraconservative) case.
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price level, it would be naive of unions to expect the central bank to adhere to such a 
promise, since naive expectations would cause the marginal benefit to the central bank 
of delivering a monetary surprise to exceed its marginal cost. Only the rational 
expectation of p , as given by (84), ensures the equality o f this marginal benefit and 
marginal cost, and hence deprives the central bank of an incentive to deliver a 
monetary surprise. The presence of a term in ficr] in (103) is thus attributable to a
time-inconsistency problem faced by the central bank, and for this reason it may be 
legitimately described as a bias.
The derivative o f (103) with respect to cb is:
8 £ ( P l , „ J 2 l - 2 c t [ a  + e ( l - a ) ] 2®k . .
8cb \  c \ { \ - a f
[ct«(l -  ap(» -1  + <I>t ) + {g + c, (1 -  g)[a + fi(l -  g)] }<Pt ] ] 2 2(1 - g ) 2 2
[cia ( l - g )  + {e + c„(l-g )[g  + f( l-g )]}® t]3 r  9 [l + et( l - a ) 2]3 “
(117)
This expression tells us that price level variability is a monotonic decreasing function 
of cb when 1 < « < o o . Combining (117) with (99a) yields an expression for the
derivative with respect to cb o f the expected social loss when 1 < n < oo :
_ - 2 c >  + e { \ - a ) f ® bX tp a l
dcb cb( \ - a )  [ctg ( l - g )  + {c + c„(l-g)[g  + £(l-g)]}<Ds]-
Z f e - c . X l - g ) 2/?^2
T
where:
+ _^j?— izv— r '  ( t i g )
[ i+ Cj( i - g ) 2]3
X t S ( n - l ) c ba ( l - a ) [ c s + c2b( \ - a ) 2)
+ [c4g(l -  a) + {£ + cu (1 -  g)[g + f(l -  g)] }Os ]
The principal aspects o f the relationship between the expected social loss and the 
delegation parameter cb when 1 < « < q o  are as follows. It is clear that (118) is
negative for all admissible values of cb such that cb ^ c s . It must therefore be the case
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that if the monetary regime is one of discretion, appointing a conservative or 
ultraconservative central banker must be better for social welfare than appointing a 
liberal or one with ‘representative’ preferences. This is precisely the same result as 
was obtained for the two extreme cases of n = 1 and atomistic unions. However, 
whereas for the latter two cases it was found that the possibility o f an 
ultraconservative being socially optimal could be ruled out, this same conclusion does 
not necessarily follow for the 1 < n < oo case. Since employment variability can be 
falling in all admissible cb provided the externality is strong enough to ensure the
condition stated in (100) holds, i.e. if  ¥  , and since price level variability is a
monotonic decreasing function of cb regardless o f signal quality, it follows that
l Gl  > ^  is a sufficient condition for the expected social loss (when 1 < n < oo) to
be a monotonic decreasing function of cb, and hence for the optimal appointment to
be an ultraconservative. Although marginal increases in cb, when cb > cs , lead to
worse stabilisation, from society’s viewpoint, o f the unanticipated component of 
shocks, if the externality is severe enough the externality-mitigating effect of greater 
conservatism, and its associated beneficial effect in reducing the stochastic inflation 
bias, outweighs the former detrimental effect relating to stabilisation of union forecast 
errors, and.hence leads to an improvement in social welfare. If the quality of unions’ 
signals is sufficiently poor, however, so that the externality is relatively weak and the 
unanticipated component of each shock contributes substantially to employment 
variability, the optimal choice of central banker is a conservative, as was found to be 
the case for the two extremes of wage-bargaining structure. A necessary condition for 
this to be the case is that ° l / ° i  < 'F , since this condition must hold if  the variance of 
employment, considered as a function of cb, is to have a (unique) interior minimum.
III. 5.5 Signal Quality and Union Welfare under Discretion 
An important aspect o f the equilibrium outcomes under discretion remains to be 
discussed, namely the relationship between unions’ equilibrium expected loss and the 
quality of the signal, which depends of course on the variance of signal noise, c rj.
Bearing in mind results (28a) and (28b) regarding how a marginal increase in cr]
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affects the variances of the anticipated and unanticipated components of # , it is 
apparent from (94) that a marginal deterioration in signal quality will have both a 
beneficial externality-mitigating effect, and a detrimental exacerbating effect on union 
forecast errors. (The former effect concerns the term in f i a 2e in (94), the latter effect
the term in fieri):
dE(-a L  \ - c u{cu[a + e ( l - a ) f O l + [ c ba ( l ~ a )  + e O bf }
dor' [c„a(l -  a )  + {s + c. (1 -  a)[a + ff(l -  a)] }<Dt ]‘
, [c „ + q ;( l-Q 0 2] j p i
2 t2[l + ct ( l - a r ]
(119)
It follows from (119) that when unions are non-atomistic, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the externality-mitigating effect to outweigh (be outweighed by) the 
forecast-error effect, and hence for a marginal deterioration in signal quality to have a 
net beneficial (detrimental) effect on union welfare is the following:
dE(Cl) )
 ^ P ^ < ( > ) 0  iff A© < (>)0 (120)
dcru
where: A = - c 2ba ( \ - a ) 2 +{cu[a + £ ([-cc)]-cb£(\-a)}Q>b 
0  = [1 + (1 -  a ) 2]A -  2{n -  l)c„a[l + cb( l - a ) 2]2
For convenience, and because there seems very little danger of confusing the reader, 
the same notation has been used here as was used to describe the equivalent result for 
the simple rule scenario, namely (54). The affinity of (120) to (54) is plain: under 
discretion, whether a marginal deterioration in signal quality is beneficial or not to 
union welfare depends on the sign of the product of two terms, one of which, A , is 
linear in cu, and the other of which, 0 ,  is quadratic in cu. Note that as in the simple
rule scenario, A under discretion is equal to minus one times the numerator of the 
coefficient on fis in the expression for the equilibrium nominal wage (as can be seen 
from comparing A in (120) with (83)).
206
The graphs o f A and 0  are depicted below in Figure III.5. These two functions of
cu have a common vertical intercept. For conformity with our notational practice for 
the simple rule scenario, the points at which the parabola of © intersects the 
horizontal axis (i.e. the cu solutions to the equation 0  = 0 ) are denoted cu and cu. 
The parallel between results (120) and (54) extends further in that just as under the 
simple rule we saw that there was a particular cu value which led unions to disregard
the signal, and hence rendered their equilibrium expected loss independent o f cr2, so 
too is this the case under discretion. From scrutiny of (83) it is apparent that when 
cu = cbQ ~a )[cba Q ~ a ) + £®bV\.a  + £‘0 - a )]^)6 > the externality works in such a 
way as to lead unions to set a zero nominal wage regardless of s. It seems 
fitting to use cu to denote this particular value, since it is the counterpart under 
discretion of the simple-rule scenario special case discussed earlier, namely 
c» =c,,siwi,M, s (r - l)(r«  + sA)/[a + s ( l - a ) lA .  Note that A|__= = 0 , and hence
The intuitive explanation for (121) is that when cu =cu, the externality-mitigating
effect and the forecast error effect are precisely equal in absolute value and therefore 
cancel each other out.
The reader will recall that under the simple rule, when cu takes a particular value it 
is efficient for unions to ignore the signal and always to set a nominal wage of zero. 
This simple-rule special case is that in which cu = cu Simple Rule = ( / - l ) / ( l - a ) ,  and
although when this expression holds any non-zero response is inefficient, under 
equilibrium wage-setting the externality leads each union to adjust its wage in 
response to the signal. Hence in this special case under the simple rule the externality- 
mitigating effect of a deterioration in signal quality must outweigh the forecast-error
that:
=  0 (121)
where c„ = cb( l - a ) [ c ba ( l - a )  + s O b] 
[a + e ( l - a ) ] Q b
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Figure III.5
Identification of the sign of the impact of a marginal deterioration in signal 
quality on the expected loss of non-atomistic unions under discretion
A
A,  0 Range o f values for which
d E ( n Uj j ) / d c r l <  0
=  0
Notes:
1. It is assumed that 1 < n < co .
2. Note that cu = cb( I -  a)[cba(  1 -  a)  + £ <h6] /[a  + £-(1 -  a)]Q>b , and 
A|C(=0 = -c b( \ - a ) [ c ba ( \ - a )  + £<&b] .
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effect, since the latter effect is necessarily zero. The analogous special case under 
discretion is that in which cu =cb. If each union places the same weight on real wage
variability, relative to employment variability, as the central bank places on price 
level variability, relative to employment variability, it follows that when unions are 
completely uninformed about the shock, the conduct of monetary policy by the central 
bank must bring about unions’ preferred apportionment of the shock’s impact between 
employment and the real wage. Hence when cu = cb wage-setting efficiency requires
that unions completely ignore signals, and a deterioration in signal quality must be 
beneficial to unions.
This reasoning leads us to surmise that cb must be a member o f the set of cu values 
for which d£ (Q “ ) dcr2u < 0 is the case. Sure enough, evaluating A and © for
J  * ' = " N E  /
c u ~  c b we find that their product is negative if there are multiple unions:
(A l.-c.)(0 L . J  = l)2csV [ l  + c4( l - a ) 2]3 < 0 V « > 1  (122)
The range o f cu values for which dE(Qu. ) dcr2 < 0 is the case, therefore
J W =  WNE /
contains cb , has a positive lower bound of cu , and has for its upper bound the positive 
cu solution to the equation 0  = 0.
Note that if  there is a single union, cu , cu and cb all coincide, implying that there is
no positive cu value for which A and 0  differ in sign. This is unsurprising: a
worsening of signal quality cannot make the single union better off, since there is no 
externality to be mitigated. Formally evaluating A and © for n = 1 confirms this:
(4,-iXeL.,) = cl <c. -  c*)2(1 -  + -  «)2] (123)
Expression (123) is positive for all cu values such that cu * c b, and is zero when 
cu = cb since in this special case the central bank stabilises the unanticipated 
component of the shock in the most desirable way from the point of view of the union.
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l.
Although we have found many points in common between the two scenarios as 
regards the relationship between signal quality and union welfare, they differ as 
regards one aspect o f the results summarised in (54) and (120). Whereas under the
simple rule the special-case values of cu and cu are positive only if  y  > 1, their 
counterparts under discretion are necessarily positive because of the assumption that 
cb is positive. This means that whereas under the simple rule it is possible for
dE(Clu.- ) d a l  < 0  to be the case for all positive cu values below a certain
J  ^  = ^ N E  /
critical value (and y  = 1 was found to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for this to be so), under discretion the cb > 0 restriction means that the range of cu
values for which dE(Qul ) da]  < 0  cannot have zero as its lower bound. A
J W = WNE /
related point is that whereas under discretion there must, provided n>  1, be a range of 
c values for which dE(Quj ) d o 2 <§ is the case, under the simple rule unions’
J  *> =  * N E  /
expected loss can be a monotonic increasing function of cr^, for all admissible cu 
values.
For the sake o f completeness, we end this subsection by stating the equivalents of 
(119) and (120) for the case of atomistic unions. Taking the limit as n tends to infinity 
of both (91a) ahd (91b), combining the resulting expressions with (10), and 
differentiating the result with respect to a]  , yields:
= |  -c„{fr2+ c J a  + g (l-aQ ]2} ( [c„ + c2( l - a ) 2]j ^ 2
dcr!. {e + cu( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( l -a ) ] }  [l + cb( l - a )  ]
(124)
It follows from (124) that the atomistic-case equivalent of result (120) is:
• n Z . E W j  )]
da!
<(>)0 iff A '0 ' < (>)0
where: A' = cu [a + s (  1 -  a)] -  cbs(  1 -  a)
©' s  [i + (i _  a f  ]A' -  2cua[\ + cb( 1 -  a )2].
(125)
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Figure III.6
Identification of the sign of the impact of a marginal deterioration in 
signal quality on the expected loss of atomistic unions under discretion
Range o f values for which 
dE{Q.u\ )/dct 2 <0j I W = W we. /
211
Figure III.6 above gives a graphical representation of this result. Note that as in the 
case of non-atomistic unions, cb lies within the range of cu values for which a
deterioration in signal quality is beneficial for the welfare of atomistic unions, and this
is for the same reason as given earlier for the non-atomistic case.
>
III. 5.6 Signal Quality and Socially Optimal Delegation 
The previous subsection has found that an improvement in the quality of unions’ 
information regarding the productivity shock, as embodied in cr2, the variance of
signal noise, can be either beneficial or detrimental to union welfare, depending on the 
strength of the externality, which depends in turn on the structural parameters n and 
s ,  as well as the weight parameters cu and cb. This subsection continues the 
investigation o f the welfare repercussions of unions’ information quality by 
considering how marginal changes in cr2 affect the expected social loss. Rather than
address this issue directly, however, it will be more convenient to discuss it in passing 
while analysing an extended version of the model outlined in previous sections. The 
extension introduced in this subsection is to endogenise cr2 by making it a choice
variable of either the central bank or of the framers of the constitution whose task it is 
to design the monetary regime. One immediate implication of this is that the socially 
optimal monetary rule derived in Section III.4 ceases to be a valid yardstick for 
evaluating the relative performance of the discretionary monetary regime. Indeed, in 
the remaining sections of this chapter we abstract entirely from rule-based regimes 
and focus exclusively on discretion.
The relaxation o f the implicit assumption of previous sections that signal quality is 
exogenous thus makes ‘economic transparency’ a key aspect of the model. It will be 
recalled from Chapter I that this phrase, coined by Geraats (2002), refers to the 
disclosure by the authorities of information regarding macroeconomic - disturbances, 
and that the previous contributions to this literature which are most closely related to 
the analysis of this chapter are those of Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2002). The 
model of this subsection shares in common with these two precursor papers a focus on 
the implications o f economic transparency for the efficacy of stabilisation policy, and 
like .them abstracts from issues relating to the potentially ameliorating effect of
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economic transparency on a mean inflation bias partly originating in private sector
uncertainty regarding the central bank’s objectives. Both Cukierman (2001) and
Gersbach (2002) assume that the policymaker faces an expectations-augmented
Phillips curve (Lucas surprise supply function), so that employment (or output)
/
depends on the realisation of the supply shock and on private-sector expectational 
errors regarding inflation. If the private sector is uninformed about the shock, 
expected inflation will be such that the marginal benefit of offsetting the shock’s 
employment impact by means of an inflation surprise will exceed its marginal cost. 
The drawback to economic transparency identified by these two papers is simply that 
the adjustment of expected inflation in the light of information about the supply shock 
causes the marginal benefit and marginal cost of an inflation surprise to be equated, 
and hence renders attempts to stabilise the economy ineffective.
This subsection differs from Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2002) in several 
important respects. By working with a Phillips curve relationship, both papers abstract 
from the possibility that private-sector agents might respond to information regarding 
the supply shock in ways other than by merely adjusting their inflation expectations. 
The more sophisticated supply-side structure of the model of this chapter overcomes 
this deficiency. As is evident from equation (83 ') above, when unions are averse to 
deviations of both the real wage and employment from their mean values, their 
equilibrium nominal wage response to the signal involves both an adjustment to 
incorporate into the wage their revised rational expectation of the price level, and a 
further adjustment to prevent the full impact of the anticipated component of the 
productivity shock being borne by employment. It is noteworthy from (83'), (88a) and 
(88b) that in the limiting cu —> co case in which each union is solely concerned to
protect its real wage from the impact of the shock, and hence is indifferent to its 
employment impact, the equilibrium nominal wage is adjusted solely for the price- 
level expectation, E[(p\w=w ) |s ] . 47 The models o f Cukierman and Gersbach can
therefore be thought o f as corresponding to a special extreme case of the model of this 
section, namely the case in which cu -»  o o . As previously noted, the wage-setting 
externality which arises in our model whenever there are multiple unions (and the 
goods market is not perfectly competitive) is absent in the limiting cu -»  oo case.
47 The second term on the right-hand side o f  (8 3 ')  is zero in the limiting cu ->■ oo case.
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Hence this chapter also advances the literature on transparency by investigating how 
this wage-setting externality affects the relationship between economic transparency 
and the authorities’ ability to stabilise the economy. A final respect in which the 
chapter differs from the Cukierman and Gersbach papers is that it addresses the issue 
of socially optimal delegation arrangements (specifically, the optimal value for the 
central bank’s weight parameter cb).
This subsection therefore investigates both the relationship between social welfare 
and economic transparency, and the implications of that relationship for the optimal 
choice of central banker. In the interests of clarity it will be useful to begin with a 
careful discussion o f the model’s assumptions about the timing of moves. There are in 
fact several timing scenarios which are captured by the information structure o f the 
model. As in previous subsections, in the very first stage of the multi-stage game 
society assigns a loss function to the central bank, and endows it with the 
discretionary power to set the money supply after the determination of w. The 
departure from our earlier version of the model is that the central bank also has the 
power to supply unions with information regarding the productivity shock prior to 
wages being set. Hence, unlike in previous subsections, the central bank now has the 
ability to influence wage-setting by disclosing information about the shock to unions. 
In the most straightforward timing scenario consistent with the assumed information 
structure, the central bank, immediately after it is assigned its loss function, chooses 
the quality of the productivity-shock signal that it will receive prior to the signing of 
wage contracts by unions and firms. In other words, the variance o f the signal noise 
term, cr2, is a choice variable of the central bank. (With <j 2b exogenous and fixed, a
particular choice of cr2 implies a particular /?.) Upon receiving a noisy signal s of the 
productivity shock (where the noise term u is randomly drawn from the zero-mean 
normal distribution which has the central bank’s choice o f cr2 as its variance), the 
central bank then forms its own best forecast, (3s, o f the shock and communicates this 
to unions. (Equivalently, it is the signal itself that is communicated by the central 
bank to unions, and it is assumed that the unions have learnt the value of cr2, so that 
the informativeness o f the signals is known to them, which consequently enables each 
union to form the rational expectation E{6 \ s) = (3s.) The stages of this scenario 
subsequent to unions receiving the forecast or signal are the same as for previous
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versions of the model in which cr2 was exogenous. These stages are the determination
of the aggregate nominal wage in the simultaneous-move wage-setting game, 
followed by the central bank setting the money supply in the light o f full information 
regarding the productivity shock, with firms then simultaneously setting prices, which 
in turn leads to the determination of the price level, the real wage, employment and 
output. As in previous sections of this chapter, the information structure is consistent 
with the money supply being set either prior to, or at the same time as, prices: the 
important point is that m is set after w has been determined, and that the central bank’s 
information regarding the shock at the time it sets m is superior to the information 
possessed by unions when setting wages. Note that, just as elsewhere in this chapter, 
the assumption that the central bank is perfectly informed about 6 when setting m is 
innocuous, since any forecast errors regarding the shock made by the central bank at 
this juncture would not affect its monetary response to w, and would be irrelevant to 
union wage decisions taken earlier in the game. This timing scenario is summarised 
by In n e  Line III.3 below.
Before moving on, we mention a variant timing scenario consistent with the 
information structure discussed above, and which consequently leads to the same 
equilibrium outcomes as the one represented in Time Line III.3. This alternative 
differs in that the central bank observes the actual realisation o f the shock at the time 
it occurs, but nevertheless chooses to pass on to unions a noisy signal of this shock. In 
effect, the central bank is envisaged as adding to 0 a random noise term drawn from a 
zero-mean normal distribution with variance cr2 which it has previously chosen. It is
assumed for simplicity that unions have come to know the value of this variance (by 
studying, for instance, the correlation between previous pairs o f signal and shock), so 
that the quality of the signal supplied by the central bank is known to them. The time 
line for this scenario appears below as Time Line III.4.
With this information structure in mind, we now derive society’s optimal choice of 
central banker using backward induction. The relevant expressions for equilibrium 
employment variability and price level variability for given values o f cr2 and cb, are
(91b) and (103), and substituting these into the loss function assigned to the central 
bank, namely (9), yields:
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7
E( Q cb ) = Ci[l + cs( l - a ) 2] P°l 12 n2
+  •
[l + c4( l - a ) 2]' 
c2 [« + « ( ! -  a ) ]2 OjySa2
cb 0  -  “ ) [c»a(l -  a) + {<? + c, (1 -  a)[a + e(l -  a)] }<Dt ]'
(126)
The central bank which has been assigned a loss function with given weight cb will 
choose cr2 to minimise (126). This optimisation task will involve scrutiny of the 
following derivative:
dE{Q.eb ) 8E(D.cb
m' = mV £  _ )W = W N E dE(Cicb1 )w = w NE dP )
da l  da] dp
P  fixed
dE{ Q cb
dcr‘
= cb[\ + cb( \ - a f ] T P ‘
where Y = 1 c2u[a + £ ( \ - a ) ] 2<&2b
(127a)
(127b)
[1 + cb( 1 -  a Y Y  cl (1 -  a y  [cba (  1 - a ) + {e + cM( 1 -  a)[a  + e(\ -  a)] }Ob Y
(127c)
It follows directly from (127b) that T > (<)0 is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the central bank’s (unconditional) expected loss to be strictly increasing 
(decreasing) in cr]. Clearly, a further corollary is that Y  = 0 is a necessary and
sufficient condition for this loss to be independent of erM2.
Before embarking on an economic interpretation of these findings, it is worthwhile 
enlarging upon a point hinted at in the first, paragraph of this subsection. When cr2 is
exogenous, and the central bank’s sole instrument is consequently the money supply, 
the best possible outcome from the central bank’s point of view is for the impact of 
each 0 shock to be divided between employment and the price level according to 
(respectively) the weights c6( l - a ) / [ l  + c6( l- c r )2] and - l / [ l  + cA( l - a ) 2], so that the 
resulting (unconditional) expected loss of the central bank is minimised at 
c^cr^/tl + ^ C l-c r )2]2 . (This best possible outcome when cr2 is exogenous will only 
be attainable if  unions ignore signals, either because they are infinitely noisy or
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because cu = cu happens to be the case.) When cr2 is made a choice variable of the
central bank, however, the set of possible outcomes changes, as does the set of 
outcomes attainable by the central bank. The aforementioned best possible outcome 
when <7 2 is exogenous is obviously^ attainable when <r2 is endogenous, since it can be
brought about by making the signal infinitely noisy and by setting the money supply 
optimally in response to 6.  It turns out, however, that it may be possible for the 
central bank to achieve a superior outcome to this by selecting a finite value for cr2
and hence allowing the equilibrium wage response to the signal to determine the 
apportionment of the anticipated component of the shock, J3s, between employment 
and the price level. By doing this, the central bank in effect deprives itself of the 
power to influence, via its setting of the money supply, the component of the 
equilibrium outcome which relates to / f r . (More precisely, although the central bank 
will still be able to influence, via a monetary surprise, the outcome component 
relating to ps, it will choose not to do so since the rational expectation incorporated 
into the wage ensures that the marginal cost of a monetary surprise will exceed its 
marginal benefit to the central bank.) Note that by choosing a finite value for cr2, the
central bank not only relinquishes the ability to use the money supply to determine the 
employment outcome relating to J3s, but also incurs a stochastic inflation bias. 
Despite this drawback, it nevertheless remains possible that the central bank will find 
it advantageous to make the signal informative rather than infinitely noisy.
(An alternative way of making the point is the following. The productivity shock 
variance, cr] , must be distributed in some way between employment variability and
price level variability. If the central bank can choose cr2, it can in effect choose the
fraction of <jj (specifically, the fraction p ), for which this distribution will be
determined by equilibrium wage-setting, with the distribution o f the remaining 
fraction, (1 -  P), determined by its own optimising behaviour in setting the money 
supply in response to the unanticipated component of each shock. Clearly, relative to 
the scenario considered previously in which cr2 was exogenous, having the ability to
select cr2, and hence p , cannot make the central bank worse off, since it can always
set cr2 at whatever value it had in the scenario in which it was exogenous.)
i
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Mindful of these facts, we return to the economic interpretation of (127b) and 
(127c). It is evident from these expressions that the sign of T depends on the relative 
strength of two effects of opposite sign. A marginal increase in cr2, via the resulting
marginal decrease in p ,  reduces the value of the term in ficrj on the right-hand side 
of (126), and consequently has a beneficial effect on the central bank’s expected loss. 
Counteracting this is the effect of a marginal increase in cr2 on the term in the
variance of union forecast errors. Since p a ]  = (1 -  P)cr2e , it is evident that this 
variance is an increasing function of a 2, and hence that the effect involving the term 
in p o 2u is detrimental. Which of these two effects is the stronger determines the sign
of T and hence the sign of the impact of a deterioration in union signal quality on the 
central bank’s expected loss. Note that there are two aspects of the model which 
matter for the relative strength of the two effects. The first o f these aspects is the 
magnitude of cu relative to cb, while the second is the strength of the wage-setting 
externality.
The first step towards gaining further insight is to obtain an alternative expression 
for T by writing the right-hand side of (127c) as a single term:
r  = - l  5-----------------5-5------------ --------------------------------------------- 7 (127d)
where:
T  = - c 2[a + e(\ -  cc)]2[ 1 + 2c ,(1 -  a ) 2]<&2b +
+  2cucl  (1 “  « ) 3 [ a  +  * 0  -  a)]  f o a ( l  - a )  + ed>b ]O b + c 2 (1 -  a ) 2 [cba (  1 -  a )  + e  O ,  ]2
(127e)
V  is quadratic in cu , and since d2V /d c 2 < 0 and r'| > 0, it immediately follows
that the equation T' = 0 has two real cu solutions of opposite sign. Denoting these 
solutions by F,' and V2, they are found to be:
r _ - c t ( l - « ) [ c ta ( l - g )  + g Q t ]
1 [a + f ( l  -  a )][l + 2cb (1 -  a ) 2]Ot
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r '  — b^O- (I27g)
[a.+ e ( l - a ) ] O b
From comparison of (127g) with (121) it is apparent that =cu, i.e. that is the
Jr
value of cu which leads unions to disregard the signal. From the facts that have been 
established about V2, it then follows directly that the following condition is both 
necessary and sufficient to ensure the central bank’s expected loss is increasing in a ] :
dE(Qcb )
---------- p ^ > 0  iff 0 < c u <cu (128a)
d a ! .
It also follows that the necessary and sufficient condition for the central bank’s 
expected loss to be decreasing in a 2u is:
dE(Qcb )
^ < 0  iff >cu (128b)H' = W.
da!
Finally, if  cu = cu the central bank’s expected loss is unaffected by a deterioration in 
the quality of the unions’ signal:
dE{Qcb\ )
  = 0  iff cu =cu (128c)
da,.
Result (128c) is the most straightforward of these results to explain: since unions 
ignore the signal when cu =cu, the macroeconomic outcomes which are of concern to 
the central bank, and hence its expected loss as well, are independent o f a ] .  It is
noteworthy that cu is the only admissible value of cu in respect o f which both the 
expected loss of unions and the expected loss of the central bank are unaffected by 
changes in a 2U. Combining results (128a) to (128c) with the results contained in (120) 
and (121), the range of possible values for cu (i.e. the non-negative portion o f the real
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line) is found to be divisible into five sections according to the impact of marginal 
increases in cr2 on the welfare of unions and of the central bank. This finding is
depicted below as Figure III.7, where two particular values of cu, namely cu and cu 
(the positive cu solution of the equation 0  = 0) constitute ‘sections’ in themselves.
A striking aspect of the results summarised in Figure III.7 is that there exists a range 
of cu values (specifically, the range < cu <cu), for which a deterioration in the
quality of the unions’ signal of the supply shock can be beneficial to the welfare of 
both the unions and the central bank. As we shall see, this at first sight counter­
intuitive finding can be explained in terms of the mitigating effect which a decline in 
signal quality has on the wage-setting externality. Results (128a) to (128c) also 
directly imply the quality o f the signal that will be chosen by the central bank when 
cu satisfies one or the other of the stated conditions. Since its expected loss is strictly
increasing in cr2 when cu is in the interval 0 < c u <cu, it follows that the central bank 
will choose a setting of zero for cr] , so that s = 6 at all times, and the unions are 
consequently fully informed about the shock when setting wages. Conversely, if 
cu > cu the central bank’s optimal strategy is to make signals infinitely noisy (i.e. 
choose the limiting case in which cr2 -»  qo ), so that each union in setting its wage 
disregards the particular realisation of s which it observes. In the special cu = cu case 
the central bank’s choice of cr2 is indeterminate.
As mentioned earlier, there are two aspects of the model which underlie these 
results, namely the relative magnitudes of cu and cb, and the wage-setting externality.
To obtain intuition regarding results (128a) and (128b) it is helpful to begin by 
isolating the aspect involving the weight parameters. This can be straightforwardly 
done by considering the version of the model in which the goods market is perfectly 
competitive, and from which the externality is therefore absent. It will be recalled that
J™* cu =cb’ s0 ^ a t  in this special case results (128a) to (128c) simplify to the
following:
lim
dE( Q cb )
dcrt
> 0  iff 0 < c.. < ck (129a)
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lim
£ - ► 0 0
d E ( n cb )
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(129c)
Hence in the absence of the externality the central bank’s optimal strategy when 
cu < cb is to choose cr2 -  0 , so that the signal it provides to unions is perfectly 
informative, while its optimal strategy when cu > cb is to deny unions any useful
information about the productivity shock.
The economic intuition for this has already been hinted at in our earlier discussion 
of the relationship between signal quality and union welfare under discretion, but 
requires elaboration at this point. When wage-setting is efficient, each union ignores 
the signal when cu = cb, since the very fact that the central bank places the same
relative weight on price level variability as the representative union places on real 
wage variability, implies that in the absence of wage adjustments in response to 
signals, monetary policy brings about the unions’ efficient combination of real wage 
variability and employment variability. However, if cu > cb is the case, and unions are
uninformed about shocks, the central bank, via its setting o f the money supply, brings 
about too little employment variability, together with too much real wage variability, 
from the unions’ viewpoint. Hence if unions receive a signal which is at all 
informative (i.e. if cr2 is finite, so that p  > 0), they will form the forecast J3s of the 
shock, as well as the associated rational expectation of the central bank’s optimal 
monetary response to the aggregate wage and /3s, and will incorporate this rational 
expectation into the wage in order to ensure the impact of J3s on employment and the 
real wage conforms to the efficient pattern. This means that if  cu > cb, union wage
responses to informative signals will cause employment variability to be higher than 
were the signals completely uninformative. Worse still, the unions’ recognition of the 
incentives facing the central bank implies that the excessive employment variability 
will be accompanied by a stochastic inflation bias. The better is signal quality, the 
more severe will be both these problems, and hence when cu > cb the central bank’s 
optimal strategy is to make signals infinitely noisy, so that the apportionment of the
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impact of each shock between employment and the price level does not depend at all 
on wage-setting, and instead is determined solely by the central bank’s setting of the 
money supply. It is noteworthy that the set of cases for which cu > cb includes the
special limiting cu -> co case mentioned earlier, in which unions wish to divert the
full impact of the shock on to employment, and consequently react to the signal only 
by adjusting the wage for their revised expectation of the price level. Thus a special 
case of our model replicates the result of Cukierman (2001) and Gersbach (2002).
In the converse case in which < c b > if unions are completely uninformed about
the shock, the conduct o f monetary policy will cause too much employment 
variability, and too little real wage variability, from unions’ point of view. 
Consequently, making signals more informative will reduce employment variability 
because of the efficient adjustment of the wage in response to each (non-zero) signal, 
and the resulting distribution o f the anticipated component o f each shock between 
employment and the real wage in accordance with union preferences. While greater 
economic transparency has a disadvantageous aspect in that it exacerbates the 
stochastic inflation bias, this drawback does not outweigh its beneficial effect of 
reduced employment variability. Therefore, when cu <cb, the central bank will
choose full economic transparency (i.e. choose to make signals perfectly informative).
Turning now to investigate how these conclusions change when the goods market is 
monopolistically competitive, it is useful to begin by once again considering the 
cu = cb case. This we know to be the special case in which wage-setting efficiency
requires every union to ignore the signal. However, with a monopolistically 
competitive goods market this does not happen under equilibrium wage-setting. 
Improvements in signal quality must therefore have an unambiguously detrimental 
impact on the central bank’s expected loss when cu = cb, since the resulting
worsening of the externality both directly increases employment variability and 
exacerbates the stochastic inflation bias. Next, we make use o f a fact established in 
our earlier discussion of the relationship between signal quality and union welfare in 
subsection III.5.5, namely that when the goods market is monopolistically 
competitive, the externality induces unions to ignore signals in equilibrium if cu has a
particular value. This value is cu, and provided n > 1 and s  is finite, cu < cb is the
case. When cu = cu the central bank’s expected loss is independent of signal quality.
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It is known from previous analysis that when cu is in the interval cu < cu <cb,
monetary policy would, in the absence of wage adjustments in reaction to signals,
bring about higher employment variability than unions desire, and therefore were
wage-setting efficient, improved signal quality would lead to lower employment
*
variability. When the goods market is monopolistically competitive, however,
improvements in signal quality do not have this effect: even though when cu <cu < cb
union preferences are such that each union would prefer lower employment variability 
and higher real wage variability than the central bank brings about in the absence of 
wage movements in reaction to signals, the externality in wage-setting leads to 
employment variability being greater than were the signal completely uninformative. 
The introduction of the wage-setting externality into the model, or its strengthening as
a result o f a reduction in £ or an increase in n, has the effect o f shifting cu closer to 
the origin and thus enlarging the set of cu values for which improvements in signal
quality worsen the central bank’s expected loss, and for which it is therefore optimal 
for the central bank to pursue a strategy of making signals completely uninformative.
For values of cu such that cu <cu, the presence o f the externality is insufficient to
prevent improvements in signal quality having a beneficial effect on employment 
variability, so that the optimal strategy for the central bank to follow is one of full 
economic transparency (i.e. perfectly informative signals).
It remains to work out society’s optimal choice of the delegation parameter cb in 
the light of these findings. To this end, we first o f all obtain society’s expected loss 
for a given value of cb by substituting (91b) and (103) into (8):
E(Q S ) =
w = wNE
+ (130)
cl (1 -  a f  [c„a (1 -  a )  + {e + c, (1 -  a)[a  + s(X -  a)] }<D b ]2
Differentiating (130) with respect to a]  yields:
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dE(Qs )
 ^ p ^  = [cs + c 2b{ \ - a ) 2]Y fi2 (131)
where T is as in expressions (127c) or (127d). Equation (131) immediately reveals 
that the necessary and sufficient condition for the expected social loss to be increasing 
in crj is the same as for the central bank’s expected loss. Hence the social-loss 
counterparts to (128a), (128b) and (128c) are as follows:
(132a) 
(132b) 
(132c)
These expressions imply that, provided cb is finite, a marginal increase in a]  has
exactly the same repercussions for the expected social loss as it does for the expected 
loss of the central bank.48 Figure III.7 is therefore doubly useful in that it also 
compares how a deterioration in signal quality affects society’s welfare with how it 
affects the welfare of unions. (All that is required for Figure III.7 to fulfill this 
purpose is that each of the ‘cb’ superscripts be replaced with an ‘s ’ denoting 
‘society’.) Hence the at first sight counter-intuitive finding emerges that when cu is in
the interval cu < cu < cu, greater economic transparency (a decrease in the noisiness of
the signal) is detrimental to the welfare of both society and of unions, a result which 
we know from previous discussion is attributable to the role o f signal quality (i.e. the 
unions’ forecasting slope, f i ) in determining the welfare impact of the adverse wage- 
setting externality. (Recall that fi can be thought of as the weight which apportions 
the productivity shock variance, a j , between the variance of the anticipated 
component of shocks, fieri, and the variance of the unanticipated component of
48 The proviso that cb is finite turns out to have some significance in what follows.
dE(Qs )
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shocks, (1 -  P)<J2e , with the adverse wage-setting externality only appertaining to the 
former.)
Having established the relationship between social welfare and signal quality for a 
given value of the delegation parameter cb, we can now proceed to derive the socially
optimal choice of cb when signal quality is chosen by the central bank, and therefore
is itself a function of cb . The derivation focuses on a particular value of cb, namely
cu =cb( l - a ) [ c ba ( l - a )  + s<S) b]/[a  + £(1- a )]<$>b , since if cu <cu an optimising
central bank assigned a loss function with weight cb supplies perfectly accurate
signals, while if  cu > cu it supplies completely uninformative signals. The most
straightforward way to solve society’s delegation problem is to ascertain first of all 
what would happen were society to appoint a representative central banker (i.e. were
society to set cb =cs). Were such an appointment to be made, cu would take a
particular value, specifically it would be:
c , q - g ) M ( i - g ) + g « D , ]  n 3 3 ,
[ a +  g (l-<*)]$,
where: <P, s<DJ = n[l + c „ ( l - a ) 2] - l  (133b)
There are three possibilities which we must now consider. Firstly, if  it so happens
that c.. > c. the representative central banker will choose to make signals
completely uninformative, and will then use the money supply to apportion the entire 
impact of the shock between employment and the price level in the way that 
minimises the expected social loss. Since we established earlier that the signal quality 
which is optimal for the central bank with finite cb is also optimal for society, it
follows that society’s optimal delegation choice when cu >cu is to appoint a
representative central banker, and that the resulting monetary regime will be 
completely opaque.
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The second possibility is that cu =cu happens to be the case, so that unions
ignore signals, regardless of their quality. In this case the central bank’s choice of 
signal quality is irrelevant to the outcome (and is consequently indeterminate), and 
society’s optimal delegation choiceds again a representative central banker so that the 
socially optimal apportionment of the productivity shock variance between
employment variability and price level variability is achieved. Given cu > cu ,
C b = CS
therefore, optimal delegation will result in a minimised expected social loss with the 
following value:
.2
e_
w~wm ,cb =cJ.c„ '  [1 +  C5 ( l  -  a Y ]
E(Cis =l ) = ------- ^ — =- (134)
The third possibility is that the value of cu is sufficiently low that the appointment of 
a representative central banker results in cu < cu being the case. It follows from
cb=c,
(128a) that the representative central banker will then be completely transparent about 
productivity shocks (i.e. chooses <j ]  = 0), so that each union is fully informed about 
6 when setting its wage. (The argument invoked earlier that, given cb is finite, the 
central bank’s optimal choice of cr2 is also socially optimal remains valid.) As
described previously, the unions’ rational expectation formed in the light of full 
information regarding 9 ,  and the incorporation of that rational expectation into the 
equilibrium nominal wage deprives the central bank of an incentive to influence 
employment via its setting of m. We know from a previous subsection that the 
resulting expression for employment variability is a decreasing function of cb for 
n>  1, while in the extreme cases of n = 1 and atomistic unions it is independent of 
cb . Complete transparency also gives rise to a stochastic inflation bias (indeed, this 
will be the sole component of the expression for price level variability), and this too is 
known to be a decreasing function of cb for all n > 1. It follows, therefore, that if 
unions are perfectly informed about the shock when setting wages, the resulting 
expected social loss must be strictly falling in cb. Furthermore, appointing a
conservative central banker (i.e. one for which cb is finite and exceeds cs) will not
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impair the central bank’s incentive to be completely transparent when <cu
since cu is an increasing function of cb for all n > 1, as is evident from the following 
derivative:
8c„ ( l - g ) [ c ta ( l - « ) ( n - l  + O t ) + g ^ ]  -13„
8c„ {a + e(\-a)YS>l
(Note that a necessary proviso for this argument is that cb is finite, since cu has been
derived on the assumption that this is the case.) The fact that when cu < cu the
C h  £  C ,
expected social loss is strictly falling in cb suggests that the optimal choice of central
banker in these circumstances may be an ultraconservative, i.e. one whose sole 
concern is to stabilise the price level and who is indifferent to employment variability. 
In our model, the limiting -> co case therefore corresponds to this type of central
banker. The fact that cb is infinite for an ultraconservative creates a small difficulty, 
however, since the expected loss of an ultraconservative central bank is necessarily 
zero and independent o f cru2, and consequently such a central bank will lack an
incentive to provide any particular quality of signal to the unions. (If the central 
bank’s sole concern is price-level stability, the stochastic inflation bias associated 
with the anticipated component of shocks is zero, while if  such a central bank chooses 
a regime of less-than-perfect signal quality, it perfectly neutralises the potential price- 
level impact o f the component of each shock which is unanticipated by unions via an 
appropriate setting of the money supply.) However, the socially optimal outcome will 
not be attained unless the ultraconservative central bank does practise full economic
transparency. Hence when Cu<CH\ , optimal delegation will involve both the
C b = C S
appointment o f an ultraconservative central banker and a constitutional requirement 
which compels the central bank to provide perfectly informative signals to unions. 
Note that the resulting equilibrium outcome would feature complete stability of the 
price level together with positive employment variability (and positive variability of 
the real wage), and that the expected social loss would be given by:
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lim E(Q* j »2c2(l-aQ2[g + g ( l -g )]2<j82
ch~* oo [a + n ( \ -  a){s + cu( \ -  a )[a  + s(\ -  a)]}]*
Two final points relate to the comparison of (134) with (136). The arguments
provided regarding the optimal delegation decision imply that when cu < cu the
right-hand side of (136) must be smaller in magnitude than the right-hand side of 
(134). These two expressions also allow us to identify the circumstances under which 
society will find it preferable to appoint an ultraconservative (who then practises full 
transparency) rather than a central banker with representative preferences (who 
chooses to make signals completely uninformative). Appointing an ultraconservative 
will be socially optimal if  the right-hand side of (134) exceeds the right-hand side of 
(136). Manipulating the resulting inequality, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
this to be the case is found to be:
c > ____________ ft2c2( l - a ) 2[a + £ ( l -a ) ]2_____________
’ [a + ns(l  -  a)] {a + ns(\ - a )  + 2ncu(l - a ) 2[a + f( l -  a)]}
The right-hand side o f (137) is increasing in n for all n > 1, and is decreasing in s  for 
all n>  1, indicating that for given cu and a , the set of cs values which will lead
society to appoint an ultraconservative is smaller, the more severe is the externality. 
This makes perfect sense, since under an ultraconservative both employment 
variability and (since the stochastic inflation bias is zero) the expected social loss 
must be larger, the greater the externality’s strength. When society finds it optimal to 
appoint a representative central banker, on the other hand, the expected social loss is 
necessarily independent of n and s , since the resulting regime o f complete opacity 
prevents the externality from arising at all. Hence if the two sides o f (137) happened 
to be equal, so that appointing an ultraconservative gives rise to the same expected 
loss as appointing a representative central banker, a worsening o f the externality must 
tip the balance in favour of the latter. This immediately implies that the stronger is the 
externality, the smaller must be the set of cs values which imply that society’s 
optimal delegation choice is an ultraconservative.
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III.6 Conclusion
This chapter has built on Chapter II by extending to a stochastic context the analysis 
of the macroeconomic implications of union wage-setting decisions when firms 
operate in a monopolistically competitive goods market. The key feature of the 
chapter has been the addition of "stochastic elements to our basic model, and in 
particular the introduction of a stochastic productivity shock in respect of which 
unions possess noisy information at the time wages are set. The objective function of 
the representative union in this chapter assumes an aversion to variability in both 
employment and the real wage about their respective mean values, and in terms of 
both individual and collective union welfare gives rise to a trade-off between 
employment and the real wage as regards stabilisation of the anticipated component of 
each shock.
A major finding of the chapter is that an adverse macroeconomic externality arises 
from individual wage decisions made in response to the common signal of the 
productivity shock. The externality is the consequence o f each union not fully 
internalising the price-level repercussions of its individual wage, and results in real 
wage variability being inefficiently low (i.e. less than that which would result from 
fully coordinated wage-setting), and employment variability being inefficiently high. 
As in the case of the wage-setting externality relating to the mean real wage which 
was seen to arise in the non-stochastic model, this chapter’s externality is weaker* the 
smaller is the number o f unions, and is absent if there is a single economy-wide union. 
A second parallel with the results of Chapter II is that the presence of imperfect 
goods-market competition is essential to the existence of the externality, which is 
weaker the more competitive is the goods market, and indeed is absent when firms are 
perfect competitors.
As in Chapter II, the externality has been shown to arise under a variety o f monetary 
regimes. The current chapter’s principal concern has been to investigate how the 
externality affects the relationship between welfare and the quality of unions’ 
information about the shock, and the implications of that relationship in turn for the 
optimal design o f a discretionary monetary regime. With regard to these issues, a 
major finding of the chapter is that under the simple rule, deterioration in signal 
quality has, a few special cases apart, both a beneficial externality-mitigating effect on 
union welfare and a detrimental effect involving the resulting higher variance of union 
forecast errors. For a certain set of parameter values, the externality-mitigating effect
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on union welfare outweighs the forecast-error effect, so that unions are better off, the 
worse is the quality of their information about productivity shocks. A similar result 
has been shown to appertain to the discretionary regime when the representative 
union’s weight parameter cu takes one of a set of possible values which are functions
Jr
of the central bank’s own weight parameter cb. Economic intuition for this result has
been provided, with one o f the key points being the fact that if  the two weight 
parameters are equal, so that the relative preference of unions for employment 
stability coincides with the central bank’s relative preference for it, efficiency in 
wage-setting requires that unions maintain the nominal wage at its mean value 
regardless o f the signal, since monetary policy in this situation stabilises shocks in the 
way that unions ‘collectively’ find most desirable. Since the wage-setting externality 
leads to wages inefficiently responding to signals when cu = cb, it follows that there 
exists a range o f cu values in respect of which a worsening of signal quality is 
beneficial to union welfare, and that this range includes, and extends on either side of,
Closely related to this key result is another which relates to the relationship between 
employment variability and the central bank’s weight parameter when the quality of 
unions’ information is held constant. For the extremes of wage-bargaining structure, 
the impact of the anticipated component o f each shock on employment is found to be 
independent o f this weight, either because unions are atomistic, so that changes in cb
do not affect the extent (zero) to which each union internalises the price level impact 
of its wage decision, or because there is a single union, so that full internalisation 
occurs regardless o f the monetary regime. However, for the case of multiple non- 
atomistic unions, each of which partially internalises the macroeconomic 
repercussions o f its wage, the weight cb does matter for employment outcomes
relating to the anticipated component of each shock. A higher cb induces greater
internalisation of wage consequences and hence mitigates the externality. Although 
the component o f employment variability relating to the anticipated component of 
shocks is thus lowered by a marginal increase in cb, whether greater central bank
conservatism reduces employment variability as a whole depends however on the 
magnitude of the resulting increase in the component of employment variability 
relating to the unanticipated component of shocks. These results therefore provide a
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candidate explanation for why empirical studies typically do not find greater central 
bank conservatism to be associated with higher employment variability.
The chapter identifies another beneficial effect of an increase in the weight placed 
on inflation by the central bank, namely a reduction in price level variability, whether 
arising from the anticipated or unanticipated component o f shocks. While the 
reduction in the contribution of union forecast errors to price level variability is a 
straightforward consequence of greater conservatism leading to stronger emphasis on 
moderating (via use of the money supply) the impact of such errors on the price level, 
the effect of greater conservatism on the stochastic inflation bias (the component of 
price level variability relating to the anticipated component o f shocks) is more subtle, 
since it works purely via its beneficial influence on the expectation o f the price level 
formed by each union conditional on the signal. Taken in conjunction with the 
aforementioned findings concerning employment variability, the optimal degree o f 
central bank conservatism when signal quality is exogenous is found to be that which 
exploits the trade-off between, on the one hand, the components of the expected social 
loss which are falling in cb (i.e. price level variability and, if  unions are non-
atomistic, the component of employment variability relating to union forecasts of 
shocks), and on the other hand the component of employment variability relating to 
union forecast errors, since this alone is an increasing function of cb.
The penultimate section of the chapter investigates how these conclusions change 
when signal quality is endogenised, and is assumed to be a choice variable of the 
central bank. Society’s optimal delegation decision was found to depend upon 
whether cu fell below or exceeded a particular critical value, namely the critical value
which, were a central banker with representative preferences to be appointed, would 
result in each union in equilibrium choosing not to adjust its wage in response to the 
signal, regardless of the signal’s value. If cu happens to take this value, the central
bank will have the task o f stabilising the entire component o f the shock, regardless of 
its choice of signal quality, and hence a representative central banker is society’s 
optimal choice. If cu exceeds the critical value, society will again appoint someone 
with representative preferences, since such an appointee will practise the regime of 
complete opacity which is socially optimal in these circumstances. Finally, if  cu falls 
below the critical value, it is in society’s interests, because of the resulting amount of
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employment variability, that the central bank provide unions with a perfectly 
informative signal of each shock. Appointing a conservative central banker will 
ensure this. However, because the stochastic inflation bias is strictly decreasing in cb,
and since when unions are fully informed equilibrium employment is beyond this
>
parameter’s influence, it turns out that the optimal delegation decision involves both 
appointing an ultraconservative, and supplementing this with a constitutional 
provision to ensure such an appointee does provide unions with perfectly informative 
signals.
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Chapter IV 
The Macroeconomics of Wage Indexation:
Introduction and Literature Review
IV.l Introduction
The formal investigation of the macroeconomic repercussions of wage indexation is 
generally agreed to have commenced with the seminal paper by Gray (1976), while an 
important extension to this approach was made by Ball (1988), who incorporated 
monopolistic competition into Gray’s framework. Since the central vein of the 
macroeconomic literature consists of adaptations of these two key papers, it will assist 
our discussion to set out below a model which embraces the Gray and Ball frameworks as 
particular cases. Contributions which build on this approach, or on a simpler approach 
based on Barro and Gordon’s (1983a) model, are subsequently discussed, together with 
their potential shortcomings. The short penultimate section of the literature review is 
devoted to the relatively small number of papers concerned with multiparameter wage 
indexation, an idea which is applied to the basic model of this thesis in Chapter VI. The 
final section summarises and draws conclusions. Throughout, attention is confined to the 
theoretical literature on closed economy macroeconomics, since the models subsequently 
developed in Chapters V and VI are, in common with the entirety of this thesis, 
concerned with the implications for domestic macroeconomic outcomes of choices 
relating to the nominal wage made at the level of the individual union. In view of this, the 
substantial body of literature dealing with the question of the optimal degree of wage 
indexation for exchange rate stabilisation or monetary union purposes is not discussed.1
IV.2 The Gray (1976) and Ball (1988) Models
This section sets out a model which encompasses the key contributions of Gray (1976) 
and Ball (1988). The structural equations of this encompassing model, together with the
1 A comprehensive survey is provided by van Gompel (1994). Note that space constraints also lead us to 
disregard wage-indexation papers featuring macroeconomic topics which are not the concern o f this thesis: 
for example, the government budget constraint (Waller and VanHoose, 1989), public debt (Guidotti, 1993), 
and central-bank reputation in a repeated game (Diana, 2002).
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individual firm’s implied labour demand, are set out below as expressions (1) to (8). 
There is no need to comment in detail on the majority of these equations, since they are in 
most cases identical to the counterpart equations for the wage-setting model developed in 
earlier chapters:2
y i = ali +Q 0 < a  < 1 (1)
i
y s = jy.di = a l  + 0 (2)
y D = r ( m - p  +  (j>)
1
P = JPidi
0
(3)
(4)
y? -  y D = - £ ( &  -  p), £> 1  (5)
d r ( m - p  + 0 ) - £ (w i - p )  + ( £ - l ) 0  
[a + s ( \ - a ) ]
Note that the specification of the production function, which is common to all firms, is 
precisely that assumed by Ball. While Gray does not assign this specific functional form 
to her model’s production function, restricting it instead to exhibit diminishing marginal 
product of labour, the log-linear specification of (1) is a particular case which conforms 
to the general concave-in-levels specification adopted by her. So far as the specification 
of aggregate demand is concerned, namely equation (3), note that Gray sets the elasticity 
parameter y equal to unity for simplicity, while Ball instead restricts it to be positive. 
Both papers assume that the money stock, m, is fixed: in other words, that there is no
2 All variables are specified in logarithms except where stated otherwise, and the notation conforms to that 
used in the rest o f this thesis, rather than to the notation o f Gray and Ball.
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monetary intervention on the part of the authorities. The scenario is therefore exactly 
equivalent to that of the simple rule considered in Chapter III above. We also draw the 
reader’s attention to the fact that Gray assumes a perfectly competitive goods market: in 
terms of equation (5), her model therefore corresponds to the limiting case in which 
£ —»oo . In common with much of the literature, both Gray and Ball assume that 
employment at the individual firm is always equal to the individual firm’s labour demand.
The equations which have been set out thus far are identical to their counterparts for the 
wage-setting model of Chapter III. The Gray-Ball framework differs from our model, 
however, in two particular respects, namely in the specifications of desired labour supply 
and of the contract nominal wage. Gray allows desired labour supply to be responsive to 
the real wage:
i f  = c o { w i -  p) c o >  0 (7)
Ball confines his attention to the special co = 0 case in which labour supply is completely
inelastic with respect to the real wage. The specification of the nominal wage is:
wi = wi +xi( p - E p )  (8)
where wt is the base nominal wage and x, the degree of indexation to expectational errors 
in respect of the price level. wi and x, are stipulated in a contract signed prior to the 
realisations of the two shocks being observed by the parties to the contract. The 
expectational error p - E p  is therefore the unforeseen departure of the actual price level 
from its rational expectation formed at the contract signing date.
Several features of the nominal wage equation (8) are noteworthy. Firstly, the wage is 
assumed to be indexed symmetrically to both positive and negative expectational errors 
regarding the price level. This simplifying assumption greatly enhances the model’s
tractability, at the cost of not reproducing a feature common to virtually all real-world
3 The assumption o f  entirely passive monetary policy made by Gray and Ball warrants a simpler 
specification for aggregate demand which discards the velocity shock and simply assumes instead that the 
money stock itself is a stochastic variable. This is precisely the specification found in their papers.
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indexed wage contracts, namely that the indexation clause becomes operative only when 
a positive expectational error regarding the price level occurs. The only paper to have 
formally investigated the implications of such asymmetric wage indexation is Cover and 
VanHoose (2002). These authors apply this more realistic specification to the Gray model, 
and for reasons of tractability, assume uniform distributions for the two shocks. They find 
that if a contract specifies (positive) indexation of the wage to only positive expectational 
errors, so that workers are in effect insured against a fall in their real wage below its 
expected value, the consequence is a lower base nominal wage. However, the lower is the 
base nominal wage, the lower is the expected price level, which in turn affects the 
probability of a positive expectational error, which alters the desirable degree of 
asymmetric indexation. Numerical simulations for plausible values of the structural 
parameters are resorted to in order to study these interaction effects and their implications 
for the equilibrium degree of wage indexation. Cover and VanHoose find that a 
sufficiently large ratio of the aggregate demand shock variance to the productivity shock 
variance will prevent the existence of an equilibrium in which the degree of asymmetric 
indexation is positive.
The second noteworthy feature of (8) is its assumption that the wage is indexed to 
expectational errors regarding current inflation, rather than being (more realistically) 
indexed to lagged expectational errors (i.e. errors regarding inflation in the period 
immediately preceding that covered by the contract), or to lagged inflation itself. A more 
sophisticated model would therefore allow for the fact that under a typical indexed 
contract, weekly or monthly base-wage payments are accompanied by less frequent 
indexation-clause payments, with the latter being made in respect of inflation. The 
principal papers investigating this issue are Fischer (1977b) and Jadresic (2002), 
discussion of which is deferred to a subsequent section of this survey. A final feature of 
(8) to which attention should be drawn is that indexation to other macroeconomic 
variables in addition to the price level is not considered.
Gray, Ball, and many other papers in the central vein of the literature assume that the 
adverse welfare consequences of stochastic shocks are adequately represented by the 
unconditional expectation of squared deviations in employment from its full-information 
level, i.e. the employment level which would prevail in the aftermath of shock
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realisations, were those shocks perfectly foreseen and the contract base nominal wage set 
appropriately to ensure labour market clearing. The standard specification of the loss of 
‘wage-setters’ (a term which in this context embraces both parties to the contract) at the 
individual firm is consequently:
E Q  = E(lt - l IFI)2 (9)
where /, FI denotes ful 1-information (log) employment. (Gray’s specification of the loss
in terms of the deviation in output from its full-information level is exactly equivalent to 
this, as of course is a loss function quadratic in real wage deviations from the full- 
information real wage, as used by Bar-Ilan and Zanello (1996), for instance.) This 
specification is implicitly underpinned by the assumption that both contracting parties are 
risk-neutral. It approximates, by means of a second-order Taylor-series expansion, the 
welfare loss occasioned by departures of employment from its full-information market- 
clearing level.4
Minimisation of (9) by choice of xi leads to an expression for the optimal degree of
indexation of the individual firm’s wage to the price level. Since individual firms and 
their captive labour pools are assumed to be atomistic in Gray, Ball and the subsequent
i
literature, the aggregate degree p f  indexation, x = is assumed to be taken as given
0
by those at firm i who are responsible for the choice of xt . The resulting symmetric Nash 
equilibrium degree of indexation is independent of the relative-price elasticity of demand 
parameter e :
4 In the macroeconomic literature, relatively few attempts have been made to ground the wage indexation 
decision in the maximisation o f a specific worker utility function. Benassy (1995) is an exception. He 
assumes both workers and their employers have the same logarithmic utility function, and using an 
overlapping generations model he proceeds to demonstrate that utility maximisation by rational trade 
unions will lead them to adopt less-than-full wage indexation, thereby showing that the existence o f  
incomplete nominal wage flexibility can be reconciled with utility maximisation by rational agents.
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* n e =  1--------------- 5----- r ~ ^ ---------------------7-  ( 10){(1 + (D)od + y (1 -  a)[ 1 + <y(l -  a)]<7,}
>
Gray assumes ^ = 1, and evaluating for y = 1 yields (differences in notation apart) 
Gray’s equation (15). Setting co = 0 in- (10) yields Ball’s equation (13) for the
4
equilibrium degree of (costless) indexation in his model. In other words, the expressions 
for the Nash equilibrium degree of indexation in Ball and Gray are particular cases of (10) 
which result when certain values are assigned to y and co. Minimisation of (9) subject to
the constraint that indexation must be symmetric (i.e. xt = xVz)5, reveals that the Nash
equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient in the sense that it is the degree that would 
be chosen by a benevolent authority concerned to minimise the expected loss of wage- 
setters at the representative firm.
Equation (10) exhibits several key results of the literature. In particular, (10) prescribes 
full indexation to the price level when productivity is not stochastic (the o]  = 0 case).
The intuition for this is that in the absence of productivity shocks, the market-clearing 
real wage must always be equal to its expected value, while movements in the price level 
are attributable purely to aggregate demand shocks, so that full indexation is therefore 
necessary to eliminate undesirable departures of the real wage from its expected value. If 
the economy is subject to both types of shock, (10) prescribes partial wage indexation, 
with the degree of wage indexation falling as the ratio crj  j o ]  decreases. Intuitively, an
economy in which productivity shocks predominate, and which are therefore a greater 
source of price level variability than aggregate demand shocks, will require a low degree 
of wage indexation, since in the absence of wage indexation, price level movements 
generally cause the real wage to adjust in the direction considered desirable, so far as the 
stabilisation of employment at its full-information market-clearing level is concerned. If 
aggregate demand disturbances are completely absent, so that o j  = 0, the optimal degree
of wage indexation in the Gray model is independent of the productivity shock variance, 
and depends on the aggregate demand elasticity y and the labour supply elasticity co. In
5 This amounts to minimising squared deviations o f aggregate employment from the full-information level.
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the special case considered by Gray in which labour supply is completely inelastic, 
i.e. co = 0, and y is at its commonly assumed value of unity, an absence of nominal
disturbances (cr  ^ = 0) requires zero "wage indexation for full efficiency, since in this
special case the induced change in the price level occasioned by the productivity shock is 
precisely sufficient to bring about the desired movement in the real wage which ensures 
employment attains its full-information value.6
IV.3 An Alternative Interpretation of the Gray-Ball Result in Terms of the 
Argument of Blanchard (1979)
The Gray-Ball optimal indexation result given by (10) can alternatively be interpreted 
as an optimal formula for the exploitation of information. Although it is seldom remarked 
upon, the Gray-Ball result therefore has aspects in common with the findings of the 
macroeconomic literature on signal extraction. Papers investigating this issue, of which 
some discussion has been provided in an earlier chapter of this thesis, generally involve a 
strategy being chosen by a player conditional on that player’s inference about the state of 
the world, with such inferences being arrived at by applying the simple econometric 
methodology of signal extraction to a noisy item of information concerning a stochastic 
variable. In an earlier chapter, for instance, the individual union’s nominal wage is set 
after a forecast of the future productivity shock has been formed on the basis of 
information contaminated by noise. In the wage indexation literature, the price level plays 
the role of the potentially noisy item of information from which inferences about 
stochastic shocks can be made. The difference with the wage-setting literature involving 
signal extraction are firstly that in the Gray-Ball framework, the informative variable, 
namely the price level, is realised after the individual player’s strategic variable (the 
degree of indexation) has been chosen, and secondly the aggregate of such strategy
6 Note that, depending on the values taken by the structural parameters which appear on the right-hand side 
o f (10), the degree o f  indexation which minimises employment deviations from the full-information
market-clearing level may be negative. In the simple crj = 0 case, for example, we have 
x n e  Io-2 - q  = l ~ [ / / ( l  + iW)] > implying that if  the elasticity o f  aggregate demand with respect to price-level 
movements is sufficiently large (specifically, if  y  > (1 + co) ), negative indexation is optimal.
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choices itself influences, via feedback effects, the realised value of the price level itself. 
As Blanchard (1979) recognises, the optimal indexation scheme seeks to exploit the
n
information content of the price level. By making the nominal wage contingent on the 
realised value of this informative variable, an outcome closer to the full information 
outcome can be achieved. If there is only one stochastic, shock affecting the economy, the 
price level becomes perfectly informative of the realisation of that shock, and the 
appropriate indexation scheme can then bring about the full-information outcome. Thus if 
there are no productivity shocks, all price movements are attributable to aggregate 
demand disturbances, and full indexation of the wage to this fully informative variable 
will ensure ex-post labour market clearing. Conversely, a complete absence of stochastic 
aggregate demand disturbances renders the price level a perfect indicator of productivity 
shocks, and then the optimal indexation scheme adjusts the nominal wage by precisely 
the amount required to ensure that the response in (desired) labour supply to the resulting 
change in the real wage is equal to the induced change in the demand for labour. With 
both types of shock present, the price level can be regarded as noisily informative in 
respect of each of these shocks. For a given variance of the productivity shock, a larger 
variance of the aggregate demand disturbance renders the price level a noisier indicator 
of the productivity shock, making higher indexation optimal.8 Equivalently, for a given 
aggregate demand shock variance, a larger productivity shock variance increases the 
noisiness of the price level as regards its informativeness about the aggregate demand 
shock, and this decline in the reliability of the price level as an indicator of purely 
nominal disturbances makes it optimal to reduce the linkage between the price level and 
the nominal wage. The Gray-Ball result thus corresponds to an optimal scheme for 
exploiting the information content of the price level in order to minimise the deviation of 
employment from its full-information outcome.
7 This point is central also to the paper by Adolph and Wolfstetter (1991). That Gray’s optimal indexation 
scheme parameter has affinities to a signal-extraction result is explicitly remarked upon only by Devereux 
(1987).
8 As explicitly recognised by Devereux (1987), p.430.
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IV.4 Modifications of Gray’s Model which do not Engender Externalities
Before proceeding to discuss the existence of externalities in variants of the Gray-Ball 
model, we briefly review sundry contributions to the literature which, by modifying one 
or the other of the structural equations of Gray’s model, produce results which are argued 
to throw doubt upon the robustness of her conclusions regarding the optimal degree of 
wage indexation. Cukierman (1980), for example, shows that Gray’s results are crucially 
dependent on the assumption that employment under contracts is demand-determined. 
However, as already mentioned elsewhere in this work, the empirical evidence in general 
supports this assumption that under labour contracts firms retain the ‘right to manage’. 
Bar-Ilan and Zanello (1991), meanwhile, point out that when the structural parameters of 
the Gray model are assigned plausible values, the resulting numerical value for the 
optimal degree of indexation is inconsistent with the empirical facts concerning wage 
indexation in the US. These authors show that the introduction of a term in price-level 
variability into the objective function assumed by Gray lowers the optimal degree of 
wage indexation, and thus reduces the extent of the disagreement between theory and the 
observed low incidence of wage indexation in the US, as well as the low estimated 
elasticity of contract wages with respect to price-level expectational errors in that country. 
The flaw in this argument, of course, is that were the degree of indexation endogenised in 
a model of atomistic agents, every such agent would perceive its individual indexation 
choice to have a negligible effect on the price level, implying that the expression derived 
by Bar-Ilan and Zanello would not in fact prevail in equilibrium.
A more interesting paper which falls into this category is Nishimura (1989), which 
introduces aspects of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) into Gray’s framework. In 
Nishimura’s model, the goods market is perfectly competitive, as in Gray, but the labour 
market is characterised by monopolistically competitive unions, each supplying a special 
type of labour, with each firm employing members of every union in the economy. In 
addition to economy-wide shocks, there are labour-type-specific shocks to the individual 
union’s labour demand and supply, with these shocks being imperfectly observed. 
(Unions observe the composite shocks to their labour demand and supply.) In a passive 
monetary policy context, Nishimura proceeds to show that in this labour-market scenario, 
full indexation of the wage to the aggregate price level fails to insulate the economy from
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purely nominal disturbances, and partial indexation is required to achieve this. 
Nishimura’s conclusion is therefore sharply at variance with that of Gray and the 
mainstream literature, which finds that full indexation guarantees insulation from purely 
nominal disturbances.
The validity of Gray’s findings has also been questioned by papers which address an 
issue briefly alluded to above in our discussion of the Gray-Ball model’s specification of 
the nominal wage. Gray, Ball and the bulk of the literature, assume that the wage is 
indexed to expectational errors regarding the current price level, rather than to lagged 
expectational errors, or to lagged inflation itself. The robustness of Gray’s key result that 
full indexation stabilises aggregate output when aggregate demand shocks are 
predominant, and destabilises it when productivity shocks are predominant, to such 
alternative specifications was investigated by Fischer (1977b). Fischer modified the basic 
Gray model so that instead of wages being indexed to the expectational error regarding 
the current period price level (or inflation), the wage is indexed to the adjustment in 
expectations regarding the price level which has occurred in the immediately preceding 
period. Temporarily introducing time subscripts in the interests of clarity at this point, 
Fischer assumed that the wage is indexed fully to E p -  E p t_, , the revision in
expectations concerning the price level. (Recall that in Gray, the wage is indexed to 
p  -  E p t , the expectational error regarding the current period price level.) Fischer found
t - \
that when the economy featured overlapping two-period contracts, Gray’s conclusions 
were indeed robust to the modification he considered.
Jadresic (2002) departs from Gray and Fischer by considering full indexation of the 
wage to lagged inflation rather than (less realistically) to expectational errors regarding 
current inflation or to the lagged adjustment in expected inflation. Jadresic’s model, like 
Fischer’s, features uniformly staggered two-period wage contracts, while the shocks are 
assumed to have a permanent impact on the level of output. For certain values of the 
structural parameters, including in particular a low responsiveness of inflation to the rate 
of change of aggregate output adjusted for the productivity shock, Jadresic finds that full 
indexation of wages to lagged inflation (a typical feature of real-world indexed wage 
contracts) has a destabilising effect on output both with regard to productivity shocks and
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to aggregate demand shocks. The conclusions of Gray and Fischer are found to be robust 
to Jadresic’s modification only in cases in which the parameter measuring the 
responsiveness of inflation to the rate of change of aggregate output, adjusted for the 
productivity shock, is close to unity, a value which Jadresic argues to be plausible only 
for very open economies. In addition, Jadresic proceeds to show that when fully 
accommodating monetary policy is introduced into his model, so that the current money 
growth rate is no longer fixed as in Gray and Fischer, but responds one-to-one to the 
previous period inflation rate, output is then found to be immune to real disturbances 
when there is full indexation of the wage to lagged inflation. This result contrasts sharply 
with the general finding in the literature building on Gray, that when the wage is indexed 
to expectational errors regarding current-period inflation, real disturbances are output- 
destabilising regardless of whether monetary policy accommodates such shocks or not. 
Jadresic argues furthermore that partial indexation of the wage to lagged inflation also 
makes both types of shock destabilise output when the structural parameters have 
particular values, although the destabilising effect is less severe, the lower the degree of 
partial indexation. Jadresic’s model therefore appears to imply that when nominal wages 
are indexed to lagged inflation, the conclusions arrived at by Gray and Fischer may not 
be valid. While Jadresic’s findings are clearly of potential importance, there needs to 
develop a wider consensus on the likely values of the model’s key structural parameters, 
however, before the debate on this matter can be viewed as definitively settled.
IV.5 Indexation Externalities in Versions of the Gray-Ball Model with Passive 
Monetary Policy
The basic Gray-Ball framework outlined above does not give rise to indexation 
externalities, despite the fact that the choice of indexation degree at the individual firm 
affects the mean degree of indexation across the economy and hence has repercussions 
for the variability of the price level. Regardless of the degree of goods market 
competition, the equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient when adjudged in terms of 
the assumed loss function of wage-setters. Ball provides an intuitive explanation for this. 
Although the aggregate degree of indexation affects the individual firm by altering the
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responsiveness of the price level to both kinds of shock, it turns out that appropriate 
choice of the individual indexation degree ensures that the impact of unexpected price 
level movements, due to shocks, on labour demand working through the real wage 
exactly offsets their impact on labour demand working via real money balances and 
hence individual product demand. (The latter channel does not operate under perfect 
competition.) Individually optimal wage indexation therefore ensures that the individual 
firm’s employment is fully insulated from the effects of the indexation decisions taken at 
other firms, and hence also from the aggregate degree of indexation. For an externality to 
arise when the loss function of wage setters has the specification it has in Ball, a cost to 
adopting indexation must be introduced, with this cost differing across firms. Ball shows 
that when a certain proportion of firms choose not to index at all rather than incur a cost, 
an increase in that proportion, or in the equilibrium degree of indexation, can be either 
beneficial or detrimental to the welfare of wage-setters at non-indexed firms. Whether or 
not the externality works to the disadvantage of the non-indexed wage-setters depends on 
the relative values of the parameters y and e, since the greater price-level variability 
which is a consequence of higher indexation and/or more firms adopting indexation, 
affects the individual firm’s employment variability via several potentially counteracting 
channels: the greater real wage variability at non-indexed firms which is caused by higher 
indexation at the aggregate level, may, in its employment variability impact, be either 
counteracted or exacerbated by the influence greater wage indexation has, via the induced 
change in aggregate demand variability, on the variability of individual firm product 
demand.
Ball’s 1988 paper thus initiated one of the principal themes of the subsequent wage 
indexation literature, namely the investigation of macroeconomic externalities arising 
from individual indexation decisions. The Gray and Ball papers assumed purely passive 
monetary policy, however, and hence abstracted from potential links between indexation 
decisions and macroeconomic outcomes via induced changes in the conduct of policy. A 
second major concern of the literature, additional to the theme of indexation externalities, 
has therefore been to extend the Gray-Ball framework to investigate the potentially 
beneficial effect wage indexation may have on the inflationary bias associated with 
discretionary monetary policy when a low-mean-inflation policy is time inconsistent. A
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subsidiary third theme which investigation of the two aforementioned main themes often 
leads to is the devising of theoretical explanations for why the empirically observed 
incidence of wage indexation is often low, and as to why, when it is stipulated in wage 
contracts, the degree of wage indexation is often less than unity. (The Gray and Ball 
models provide one candidate explanation for the latter, of course.)
It is best to commence our survey of the post-Ball literature with a discussion of 
Kovanen (1992), Kempf (1998) and Duca and VanHoose (1998a), since unlike the bulk 
of the later literature, these authors are not concerned to study the impact of wage 
indexation under discretionary monetary policy, but rather focus on endogenous 
indexation in a passive monetary policy context. The departure from the Gray model 
made by Kovanen in his little-noticed paper is to assume that perfectly competitive firms 
employ two different types of labour, which differ in their marginal products. The Cobb- 
Douglas production function generally used by the literature is abandoned in favour of a 
log-linear approximation of the following CES production function: in levels, output is 
given by Y = (Lb + N cb)ube0 , where 6 is the (log) productivity shock, (1 — Z>)_1 is the 
elasticity of substitution between the two types of labour and 0 < c < 1 renders L and N  
the skilled and unskilled types respectively. Kovanen proceeds to demonstrate that if all 
workers in the economy simultaneously choose their individual degree of indexation, the 
equilibrium degree is partial, similar in many respects to Gray’s result, and common to 
both types of workers. In other words, productivity differences do not matter for 
individual indexation choice (although they do matter for a labour type’s expected loss in 
equilibrium), and there are no externalities. However, if one of the two labour types is 
constrained to have zero indexation, with workers of the other type free to choose their 
individual degree, indexation externalities do arise. It transpires in Kovanen’s model that 
if skilled workers are the type which can choose their indexation degree, their equilibrium 
choice then has a negative externality as regards the welfare of the unskilled workers who 
are constrained to be non-indexed. Conversely, if it is unskilled workers who are free to 
choose, while skilled workers are constrained, there is a positive indexation externality as 
regards the welfare of the latter. Of course, the arbitrariness of the assumption that one 
particular type of labour is constrained and the other not can be criticised, but
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nevertheless Kovanen’s analysis is of considerable value in demonstrating the potential 
for externalities to arise when the Gray-Ball model is modified.
Turning to Kempf (1998), the element of originality in this paper is the modification of 
the Ball (1988) model to allow for multiperiod wage contracts, so that each firm’s wage- 
setters must decide upon the degree of indexation of its wage to price-level expectational 
errors in respect of the price level for several future periods. (Firm z’s indexation 
parameter setting is the same for all periods covered by the contract, with each period 
having its own particular realisations of both shocks, and the expectational errors all 
relate to expectations of future price levels formed at the contract-signing date.) The 
number of periods covered by a contract is assumed to be equal to the number of 
industry-sectors, which are monopolistically competitive. 9 In order to avoid 
complications relating to strategic interaction between firms, Kempf assumes that within 
each sector firms are perfect competitors and hence are atomistic. He proceeds to 
investigate whether individual indexation choices in the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
differ from the efficient degree which may be achieved by co-ordinated indexation, and 
finds that when firms sign wage contracts simultaneously across the entire economy, the 
equilibrium degree of indexation is efficient, just as it is in the version of Ball (1988) in 
which indexation is costless. Kempf s most important findings, however, relate to the 
scenario in which the signing of contracts is staggered across industry sectors, so that 
while within each sector the firms are identical as regards the set of periods covered by 
their respective wage contracts, the wage-contract periods of any two sectors are not 
coincident. For this scenario of overlapping sectoral contract-periods, Kempf finds that, 
provided both types of shock exist, a particular sector’s degree of indexation has spillover 
effects which increase the frequency of expectational errors in respect of the price level, 
and which lead necessarily to a larger mean absolute-value deviation of the representative 
firm’s employment from its full-information level. An incentive therefore arises for the 
individual firm’s wage-setters to set a lower degree of indexation than the efficient
9 A slightly curious feature o f  K em pf s model is that Ball’s relative-product-demand elasticity parameter s  
is assigned an inadmissible value o f  unity. However, although Kempf does not comment on the matter, it 
would appear that his model is the limiting case as s  -> 1 o f a more general model in which e  may take 
any value in excess o f unity.
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degree, in order to combat the additional source of employment variability, and for this 
reason an adverse externality comes to characterise individual indexation decisions.
The third paper which investigates indexation externalities in the Ball (1988) 
framework is Duca and VanHoose (1998a), which weds the monopolistically competitive 
firms of Ball’s model to the multisector economic structure of Duca and VanHoose’s 
earlier papers, Duca (1987) and Duca and VanHoose (1991). The key feature of these 
earlier papers is that the economy consists of two sectors which differ in two respects, 
namely as regards the good produced and labour-market structure. The two sectors 
produce different goods, but within each sector firms are in perfect competition, while all 
workers across the economy consume both these goods. The labour market of the 
classical sector features spot-market hiring of labour, while the non-classical or 
Keynesian sector features wage contracts. Duca (1987), which does not investigate wage 
indexation issues at all, uses this basic framework and also assumes that labour supply is 
elastic with respect to the consumption real wage, and that only aggregate demand 
disturbances affect the economy (i.e. productivity shocks are ignored by Duca). In the 
absence of activist monetary policy an aggregate demand disturbance will differ in its 
impact on the prices of the two goods because of the stickiness of contract nominal wages 
in the non-classical sector. However, this has implications for employment and output in 
both sectors because the resulting movement in the consumption real wage will change 
equilibrium employment in the classical sector. Duca (1987) thus demonstrates that even 
sectors which have full flexibility of both goods prices and nominal wages are not 
immune to being affected by aggregate demand disturbances when sticky contract wages 
elsewhere in the economy create spillover effects on the consumption real wage. While 
this insight is of value in itself, Duca’s paper throws no light on externality issues, since 
the existence of wage contracts in one sector of the economy is simply assumed, and is 
not endogenised.10
This two-sector, two-good, perfect competition framework is developed in Duca and 
VanHoose (1991), which allows for multiparameter wage indexation in the non-classical
10 These wider issues are taken up in Duca and VanHoose (2001), which allows for productivity shocks, 
aggregate demand shocks, and sector-specific demand shocks, and investigates the repercussions o f an 
increase in the degree o f  (monopolistic) goods market competition on the decision taken at the individual 
firm level, to adopt a (non-indexed) wage contract. Since this paper does not consider wage indexation 
issues at all, it is not appropriate to discuss it further here.
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sector’s wage contracts, while sector-specific productivity shocks are also introduced. 
Since Duca and VanHoose (1991) focuses on the optimal multi-parameter indexation 
scheme for their two-sector scenario* we defer discussion of this paper to a later section 
of this chapter. For the purposes of our present discussion, however, it is worth remarking 
that the spillover effects identified by Duca (1987) are found in Duca and VanHoose 
(1991) to be relevant to optimal indexation.
Duca and VanHoose (1998a), like its 1991 forerunner, modifies Duca (1987), but does 
so in a different way. While it is assumed that monetary policy is passive, and that there 
are two sectors which differ according to whether they feature wage contracts or a labour 
spot market, the assumption made in Duca (1987) that there are just two goods, each of 
which is produced by perfectly competitive firms, is discarded, with all firms assumed 
instead to be in monopolistic competition, as in Ball (1988). The proportion of firms 
hiring labour under contracts, with the contract wage indexed only to the price level, is 
exogenous and denoted Q, while the remaining proportion of firms, 1 -  Q, engage in 
spot-market hiring. There are no sector-specific shocks in Duca and VanHoose (1998a) 
and, as in Ball (1988), the productivity shock is common to all firms. Finally it is 
assumed that labour supply is completely inelastic with regard to the real wage, since the 
effect which is of interest is not the spillover effect involving equilibrium employment in 
the classical sector studied in Duca (1987), but rather is a spillover effect relating to the 
endogenous degree of wage indexation.11
The identification of this spillover effect, and its functional relationship with the 
degree of goods market competition, as represented by s, is the principal point of Duca 
and VanHoose’s 1998a paper. However, they also contend to have found an externality 
arising from the choice of indexation degree by wage setters at the individual firm, and 
consequently appear also to make assertions about the welfare implications of the 
spillover effect. In what follows, it will be argued that this contention that an externality 
exists in the Duca and VanHoose (1998a) model is incorrect. The average goods price in
11 With completely inelastic labour supply, employment and output will be at their market-clearing values 
in the classical sector, so that no welfare loss can arise in the classical sector as a result o f  spillover effects 
on the real wage. (The consumption real wage will be affected by the existence o f wage contracts in the 
non-classical sector, but this is o f no consequence for the standard loss function which measures the 
welfare loss in terms o f  the squared deviations o f employment from its full-information value.)
251
the sector which features spot labour markets responds in a different manner to the 
shocks than does the average price of goods in the non-classical sector, and this disparity 
in response constitutes a spillover effect on the latter sector’s consumption real wage. 
Duca and VanHoose, however, do not confine their discussion to this spillover (a term 
which encompasses effects which may be neutral in their welfare repercussions) but go 
further and talk of an associated externality appertaining to the indexation decisions taken 
at the level of the individual firm. Use of the word ‘externality’, o f course, 
unambiguously asserts that the decision taken by an individual has a non-neutral welfare 
effect, whether adverse or beneficial, on others. Such non-neutral welfare effects do not 
characterise the equilibrium indexation decisions of individuals in Duca and VanHoose 
(1998a), since it can be shown that the equilibrium indexation degree is in fact efficient 
from the point of view of the wage-setters at firms in the non-classical sector.12 
Efficiency here is represented by the aggregate indexation degree which minimises the 
variance of aggregate employment in the non-classical sector. If the trouble is taken to 
obtain an expression for the variance of aggregate non-classical employment, the degree 
of indexation which minimises this variance, and is therefore efficient, is found to be:13
x = ___________ [a(l-Q) + g(l-aQ]___________
{[a ( l-n )  + £(l-a)]o-;+[£ - a ( £ - l ) ( l - n ) ] CT92}
and this is identical to the equilibrium degree of indexation in Duca and VanHoose’s 
model.14 The implication is that for given values of the exogenous parameters Q and s, 
no externality derives from individual indexation decisions in the scenario considered by 
Duca and VanHoose. This is not to say, of course, that changes in the exogenous 
parameters Q and s  do not have welfare repercussions: they do, but such parameter 
changes are not the focus of attention in Duca and VanHoose. Their principal point is that 
the (partial) degree of equilibrium (and, as we have seen, efficient) indexation of the
12 O f course, since the labour market in the classical sector always clears, the equilibrium degree of 
indexation in the non-classical sector is obviously also efficient from the point o f  view o f the economy as a 
whole.
13 Using the notation o f this chapter.
14 The denominator o f Duca and VanHoose’s equation (14) on p.585 o f  their paper contains a typographical 
error.
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wage to the price level, as given by (11), is dependent on the degree of goods market 
competition when there exists a sector of the economy which hires labour on a spot 
market rather than under contracts. This point is most starkly apparent from the fact that 
if all firms employ labour under contracts (the Q = 1 case), and/or there is perfect 
competition, so that all firms produce a homogenous good and the classical sector’s 
average price cannot depart from the average price in the non-classical sector, then the 
spillover effect is absent and the efficient and equilibrium degree of indexation simplifies 
to the result obtained by Gray for the case of real-wage-inelastic labour supply.15 The 
authors proceed to demonstrate that the degree of wage indexation to the price level 
decreases as the degree of goods-market competition rises, and contend that this negative 
relationship would still be found were allowance made for endogenous changes in Q, the 
proportion of firms with wage contracts, in response to an increase in e. In other words, 
any indirect effect of a change in s  on the equilibrium degree of wage indexation, 
working via an induced change in Q, will not outweigh the direct effect of an increase in 
e on the degree of indexation. These findings that greater goods market competition 
should be associated with a lower degree of equilibrium wage indexation, is supported by 
the empirical evidence, of which some is supplied by Duca and VanHoose’s own 
accompanying econometric study.
15 While setting Q = 1 in (11) for the equilibrium and efficient degree o f  indexation in Duca and 
VanHoose’s model yields Gray’s result, taking its limit as s  -»<», which amounts to considering the case 
o f perfect competition, does not yield the Gray result. The reason for this is that Duca and VanHoose have 
assumed Q to be exogenous, whereas a more sophisticated model would allow for endogeneity o f Q to 
changes in the relative-product-demand elasticity s. Under perfect competition, a diversity o f  labour 
market institutions which allow marginal cost to differ between sectors would not be possible. In a footnote 
Duca and VanHoose concede that, in another paper o f  theirs, later published as Duca and VanHoose (2001), 
it is seen that the (endogenous) proportion o f  firms engaged in spot-market hiring o f labour increases as a 
consequence. It is this failure to allow Q to be endogenous in their 1998a paper which explains the
implication o f their 1998a model that ^ mxNE = / [ ( l -a )cr^  + ( l - a  + a Q ) a l ]  . This expression,
and the implication that the perfectly competitive case o f their 1998a model does not replicate Gray’s result, 
is not in fact to be found in Duca and VanHoose (1998a). Ironically, the paper’s incorrect expression for 
the equilibrium degree o f indexation, namely Duca and VanHoose (1998a) equation (14), does reproduce 
Gray’s result when its limit as e  -»  oo is taken.
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IV.6 Wage Indexation and Macroeconomic Outcomes under Discretionary 
Monetary Policy
IV. 6.1 Introductory Remarks >
The previous section has surveyed the relatively few papers which model the 
macroeconomic impact of wage indexation when the monetary regime is entirely passive, 
i.e. the authorities refrain entirely from monetary policy, and private sector agents 
recognise that this is the case. In this section, we discuss the rather more voluminous 
body of work which investigates wage indexation issues under discretionary monetary 
policy regimes. This body of literature can be crudely subdivided into two strands. The 
first of these ignores the potential stabilisation role of monetary policy in response to the 
observed values of the shocks, or forecasts thereof, and instead focuses on the 
relationship between wage indexation and any inflation bias. As will be seen below, 
several papers in this strand do not build on the Gray-Ball framework, but instead are 
based upon Barro and Gordon (1983a). The second strand explicitly allows for active 
stabilisation policy by the authorities.
It should also be mentioned that the literature concerned with optimal stabilisation 
policy when the economy is subject to diverse kinds of macroeconomic shock also often 
assigns a role to wage indexation. However, detailed discussion of this literature is not 
warranted here, since its focus is on how the economy can be stabilised when it is subject 
to shocks rather than on indexation externalities: the degree of wage indexation is 
typically not endogenised, and the time-inconsistency issue and its associated inflation 
bias are ignored. Papers in this vein include Fethke and Jackman (1984) and Tumovsky 
(1987). Fethke and Jackman use an IS-LM AD-AS model to investigate how a fixed- 
interest-rate rule performs relative to a fixed-money-supply rule when wage indexation 
affects the responsiveness of aggregate supply to price level movements.16 Tumovsky
16 Their principal result is that even when private-sector wage decisions are underpinned by rational 
expectations, the mean and variance o f output differs between the two rules if  wages are not made 
contingent on the realised values o f  the money supply or interest rate. This result is a counter-example to 
the policy-neutrality proposition o f  Sargent and Wallace (1975). In particular, if  the degree o f wage 
indexation to the price level is endogenously determined by contracting parties concerned to minimise 
departures o f  employment from its full-information level, the component o f  output variability arising from 
supply shocks is invariant to the rule’s design, but the component o f output variability arising from shocks 
to aggregate demand is sensitive to the choice o f policy rule. Despite rational expectations, the optimal 
choice o f rule then depends upon the same considerations as those identified by Poole (1970) for an 
adaptive-expectations framework.
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(1987), meanwhile, only in passing discusses the optimal degree of indexation, and finds 
that when the degree of wage indexation is an additional policy instrument which can be 
used in conjunction with activist monetary policy, the optimal degree of indexation is 
partial, a result similar to Gray’s.
IV. 6.2 Models in which Monetary Policy is Discretionary but Non-Activist
We begin with those contributions which ignore the existence of stochastic shocks, and 
consequently also ignore the stabilisation repercussions of wage indexation emphasised 
by the Gray-Ball approach. Fischer and Summers (1989) is one such classic paper which 
abstracts from the existence of shocks, and simply assumes the existence of wage 
indexation as an exogenous feature of the economy. These authors do not follow Gray 
and Ball, and instead adopt the Barro and Gordon (1983a) set-up in which the authorities 
can, given naive private sector expectations, exploit a short-run Phillips curve by 
delivering surprise inflation and thus occasion a departure of unemployment from its 
(socially suboptimal) natural rate. Of course, in the rational-expectations equilibrium this 
incentive to deliver surprise inflation is recognised by the public, and the suboptimally 
high time-consistent inflation rate is both expected and delivered. By steepening the 
short-run Phillips curve and hence reducing the marginal benefit, in terms of temporarily 
reduced unemployment, of a given amount of surprise inflation, wage indexation has a 
potentially beneficial effect on the inflation bias. Fischer and Summers abstract from the 
possibility that higher wage indexation might mitigate the social costs of inflation, and 
(implicitly) argue that indexation measures which combat the undesirable wealth- 
redistribution effect of inflation (such as indexation of pensions, benefit payments, and 
debt instruments), lower the marginal social cost of a given inflation surprise, and thus 
exacerbate the bias.17
Ball and Cecchetti (1991) also use the Barro and Gordon model in order to demonstrate 
the potentially socially beneficial impact of wage indexation in a purely deterministic 
scenario. They introduce a tax distortion to labour supply in order to generate a trend
17 Agell and Ysander (1993) is a reply to Fischer and Summers which is largely concerned with the 
potentially beneficial impact on the inflation bias o f indexation o f tax brackets to protect real wages from 
erosion by inflation.
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inflation rate, while the key feature of their model is the existence of two-period nominal 
wage contracts, the signing dates of which are staggered such that half of all the contracts 
in the economy come up for renegotiation in each period. The wage specified in these 
contracts is assumed to be ‘fixed’, in the sense that it is the same in both periods covered 
by the contract. Wage-setters are assumed to set their individual firm wage so as to 
minimise deviations of the real wage from its equilibrium value, and given the fixed 
contract wage assumption, this objective makes it optimal to set the contract nominal 
wage equal to the mean of the market-clearing wage values for the two periods covered. 
The presence of a trend inflation rate (i.e. a bias) arising from the time inconsistency of 
zero-inflation discretionary monetary policy, creates greater dispersion in real wages 
which directly reduces social welfare.18 Thus unlike in Fischer and Summers, the role of 
wage indexation in Ball and Cecchetti’s paper is not restricted to its effect of steepening 
the Phillips curve and thereby mitigating the inflation bias. Instead it has a second, 
counteracting, effect which outweighs the Phillips-curve-steepening effect, and which 
operates to increase the bias by making a given inflation surprise less costly to society 
and hence more tempting to the policymaker. Ball and Cecchetti find that an increase in 
the proportion of firms which have fully indexed wage contracts is in net terms socially 
beneficial, in that the direct enhancement of social welfare brought by reduced wage 
dispersion outweighs the social cost of its accompanying evil, a higher inflation bias.19 
The arguable weaknesses of their paper are twofold. Firstly, their result requires that 
contract wages in the absence of indexation are ‘fixed’ rather than ‘predetermined’: i.e. 
the contract does not allow for the second-period wage to differ from its first-period 
counterpart. Ball and Cecchetti’s only defence of this crucial assumption is that increased 
prevalence of wage indexation has been found in empirical research to be associated with 
greater frequency of wage adjustments in response to inflation. The second arguable 
shortcoming is the absence of stochastic shocks, which, as the Gray model shows, makes 
partial wage indexation generally optimal. Ball and Cecchetti’s counter-argument to this
18 Ball and Cecchetti plausibly assume the firm-level individual loss is quadratic in deviations o f the real 
wage from the value the market-clearing real wage would have in the absence o f  the tax distortion to labour 
supply.
19 The obvious existence o f  other social costs associated with inflation are found by Ball and Cecchetti to 
render the inflation bias less sensitive to increased prevalence o f  wage indexation, thereby strengthening 
their case that wage indexation, while inflationary, is socially beneficial in net terms.
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is that the emphasis on the social benefits of increasing the proportion of firms with 
indexed contracts appears to be a robust policy prescription even when the optimal 
degree of wage indexation to the price level is less than full. This counter-argument may 
fail, however, if proper account is taken of how, when stochastic shocks are present, more 
widespread wage indexation may cause greater variability of inflation and thus may 
exacerbate wage dispersion.
The first papers to introduce discretionary monetary policy into the Gray-Ball 
framework were those of Devereux (1987, 1989), which feature a tax distortion to labour 
supply in order to generate an inflation bias. The policy scenario may be described as 
‘discretionary but non-activist’, since the authorities are assumed to set the money stock 
after contract wages have been set, but before the realisation of stochastic shocks, with 
the objective of minimising a standard social loss function featuring two terms, a 
quadratic term in output deviations from socially optimal output (i.e. the output level that 
would prevail under full information and in the absence of the tax distortion) and a 
quadratic term in inflation itself. Devereux’s principal point is that an increase in the 
variance of the aggregate demand disturbance can in certain circumstances be beneficial 
to welfare. The reason for this is that although a higher such variance must necessarily 
worsen real wage variability, and hence output and employment variability, despite the 
induced increase in the optimal degree of wage indexation, this adverse effect could be 
offset, and even outweighed, by the beneficial effect of higher wage indexation on the 
inflation bias. The most propitious circumstances for this to be the case were found to be 
low variability of productivity together with a large inflation bias and a low weight on the 
inflation term in the social loss function.
Devereux’s 1987 paper, therefore, was limited in its aims. It confined itself to 
demonstrating that when the degree of wage indexation is endogenously chosen to 
minimise employment deviations from its full information value, and discretionary 
monetary policy is characterised by an inflation bias, higher aggregate demand volatility 
does not necessarily worsen social welfare. Thus Devereux’s paper did not address the 
question of what is the socially optimal degree of wage indexation in this non-activist 
scenario, and the related question of whether individual indexation decisions have social 
externalities. These issues are the principal concern of Waller and VanHoose (1992), a
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paper which builds on Devereux (1987) in order to demonstrate that the equilibrium 
indexation choices of atomistic wage-setters are inefficiently low in degree, when 
evaluated from the perspective of a social loss function comprised of a weighted sum of 
the variance of output around its socially optimal level, and the square of the trend 
inflation rate.20 Waller and VanHoose’s result that equilibrium indexation is socially 
inefficient therefore depends upon their assumption that it is only the trend inflation rate 
(and not the variability of inflation about that trend) which is detrimental to welfare. 
Their loss function fails to capture the possibility that it is greater inflation variability, 
rather than a higher mean, that constitutes the major source of welfare loss to society. A 
specification of the social loss function which features a quadratic term in actual inflation, 
rather than a quadratic of the trend, may have led to different conclusions regarding the 
direction of the externality, as Waller and VanHoose themselves acknowledge in a 
footnote.21
IV. 6.3 Models in which Monetary Policy is Discretionary and Activist
Models which allow for active stabilisation policy by the monetary authorities can 
broadly be subdivided into those which treat the degree of wage indexation as exogenous, 
and consequently adapt Barro and Gordon (1983a), and those which allow for 
endogenous indexation, building on the Gray-Ball framework outlined earlier.
In the former category are the papers by Mourmouras (1993, 1997b), which constitute 
attempts to evaluate the social welfare repercussions of an exogenous change in the 
degree of wage indexation, by taking into account how wage indexation may possibly 
affect the marginal social cost of inflation surprises. The key idea in Mourmouras (1993) 
derives from the theoretical demonstration of Katz and Rosenberg (1983) that greater 
variability of the real wage caused by increased inflation variability, results in a loss of 
production efficiency and hence is detrimental to social welfare. Since the implications of
20 Mourmouras (1997a) is a minor contribution which shows that in the Waller and VanHoose (1992) 
model, delegation o f  monetary policy to a central banker whose weight on the squared trend inflation term 
is greater than society’s, reduces the socially optimal degree o f  indexation, but has no effect on the 
equilibrium degree o f indexation. Thus in the Waller and VanHoose model, the more conservative is the 
central banker, the smaller is the positive externality appertaining to the individual indexation decision.
21 Waller and VanHoose (1992) p.1459, footnote 4.
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this causal connection between wage indexation and socially detrimental real wage 
variability are adjudged by Mourmouras not to matter for the degree of wage indexation 
chosen by wage setters, his papers omit the firm-level optimisation exercises which are 
the principal concern of Gray, Ball, and Devereux. His focus instead is upon examining 
the implications of Katz and Rosenberg’s argument in the context of the Barro and 
Gordon (1983a) model: in other words, a Phillips-curve trade-off is assumed, with the 
authorities able directly to set inflation in response to the realised value of the 
productivity shock. Mourmouras shows that in his model the variance of the real wage is 
falling in the degree of wage indexation. Mourmouras therefore contends that since this 
will reduce the marginal social cost of an inflation surprise, and thus will worsen the 
policymaker’s temptation to spring such a surprise, the effect of higher wage indexation 
on the inflationary bias is ambiguous, rather than unambiguously beneficial as Fischer 
and Summers (1989) had argued. Clearly, the validity of Mourmouras’ argument depends 
on there being a perception on the part of the private sector that lower real wage 
variability is socially beneficial, and hence that exogenous increases in wage indexation, 
by lowering real wage variability, are (for a given Phillips curve trade-off) inflationary. 
Thus the beneficial effect of wage indexation on the bias working via its reduction of the 
marginal benefit of an inflation surprise, is counteracted by a bias-worsening effect 
working through public perceptions of the temptation facing the policymaker. However, 
the current consensus is that the resource-misallocation costs of price misperceptions 
caused by inflation, of which Katz and Rosenberg’s production-inefficiency story is an 
example, are likely to be small (see for example, Cecchetti, 2001). Mourmouras (1997b) 
extends this author’s 1993 paper by allowing the policymaker’s weight on inflation 
stabilisation to vary endogenously with exogenous changes in wage indexation, the 
dubious rationale for this again being the notion derived from Katz and Rosenberg that 
the lower real wage variability brought by higher wage indexation reduces the social 
costs of inflation and hence alters the policymaker’s weight parameter. Taking into 
account this purported effect on the policymaker’s preferences, Mourmouras is once 
again led to the conclusion that the impact of higher wage indexation on mean inflation is 
of ambiguous sign.
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Another limitation of Mourmouras’ papers is that changes in the degree of wage 
indexation are entirely exogenous, rather than determined endogenously by firm-level 
decisions. The assumption of exogeneity has the disadvantage that it precludes 
identification of indexation externalities, and furthermore deprives Mourmouras’ 
arguments of applicability to real-world economies in which indexation is chosen by 
individual agents: in such scenarios, a change in the marginal social cost of inflation 
surprises, or a change in the policymaker’s weight parameter, would induce further 
adjustments in the degree of wage indexation, interaction effects which are not captured 
by Mourmouras’ model. His analysis is most relevant, therefore, to economies in which 
the degree of wage indexation is set by an authority distinct from the monetary 
policymaker. This consideration raises the question of whether there is an optimal degree 
of wage indexation, considered as a policymaker’s instrument, to accompany an 
inflation-biased discretionary monetary policy regime. This issue is addressed by Milesi- 
Ferretti (1994) and Crosby (1995).
Milesi-Ferretti’s two most important results are as follows. Firstly, when monetary 
policy can respond to both types of shock, and there is some underlying distortion which 
creates an inflation bias, an appropriate setting of the wage indexation instrument can 
reduce the inflation bias and the variance of inflation for a policymaker of given 
preferences, but that the differences in bias and inflation variance between any two 
policymakers whose stabilisation preferences vis-a-vis inflation and output differ, are not 
completely eliminated under optimal indexation by the policymaker. The second result is 
that with optimal choice of indexation beforehand, the particular weight parameter of the 
policymaker does not matter for the resulting variability of employment and output. This 
is because in the absence of wage indexation, employment and output will be more 
variable, the higher the policymaker’s weight on inflation, but it is precisely such 
inflation-averse policymakers who have less need to set a high degree of wage indexation 
in order to reduce the bias. A higher weight on inflation does, ceteris paribus, lead to 
higher employment variability, but it also leads to a lower setting of wage indexation, 
which for the standard reasons found in the literature, dampens the impact of productivity 
shocks on employment, aggregate demand shocks being completely neutralised by 
monetary policy in Milesi-Ferretti’s model. It turns out that when policymaker’s wage
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indexation instrument setting is optimal, this is just sufficient to offset the role of the 
policymaker’s weight in determining employment variability.
In an extension, Milesi-Ferretti considers how a governing party’s pre-election 
commitment to a particular setting of the wage indexation instrument will be influenced 
by the parties’ respective weights on inflation: one conclusion which emerges is that a 
party with a high weight on inflation, and consequently relatively modest bias problem, 
may have an incentive to set a low (perhaps even zero) degree of wage indexation when 
an election is imminent, in order to make a rival, less inflation-averse, party a less 
attractive electoral prospect. (This of course abstracts from time-inconsistency problems 
relating to the setting of the wage indexation instrument itself, an issue not considered by 
Milesi-Ferretti.) Crosby (1995) analyses a similar scenario of electoral rivalry, but in his 
paper the possible settings of the wage indexation instrument are restricted to be either 
zero or one. Crosby differs from Milesi-Ferretti’s extension in that the incumbent party 
cannot bind the victorious party in an imminent election to a particular wage indexation 
setting, while discretionary monetary policy is conducted by the elected party in 
ignorance of the future values of the shocks (i.e. the scenario is ‘non-activist’). Crosby 
assumes that ‘left-wing’ parties are particularly prone to an inflation bias on account of 
the public’s perception of their preferences. His principal finding is that such left-wingers 
will often (depending on structural parameters such as the productivity and money- 
demand shock variances, and the size of the distortion which generates the bias) find it to 
their electoral advantage to precommit to a regime of full wage indexation. The recent 
political history of Australia is cited as an example of this.
Having dealt with that portion of the literature which has studied the implications of 
exogenous changes in the wage indexation parameter when low-mean-inflation activist 
monetary policy is time-inconsistent, we now turn to the literature on endogenous wage 
indexation under such a monetary regime. The principal papers here are VanHoose and 
Waller (1991), Fukuda (1993), Bar-Ilan and Zanello (1996), Hutchison and Walsh (1998), 
and Lawler (1998).
VanHoose and Waller (1991) consider four scenarios which differ according to the 
information sets available to atomistic wage-setters and the monetary authorities. The 
information sets may contain forecasts of the future shocks, with these forecasts being
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provided by an impartial third party. This assumption therefore evades the issue of 
whether forecasts published by the authorities will be credible to the private sector when 
private sector expectations based omsuch forecasts are a determinant of the subsequent 
effectiveness of monetary policy. With the forecasts thus assumed to be wholly credible 
to wage-setters, VanHoose and Waller proceed to examine the equilibrium degree of 
indexation for two scenarios in which the authorities have no informational advantage 
over the private sector, with forecasts unavailable in one of those two scenarios, but 
commonly available in the other, as well as two scenarios in which the authorities do 
enjoy an informational advantage and observe the shocks with complete accuracy before 
setting the money stock (the latter two scenarios again differ as to whether forecasts have 
been made available or not). When the policymaker does not enjoy an informational 
advantage, Gray’s optimal indexation result (or a variant of it featuring the forecast 
variances of the two shocks, rather than the shock variances themselves) emerges as the 
equilibrium degree of indexation. Once an informational advantage is conferred on the 
policymaker, so that the money stock is set conditional on full information regarding both 
shocks, the equilibrium degree of indexation is found by VanHoose and Waller to be zero, 
regardless of the availability of the forecasts. This conclusion was based on the 
assumption that the admissible value of the indexation parameter is confined to the unit 
interval. Bar-Ilan and Zanello (1996) relax this assumption in a model which, despite 
numerous superficial differences from VanHoose and Waller, essentially reproduces the 
latter’s third scenario of fully informed authorities together with no forecasts available to 
wage-setters. Without a lower bound on the degree of wage indexation chosen by 
individual agents, Bar-Ilan and Zanello find that the equilibrium degree of indexation is 
unbounded below. In other words, when fully informed monetary policy responds 
actively to shocks in pursuit of both output stability and price-level stability, wage-setters 
at the individual firm can always reduce the departure of the firm’s employment from its
full-information value by indexing the wage negatively to the price level, and the more
22negative this indexation degree the better. Bar-Ilan and Zanello’s result that a lower
22 Bar-Ilan and Zanello in fact specify the loss function o f  individual firm wage-setters to be quadratic in 
deviations o f the real wage from the full-information equilibrium real wage. This o f  course is exactly 
equivalent to the more common practice standard in the literature o f specifying wage-setters’ loss in terms 
o f employment deviations from full-information equilibrium employment.
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bound must be placed on the admissible degree of individual indexation if an equilibrium 
is to exist, must also be modified in the light of Lawler (1998), another paper which 
reconsiders the fully informed activist monetary policy scenario of VanHoose and Waller 
(1991). Lawler’s paper reveals the existence of a Nash equilibrium overlooked by Bar- 
Ilan and Zanello, in which all firms’ wages are fully indexed to the price level. The 
monetary authorities consequently cannot influence employment by means of inflation 
surprises and therefore devote policy to stabilising the price level completely, and as a 
consequence agents at the individual firm are deprived of an incentive to deviate from 
full indexation. However, the difficulty atomistic agents may have in co-ordinating on 
full indexation is recognised, especially as individual welfare and social welfare alike are 
higher in the alternative equilibrium at the lower bound.
This group of papers, therefore, has principally focused upon the existence and 
characteristics of equilibrium indexation under activist monetary policy, when atomistic 
agents are concerned to minimise the standard loss function assumed by Gray and Ball. 
The common finding that the equilibrium degree of indexation is zero when the 
authorities possess full information on the shocks is interpreted as a possible explanation 
for the general absence from real economies of wage indexation to the price level.23 In 
addition, VanHoose and Waller have a further interesting result, analogous to Devereux’s, 
in their scenario in which forecasts are available to both wage setters and the monetary 
authorities, but the latter are not fully informed about the shocks when setting the money 
stock. An increase in the conditional variance of the aggregate demand disturbance can in 
certain circumstances be beneficial to welfare, because of the induced change in the 
equilibrium degree of wage indexation. This possibility does not arise when the 
authorities possess full information, since active monetary policy then neutralises the 
aggregate demand disturbance completely, making productivity shocks the only source of 
welfare loss to atomistic agents and hence bringing about zero indexation in equilibrium. 
The socially optimal degree of indexation, and the related issue of externalities, are not 
addressed in VanHoose and Waller (1991), the principal concern of which is to 
demonstrate how the equilibrium degree of indexation in a perfectly competitive
23 Bar-Ilan and Zanello (1996) is in fact exclusively devoted to providing a theoretical explanation for this 
empirical stylised fact, and, like Lawler (1998), abstracts from the existence o f  an inflation bias, so that a 
welfare evaluation o f  equilibrium indexation is not pursued.
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economy with atomistic wage-setters is sensitive to the information sets of the private 
sector and the authorities.
This sensitivity of equilibrium outoomes to the economy’s information structure is also 
evident from Fukuda (1993) and Hutchison and Walsh (1998). Fukuda’s assumed 
information structure differs from that of VanHoose and Waller: his paper adapts 
Devereux (1987) by conferring on the policymaker an informational advantage regarding 
one of the shocks. As in Devereux, private sector atomistic agents do not possess any 
information about the future shocks at the time the wage contract is concluded. The 
policymaker, however, does possess noisy information about the aggregate demand 
disturbance (but no information at all regarding the productivity shocks) at the time of 
setting the money stock. A time inconsistency problem which causes an inflation bias is 
assumed. The equilibrium degree of indexation in this scenario is then found to resemble 
Gray’s result, save that it depends not only on the variances of the productivity and 
aggregate demand shocks, but also on the variance of the noise disturbance which 
contaminates the authorities’ signal of the aggregate demand disturbance. Fukuda 
demonstrates that in this setting, an increase in the noisiness of the policymaker’s 
information can in some circumstances be socially beneficial, as a result of the 
endogenous increase in the degree of wage indexation and consequent mitigation of the 
inflation bias.
The model set out in the appendix to Hutchison and Walsh (1998) also differs in its 
information structure from VanHoose and Waller, in that Hutchison and Walsh assume 
the authorities possess full information on the economy-wide productivity shock, but lack 
full information on the eventual price level which will follow their monetary response to 
the productivity shock. (Aggregate demand shocks are not explicitly modelled by 
Hutchison and Walsh, who assume that the monetary instrument is an intended 
realisation of the price level, which differs from the actual realisation of the price level by 
a random control error which cannot be predicted by the authorities.) Hutchison and 
Walsh make a second departure form the mainstream of the literature by assuming that a 
single all-encompassing monopoly union sets both the base nominal wage, and the degree 
of indexation, for all wage contracts in the economy. Their reason for this assumption is 
that it is argued to provide a better representation of the centralised wage bargaining
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which characterises New Zealand, the study of the impact of institutional reforms on that 
country’s output-inflation trade-off being the principal focus of Hutchison and Walsh’s 
paper. Since their emphasis is on investigating the relationship between the central bank’s 
weight on inflation and the output-inflation trade-off, rather than how changes in that 
weight, together with induced changes in the degree of wage indexation, affect any 
inflation bias, the authors abstract from the existence of such a bias by assuming the 
central bank’s preferred output objective is consistent with the union’s employment 
objective. Thus the welfare issues which are the subject of VanHoose and Waller (1991) 
and other papers are not addressed by Hutchison and Walsh. It is their result regarding 
the equilibrium degree of indexation under this alternative information structure which is 
of interest. They find that the degree of indexation chosen by the single union as 
Stackelberg leader is a decreasing function of the weight placed on inflation stabilisation, 
in the authorities’ loss function, and this is so irrespective of whether or not the union’s 
loss function also features a quadratic term in the deviation of the real wage from its 
target real wage (the latter is the real wage which ensures the union’s employment target 
is the mean employment level). A theoretical rationale is thus provided for the empirical 
evidence that New Zealand’s output-inflation trade-off increased (i.e. the short-run 
Phillips curve became flatter) following 1989, the year of reforms which can plausibly be 
interpreted as having increased the central bank’s weight on inflation.
IV.7 Multiparameter Wage Indexation
This penultimate section prepares the ground for Chapter VI by surveying the rather 
sparse literature on the macroeconomics of multiparameter wage indexation. With this 
form of indexation, the wage is indexed not only to the price level but also to an 
additional variable.
The earliest contribution to this vein of literature has already been mentioned, namely 
Blanchard (1979), a paper which insightfully draws attention to the potential for 
multiparameter schemes to achieve superior outcomes by exploiting an additional source 
of information about macroeconomic disturbances. Blanchard’s chief concern, however, 
was to devise a model in which, despite the manifest information-related advantages of
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multiparameter indexation, structural features of the economy and active stabilisation 
policy lead conventional single-parameter indexation to be the equilibrium choice of 
indexation scheme at the level of the individual firm. Just as in Gray and Ball, in 
Blanchard (1979) firms and workers are both risk neutral, and are parties to a contract 
which, when expectations regarding prices prove correct, replicates the full-information 
outcome (i.e. ensures the labour market clears). Productivity shocks to the firms’ 
production function are not explicitly modelled: instead the real disturbance takes the 
form of an expectational error regarding the price of the composite consumption good 
relative to the price of a composite input-materials good. Movements in the relative 
materials price require substitution of labour for materials, or vice versa, for full 
efficiency, and (given the assumption of demand-determined employment) ex-post labour 
market clearing. Blanchard shows that a multiparameter indexation scheme which 
involves indexing the wage fully to the expectational error regarding the consumption 
good’s price (the ‘price level’) and negatively to the expectational error regarding the 
relative price of materials, can replicate the full-information outcome. However, if the 
adoption of such a scheme involves a cost, a restricted wage-indexing rule which 
involves solely indexing to the price level may be optimal. It is found that an increase in 
the correlation (whether positive or negative) between the price level and the relative 
materials price makes it more likely that the restricted rule is optimal, since a higher such 
correlation makes the price level more informative as regards the real disturbance. A 
higher variance of the relative price of materials, however, renders it less likely that the 
restricted rule is superior to the alternative of incurring the cost of also indexing the wage 
to this relative materials price. Blanchard introduces an aggregate demand equation 
which features stochastic velocity and monetary shocks, and allows for a stabilisation 
response by the authorities to such shocks as well as to the real disturbance, the relative 
price of materials. A distinction is drawn between the actual joint distribution of the two 
prices (their variance-covariance matrix), and its subjective counterpart upon which the 
parties to the wage contract base their decisions as to whether to index to both prices or 
solely to the price level, as well as their decision regarding their degree of indexation to 
these price(s). The subjective distribution is revised after each contract period closes, and 
adjustments to the degree of indexation alter the actual distribution by affecting the
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variance of the price level. In equilibrium the actual and subjective distributions are 
identical, and no further adjustments to the adopted indexation rule are made. In 
Blanchard’s model, a decision to adopt a restricted indexing rule is self-perpetuating in 
that it leads to an equilibrium also characterised by such a rule, with the degree of 
indexing between zero and unity, full indexing being optimal only in the two extreme 
cases of perfect correlation and no correlation whatsoever between materials and 
consumer goods prices. Under such a restricted indexing-to-price-level-only rule, it is 
found that stabilisation policy has the advantageous effect of increasing the correlation of 
the price level with the relative materials price, thereby making the restricted rule more 
effective in approximating the full-information outcomes for the real wage and 
employment.24
This important idea of optimal information exploitation is also central to the key paper 
by Kami (1983) which pointed out, in a model based on Gray (1976), that indexing the 
contract nominal wage appropriately to both the price level and to aggregate output, 
would enable the real wage to adjust to its market-clearing value, i.e. the value the real 
wage would have were full information regarding the productivity shock available at the 
time wage contracts are concluded. Note that, unlike in Blanchard (1979), the values of 
the multiparameter indexation parameters are not endogenously determined in Kami, 
since the latter’s implicit concern was to identify their optimal values from the viewpoint 
of a benevolent authority which possesses the power to impose such a scheme on all 
firms. Kami differs significantly from Blanchard in assuming that the real shock is a 
common disturbance to the representative firm’s production function, and in abstracting 
entirely from active stabilisation policy. These features of Kami’s model, together with 
the assumed firm-level objective function, imply that were determination of the 
indexation parameters to be endogenised, their equilibrium values would be identical to 
those found to be socially optimal by Kami.
The papers in this strand of literature which are most closely related to Kami’s analysis 
are Duca and VanHoose (1991, 1998b), both of which focus, like Kami, on deriving the 
multiparameter indexation scheme which replicates the full-information market-clearing
24 A similar conclusion that stabilisation o f  aggregate demand disturbances can be welfare-enhancing for 
the reason that it improves the information content (with respect to real shocks) o f  the price level is to be 
found in Adolph and Wolfstetter (1991).
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employment level. (Duca and VanHoose in this pair of papers do not endogenise the 
degrees of indexation.) The major departure from Kami concerns the second variable to 
which the wage is indexed. In particular, Duca and VanHoose argue that, when 
accompanied by indexation of the wage to the price level, contractual provisions for 
productivity-related bonuses and profit-sharing amount to a form of multiparameter 
indexation, and that this can be crudely but effectively modelled by assuming that the 
wage is indexed both to the price-level expectational error and to the actual realisation of 
the productivity shock.
Duca and VanHoose (1991) develops a two-sector model based on Duca (1987), in 
which each sector produces a single good under perfect competition, with the sectors 
differing as regards sector-specific productivity shocks, as well as in labour market 
structure: while one sector features wage contracts, the other has spot-market hiring. 
Duca and VanHoose demonstrate that in such an economy, optimal multiparameter 
indexation can reproduce market-clearing outcomes in a manner reminiscent of Kami, 
and will involve partial indexation to the two goods’ prices, together with partial 
indexation to the productivity shocks, with these indexation parameters dependent on 
labour supply elasticities as well as the relative sizes of the two sectors. Duca and 
VanHoose (1998b), like its precursor paper, features two sectors, one with wage contracts, 
the other with spot-market hiring, while all firms are in monopolistic competition as in 
Ball (1988). The paper’s principal result is that more intense goods market competition 
reduces the optimal degree of wage indexation to the price level and increases the optimal 
degree of indexation to a linear combination of factors (including sector-specific 
productivity and demand shocks) which is related to the marginal product of labour. This 
finding is argued to be consistent with the empirical evidence for the US labour market in 
recent decades, where increasing goods market competition has been correlated with 
reduced incidence of price-level indexing and greater prevalence of profit-sharing in 
wage contracts.25
The only other contribution to the macroeconomics of multiparameter wage indexation 
which remains to be discussed is Drudi and Giordano (2000). This paper differs
25 Heo (2003) provides an alternative theoretical explanation o f these empirical facts by incorporating 
efficiency wage considerations into the Gray (1976) model.
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substantially from those previously mentioned and from the model developed in Chapter 
VI below, and therefore a relatively brief description of it is justified. Its chief point of 
interest from the perspective of this>thesis is its approach to modelling the widespread 
contingency of workers’ remuneration on productivity-related outcomes: Drudi and 
Giordano’s modelling approach is simply to assume that the wage is indexed to the 
productivity shock itself. Their model involves a repeated game in which the private 
sector (consisting of a single union and a single firm which bargain over the base nominal 
wage) do not observe the policymaker’s type. Union bargaining power increases the 
mean real wage and hence also mean unemployment, and consequently creates the 
temptation for a weak policymaker who attaches some weight to employment 
stabilisation to renege on any precommitment to deliver zero inflation. Drudi and 
Giordano’s principal concern is to investigate, using numerical methods, the welfare 
repercussions of certain combinations of indexation parameter settings (which for the 
greater part of their paper are exogenously given), and in particular those parameter 
values which induce a weak policymaker to deliver zero inflation in the initial stage of 
the repeated game, in order to acquire a reputation for toughness. Full indexation of 
wages to productivity shock realisations is found to be potentially beneficial in that the 
resulting greater employment stability reduces the temptation to spring inflation surprises 
and hence alleviates the inflation bias. (The model features a trade-off between this effect 
and the increase in mean unemployment which arises as a result of the higher mean real 
wage which is necessary to compensate union members for their greater exposure to 
undesirable real wage variability.)
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IV.8 Conclusion
Among the more striking conclusions which emerge from the literature surveyed above 
are the following. Indexation of wages to the expectational error regarding the current 
price level can speed up the transmission of shocks to the price level, and hence can 
exacerbate price-level/inflation variability. On the other hand, wage indexation of this 
kind can reduce the mean inflation bias associated with discretionary policymaking. As 
regards stochastic real outcomes, such indexation reduces real wage variability and hence 
exacerbates employment and output variability in economies in which productivity 
shocks are dominant relative to aggregate demand shocks. In the light of the criticisms 
made by Jadresic (2002), however, these conclusions can hardly be considered robust. So 
far as macroeconomic models featuring endogenous wage indexation are concerned, the 
literature again does not come to unambiguous conclusions, and is comprised instead of a 
diverse set of results regarding the character of equilibrium indexation, which has been 
shown to be sensitive to the information structure of the economy and the degree of 
goods market competition, as well as to sectoral differences in labour-hiring practices. A 
modest success of the literature is that several different lines of inquiry have provided 
theoretical explanations for why zero indexation may be an equilibrium. On the question 
of macroeconomic externalities appertaining to individual indexation decisions, no very 
clear conclusions emerge: not particularly convincing assumptions regarding the costs of 
indexation, or constraints on the ability of particular labour types to index, are necessary 
to generate such externalities in a passive monetary policy context, while there are 
grounds to doubt their genuine existence in the multi-sector economies studied by Duca 
and VanHoose. There are, however, sounder reasons for thinking that a beneficial 
indexation externality relating to the mean inflation rate may arise under discretionary 
monetary policy when low-mean-inflation policy is time inconsistent. The model set out 
in Chapter V below investigates these externality issues by introducing into the standard 
model an arguably more realistic representation of the objectives of those choosing the 
degree of wage indexation.
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Chapter V: Monopoly Unions, Monopolistically Competitive
Firms and Single-Parameter Wage Indexation
*
V.l Introduction
As mentioned in the concluding section of Chapter IV, the theme of externalities has 
figured prominently in the macroeconomic literature on wage indexation. These 
externalities have been of two essential kinds, namely those relating to the welfare of 
wage-setters (a term which, it will be recalled, in the relevant strand of literature denotes 
both workers and their employing firm), and those relating to the welfare of society as a 
whole. It seems fair to say that the literature has had difficulty in devising theoretical 
arguments for externalities of the former kind. While Kempf (1998) is moderately 
successful in this respect, the assumptions made by Ball (1988) and Kovanen (1992) 
which give rise to such an externality can be criticised as unrealistic and/or arbitrary, 
while the claim of Duca and VanHoose (1998a) to have pinpointed an externality appears 
to be incorrect. As regards the second type of wage indexation externality, that relating to 
social welfare, the work of Waller and VanHoose (1992) suggests that this externality is 
positive, as a result of the beneficial effect a higher degree of wage indexation may have 
on the trend inflation rate. However, as pointed out above, Waller and VanHoose 
assumed a specification for the social loss function which precluded possible social 
externalities relating to indexation’s impact upon the variability of inflation about its 
trend rate.
In view of these criticisms, it therefore appears that further investigation of 
macroeconomic externalities arising from individual agents’ wage indexation decisions is 
amply warranted. The model set out below pursues this, addressing in particular the 
efficiency, and social optimality, of individual indexation decisions when agents 
(specifically, monopoly unions of the kind considered in earlier chapters) attach some 
weight to the variability of their individual real wage as well as to the variability of their 
individual employment. By studying the macroeconomic outcomes which result when 
indexation is the means adopted to minimise our familiar monopoly-union loss function, 
this chapter addresses an acknowledged weakness of the literature surveyed above, 
namely its disregard for the real-world role wage indexation plays in enabling workers to
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lower their exposure to real-wage variability. It will be seen that the arguably more 
realistic representation of union preferences adopted here does reveal the existence of 
macroeconomic externalities appertaining to individual wage indexation decisions.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section sets out the 
model, which shares many features with the wage-setting models considered in earlier 
chapters. Sections V.3 and V.4 then derive the equilibrium degree of indexation, as well 
as efficient and socially optimal indexation, for the cases of the simple monetary rule and 
discretionary monetary policy respectively.1 Conclusions are drawn in Section V.5.
V.2 The Model
Equations (1) to (9) comprise the essential structure of this chapter’s model economy. 
In the absence of explicit statements to the contrary, the notation used for the following 
model is the same as that used in previous chapters, with time subscripts again 
suppressed. The convenient normalisation /?_, = 0 is once more adopted, so that n  = p.
y f = a l '  + 6 , 0 < a < l  (1)
where 0~N(0,o- j ) .
y s =  j'y fdi  (2)
0
y? - yD =  -eiPt - p i  s > 1 (3)
i
where p  = Jp .d i .
1=0
1 The simple rule scenario is equivalent to, and might alternatively be described as, a scenario o f ‘passive 
monetary policy’, in the sense that this term was used in reviewing the indexation literature in Chapter IV. 
Similarly, the usage o f  that chapter might similarly lead us to use the term ‘activist’ as an identifying label 
for the discretionary regime in which the monetary authorities are able to set the money supply in reaction 
to shocks. However, in the interests o f consistency with the practice o f  earlier chapters, the terms ‘simple 
rule’ and ‘discretion’ will be used here.
272
y D = y(m -  p  + (f>), y > 0 (4)
where <f> ~ N(Q,crJ ) .
>
/* = 0  (5)
j l n  /  j l n
I f  = /  Jrfi
0 - 1) / " 0 - 1) / "
(6)
W, = W/ +JCj.(/7-£/7) 
= wj +xj ( p - E p )  
w =w + x(p -  Ep)
(7a)
(7b)
(7c)
V i  ” V l  n V i  "where w = \wj di = — ^  wy , w = (w,di = — ]T wy , x = jx  di = —^ ix i
o "y=l 0 "y.l o ">=l
n‘ =i)+c,(Wj- Pf  (8)
Q ' = / 2+ c, p 2 (9)
1 1 /J
where / = J/. di = — .
0  n  j  =  1
The majority of these equations are familiar from previous chapters, and therefore do 
not require discussion, equations (7a), (7b) and (7c) being the only exceptions in this 
respect. Equation (7a) states that the nominal wage, wt , set down in the contract between 
the individual firm and its associated monopoly union, consists of a base nominal 
wage, wn and an indexation term, x ^ p - E p ) ,  where x, is the degree of indexation and 
(p -  Ep) is the expectational error regarding the price level for the period covered by the
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wage contract. Equation (7b) is simply the individual union’s equivalent of (7a), while 
(7c) is their aggregate-level counterpart. The chosen specification of the contract wage 
means that the more realistic approaches of Jadresic (in which indexation is to lagged 
inflation) and Cover and VanHoose (in which indexation is asymmetric) are not pursued 
in this chapter, partly for reasons of superior tractability, but more importantly because 
our focus is on establishing the existence of macroeconomic externalities when aversion 
to real wage variability influences the chosen degree of wage indexation. A second 
departure from the model of Chapter III is that it is now assumed that no information 
about the realised values of the shocks is available to the contracting parties at the time 
their agreement is concluded and the contract parameters wj and xt are determined. Thus
neither unions nor firms receive an informative signal of the future realisation of the 
productivity shock at the contract-signing stage of the game, and the private sector’s 
information at that stage is confined to the structural features of the economy embodied 
in equations (1) to (9), which include, of course, the distributions of the two shocks.2 
Were we to follow the practice of earlier chapters and allow unions to observe, at the 
contract-signing stage, a noisy signal of the productivity shock, this would not alter the 
basic results obtained below regarding the nature of the indexation externalities. In such a 
model featuring both productivity shock signals and indexation, equilibrium outcomes 
would involve adjustment of the base nominal wage in response to the signal just as 
described in Chapter III. The sole difference to the results presented below would be the 
non-dependence of union indexation decisions on that component of the productivity 
shock variance which relates to the anticipated component of shocks. Just as in the model 
which follows, indexation choices when signals are informative would be a function of 
the variance of union forecast errors of the productivity shock, but unlike what will 
follow below, this forecast-error variance will differ from the variance of the shock itself. 
The inclusion of signals would therefore merely result in the replacement of crj with
(1 -  /3)crl wherever <j ]  occurs in the expressions reported below,3 and would not affect 
at all the insights yielded by the model.
2 This amounts to assuming that the /? parameter o f Chapter III is now identically zero: /? = 0 .
3 Recall that the variance o f  union forecast errors is E ( 9 -  fis)2 = (1 -  P)<j ] .
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In the interests of clarity, and for consistency with the practice of earlier chapters, two 
time-line diagrams are presented below which represent alternative scenarios which are 
consistent with the assumed information structure, and which consequently lead to the 
same equilibrium outcomes. Note that although these time-lines assume that the money 
supply is set in the final stage of the game, and in particular after the aggregate nominal 
wage has been determined, it would make no difference to the results of the next section 
relating to the simple-rule scenario were the actual implementation of the rule to take 
place instead prior to, or simultaneously with, the determination of w. Similarly, in the 
discretionary monetary policy scenario considered in Section 4, the precise time at which 
m is set could be altered without affecting the reported results, provided the assumption is 
maintained that the unions do not observe m (and thus do not possess any information on 
the basis of which conditional expectations of the two shocks may be formed) prior to 
making their indexation choices.
The union loss function, namely equation (8), is identical to that adopted in Chapter III, 
and hence abstracts from any desire on the part of the representative union to raise the 
mean real wage above its market-clearing level. This simplifying assumption is entirely 
justified, since this chapter’s focus is on indexation externalities relating to the stochastic 
aspects of the economy, i.e. to the variances of the price level, real wage, and 
employment.4 As we know from Chapter III, with cu > 0 the specification given by (8) 
amounts to assuming that the individual union is averse to variability of both employment 
and the real wage about their expected market-clearing values, while in the cu = 0 case
the union is only averse to employment variability. An immediate implication of (8), 
therefore, is that the individual union will set the contract base nominal wage at the value 
which is consistent with expected labour-market clearing.
Having set out the model’s structural equations, we now derive reduced-form 
expressions for the price level, real wage and employment. To this end, we must initially
4 As in Chapters II and III, specifying a mean real-wage objective greater than the expected market-clearing 
real wage o f zero would merely alter the constant term in the expression for the equilibrium price level, and 
in the case o f the discretionary monetary regime would cause the model to be characterised by a mean 
inflation bias. This would not affect in any way the conclusions to be drawn concerning the relationship 
between wage indexation and the stochastic aspects o f the economy.
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obtain an expression for aggregate supply in terms of the price level, the money supply, 
and the stochastic shocks. Our first step is to note that, as in Chapter III, profit- 
maximisation leads to the following equation for the individual firm’s labour demand:5
jD = y ( m - p  + 0 ) - £ ( w i - p )  + ( £ - l ) 0  
[a + £{ \ -a) ]
We have already noted that the base nominal wage, w, , will be set equal to the expected 
market-clearing nominal wage, i.e. that which ensures that E{lD^) = lsi = 0. Hence using
(10), wn w. and w are found to be:
wi = Wj = W = -  |[yEm + ( s -y )Ep]  (11)
Appropriate substitutions involving (1), (7a), (10) and (11) then lead to the following 
expression for firm z’s output as a function of xn  the realised values of the shocks, and 
the expectational errors of m and /?:6
5 _ ya[m - E m - ( p -  Ep) + <j)] + sa (  1 -  xt)(p -  Ep) + s6  
y ‘ ~ [a + « ( l - a ) ]
Aggregate supply is then obtained by integrating individual firm outputs over the unit 
interval:
5 _ ya[m -  E m - { p -  Ep) + (£>] + £a(  1 -  x)(p -  Ep) + sQ 
y  ~ [ a + £ (1 -a)]
5 Equation (12) is derived in Appendix II. 1.
6 As in previous chapters, employment under the contract is assumed to be demand-determined.
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Equating (13) with the aggregate demand equation, (4), obtaining the implied expectation 
of p  in terms of Em and w , 1 and substituting this for Ep as well as the right-hand side of
(11) for w, leads to the following reduced-form expression for the price level:
_ y(l -  a)(m + <j>) + 1 -  x)Em - 6  ( „
P I>(1-« ) +  « ( ! -* ) ]
A noteworthy point about (14) is that it implies that the price level is undefined when 
x = [a + y ( l - a ) ] / a  , and this is consequently an inadmissible value for x. The 
subsequent analysis therefore implicitly assumes that x ^  [a + y(l - a ) ] / a , a fact which 
will play a minor role in the discussion provided below. Another implication of (14) is 
that Ep = E m , and hence the individual union’s expectational error in respect ofp  is:
Combining wi =wj = w = E m  with (6), (7b), (10), and (15) then yields the following 
reduced-form expressions for the individual union’s real wage and employment:
(1 “  Xj)[r( 1 -  a ) ( m - E m  + (f))-6]
w . - p  = ---------   (16a)
[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ]
I = — - - - - - - - -7 - 1— :- - - -  |  rl<*(1 “  * )  +  gQ ~ « ) 0  "  * , ) ] 0  “  Em + <t>)J [ y ( l -  a)  + a ( \ -  x)][a + s ( \ -  a)] { 1
+ { / - £ ( ! -  * ,)+ (* - l ) [ y ( l - « )  + « ( ! - x ) ] } 0  )  (16b)
The aggregate counterparts to (16a) and (16b) are:
7 This expectation is Ep = [y(  1 -  a)Em  + a w ] / [ a  + y(  1 -  a ) ] . In combination with (11), this implies that
= Wj. = w = Em = Ep .
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w - p  = -
(1 -  x)[y(l -  a){m -  Em + -  6]
[ y ( l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
(17a)
 ^_ y(l -  x)(m -  Em + (f>) + (y -1  + x)6 (17b)
[ r ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
V.3 Wage Indexation under the Simple Rule
V.3.1 Outline o f  the Simple Rule Scenario 
We focus to begin with on the scenario considered by Ball (1988), in which the 
authorities abstain entirely from monetary intervention in response to the stochastic 
shocks, or, equivalently, possess no information about the shocks when setting their 
instrument, the money supply. This scenario therefore corresponds to the simple rule of 
previous chapters, according to which the money supply m is kept fixed. An alternative 
interpretation is that m is the mean value of the money supply, with the aggregate demand 
disturbance, (f>, representing, when non-zero, a stochastic deviation from its mean value 
of the money supply itself. It is convenient (and, as before, innocuous) to normalise m at
O
zero, and consequently we have m = Em = Ep = 0 . The base nominal wage is therefore 
also zero, and the equations for union/ s nominal wage and for the price level simplify to 
the following expressions:
With m fixed, it is apparent from (14') that, provided x <[a + y ( l - a ) ] / a  , a higher 
degree of aggregate wage indexation increases the extent to which the price level deviates
(7b')
^  [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ]
(14')
See the first paragraph o f Section 3.1 .(i) o f Chapter III for a discussion o f  the m = 0 normalisation.
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from its mean value in response to shocks.9 It is also useful to state at this point the 
variances of the price level, of the individual union’s real wage and employment, and of 
their aggregate counterparts, as functions of x and the structural parameters, under the 
simple rule. These expressions are obtained by squaring and taking expectations of (14'), 
(16a), (16b), (17a) and (17b):
2 y 2( \ - a ) 2cr2 +crlEp2 = - L I  L - t  * (18)
[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
,2 (l-*y)2[r20 - a f c r l  + crj]E(w - p )  = --------------------------\ -2----- (19a)
[r(l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
e i 2 =  y \ a  0  ~  *) +£(l ~ Q f ) ( 1 ~  xj ) 3 2 +( r ~  £(l ~ xj ) +(£ -  ^ [ r C 1 -  a ) + < * 0  -  *)] f
1 [a + s ( \ - a ) ] 2[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2
(19b)
\2 ( l - x ) 2[y2( l - a ) 2(7l+cT2]
E ( w - p ) = — — -----  -\ --2----  (20a)
[ y ( l - a )  + a ( \ - x ) \
7 ( l - x ) 2y 2a 2 + ( y - l  + x)2crl
E l 2 =   } - -> ■-   -  (20b)
[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
It is apparent from these equations that when both types of shock are present, there is 
greater scope to reduce real wage variability via wage indexation, than there is to reduce 
employment variability by means of it. Indeed, regardless of the values of cr^  and crj,
real wage variability can always be completely eliminated by indexing the wage fully to 
the price level, since x . = 1 stabilises uniony’s real wage perfectly, and x = 1 is similarly
9From (14'), dp/dx = a[y( \-a)<f i  -  0 ] / [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ] 2 . Since dp/d<f>> 0 and dp jdO < 0 provided 
x < 1 + [y(\ -  a ) / a ]  , it follows that when this condition is satisfied (as it always is in our 
model) a higher degree o f  aggregate wage indexation increases the responsiveness o f  the 
price level to both types o f  shock. This point is also apparent from (18), since 
dEpl /dx = 2a [y 2( l - a ) 2a^ + a l ] [ y ( l - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ] ~ 2 > 0 provided x < 1 + [y(  1 - a ) / a ] .
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effective in the aggregate case. The essential reason for this is that the stochastic shocks 
can only affect the real wage indirectly via their impact on the price level. This differs 
sharply from the relationship between the shock variances and employment variability, 
since employment cannot be perfectly stabilised by means of wage indexation when both 
cr^  and cr] are positive. As is apparent from equations (16b) and (17b), the productivity
shock exerts both a direct influence on employment, and an indirect influence on it via its 
impact on the price level and hence on the real wage and aggregate demand. While it is 
possible to neutralise totally the employment impact of productivity shocks by setting jc;
(or, in the aggregate case, x) appropriately, this setting of the indexation parameter 
necessarily differs from unity and therefore implies that the real wage, and consequently 
employment too, cannot at the same time be completely insulated from velocity shocks.
V.3.2 Efficient Wage Indexation 
From the collective viewpoint of unions, the efficient degree of indexation, x *, is that 
which minimises union f  s expected loss, given that every union does set this particular x, 
(i.e. given that indexation is constrained to be symmetric). For the simple rule scenario, 
this expected loss is obtained by combining (19a) and (19b) with the unconditional 
expectation of (8), and imposing jc . = x  V y :
£Q „| _ r 1 (1 -  *)2[1 + c,(1 -  a ? ]oj + Kr -1  + X ) 2 + c„(1 -  x f  ]al
k-vy [ y ( l - a )  + a ( \ - x ) f
Minimising (21) by choice of jc ,  the efficient degree of aggregate wage indexation is 
found to be:
x* = \ ----------------------------------  (22)
{y2 (1 -  a)[ 1 + (1 -  a )2]a2 + [1 + (1 -  a)]cr20}
This expression has been derived on the assumption that the value of at least one of the 
two shock variances is finite and positive. With this fact in mind, we state the efficient
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degree of indexation when one or the other of the two shock variances takes an extreme 
value:
1™X' =X*\ = i , (23a)
IcrJ =0
(23b)
4=° \ + cu( l - a )
The following derivatives also provide insight into the relationship between x * and the 
variances of the shocks:
dx* y 3( l - a ) [ \  + cu (1 — or)2 ]crj
d v ]  ( r 2 (1 -  a ) [ l  +  (1 -  a ) 2 ]< r2 +  [1 +  c B (1 -  t f ) ]< r2 }2 
Note with regard to (24a): dx* j  da} > 0 provided a] > 0, while {dx* j d a } ^  2_q = 0.
dx* ~ r \  1 ~ «)[1 + c„(l “  « )2K 2
(24a)
( r 2 0  -  a ) [ l  +  ^  (1 “  a ) 2 ]cr2 +  [1 +  c„ (1 -  a )]< r 2 }2
(24b)
This derivative can be unambiguously signed when velocity shocks are present: 
specifically, dx*Ida] < 0 provided a] > 0, while {dx'/dafy  2 = 0. ^ iCf =0
These results reveal that there are several aspects of the efficient degree of indexation 
in our model which tally with the findings of previous contributions to the literature on 
wage indexation. In particular, there is the immediate implication of (22) that the efficient 
degree of indexation does not exceed unity, while (23a) is an instance of a result common 
to many papers, including those of Gray (1976) and Ball (1988), namely that full 
indexation of the wage to the price level is desirable when velocity shocks completely 
predominate.10 A point worth making with regard to the latter result, however, is that
10 To eliminate entirely the possibility o f  confusing the reader, we emphasise that full indexation to the 
price level is only ever efficient if a j  = 0 , and that if a j  > 0 ,  x* < 1 is then the case. In the passage to
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while (23a) indicates that full indexation is efficient whenever the ratio of the two shock 
variances, a ] /cr^ , is zero, the two extreme cases which give rise to cr^/cr^ = 0 will not
have identical outcomes under full indexation. Clearly, in the orj = 0 case x = 1
completely insulates not only the real wage but also aggregate demand11 from velocity 
shocks, so that complete stability of both the real wage and employment is achieved. In 
the limiting case in which cr^  - » c o , by contrast, efficiency requires x to be unity simply
because velocity shocks are overwhelmingly the major source of variability in outcomes: 
the resulting high exposure of employment to productivity shocks is a price worth paying 
to avoid real outcomes being exposed to velocity shocks. Similar arguments arise in 
respect of the results contained in (23b), i.e. the efficient degree of indexation when the 
ratio cr^/o^ tends in the limit to infinity. The fact that efficiency involves the same
degree of indexation when crj —» oo (with crj > 0 of course) as when velocity shocks are
absent does not mean that real outcomes under efficient indexation are identical in the 
two extreme cases. Indeed, it is intuitively obvious that when indexation is efficient the 
o-J = 0 case must result in a smaller expected union loss than the limiting case in which
a] -» oo, since the variances of both shocks are larger in the latter.
More generally, it is clear from (24a) and (24b) that, provided both types of shock exist, 
the efficient degree of indexation is closer to unity, the smaller is the ratio o^/cr^ . The 
reason for this is that efficiency involves the optimal exploitation of a trade-off between 
real wage variability and employment variability. As cr^  increases marginally relative to
<70, a higher degree of indexation is desirable in order to reduce real wage variability, 
both (when cu > 0 ) for its own sake, and because of the contribution it makes to 
employment variability. However, both the direct impact of the productivity shocks on
which this footnote relates, as well as in the remainder o f this chapter, the phrase ‘velocity shocks 
completely predominate’ is used as a convenient means o f  referring to both the case in which c j  = 0 and 
the limiting case in which cr^  -> oo .
11 Under the simple rule, aggregate demand is given by y D = ^ [ a ( l - x ) ^  + 0 ] / [ y ( l - « )  + a (l-A :)], and its
variance by E ( y ° )2 = y 2 [ a 2{\ -  x fcr ]  + a \ ]/[/(1  -  a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2 . In this context, note also that equation 
(10) indicates that firm /’s labour demand is a simple monotonic increasing function o f  aggregate demand.
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employment, and their indirect impact working via the price level and aggregate
adjusting x, as a j  increases, so as to ensure the beneficial marginal effect on real wage
variability is equal to the detrimental marginal effect on employment variability.
This trade-off will be further discussed in a little while as part of the intuitive 
explanation of the form taken by the x * expression itself. However, before embarking on 
this, it is worthwhile examining first of all the relationship between x * and cu. For the 
two extreme admissible values of this weight parameter, it is found that:
The explanation for results (25a), (25b) and (26) is straightforward. In the limiting 
cu —> oo case, the representative union’s sole concern is to secure a stable real wage, and 
this can always be achieved via coordinated indexation of unity. In the opposite extreme 
case of cu = 0 , minimisation of employment variability is union f  s sole objective, and
with both types of shock present, the setting of x which minimises the variance of 
employment will depend upon the relative magnitudes of the shock variances. This is the 
familiar lesson of Gray (1976) and Ball (1988), both of which papers assume, of course,
12 Using the expression for E ( y D) 2 stated in the previous footnote, we find that: 
d 2E ( y D)2/dcr2gdx = 2a / [y( l  -  a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 3 . Hence the contribution made by a 2g to employment 
variability is larger, the closer to unity is x. (This assumes x < [a  + y ( l - a ) ] / a  , an inequality which does 
hold under both efficient and equilibrium indexation.)
demand12, are exacerbated by a marginal increase in x towards unity. Efficiency involves
(25a)
x
y 2( l - a )c r l+ ( \ - y )c r 20
y 2( \ - a ) a ] + c j 2B
(25b)
Differentiating x*, as given by (22), with respect to cu we have:
dx =  y( 1 -  a)[y7{ 1 -  a fcr]  + cr2B]ar2Q_______
{ /2(1 -  a)[ 1 + c„(l -  a ) 2]a2 + [1 + c j l  -  a)]ct2b}2
(26)
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that the objective of indexation is the achievement of employment stability. It is not at all 
surprising, therefore, that (25b) is identical to the efficient degree of (costless) indexation 
in Ball’s model.13 In her paper, Gray,assumes that the y parameter of our model is equal
to unity, and when (25b) is evaluated for y - 1, the resulting expression for x*\
lc„ =0, y=\
turns out to be the optimal degree of indexation in Gray’s model when labour supply is 
completely inelastic. Finally, note that (26) indicates dx*/dcu > 0 to be the case provided
<jj > 0 . This is attributable to the fact that under symmetric indexation, real wage 
variability is lower, the closer is x to unity (as is evident from (20a)). Hence the larger is 
the relative weight placed by unions on real wage variability, the closer to unity is x *. In 
the absence of productivity shocks, full indexation is always efficient, regardless of cu,
which explains why (26) implies that (dx*/dcu)\ 2 = 0.1(70=0
To acquire intuition regarding our x* expression, (i.e. equation (22)), it is helpful to 
consider initially the special case in which the economy is subject only to productivity 
shocks. The efficient degree of indexation when velocity shocks do not exist has already 
been presented above as part of expression (23b), to which we refer the reader once again. 
Relevant also to the analysis is an entity which will be familiar from Chapter III, and 
which was originally derived in Appendix II.2, namely the symmetric-wage labour 
demand curve. It is convenient to repeat its equation here14:
, -  -  c^L --v ,n + ^, = ------ '-------------   (27)
J\Wj = wy/ ( l ~ a ) .
Since in this chapter the nominal wage of union j  is (given the normalisations) = X j p , 
(27) may be alternatively written as follows:
13 Equation (25b) is identical, apart from notational differences, to equation (11) o f  Ball (1988), p.303.
14 At this point we add subscripts to some o f  the variables in this equation in order to emphasise the 
underlying assumption o f  symmetry in wages.
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i (^ -x,){p\x )+e
l \  . = --------------   2- (27')
j  Xj =x\/j ( 1 - a )
/
Equation {21') implicitly assumes that Xj = x \ / j , and hence will be referred to as the
symmetric-indexation labour demand curve.15 For concreteness, the case of a positive 
productivity shock, 0 > 0, will be studied: needless to say, an explanation which parallels 
that given here could be provided for the case in which 0 < 0 . 16 The symmetric- 
indexation labour demand curve when 0>O is depicted below in Figure V .l. Since this 
diagram is closely related to Figure III.l of Chapter III, it will require very few 
explanatory remarks. It differs from Figure III.l in only one important respect, namely 
that f3 = 0 is now assumed to be the case, so that the expectation of the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve which appears in Figure III.l implicitly passes through the origin in 
Figure V .l. (Since it does little to advance the discussion, the expected symmetric- 
indexation labour demand curve is omitted entirely in order to reduce diagrammatic 
clutter.)
Under symmetric indexation, the outcome in the labour market(s) in which union j  is 
the monopoly union, and indeed the outcome at the aggregate level, must be located on 
the.labour demand curve depicted in Figure V .l. Each point on the curve corresponds to a 
particular degree of symmetric indexation. If = IV /, so that x = 1, the outcome will be
at the vertical intercept of the labour demand curve, the real wage will take its expected 
market-clearing value of zero, and will be unaffected by the shock, the impact of which 
will be borne entirely by employment. As x decreases from unity, the outcome migrates 
gradually down the curve. The x value which ensures the outcome is at the.horizontal- 
axis intercept of the curve is 1 - y  , and this x value is positive if, and only if, y < 1. The
15 Like (27), (27') is a special case o f  the aggregate-level labour demand curve, and therefore may be 
alternatively written with / and x  respectively in place o f / ■ and X j . The important point regarding (27) 
and (27') is that Wj = wV/ , which in this chapter amounts to Wj = w V/ and Xj = jcV/ .
16 As for the 0 = 0 case, this is simply that in which the symmetric-indexation labour demand curve passes 
through the origin. Since there is no expectational error regarding the price level in this case (i.e. 
p\g_Q = Ep = 0 ), the indexation clause in the wage contract does not come into play, and the wage is at its
mean level o f zero. Labour-market clearing occurs, and the outcome is located at the origin.
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efficient jc , of course, is that which ensures the outcome is at the tangency point between 
the isoloss map and the symmetric-indexation labour demand curve, and from (23b) this x
is known to be x* 2 = [1 -  y + cu(\^~ a)]/[l + cu( 1 -  a )] . It is clear that when y < 1 (and\<jj =0
cu > 0 )> the outcome at the tangency point is brought about by an x value which is 
positive. If y > 1, part of the curve lying above the horizontal axis is then associated with 
negative values of x, and the possibility then arises that the tangency itself is located at a 
point associated with a non-positive x  value. The closer to zero is union f  s weight 
parameter cu, the more horizontally elongated are the ellipses which make up the union’s 
isoloss map. In other words, the stronger is union f  s relative aversion to employment 
variability (i.e. the lower is cu) the lower down the curve will the tangency point be. 
Hence for a given y value in excess of unity, the tangency point will only be located on 
the part of the curve associated with negative jc  values if cu is sufficiently low.
These facts are of assistance in interpreting a key aspect of our result for the efficient 
degree of indexation in the absence of velocity shocks, namely that it is zero if, and only 
if, cu happens to satisfy the equation cu =cu, where cu = (y . This finding is
obviously closely related to one of the key results of Chapter III, namely that when 
cu =cu, the efficient nominal wage is always zero, regardless of the realised value of the 
signal, and regardless also of signal quality. It will be recalled that the model of this 
chapter only differs from that of Chapter III in that it assumes signals to be completely 
uninformative (/? = 0), and in that it also allows for wage indexation and velocity shocks 
(and for the moment the latter are assumed absent in any case). Given the nature of these 
differences, it is hardly surprising that if efficiency in wage-setting requires that w = 0 at 
all times, the efficient degree of indexation should turn out to be zero, since with a base 
nominal wage of zero, a setting of zero for jc clearly ensures that the efficiency 
requirement identified in Chapter III for the cu = cu special case is met. Underpinning 
this result is the fact that when cu =cu, the movement in the price level occasioned by a
non-zero realisation of the productivity shock is, in the absence of an adjustment of the 
aggregate nominal wage, precisely what is required to ensure the outcome is located at
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Figure V .l
Employment and real wage outcomes from efficient indexation
(1 - a )
1 — r  +  c u ( l - a )x =
l + c „ ( l - a )
>Wj ~ P
Symmetric-indexation 
labour demand curve
Notes:
1. It is assumed for illustrative purposes that 0  > 0 .
2. If crj = 0 is the case, each o f  the indicated points on the symmetric-indexation labour demand curve will 
be the outcome brought about by the stated value o f x. If crj > 0 ,  each indicated point will, if  the stated 
value o f  x is set, be the mean outcome (i.e. it will be the outcome if  <(> = 0 transpires).
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the tangency point between the isoloss map and the symmetric-wage labour demand 
curve.
Effective use can also be made at this juncture of arguments devised in Chapter III to 
explain the efficient wage response to a non-zero signal when cu * c u. As we saw in that
chapter, if cu > cu is the case, a non-zero productivity shock has, in the absence of any
nominal wage adjustment (i.e. if Wj = OVy ), too weak an impact on employment and too
strong an impact on the real wage. When a positive shock is expected, i.e. when 
E{0 1 s) = J3s > 0, efficiency requires that the fall in the price level caused by the shock’s 
anticipated component be accompanied by a decrease in the nominal wage, so that this 
component’s impact on the real wage is dampened, and its impact on employment is 
strengthened, by just enough to ensure that the ideal distribution of the impact across 
these outcome variables is achieved. Plainly, this reasoning is applicable also to our 
finding that the efficient degree of indexation is positive when cu >cu, since positive
indexation ensures that the nominal wage adjusts negatively in response to the fall in the 
price level resulting from a positive productivity shock. The converse case in which 
cu <cu is that in which a positive adjustment of the nominal wage in response to a 
positive shock is desirable, since in the absence of any wage adjustment the shock’s 
impact on the real wage will be weaker, and its impact on employment stronger, than the 
impact pattern which the unions prefer. It therefore follows that the efficient degree of 
indexation should be negative when cu <cu, since negative indexation ensures that the 
price level fall caused by a positive shock results, as desired, in an increase in the 
nominal wage.
One implication of the arguments propounded in the previous paragraphs is that, in the 
absence of velocity shocks, efficient indexation of the wage to the price level must bring 
about the same expected union loss as efficient wage-setting when signals are perfectly
informative (the /? = 1 case). Combining our x*\ result, as given by (23b), with (19a),I Of =0
(19b) and (8), we find that:
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This is identical to the (unconditional) expected loss which results from efficient wage- 
setting under full information, as given by equation (23) of Chapter III, evaluated for 
P = 1. This in turn implies that efficient indexation gives rise to a smaller expected loss 
than that achieved by an efficient nominal wage adjustment in response to an imperfect 
signal. The reason for this, of course, is that if aggregate demand is not subject to velocity 
shocks, the realised value of the price level allows the value of the productivity shock to 
be inferred perfectly. Compared to noisy signals, therefore, the price level is a superior 
source of information which, although unavailable at the time wage contracts are signed, 
can nevertheless be exploited, by means of efficient indexation, to bring about the desired 
movement in the aggregate nominal wage.
It is time to investigate how the existence of velocity shocks affects the efficient degree 
of indexation. Figure V.l remains relevant to the analysis, as does the equation of the 
symmetric-indexation labour demand curve for a given realisation of 9 , namely equation 
(27 '). Given 6 , the presence of velocity shocks implies that, with a single exception, 
each value of x does not give rise for certain to a particular outcome point on the 
symmetric-indexation labour demand curve for that 6 realisation, but rather only gives 
rise to it on average. If xy = 1 - y , \ / j , for instance, the outcome will only on average be
located at the intersection point of the labour demand curve with the horizontal axis; in 
other words the horizontal intercept will be the location of the outcome when the realised 
value of (f> happens to be zero. If ^ is not zero, the actual outcome when x} -
will be positioned elsewhere on the curve. (The set of possible outcomes, given the 
positive 9 shock assumed by the diagram, will be normally distributed around the mean 
outcome.) Consequently, xy = l-^ ,V / ' does not stabilise employment perfectly when
velocity shocks exist: with cr^  > 0 it merely ensures productivity shocks do not affect 
employment, and that employment is zero on average. This is similarly true of 
X ~ W ~ 7  + cu(1 —«)]/[! + cu( l - a ) ]  , which now ensures that the outcome is at the 
tangency point only on average, i.e. when <f> = 0. The single exception to this general
truth that, when c r j  > 0 , each jc value only on average results in a particular outcome is
x = 1, since full indexation perfectly stabilises the real wage irrespective of whether 
velocity shocks are present or not. furthermore, as the symmetric degree of indexation 
approaches unity from below, the variances of both the real wage and employment, for a 
given realisation of Q , diminish monotonically, as can be seen from the following 
expressions, obtained using (16a) and (16b) with X j  = j c V  j  imposed:
In terms of Figure V .l, therefore, the existence of velocity shocks implies that as x 
approaches unity from below, the mean outcome travels steadily up the labour demand 
curve, with the distribution of possible outcomes about the mean outcome gradually 
narrowing. Note also that result (24a) implies that the introduction of velocity shocks into
located at the tangency point depicted in Figure V .l. (In other words, we know from (24a) 
that if c r ^ >0 ,  x > [ \ - y  + cu{ \ -  a)]/[\ + c„(l -  a)] is then the case.) Hence when
crj > 0, the efficient degree of indexation does not ensure that the mean outcome (i.e. the 
outcome if (f) turns out to be zero) is located at the tangency point. The presence of 
velocity shocks causes the efficient mean outcome to be positioned further up the 
symmetric labour demand curve than the tangency point, and therefore will involve a 
given realisation of 6 having, on average, a larger impact on employment and a smaller 
impact on the real wage, than under efficient indexation in the absence of velocity shocks. 
To make the point in another way, efficient indexation when 0 results on average in
the productivity shock not being divided between the real wage and employment in the 
most desirable way from the unions’ viewpoint. The implication of this is that, under
(29a)
dx
(29b)
dx [ y { \ - a )  + a { \ - x ) f
the model leads the efficient jc to exceed the jc  which causes the mean outcome to be
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efficient indexation, the larger is the variance of the velocity shock, the greater is the 
contribution made by productivity shocks to employment variability, and the smaller is 
their contribution to real wage variability. The reason why it is efficient for unions to 
incur this displacement of the mean outcome away from the tangency point is that the 
higher x which causes this displacement results in a smaller variance of the actual 
outcome around the mean as a result of velocity shocks. Clearly, this is the indexation 
literature’s familiar trade-off between on the one hand achieving greater stability in the 
face of velocity shocks, and on the other exacerbating the impact of productivity shocks 
on employment.
We complete our discussion of efficient indexation under the simple rule with an 
alternative diagrammatic representation of the aforementioned trade-off. Every 
admissible value of x uniquely gives rise to a particular combination of aggregate real 
wage variability, as given by (20a), and aggregate employment variability, as given by 
(20b). The set of possible such combinations constitutes a locus of possible outcomes in a 
two-dimensional space with the variance of the aggregate real wage and the variance of 
aggregate employment on the axes. Note that this locus also constitutes the set of possible 
outcomes for the individual union, given that indexation is symmetric (i.e. given that 
Xj = x V j ). The part of the locus which is of interest to us is depicted in Figure V.2.
The slope of the locus is given by expression (31) below, and involves the ratio of the 
following derivatives of (20a) and (20b) with respect to x:
dE(w -  p f  -  2(1 -  x)y( 1 -  a)[y2 (1 -  a )2 a] + <r2 ]
dx [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ] 2
(30a)
dEl2 2y[-(l -  x)y2 (1 -  a)o]  + (y -1  + x)a j ]
dx [y(l -  a)  + a(\ -  x)]2
(30b)
dEl2 _ dEl1/dx  _ [(1 ~ x)y2 (1 -  apcr2 + (1 -  x -  y)crl ] 
d E ( w - p )2 d E ( w - p ) 2/dx (1- x ) ( l - a ) [ / 2( l - a ) 2cr?+crj]
(31)
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Figure V.2
The locus of possible outcomes from symmetric 
indexation in the simple rule scenario
c '( l-a )2cr(
[1 + cu (1 -  a)
[l + cu( l - a )
Notes:
1. The depicted isoloss contour has slope - cu.
2
\ x j = x V j
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The only point in the diagram which is both on the locus and on the vertical axis is the 
outcome pair which results when full indexation is symmetrically adopted by every union. 
This is unsurprising, since it is known that unity is the only setting of x  which entirely 
eliminates real wage variability. The locus neither intersects nor has a tangency point 
with the horizontal axis, a fact that is consistent with the argument put forward earlier 
that, given both types of shock exist, it is not possible to stabilise employment perfectly 
by means of wage indexation. The point on the locus which involves minimal 
employment, variability is brought about by the value of x which is efficient in the
costless-indexation version of Ball’s model (i.e. by x* , as given by (25b)). It is
I cu =0
apparent from (30a) and (30b) that as x rises in value from Ball’s efficient solution value,
•j h
the outcome migrates gradually up the negatively sloped portion of the locus. The 
indifference map of the representative union in this space consists of a bliss point at the 
origin and straight line isoloss curves, with slope - c u. Setting (31) equal to - c u and 
solving forx, amounts, of course, to an alternative means of finding the efficient solution 
x *. In diagrammatic terms, therefore, x* is the value of x which causes the outcome to be 
located at the tangency point between the indifference map and the possible-outcomes 
locus, and hence ensures that the trade-off embodied in the slope of the locus is optimally 
exploited from the unions’ collective viewpoint.
17 It is straightforward to show that as x  rises above unity, both the variance o f  employment and the 
variance o f  the real wage increase, and indeed tend to infinity as x approaches its only inadmissible value o f  
[a + y ( l - a ) \ / a  . Hence as x  increases from unity, the outcome migrates in a north-easterly direction along
the upper o f the two positively sloped portions o f the locus. If  x  exceeds [ a + y ( l - a ) ] / a , both the real 
wage variance and the employment variance are then falling in x, so that as x  increases further the outcome 
will move down the lower o f  the two positively sloped portions o f  the locus, and will gradually converge 
on a particular point which is the outcome in the limiting case in which x -»  ±oo. (Only a small part 
o f  this positively sloped portion has been drawn.) The limiting values o f  these variances as 
x  becomes infinitely large or infinitely negative are, respectively, ^ ^ E l 2 = [ y 2cr^+<Tg]/a2 and
'Z±* E ( w - p ) 2 = [ r 2( l - a ) 2a l  + a g ] / a 2 . In general descriptive terms, therefore, the locus o f possible 
outcomes is smoothly curved and elongated in a north-easterly direction, with a discontinuity which 
corresponds to the setting o f x at [a  + y ( l - a ) ] / a  . (The latter is the only real value o f  x which does not 
have associated with it a point on the locus.) However, since our interest in this chapter principally 
concerns the subset o f  x  values bounded by the Ball model efficient solution and by unity, i.e. the interval 
l - y c r j [ y 2(l-« )cr^  + o ^ T ‘ -  x -  1 > on y^ that part o f  the locus corresponding approximately to this range 
o f values is depicted in Figure V .l.
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V.3.3 Equilibrium Wage Indexation 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the individual union will have an incentive to 
set its degree of indexation equal to the efficient degree, i.e. whether Xj = x * can prevail
in equilibrium. Our first step towards deriving the individual union’s optimal j c ., for
given x, is to obtain union /  s expected loss as a function of jcy, x  and the structural
parameters. After substituting (19a) and (19b) into the (unconditional) expectation of (8), 
this is found to be:
EQU =
1 [a + £ ( \ - a ) ] 2[ y ( l - a )  + a ( \ - x ) f  
+ cu[a + e( 1 -  a)]2 (I - a ) 2 ( I -  X j ) 2} a ]  + [{y -  s{ 1 - X j )  + ( e -  \)[y{\ -  a )  + a  (I -  x)]}3
+ cu[a + £ { \ - a ) ] 2{ \ - x j )2}<ji (32)
In deriving its individually optimal degree of indexation, union j  regards the indexation 
decisions of the other ( « - l )  unions as beyond its influence. Individual optimality
requires that account be taken of both the direct effect of Xj on union f  s expected loss,
as given by the partial derivative dEQ^/dXj,  and the indirect effect jcy has upon it,
working through the contribution x} makes to the realised value of jc . This latter indirect
effect involves the fact that d x / d X j = \ / n ,  and is given by the second term in the
following total derivative:
dEQIj _ dEQ!] 
dx . dx.
+
x  fixed
\ n j
dEQ
dx
(33)
Although the direct effect can be straightforwardly obtained by differentiating (32) with 
respect to x . , it is helpful to the discussion to state explicitly the derivatives of (19a) and
296
(19b), namely dE{yVj -  p )2 /dxj  and dEl^/dXj,  since the direct effect is simply their 
weighted sum, the weight in question, of course, being cu :
8E(w, -  p f  -  2(1 - *,)[r 2(l - a f a ]  + <t2] 
dxj |> ( l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2
dEl] 2sJ _ - y 2( 1 -  a)[a(  1 - x )  + s(l -  a)(  1 -  Xj)]ar)
dxj [a + s( 1 -  a)] [y(\ - a )  + a(  1 -  *)]"
+ { r - £ ( \ - x J) + ( £ - \ ) [ r ( l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] } a l  |  (34b)
The indirect effect, meanwhile, involves the derivative of (32) with respect to x, or, 
equivalently, the weighted sum of expressions (30a) and (30b), the relevant weight again 
being cu.
Expressions (33), (34a) and (34b) have prepared the ground for the derivation of the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium degree of indexation, xNE, for the general case in which n 
may take any of its admissible set of values. Before deriving xNE for the large subset of 
cases for which n> 1, however, we must derive separately the equilibrium solution for 
the case of atomistic unions. The reason for doing so is that the xNE expression for the
n > 1 subset which will be presented subsequently can only be regarded as legitimate if it 
reduces in the limit, as n ->  1 and as n - »  oo , to the equilibrium expressions which have 
been derived for the n = 1 and atomistic cases respectively. The equilibrium solution for 
the n = 1 case has in fact already been derived implicitly. It is clear that x is a choice 
variable of a single economy-wide union, and since that union will set the same degree of 
indexation in each of the wage contracts to which it is a party (i.e. = xVz' and xy = xVy
hold), it follows that E(Q.U\ ) = E(Q" ) is the case. Hence the individually optimal
J ln = l J Xj=x
indexation choice of a single union is the efficient solution, as given by (22), so that 
XuJ = x *. As for the atomistic case, this is the case in which the individual union
N b \n  = l
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believes that its x . choice has a negligibly small impact on jc , and consequently takes * as
given in choosing X j . In other words the second term on the right-hand side of (33) is
>
assumed to be identically zero, so that the first-order condition for the atomistic union’s 
individually optimal jc choice becomes dEQ^jdXj = 0 . Differentiating (32) with respect
to X j , with x treated as fixed, equating the result to zero, and imposing x} = x  in union
/  s resulting first-order condition, yields an equation which implicitly defines the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium degree of indexation in the atomistic case. The unique 
solution in the atomistic case is then found to be:
=  1 -N E , a r o u s e  ^  ^  +  ^  ^  +  ^  +  +  ^  +  ^
(35)
When this expression is compared with its counterpart for the efficient-indexation case, 
namely equation (22), it is apparent that, in general, the degree of indexation chosen by 
atomistic unions in equilibrium exceeds the efficient value. This indicates the existence 
of an adverse externality appertaining to the individual union’s indexation decision.
Proceeding now on the assumption that 1 < n < °o, so that the second term on the right- 
hand side of (33) is non-zero, the first-order condition for union / s optimal choice of 
indexation can be obtained, namely dEQ" jdxj = 0. It is not worthwhile explicitly setting
out this expression here, since our interest lies rather with the equation which implicitly 
defines xNE. This latter equation, which is to be found in Appendix V .l, is obtained by
imposing x} = jc in union f  s first-order condition. The solution is:
+ K 2ctJ - [ (K jO -^  + K 2ct^)2 -4 ( r c - l ) a K 3K 4]1/2
X    r--------------------------------- z--------------------------------------------------------------  M ( , )
m  2 (n - l) a K 3
where:
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Kj = y 2( l -a )[ya  + [ {n - \ )a  + A]{f + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + f ( l -« )]} ]
K 2 = ya[l -  s(n - 1)] + [ ( « - l)a + A] {e + cu[a + £ ( l-a ) ]}
K3 = y 2( l - a ) { £  +  cu( \ - a ) [ a  +  £ ( \ - a ) ] }or] + { s  + cu[a +  z (  1 -  a ) ] }crj
K4 = y 2{ 1 -  a)\ya + A{s + cu (1 -  a)[a + s (1 -  a)\ }]cr] + {(1 -  y)(ya + zA) + Acu [a + s (1 -  a)] jcr]
A = (n - 1)« + -  a)
Note that this is one of two solutions to the equation which implicitly defines xNE . The 
other solution is disregarded since, as demonstrated in Appendix V .l, its value in the 
limit as n -»1 , and also in the limit as £ -> co, is not the efficient degree jc * , nor does 
this second solution’s value in the limit as «->oo reduce to the atomistic-case xNE, as
given by (35). The solution reported above as (36) is satisfactory in these respects.18 
Specifically, we find that:
J™ ***= *’ (37a)
n -*oo ^ N E  ^ N E , a tom istic  case (37b)
lim 
£-*°o ^ N ExNF = x * (37c)
It is clear from comparison of (36) with (22) that when n > 1, the equilibrium degree of 
indexation differs, in general, from the efficient degree, indicating that non-atomistic 
unions’ indexation decisions are characterised by an adverse externality. Bearing in mind 
that, special cases apart, xNE>atomisticcase is greater than x*, and also that the wage-setting 
externality of Chapter III was found to be stronger, the larger is «, and to be weaker, the 
larger is s  , intuition suggests that d x NE/dn>  0 and d x NE/de  <0 must be the case. 
Although it has not been possible to devise a general proof of this for all admissible 
combinations of parameter values, it is easily shown to hold when velocity shocks are
18 This is demonstrated in Appendix V .l.
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absent (i.e. in the cr^  = 0 case), and a demonstration of this is contained in Appendix V.l.
The equilibrium indexation result for the 1 < n < oo case has in fact been stated here 
largely for the sake of completeness and for consistency with the practice of other 
chapters. Since the key aspects of the externality can be identified by focusing solely on 
the atomistic-case solution, (35), the discussion which follows concentrates on this less 
complicated case. To reduce the notational burden, the subscript ‘atomistic case’ is 
dropped for the remainder of this section, and it is to be understood that ‘ xNE ’ refers to 
expression (35).
It is appropriate to begin our discussion of the externality by reminding the reader that, 
as mentioned earlier, the variance of the price level under the simple rule is an increasing 
function of x.19 It follows from this fact that a major consequence of the externality is that 
in equilibrium, price-level variability is higher than it would be under efficient indexation. 
Furthermore, the derivatives (30a) and (30b) indicate that in equilibrium real wage 
variability must be lower, and employment variability higher, than under efficient 
indexation. The expected loss of each union is therefore larger than it would be were 
unions able to coordinate their individual indexation choices on the efficient degree jc * .20  
The macroeconomic repercussions of the indexation externality are therefore 
qualitatively very similar to those of the wage-setting externality identified in Chapter III. 
This qualitative correspondence between the two externalities will be further discussed 
below. In order to facilitate such a discussion, however, it is necessary first of all to set 
out various expressions which cast light upon the relationship between the equilibrium 
indexation solution and the model’s structural parameters.
When the ratio of the shock variances, , is zero, either because productivity
shocks are absent or because velocity shocks completely predominate, xNE is equal to
19 This is technically true only when x < l + [ y ( l - a ) / a ] . (See footnote 9 above.) However, this condition 
always holds so far as the efficient and equilibrium values o f*  are concerned.
20 It is easily shown to be the case that £ (0 "  ) > £(£2“ ) i f  the trouble is taken to obtain these
7 ,* / = * « V /  J  l ly  = l 'V /
expressions by evaluating (21) for x -  x* and x = xNE , as given respectively by (22) and (35).
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unity, which from (23a) we know to be the efficient degree of indexation in these two 
extreme cases:21
l i m
X NE ~  X Ne \ „ \ - ( \  ~~ 1 (3 & a )cr?->oo  a E\<j I =q
In the converse extreme case in which cr2/c r2 —> oo, either because velocity shocks are 
absent or because productivity shocks completely predominate, xNE is found to differ 
from the efficient indexation degree, as given by (23b):
xm  = xNE\ , = -Q_ z }± c-J ?-+ gQ. a )l (38b)
m e + c„[a + e ( l - a ) ]
The derivatives of xNE with respect to cr2 and cr2 are also of interest:
fam  = ___________ r 3g(l -  a ) {£ + (1 -  a)[a + g( 1 -  a)] }cr2____________
[y2 (1 -  a ) {£ + (1 -  d)[a + e (1 -  a)] }a) + {s + c„ [a + £(1 -  a)] }cr2 ]2
dxNE ___________-  y 2s(  1 -  a){s  + (1 -  d)[a  + g (l -  a)] }a]_
do*2 [ r 2( 1 -  « ) { f  + cu(l -  a ) [ a  + f  (1 -  a)]}<72 + { s  +  cu[a + s (  1 -  a ) ]} c r2]2
Results (39a) and (39b) reveal that as the significance of velocity shocks, as a source of 
macroeconomic instability, rises relative to that of productivity shocks (i.e. as the ratio 
cr] / crj falls), in equilibrium each union increases its degree of indexation in response to
the increased importance of velocity shocks. (This pair of results is consistent, of course, 
with the general finding of the literature.)
As for the relationship between xNE and the elasticity parameter £ , it has already been
established in expression (37c) that =x*: this result therefore indicates that the
21 In interpreting (38a) and (38b), note that xNE has been derived on the assumption that at least one o f  the 
two shock variances is positive.
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externality does not arise if the goods market is perfectly competitive. Furthermore, it is 
apparent from the following derivative (which is unambiguously negative provided 
0 < cu < oo and provided cr* j a J > 0) that the externality is weaker, the more competitive 
is the goods market:
dxNE = __________________ c„ra<T1e[r2( l - c t ) 1<Tl + al]_________________
de [y2( l - a ) { £  + c „ ( l - a ) [ a  + £(l-a)]}o-J + {£ + c„[a + £(l-a)]}<72]2
As in Duca and VanHoose (1998a), therefore, the equilibrium degree of indexation is 
falling in the degree of goods-market competition. However, whereas in Duca and 
VanHoose this arises because greater goods-market competition diminishes the impact of 
cross-sectoral spillovers on the real wage of workers who are subject to wage contracts, 
the qualitatively similar result in our model has a different source, namely that greater 
goods-market competition mitigates the negative externality which characterises the 
indexation choices of atomistic unions.
So far as the relationship between xNE and cu is concerned, we find that if cu takes
either of the two extremes of its set of admissible values, equilibrium indexation is 
efficient, as is evident from comparison of the following expressions with (25a) and (25b):
(41a)
I = r 2( i - q ) < + ( i Tr K 2 (41b)
r 2(l - a ) a j + a j
The derivative of xNE with respect to cu is unambiguously positive, provided cr* /crj > 0
dxNE _ ys[a + s ( l -  a)]cr20[y2( 1 -  a )2a 2 + cr*2]
2 t2dcu [y (1 -  a){e + cu{ 1 - a ) [ a  + s{ 1 -  a)]}cr, +{e + cu[a + e(l -  a)]}ae]
(42)
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Expressions (38a) to (42) collectively reveal that four features of this chapter’s model 
are essential to the existence of the indexation externality. The first and second of these 
features are a monopolistically competitive goods market (i.e. £ < <x>) and an aversion on 
the individual union’s part to both employment variability and real wage variability (i.e. 
0 < cu < oo). The importance of the third and fourth features is concisely captured in the
requirement that <jj ! ° l >  0 hold. In other words, for the externality to arise not only
must the economy be subject to productivity shocks (i.e. cr2e > 0 must be the case), but in
addition the velocity shock variance must not be so large as to render productivity shocks 
a comparatively negligible source of price level and aggregate demand instability (i.e. 
<7f < oo is the fourth essential feature). Clearly, the first three of these requirements have
elsewhere been identified as necessary conditions for the existence of a wage-setting 
externality in the version of our basic model analysed in Chapter III. This indicates that 
the underlying source of the inefficiency in atomistic unions’ decisions is common to 
both scenarios. Note, however, that the fourth of the above necessary conditions for the 
existence of the indexation externality also has a partial parallel in the model of Chapter 
III, namely in the fact that the wage-setting externality only exists if the variance of 
signal noise is finite ( o 2u < oo). This correspondence is not surprising, since in both
scenarios an externality only arises if there exists a variable which carries information 
about the productivity shock and which can induce an adjustment in nominal wages. In 
the present chapter’s model this role is performed by the price level, which, of course, 
becomes completely uninformative about the productivity shock in the limit as crj —> oo.
Our immediate concern is to explain how productivity shocks, monopolistic 
competition, and the assumed specification of the union loss function, together serve to 
engender the externality. In pursuit of this, it is instructive to abstract initially from the 
existence of velocity shocks, so that the equilibrium degree of indexation is given by 
(38b). As we know, productivity shocks must occasion a departure of either employment 
or the real wage, or both, from their mean values of zero, while indexation is a 
mechanism for allocating the impact of a non-zero productivity shock between the real 
wage and employment. The individual union which is averse to variability in both these 
outcome variables chooses its degree of indexation so as to allocate the shock between
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them in the most favourable way, given the constraints the union faces. In doing so, each 
atomistic union perceives (correctly) that the price level repercussions of its individual 
indexation decision are negligibly small, and recognises also that with monopolistic 
competition in the goods market, the product demand of its employer firms will not 
vanish if their prices exceed the prevailing average price. Consequently, the individual 
union perceives that it may potentially benefit from setting an individual degree of wage 
indexation which differs from the aggregate (i.e. average) degree. It so happens that if all 
other unions cooperatively abide by the efficient degree of indexation, union j  will be 
able to improve its individual expected loss, relative of course to the expected loss 
outcome associated with efficient indexation by all unions, by choosing an individual 
degree of indexation which is greater than the efficient degree. By increasing x} above
jc * ,  the individual union can trade somewhat lower real wage variability for somewhat 
higher employment variability, and thereby improve its expected welfare outcome. Of 
course, this incentive to deviate from jc * is faced by every union, and the resulting adverse 
repercussion on price-level variability means that in equilibrium all end up worse off than 
had coordination on x occurred.
The familiar concept of the perceived labour demand curve can once again be deployed 
to provide a diagrammatic representation of the externality’s source. As in previous 
chapters, there exists a perceived labour demand curve for each combination of 
productivity shock realisation, 6 , and nominal wage set symmetrically by all other 
unions other than union j .  Since atomistic unions take the aggregate nominal wage itself 
as given, there will, given 9 , be an infinite set of possible perceived curves, one for every 
possible realisation of the aggregate nominal wage. Two members of this infinite set are 
of particular interest, however: the perceived labour demand curve when the aggregate 
degree of indexation (and hence also, given 6 , the aggregate nominal wage) is efficient, 
and its equilibrium counterpart for the case in which all other unions set xNE . It is 
convenient at this point to set out the equations of these two curves:
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(43a)
1 {sz +cu[a + £■(!- a)]2 }0
' * k = x i a * k * j  [ a  + £ ( \  _  # )] I + Cu (1 _ ( x ) [ a  + _ q;)] } '*k = x NEV k * j
(43b)
(43a) and (43b) are simply the versions of equations (49a) and (49b) of Chapter III which 
arise in the limit as n - » <x>, with the notation slightly modified to reflect the fact that
a ful 1-information environment. (Although union j  has no information whatsoever at the 
time it sets xJ9 it nevertheless does know that its real wage and employment, given 6,
and given every other union sets x* or xNE, must respectively be related according to 
(43a) and (43b). It is therefore entirely appropriate to say that union j  faces a perceived 
labour demand curve at the time it chooses xJ9 despite its ignorance of 6 at that juncture.)
The two perceived labour demand curves given by (43a) and (43b), together with the 
symmetric-indexation labour demand curve given by (27') appear in Figure V.3 below, 
which to avoid an element of repetition depicts the case of a negative realisation of Q, An 
aggregate degree of indexation of unity would place the outcome on the vertical axis, and 
as jc  decreases gradually from unity the location of the outcome migrates up the 
aggregate-level labour demand curve, which coincides, of course, with the symmetric- 
indexation labour demand curve.23 The efficient outcome is at a, and given efficient 
aggregate indexation, union j  can, by appropriately adjusting x]9 ensure its individual
outcome is located at any particular point on its perceived labour demand curve passing 
through a. By increasing xj above x* sufficiently, union j  can place its outcome at the
22 With full information regarding the productivity shock, symmetric indexation is merely a special form of 
symmetric wage-setting.
23 When x = l - y  , the aggregate outcome is located at the aggregate labour demand curve’s intercept with 
the horizontal axis.
22these entities now relate to symmetric indexation by all unions other than union j ,  and to
tangency point b, which is closer than the efficient outcome to the bliss point. The Nash
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equilibrium outcome is located at c, since this is the only point on the symmetric- 
indexation labour demand curve which is also a point of tangency between the atomistic 
union’s perceived labour demand curve through that point and the isoloss map.
Figure V.3 is also useful in explaining why it is essential to the externality that cu be
positive and finite. The reason why the externality does not arise in the cu -  0 case and in
the limit case of cu —» co , is because in these extreme cases the nature of the
representative union’s isoloss map is such as to render irrelevant to the union’s welfare 
the trade-off faced by union j  between reducing the impact of a given 6 shock on the real 
wage, and exacerbating that shock’s impact on employment. In these extreme cases the 
isoloss curves are parallel straight lines, and hence no tangency point exists between 
either the aggregate level labour demand curve or any perceived labour demand curve 
and the isoloss map. Furthermore, bliss outcomes are not given by the origin but rather by 
the horizontal axis (when cu = 0 )  or the vertical axis (when cu - » oo). In the latter
cu —> oo case, union j  can achieve its sole objective of perfect real wage stability by
setting Xj = 1, regardless of the value of or] (or, for that matter, cr^). Hence there is no
possibility of an externality since every union can insulate itself fully from the 
repercussions of other unions’ indexation decisions. In the cu = 0 case union j  can, in the 
absence of velocity shocks, similarly achieve its bliss outcome of perfect employment 
stability by choosing xj so as to place its individual outcome at the intersection point of
the aggregate-level labour demand curve with the horizontal axis. (Given efficient 
aggregate indexation in this cu =0 case, so that x = x*\ = \ - y  , union / s
I =0,  cu =0
perceived labour demand curve will pass through the aggregate-level curve’s horizontal 
intercept, which is, of course, the efficient outcome when cu = 0.) Although the presence
of velocity shocks ( crJ > 0 ) will mean that this ideal outcome of perfectly stable 
employment can only be achieved on average, it will not alter union /  s incentive to set 
j c , =  jc * and thus ensure its mean outcome is on the horizontal axis.
1 lc„ =0
One further aspect of the special case in which 0 ^ = 0  requires comment before we 
proceed to explain how the existence of velocity shocks affects the externality. If we take
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Figure V.3
Labour demand curves for the case of a negative productivity shock
eQ
Atomistic union j ’s perceived 
labour demand curve passing 
through the efficient outcome
Atomistic union j ’s equilibrium 
perceived labour demand curve
Symmetric-indexation 
and aggregate-level 
labour demand curve
Notes:
1. In the absence o f velocity shocks (cr* = 0), the efficient outcome is at a and the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium is at c.
2. The vertical-axis coordinate o f point c is cu[a + s { \ -  a) ]d j  { s  + cu{ \ -  a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ] } .
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the trouble to combine our resulf namely equation (38b), with the semi-reduced
from for p  (which will be given by (14) with cr^  = 0 and the appropriate normalisations 
imposed), and the general real wage equation, w . -  /? = ( jcy -  \ ) p , the equilibrium real 
wage in the crj = 0 special case is found to be as follows:
fF)
( w - P $  « « = “-------------   (44)* {e + cu (1 -  a)[a + £(1 -  a )]}
If we compare this with equation (40a) of Chapter III, it is apparent that in the absence of 
velocity shocks equilibrium indexation by atomistic unions brings about exactly the same 
real wage that results when the wage is set in response to a perfectly informative signal of 
6. In other words, when velocity shocks do not exist, and the equilibrium price level 
therefore conveys perfect information regarding 6 , the indexation externality has 
precisely the same strength as the wage-setting externality in the perfect-signal ft = 1 
case. The essential reason for this equivalence is that in both scenarios each atomistic 
union takes the aggregate nominal wage as given. Since when =0 and J3 = 1 the two
scenarios only differ in the way that the aggregate nominal wage affects the price level, 
wage-setting and indexation decisions which are uninfluenced by the relationship 
between these aggregate variables must lead to exactly the same equilibrium outcomes.
In general, of course, velocity shocks do exist, and signals of productivity shocks are 
noisy (/? < 1), so that the equivalence identified in the previous paragraph only holds
between extreme cases of each scenario. With crj > 0 , union f  s choice of xj will
determine the average position of its real wage and employment outcome pair, for a given 
realisation of 0,  on the relevant perceived labour demand curve. The actual outcome will 
depend upon the particular realisation of (j>, and hence the distribution of possible
outcomes around the average outcome will depend on the velocity shock variance cr^  .
By increasing its individual degree of indexation marginally from the value given by the
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right-hand side of (38b)24, union j  displaces the average outcome in Figure V.3 away 
from the tangency point (which is at c, if we assume that other unions symmetrically set 
their indexation parameters equal to (38b)), but at the same time also causes the 
distribution of actual outcomes around the average outcome to narrow. Optimal 
indexation by union j  involves adjusting x. to ensure that, for a given realisation of 6 ,
the marginal benefit of reducing the variance of actual outcomes around the mean 
outcome, is equal to the marginal cost of incurring a larger departure of the mean 
outcome from the tangency point at c.
The individual union’s optimal indexation choice when velocity shocks are present can 
alternatively be analysed using the concept of a locus of possible outcomes in variance of 
real wage, variance of employment space. The aggregate version of this locus has already 
been depicted in Figure V.2. Given a particular degree of aggregate indexation, x, each 
atomistic union faces its own locus of possible individual outcomes which intersects the 
aggregate locus at the outcome point which is brought about by x.25 Two members of the 
infinite set of possible individual loci are of particular interest, namely that which obtains 
when x = x‘ , and its counterpart for the case of x = xNE. The relevant portions of these 
two loci are illustrated below in Figure V.4, together with part of the aggregate locus 
which was more fully depicted in Figure V.2. Given symmetric indexation, xy = xV /, the
individual union’s outcome combination of employment variability and real wage 
variability must be located on the aggregate locus. Given efficient aggregate indexation, 
x = x*, union j ’s individual locus is not tangent to its isoloss map at the efficient outcome 
at a, but rather at b. By increasing xy above x* sufficiently, union j  can trade increased 
individual employment variability for lower real wage variability, and thus attain an
24 The right-hand side o f (38b), o f course, is the symmetric Nash equilibrium degree o f indexation only 
when cr^  = 0 . Note that for the 6  < 0 realisation to which Figure V.3 relates, the equilibrium perceived
labour demand curve for the a j  > 0 case is not depicted, but would lie below the equilibrium perceived
labour demand curve for the cr^  = 0 case shown passing through c. The tangency point between the
representative union’s isoloss map and the equilibrium perceived labour demand curve for the cr^  > 0 case
would not be on the aggregate-level labour demand curve, but below it and to its left.
25 In Appendix V.2, an expression for the slope o f the atomistic union’s locus o f  individual outcomes is 
presented and discussed.
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Figure V.4
Efficient and equilibrium outcomes and the loci of possible outcomes
£(/;)
Locus o f  possible aggregate outcomes
Equilibrium aggregate outcome
The individual atomistic union’s locus of  possible outcomes 
given equilibrium indexation at the aggregate level
Efficient aggregate outcome
The individual atomistic union’s locus 
o f  possible outcomes given efficient 
indexation at the aggregate level
Notes:
1. Each of  the depicted linear isoloss curves has slope equal to - c u .
2. Only part of  each locus o f  possible outcomes is depicted.
3. The aggregate outcome is at point a when x = x ’ , and is at point c when x = xNE .
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individual outcome at b which is superior to that which obtains at the aggregate level 
when x  = jc * . Since, given x = x*, every union would face the locus of possible outcomes 
passing through a and b, it follows that xNE = x* cannot be the case. The symmetric Nash
equilibrium outcome is that point on the aggregate locus which also happens to be a 
tangency point between the isoloss map and the individual locus that prevails in 
equilibrium, and this point is labelled c in Figure V.4.
V.3.4 Socially Optimal Indexation 
This final subsection relating to the simple-rule scenario investigates whether union 
indexation decisions give rise to externalities which affect the welfare of society as a 
whole. To this end, it is necessary to derive the socially optimal degree of wage 
indexation. Combining (18) and (20b), the expressions for the variances of the price level 
and aggregate employment, with the social loss function, (9), yields the (unconditional) 
expected social loss as a function ofx:
En, _ r 2 [(1 -  *)2 + C, (1 -  g f  ]<r] + Kr - 1 + x f  + cs ]qj 
[y(\-ct) + a ( \ - x ) f
Minimising (45) by choice of jc ,  the socially optimal degree of wage indexation, denoted 
j c ,  is found to be:
_ 1 l r \ o ( \ - a ) 2cTl +(y2 +csct)a2d] 
r\r2( i-a)o-^+c7g] ^ 2 2 -i (46)
Several points are noteworthy about (46). The higher is the weight which society attaches 
to the variance of the price level, the lower is the socially optimal degree of wage 
indexation. In the case in which society’s weight, cs, is zero, (46) reduces to the efficient 
solution of Ball’s model when indexation is costless. This is not surprising, since with 
c = 0 the social loss function consists solely of the variance of employment. More
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generally, for the symmetric Nash equilibrium degree of indexation under the simple rule 
to be socially optimal requires both that unions be indifferent to real wage variability, 
and that the social loss be independent of price-level variability, so that 
cu = cs = 0 holds. In this special case, equations (22), (35) and (46) are such that:
x = x* = xNE = 1 - {y<j l l \y2(} -  cc)<71 + cr^]}. If cu > 0, the equilibrium degree of wage 
indexation will not be socially optimal. The proof is straightforward: (22) and (46) imply 
respectively that dx*/dcu > 0  and dx/dcs < 0 , and since it has already been established 
that jc * > xNE , it follows that xNE(cu > 0)>  x*(cu > 0) > x{cs > 0), where x( ) denotes a 
functional relationship. Furthermore, since it is easily shown that dEQs/dx  > 0 if jc  > x , it 
follows that social welfare must be falling in the degree of wage indexation when x > x . 
Consequently, in the simple-rule scenario of this section, which abstracts from any 
inflation bias associated with discretionary policy-making, the externality arising from 
the indexation decisions of atomistic unions is adverse both from the point of view of 
unions themselves and from that of society as a whole.
This finding confirms the suspicion voiced by Waller and VanHoose (1992) that if 
social welfare is falling in the variance of inflation, rather than simply in the trend 
inflation rate as assumed in their model, the direction of the wage-indexation externality 
need not be positive. The result reported above suggests that the beneficial externality 
relating to the mean inflation bias could be significantly counteracted by the adverse 
externality relating to the variability of inflation, rendering ambiguous in sign the 
direction of the net external effect of individual indexation decisions on social welfare.
V.4 Wage Indexation under Discretionary Monetary Policy
V.4.1 Outline o f  the Discretionary Monetary Policy Scenario 
In this section it is assumed that the authorities possess full information on both shocks 
when setting the money supply to minimise the social loss, as given by (9). Substituting 
the reduced-form expressions for the price level, (14), and aggregate employment, (17b), 
into (9), allows the social loss to be expressed as a function of m, x and the two shocks:
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_ [y{\ - x)(m -  Em + </>) + {y -1  + x)0]2 + cs[y ( \ -a ) (m  + fl) + a ( l - x ) E m  - O f
[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2
Minimising (47) by choice of m, the authorities’ (and society’s) optimal monetary 
response to the shocks, given jc , is found to be:
This expression implies that the representative union’s rational expectation of the 
authorities’ setting of the money supply is Em = 0 . Equation (48) also exhibits the 
standard result that when the authorities possess full information on the aggregate 
demand shock, their optimal response is to offset it completely, since such shocks cause 
employment and the price level to move in the same direction, and consequently do not 
create conflicting objectives for monetary policy.
Substituting (48) into (14) yields the price level under discretion for a given x:
( l - x ) 0p  = -----------5-------------- r- (49)
[ ( l - j r ) 2 + c , ( l - a ) 2]
The variance of the price level is:
(1 -xY<rt2 _2e=   ----
[ ( l - x ) 2 + c , ( l - a )2]2
An immediate implication of (49) is that Ep = 0 . Furthermore, whereas under the simple 
rule a marginal increase in x, when x is currently less than unity, results in an increased
26 In other words, neutralising the potential impact o f  the aggregate demand shock on the price level 
necessarily neutralises its potential impact on employment as well.
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onresponsiveness of the price level to productivity shocks, it is apparent from (49) that 
when the authorities respond to shocks and attach some weight to price-level stabilisation, 
the price level’s sensitivity to productivity shocks is not necessarily increasing in jc , when
j c < 1  :
dp _ [ c , ( \ - a f - ( \ - x f ] e  
a* [cs( l - a ) 2+ ( l - x ) 2]2
dEp2 _ 2 (1 -s ) [ ( l -* ) 2 - c f(l - a ) 2]cr2 
dx [ ( l -x ) 2 + c , ( l - a )2]3
Equations (51) and (52) reveal that under discretion, if society’s weight on the variance 
of the price level, cs , is sufficiently low to ensure cs < (1-  jc) 2 / ( 1 -o r )2 , a marginal
increase in x increases the responsiveness of the price level to productivity shocks and 
hence worsens price-level variability. Conversely, if society places a sufficiently high 
weight on price-level variability, such that cs > (1 -  jc ) 2 / ( 1  -  a )2 , a marginal increase in x
reduces the absolute movement in the price level occasioned by a given productivity 
shock, leading to lower price-level variability. The reason for this has to do with the 
effect a marginal increase in jc has on the monetary reaction function of the optimising 
central bank. Given jc , socially optimal monetary policy distributes the productivity shock 
variance, o 2e , between price-level variability and employment variability in the most 
desirable way for society. The value of jc , together with the structural parameters a  and 
a I , determines the opportunity set of employment variability, price-level variability
outcome pairs facing the central bank. Whether the changes in this set occasioned by a 
marginal change in jc induces the central bank to select an outcome pair involving higher 
or lower variability of the price level than previously, depends on society’s preference 
parameter cs, as well as on the value of jc prior to the change.
27 As stated in footnote 9, this is generally the case when x < [a + y ( l - a ) ] / a . However, our attention can 
justifiably be confined to less-than-full indexation since in the case o f  the simple rule x* and xNE are less 
than unity.
314
Preparatory to the derivation of the efficient and equilibrium degrees of indexation in 
subsequent subsections, we end these initial remarks regarding the discretion scenario by 
stating expressions for the individual union’s real wage and employment, their aggregate 
counterparts, and their respective variances. Substituting (48) into (16a) and (16b) yields:
( \ - x ) ( \ - x ) 8
w , - p  = -----------  5-  (53a)
'  y  [(1- x ) 2 + < :( ! - a ) 2]
I  =  { g ( * y  -  * ) ( !  - * )  +  £ , ( ! -  a ) [ a  +  g ( l  -  a ) ] } 0  
[a + e ( l - a m - x ) 2+ c , ( l - a ) 2]
The variances of these variables are respectively:
( l - X y ) 2 ( l ~ x ) 2 C7,2
[ ( \ - x f +cs( \ - a ) 2Y-  p f  = ... J f  „ ' 2.2 (54a)
r ,2 { £ ( X j - x ) ( l - x )  + cs( l - a ) [ a  + e ( l - a ) ] } 2<Tlt l i = -----   :-------- ;------------- —------ (*>4b)
[a + e(l — a)] [(1 — x) + c (1 — a )  ]
The aggregate counterparts to (53a), (53b), (54a) and (54b) are as follows:
( i - x f e  
[( l- *)2 +c ( l - a ) 2]w - p  = „. :2  r jr  (55a)
/ =  a d^— r  (55b)
[(l-ar)2 + c ,( l-a )2]
E(w -  p f  = ------- (12 X) — 5- 5- (56a)
[ ( l - x f  + c l l - a f f
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c2s ( l - a ) 2cr2e 
[(1-x)2+^(1-^)7
El2 = r„ f 2 (56b)
V. 4.2 Efficient Indexation 
We are now well placed to derive and discuss the efficient degree of indexation from 
the collective viewpoint of unions. As in the case of the simple rule analysed earlier, the 
efficient degree of indexation is the value of x which minimises the individual union’s 
expected loss, given that this x is adopted by every union in the economy. When 
indexation is thus constrained to be symmetric across unions (i.e. xy = xV/ ), the
individual union’s real wage and employment will be respectively equal to their 
aggregate counterparts, as given by the right-hand sides of (55a) and (55b). The expected 
loss of union j ,  under symmetric indexation is therefore obtained by combining (56a) and 
(56b) with (8):
£Q"| = [c, ( 1 a)  + c ,(l x) ]<t„
The efficient degree of wage indexation, denoted x *, is the x which minimises (57). The 
two solutions to the first-order condition d(EQ.u\ ) dx = 0 are:
J \x j= x \ l j  7
Y/2
(58a)
* ; = i  +
f  V/2
\ CU J
(58b)
Several aspects of (58) require comment. Firstly, unlike under the simple rule, the 
precise magnitude of the productivity shock variance is irrelevant to the efficient degree 
of indexation. This is because the complete neutralisation of all aggregate demand
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disturbances by monetary policy reduces the unions’ collective decision problem to one 
of how best to apportion the sole remaining source of stochastic variability between the 
real wage and employment, and hence the magnitude of that variability becomes 
irrelevant. Secondly, whereas under the simple rule the efficient degree of indexation is 
unique, under discretion there are two efficient solutions, which differ only as regards 
whether a negative or positive square root term is added to unity. (Note that the former 
solution, (58a), is negative if cs >cu.) The discussion which follows below generally
concentrates on the solution with the negative square root, since casual empiricism 
suggests that in the real world wage indexation in excess of unity is very seldom 
encountered. (In the interests of simplicity of notation, the distinguishing subscript is 
henceforth dropped, so that x* is to be understood as denoting expression (58a).)
Focusing on (58a), therefore, it is apparent that apart from the special cases in which 
society attaches no weight to price-level variability (the cs = 0 case), or unions attach no
weight to employment variability (the limiting cu -> oo case), less-than-full indexation is
efficient. The essential reason for this is that with the authorities neutralising the velocity 
shocks completely, stabilisation of the price level in response to productivity shocks also 
stabilises the real wage. In the cs = cu case, the representative union cares just as much as 
does society about the relative variability of employment, relative of course to their 
respective other objective. Consequently, when cs =cu, monetary policy brings about the
most desirable amount of employment variability from unions’ viewpoint, and 
necessarily also brings about the most desirable amount of accompanying real wage 
variability, given the constraint that indexation be symmetric across all unions. Hence 
zero aggregate indexation is efficient in such circumstances, since it does not interfere 
with monetary policy’s ability to bring about the best attainable combination of 
employment and real wage variability given symmetric indexation. In the cs < cu case,
each union places a smaller relative weight on employment variability than does society, 
and consequently, were unions to adopt zero wage indexation, the resulting amount of 
employment variability brought about by policy would be too low, and the associated 
variability of the real wage too high, than in the best outcome attainable by means of 
coordinated indexation. By increasing x from zero, when cs < cu, a desirable reduction in
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real wage variability can be secured at the cost of somewhat higher employment 
variability, and this trade-off is optimally exploited when x = x* > 0. A similar argument 
applies in the converse cs > cu case. 'In this case the representative union cares relatively
more about employment variability than does society, and so with zero wage indexation, 
monetary policy would bring about an inefficiently high degree of employment 
variability, together with inefficiently low variability of the real wage, from the collective 
viewpoint of unions. When cs. > cu unions therefore find it desirable that the wage be
indexed negatively to the price level, so that the responsiveness of the real wage to the 
productivity shock is enhanced, and the stability of employment increased.
It is clear that there is a close parallel between this efficient indexation result and our 
earlier findings with regard to efficient wage-setting under discretion, obtained in Section 
5 of Chapter III. In both cases, when the preferences of the representative union are 
perfectly aligned with those of the central bank, in the sense that both place the same 
relative weight on employment stability, efficiency requires that the nominal wage not 
adjust at all, regardless of the realised value of the productivity shock, since the central 
bank’s monetary response to 0 , and the resulting movement in the price level, brings 
about the most desirable division of the shock between the real wage and employment. If 
preferences are not perfectly aligned, efficiency requires that the aggregate wage be 
adjusted in response to the informative variable, whether that variable be a signal of 0,  or 
the value of the price level in the period covered by the wage contract. The efficient 
adjustment in w incorporates the rational expectation of the authorities’ monetary 
response to both 0 and w. This ensures that the authorities have no incentive to set m at 
any value other than that which, in conjunction with the efficient wage, w*, ensures the 
productivity shock (or, if /? <1 in the wage-setting scenario, the shock’s anticipated 
component) is divided between the real wage and employment in the ideal way from the 
unions’ collective point of view. Indeed, substituting x*, as given by (58), into the real 
wage equation, (55a), and comparing the result with equation (79a) of Chapter III, we 
find that under discretion the real wage brought about by efficient indexation differs from 
the value it has under efficient wage-setting only insofar as signal quality is imperfect (i.e. 
p  < 1 is the case):
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(59)
It follows from this that efficient indexation under discretion yields the same expected 
union loss as efficient indexation under the simple rule when velocity shocks are absent.
further corollary is that when monetary policy entirely neutralises velocity shocks, and
informative (i.e. ft < 1), efficient indexation must yield superior outcomes (from unions’ 
point of view) to efficient wage-setting in response to the signal.
A diagrammatic representation of the efficient outcome for a given positive realisation 
of 0 is provided below as Figure V.5. The diagram depicts the aggregate-level labour 
demand curve, which coincides, of course, with the symmetric-indexation labour demand 
curve. Figure V.5 is very similar to the corresponding diagram for the simple-rule 
scenario, namely Figure V .l. In particular, for a given 0,  the aggregate-level curve has 
the same vertical and horizontal intercept in the two scenarios, since these values are, 
respectively, simply the employment and real wage outcomes which result when either of 
these variables bears the full burden of the 0 shock. Despite the close similarity, however, 
Figure V.5 does differ from Figure V.l in several respects. For instance, under discretion 
when 0 > 0 , the aggregate curve does not extend into parts of the diagram which involve 
a negative outcome for either the real wage or employment. (Note that it is also evident 
from equations (55a) and (55b) that a positive shock cannot have a negative impact on 
these variables under discretion.) The essential reason for this is that for a positive shock 
to be associated with a fall in employment, the real wage would have to increase by more 
than the full value of the shock, and this circumstance could only be brought about by the 
central bank deliberately exacerbating the shock’s negative impact on the price level by 
reducing the money supply by a sufficiently large amount. However, the very fact that 
this outcome involves a fall in both the price level and in employment implies that the 
monetary contraction which would propagate it cannot be an optimal strategy for a
(In other words, under discretion EQ“j xj =** Y/ is equal to the right-hand side of (28).) A
any signal received by unions at the time of signing wage contracts is less than perfectly
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Figure V.5
The aggregate-level labour demand curve under discretion
((1 -  a )G x =
S ym m etric-in d exation  and aggregate- 
level labour dem and curve
a
Notes:
1. 6 > 0 is assumed for illustrative purposes.
2. The outcome located at the aggregate-level labour demand curve’s horizontal intercept is attained in the 
limit as x —> ± o o  .
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central bank concerned to minimise the social loss function, (9), since such an outcome 
can always be improved upon by increasing the money supply marginally in order to 
reduce the extent by which both these outcome variables depart from their socially 
optimal values of zero. The key point here is that under optimal monetary policy the 
impact of a productivity shock on employment must differ in sign from its impact on the 
price level. It follows from this that a positive shock cannot have a negative impact on the 
real wage either, since a fall in the real wage would necessarily be accompanied by 
increases in both employment and the price level. Hence apart from its two intercepts 
with the axes, the aggregate level labour demand curve depicted in Figure V.5 must lie 
entirely above the horizontal axis and to the right of the vertical. By means of coordinated 
indexation, unions can ensure the outcome is located at any particular point on the curve. 
The unique value of x which places the outcome on the vertical axis, and hence achieves 
complete real-wage stability, is unity. Every other point on this opportunity set can be 
attained by either of two values, namely x = 1 ± r , where r is a non-zero real number. 
Successive increases or decreases in x relative to unity cause the location of the outcome 
to migrate down the labour demand curve, with the horizontal-axis intercept, and hence 
complete employment stability, attained in the limit as x —> ±00 . The efficient x, of 
course, is that which ensures the outcome is at the curve’s tangency point with the
» norepresentative union’s isoloss map.
V.4.3 Equilibrium Indexation 
In deriving the equilibrium degree of wage indexation under discretion, use must be 
made of the total derivative of union f  s expected loss with respect to xy, which was
stated earlier in Section V.3 as equation (33). As in the case of the simple rule, it is 
necessary first of all to derive the equilibrium solution for the extreme case of atomistic 
unions, in order to have a criterion by which to judge the validity of solutions obtained
28 The line o f  reasoning contained in this paragraph also im plies that under discretion a negative 
productivity shock cannot have a positive impact on either the real wage or employment. Hence the 
aggregate-level labour demand curve in the 0  <  0 case has negative intercepts with both axes, and between 
these intercepts lies entirely below  the horizontal axis and to the left o f  the vertical, x  =  1 places the 
outcom e at the vertical intercept, and successive increases from unity, or decreases below  it, cause the 
aggregate outcom e to migrate up the curve, with the horizontal axis attained in the limit as ±00 .
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for the general n > 1 case. The requirement that any solution for the general case reduce 
in the limit as n -» oo to the xNE solution obtained separately for the atomistic case is one 
of two criteria which it must satisfy for it to be regarded as legitimate, the other criterion, 
of course, being the requirement that in the limit as n —» 1, the solution for the n > 1 case 
reduce to the known equilibrium expression for the case of a single union. (As under the 
simple rule, the xNE solution for n = 1 is known, since for a single union Xj is replaced
by a: in its expected loss expression, and hence xNE\n=l =  x* must be the case.)
Our first step must be to obtain the (unconditional) expected loss of union j  (whether 
atomistic or not) for given settings of Xj and x, by combining (54a) and (54b) with (8):
EQU = ~ x)(\ -  x)  + cs(\ -  a)[a + g(l -  a)]}2 + (1 -  xy)2(l -  x f c u[a + g(l -  a)]2]cr2&
[a + s ( l - a ) ] 2[ ( \ - x ) 2+cs( \ - a ) 2f
(60)
In deriving the solution for the atomistic case, the derivative of the aggregate degree of 
indexation, x, with respect to the individual union’s indexation choice is assumed to be 
identically zero: dxjdxj s  0. Bearing this in mind, a point worth noting about (60) is that
full indexation at the aggregate level (i.e. x = 1) renders the individual union’s expected 
loss independent of its individual indexation parameter xj . Consequently, under
discretion x = 1V j  must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the atomistic case. This
result is also to be found in Lawler (1998), which examines a special case of the model of 
this section, namely that in which cu = 0 . The result arises here for the same reason as in 
Lawler: if every other union has adopted full indexation, union j  has nothing to gain from 
deviating and setting jc . ^ 1 . (Equally, however, union j  has nothing to lose from
deviating and setting jc; * 1 , and thus the xNE = 1 equilibrium may require some
coordinating mechanism if it is to be brought about. Indeed a persuasive case can be 
made for regarding this equilibrium as implausible, since it is easily shown to result in a
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value for the expected union loss which is greater than the value of the loss in the other
9Qequilibria. )
Proceeding on the assumptions that dx/ dXj = 0 and x * 1, minimisation of (60) by 
choice of xy yields the individual atomistic union’s optimal choice of indexation, for 
given x:
« ♦ _ ( ! -  x ) { £ 2x  + cu[a + g(l -  a)}2} -  css{ 1 -  a)[a + g(l -  a )] 
Xj O - ^ 2 +cu[a + £ ( l - a ) f }
Imposing xy = xV j  in (61) and solving forx, the symmetric Nash equilibria are found to 
be:
c X l - a )
N E , l t a to m istic  case cu[a + £ ( \ - a )]
(62a)
{ 'i1/2gfg(l-g) 1
r , / i  \ i  I VOZD/c„[a + e ( l - a ) ] J
As in the case of efficient indexation, there are two solution values, corresponding to 
positive and negative square roots of the term css{ 1 -  a)!cu{a + £(1 -  a ) ] .
29 The proof o f  this statement follow s straightforwardly from the properties o f  the expected union loss 
under symmetric indexation, namely expression (57). Evaluated for x  = 1 , the first and second derivatives
with respect to x  o f  this function are respectively zero and negative: [ d E C lu\  ^ j d x
d l E Q uj \ / d x 3'l*,=xv//
= 0 ,
=  -  4 c r l / c s ( l -  a ) *  . Symmetric indexation o f  unity therefore maximises the
i=i
expected union loss. Each o f  the two atomistic-case Nash equilibria, (62a) and (62b), lies between unity 
and the corresponding efficient degree o f  indexation, namely x* (equation (58a)) and x*2 (equation (58b))
respectively. £12“ is a continuous function o f  x ,  since it is the ratio o f  two polynom ials in x  and its
<Xj  = rV /'
denominator is positive for all real values o f  x .  It therefore follow s that x  =  1 must result in a higher 
value o f  the expected union loss than the other two atom istic-case equilibria. Whether x  =  1 
merely m axim ises the expected loss locally, or does so globally, depends on the values o f  c u and a  . Since
E D ."| ^  = a j / ( l - a ) 2 and ^ =c„crj, it is clear that x  = l is a global maximum if  (and
only if) cu( l - a ) 2 < 1.
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Turning now to the broad subset of cases for which n is such that 1 < n < oo, the second 
term on the right-hand side of (33) which involves dxjdx} will now be non-zero. The
equation which implicitly defines The symmetric Nash equilibrium is obtained by 
replacing xj with x  (i.e. by imposing Xj = x\/j ) in the first-order condition
dEQ^jjdXj = 0 for union f s  optimal choice of Xj . This equation is not of great interest in
itself, and consequently is not reported here: it is to be found instead in Appendix V.3. 
Our interest rather lies with the x  values which solve this equation, of which there are five. 
Three of these do not pass muster as candidates for symmetric Nash equilibria. Two 
members of this unsatisfactory trio can be disregarded because they are non-real (a proof 
of this is provided in Appendix V.3), while the third solution involves full indexation to 
the price level ( x = 1 ), and can be ignored on the grounds that it is inconsistent with 
optimising behaviour by the individual non-atomistic union. (In Appendix V.3 it is shown 
that were every other union to adopt an indexation degree of unity, union j  would 
maximise its expected loss, at least locally, were it also to set Xj = 1. Hence x} = xV/
cannot be a Nash equilibrium if unions are non-atomistic. This result indicates that our 
earlier finding that x j = IV/ is a Nash equilibrium in the atomistic case, is crucially
dependent on the assumption that each individual union perceives the contribution made 
by its individual indexation choice to the aggregate degree of indexation to be negligibly 
small, and therefore in choosing Xj disregards the external effects of its choice.) It turns
out that of the five solutions to the equation formed by imposing Xj = jcV/ on union f s
first-order condition, only the following satisfy the criteria set out above for a solution to 
be considered legitimate.
where:
Xx = c] (1 -  a ) 2 j  {(« -1 )*  + O  +1 )cu (1 -  a)[a  + e (1 -  a )]}2 + 8(« -  l)cMa [a  + s (1 -  a)\  j
In Appendix V.4 it is shown using L’Hopital’s rule that the limits of (63a) and (63b) as
n -»1 are respectively equal to (58a) and (58b). Obtaining the limits of (63a) and (63b) 
as n - »  oo and as s  —» oo is straightforward:
n -* a o ^N E ,\ ^ N E , 1, atomistic case (64a)
n-± co ^N E ,2  ^  N E , 2, atomistic case (64b)
lim
e - x o ^ N E A  ~  ■/v l*   (^5a)
lim
e->oo A NE,1 ~  * 2^ .2 ^  (65b)
Appendix V.4 also contains proofs of the following results regarding the derivatives of 
expressions (63a) and (63b) with respect to n and s  :
> OVn > 1 (66a)
dn
^ ^ - < O V n > l  (66b)
dn
^ i < O V « > l  (67a)
de
^ ^ > O V r c > l  (67b)
de
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i For the same reasons as stated earlier, we largely confine our attention to the solution
with the negative square root, and therefore xNE is henceforth to be understood as
referring to (63 a). There are several aspects of this solution which accord with results 
reported in the earlier literature on wage indexation under activist monetary policy. 
Firstly, as in Hutchison and Walsh (1998), the equilibrium degree of indexation is, in
TOgeneral, a decreasing function of the monetary authorities’ weight parameter cs .
Secondly, (63a) is also consistent with the finding of Lawler (1998) that if unions attach 
no weight to the variability of the real wage, and care solely about stabilising 
employment, the degree of equilibrium indexation is unbounded below. However, if the 
law or social convention places a lower bound on the set of values that x  may take (by, 
for instance, restricting x to the unit interval), (63a) then suggests that in the cu = 0 case 
the equilibrium degree will be zero.
More significant than these points in common between xNE and earlier contributions to
the literature, however, is that the equilibrium degree of indexation in general departs 
from the efficient degree. It is apparent that the externality appertaining to individual 
unions’ indexation decisions which arises in the simple rule scenario also arises when the 
money supply is adjusted in a discretionary fashion in response to the realised values of 
the shocks and of the aggregate nominal wage. In both scenarios the indexation 
externality has the same effect in qualitative terms, namely it results in an increase in the
30 The principal qualitative difference between Hutchison and Walsh’s result for the equilibrium degree of 
indexation and the corresponding result in this chapter, is that whereas in Hutchison and Walsh equilibrium 
indexation is a decreasing function o f  the central bank’s relative weight on the quadratic inflation term in 
its objective function (the equivalent o f  this chapter’s cs ), regardless o f whether the union’s relative weight 
parameter (the equivalent o f  our cu) is positive or zero, in this chapter xNE is a decreasing function o f cs 
only if cu is positive. In other words the difference in qualitative results relates solely to the extreme case 
in which cu = 0  . (Hutchison and Walsh do not discuss the converse extreme case in which cu -> oo in the 
limit, nor do they provide an expression for equilibrium indexation when cu > 0 from which this limit case 
can be ascertained, providing instead a verbal description o f how the introduction o f a term in the real wage 
into the union objective function alters their indexation result.) Note that the difference in results is not 
attributable to the fact that Hutchison and Walsh assume a perfectly competitive goods market and a single 
economy-wide union, since the imposition o f these features on our model implies xNE will equal the
efficient solution, x*, as given by (58a), which like (63a) is also not a decreasing function of cs if cu is 
zero. The source o f the difference, rather, is that whereas this chapter (and indeed this thesis in its entirety) 
assumes the central bank’s setting o f  its monetary instrument is not subject to control errors, Hutchison and 
Walsh assume this choice variable (which in their model is the intended price level) is subject to a random 
additive disturbance term.
326
variability of employment, and a decrease in the variability of the real wage, relative to 
their efficient levels. (Note that this occurs under discretion regardless of whether price- 
level variability is increasing or decreasing in x  when x = x*.) That the externality has 
the same ultimate source in the two scenarios is evident from the fact that if the goods 
market is perfectly competitive (the limit case in which £ -» oo), and/or if unions are 
indifferent to either real wage variability or employment variability (i.e. if cu is not a
finite positive number), equilibrium indexation is efficient and xNE -  x * is the case. 31
Fundamental to the indexation externality’s existence in both scenarios, therefore, are 
two factors: firstly, the potential under monopolistic competition for the individual firm’s 
price to differ from the average price; secondly, the incentives which face union y, given 
efficient indexation by every other union, to adjust jc away from x* and towards unity in
order to obtain lower individual real wage variability at the acceptable cost of higher 
individual employment variability. The externality mechanism differs superficially 
between the two regimes in that under discretion the individual non-atomistic union 
partially (or, if n = 1 , fully) internalises the monetary-response implications of its 
indexation choice, whereas this is obviously not an issue under the simple rule. In both 
scenarios, union f s  concern is with the price-level repercussions of its setting of xJ} and
under discretion this implies that the responsiveness of the money supply to both the 
shocks, and (via w) to x, must be taken into account in making indexation choices. One
31 Note that although casual scrutiny o f  (63a) suggests that =Q =x*| =1 , and hence that the
externality does not arise in the special case in which the social loss function lacks a term in inflation, this 
conclusion is not in fact warranted, since the central bank’s optimal setting o f  the money supply, as given 
by (48), has been derived on the implicit assumption that the restrictions cs = 0 and x = 1 do not 
simultaneously hold. (In other words, m, as given by (48), can be validly evaluated for cases in which 
cs = 0 ,  provided x *  1, and for cases in which x = 1 , provided cs > 0 , but has no value (indeed, is 
undefined) in the special case in which both cs = 0 and x  = 1.) When x = 1, the central bank is powerless 
to influence the aggregate real wage and hence employment, and consequently if  cs = 0 lacks an incentive 
to set any particular m. This reasoning implies that the two efficient-indexation solutions, (58a) and (58b), 
have also been derived under the implicit assumption that cs > 0 ,  and indeed it is apparent from (57) that 
the representative union’s expected loss under symmetric indexation is independent o f  x in the special 
cs = 0 case. Note also that the individual union’s expected loss, as given by (60), is similarly independent 
o f  its individual indexation choice in the special case in which both c s = 0 and x = 1 . (Indeed,
£ Q “| ( is not defined.) This implies that the xm  results, (62a), (62b), (63a) and (63b), have also been
derived while tacitly assuming that cs > 0 .
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consequence of this is that when unions are non-atomistic, the strength of the externality, 
and the resulting variability of both employment and the real wage in equilibrium, 
depends upon society’s relative-weight parameter cs . This point will be readily apparent 
to the reader who peruses expressions (55a) and (55b) while mentally substituting xNE
(whether given by (63a) or by (63b)) for x. This dependence of real equilibrium outcomes 
when 1 < n < oo on the relative weight placed by society on price-level stabilisation ought 
not to surprise us in the least, since it is entirely consistent with our findings in earlier 
chapters that the nature of the monetary regime can influence the real wage and 
employment when strategic considerations underpin union wage-setting decisions. While 
this obviously raises the issue of optimal delegation arrangements (i.e. the extent to 
which the central bank’s weight parameter should differ from that of society), this theme 
will not be pursued here, not least because it will involve traversing a good deal of 
ground already covered in earlier chapters.
We bring this discussion of the indexation externality under the discretionary regime to 
a close by commenting on its possible diagrammatic representations. Were we to depict 
its effects on the labour market which is monopolised on the supply side by union y, the 
resulting diagram would, in the case of a negative productivity shock, very closely 
resemble Figure V.3, which, it will be recalled, illustrates the effect of the externality 
under the simple rule in a particular period when the productivity shock happens to be 
negative. (Clearly diagrams for the two scenarios would also closely resemble each other 
in the case of a positive productivity shock.) The only difference would relate to the 
aggregate-level (or symmetric-indexation) labour demand curve, which, as mentioned 
earlier, under discretion does not extend above the horizontal axis or beyond the vertical 
when the realisation of 6 is negative. Note that since each atomistic union completely 
disregards the consequences of its x . choice for the behaviour of the money supply, the
externality’s strength under discretion must in the atomistic case be the same as under the 
simple rule when velocity shocks are absent. (This is easily verified by substituting xNE,
whether given by (63a) or (63b), into (55a): the resulting real wage is found to be 
identical to expression (44).) Consequently, in the equivalent of Figure V.3 for discretion,
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Figure V.6
>
The aggregate-level and symmetric-indexation locus of 
possible outcomes under discretion
E(l))
Symmetric Nash equilibrium
Efficient outcome
Notes:
1. Each o f  the depicted linear isoloss curves has slope equal to - c u.
2. The outcome located at the aggregate-level locus’ horizontal intercept is attained in the limit as x  -»  ±0 0 .
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the perceived labour demand curves for atomistic union j  would be identical to (i.e. have 
the same slope and intercepts with the axes as) those depicted in Figure V.3. (Note that 
under discretion, whereas the aggregate-level labour demand curve is confined to a single 
quadrant of the diagram, the atomistic union’s perceived labour demand curve crosses 
both axes.)
Finally, we provide as Figure V.6 a simplified version of the discretionary regime 
counterpart to Figure V.4. The complete neutralisation of velocity shocks by monetary 
policy, and the consequent possibility of achieving perfect employment stability, implies 
that, unlike its simple-rule counterpart, the locus of aggregate outcomes under discretion 
meets the horizontal axis. Under both regimes, the vertical intercept of the locus involves 
an employment variability outcome of c r^ /( l - a )2 , which is brought about by symmetric 
indexation of unity, i.e. = IV / . Under discretion, however, the locus lacks positively
sloped portions, and apart from its vertical intercept, each point on the locus is associated 
with two values of x , specifically with x = 1 ± r , where r is a real number. The horizontal 
axis is attained in the limit as x —» ± qo . The efficient outcome is located at the tangency 
point with the isoloss map: note that this point in Figure V .6 must be closer to the origin 
than the corresponding tangency point in Figure V.4 on account of the entire elimination 
of velocity shocks. In both diagrams, the equilibrium outcome is situated further up the 
locus than the efficient outcome. (We refrain from superimposing on Figure V.6 the loci 
of possible individual outcomes faced by an atomistic union given efficient or 
equilibrium aggregate indexation, since these would resemble their Figure V.4 
counterparts in all material particulars.)
V. 4.4 Socially Optimal Indexation
The socially optimal degree of wage indexation under discretion remains to be 
investigated. Since society is now assumed to possess two instruments with which to 
minimise its expected loss, the socially optimal monetary reaction to shocks, and the 
accompanying socially optimal degree of indexation are implicitly the solutions to the 
two simultaneous first-order conditions dEQs/dm = dEQs/dx = 0 , where the expectations
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operator E is unconditional. An equivalent approach which yields exactly the same 
answer is to assume that society delegates the conduct of monetary policy to a 
representative central banker, and then derives its optimal degree of indexation in the 
knowledge that m , Ep2 and El2 will respectively be given by equations (48), (50) and 
(56b). The latter approach is obviously convenient here, and combining (50) and (56b) 
with the unconditional expectation of (9), the expected social loss, given optimal 
monetary policy, is found to be the following function of x:
EQ‘ = ---------------  r  (68)
[ ( l - x ) 2 + c n - a ) 2]
Setting the derivative of EE1S with respect to x equal to zero, and solving for x, reveals 
that x = 1 maximises the social loss. With full indexation, monetary policy is powerless 
to influence real variables, and therefore is optimally devoted to stabilising the price level 
completely. Thus the variance of inflation is minimised at zero when x = 1 . Productivity 
shocks have their strongest possible impact on employment under full indexation, 
however, and in this situation the variance of employment is therefore maximised. It 
turns out that this also ensures the social loss is maximised, despite the zero inflation 
variance.
It is easily shown that dEQ*/dx>0 if x < l ,  and dEQs/dx<  0 if x > l .  Hence under 
discretion the closer to unity is the aggregate degree of indexation, the greater is the 
social loss. Since both the symmetric Nash equilibria are closer to x = 1 than their 
efficient-solution counterparts, it follows that the indexation choice of the individual 
union has an adverse externality with regard to social welfare, in addition to its adverse 
externality as regards the welfare of unions themselves. Although equation (68) indicates 
that EQS = 0, and therefore suggests that the socially optimal degree of indexation 
under discretion is infinitely large or infinitely negative, it would be unwise to use this 
finding as a basis for policy recommendations for real-world economies. The reason for 
sounding this cautionary note is that there is, as yet, no known instance of a real economy 
in which the aggregate degree of indexation has taken a value outside the unit interval.
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Consequently, there is no means of knowing how well models in the Gray-Ball lineage 
faithfully reproduce the behaviour of the price level, real wage and employment which 
would arise in the real world were x to take a value far below zero or greatly in excess of 
unity. In view of this substantial empirical uncertainty, it seems best to confine our 
attention here to the socially optimal degree of indexation implied by the model, given 
the fact that the feasible set of values for x is generally restricted by social convention to 
be the unit interval. In the presence of such a restriction, and in the light of the result 
reported above that dEQs/dx > 0 provided x < 1, it is clear that the socially optimal value 
for x is zero.
V.5 Conclusion
This chapter has adapted our basic framework of monopolistically competitive firms 
and unions which are averse to both real wage variability and employment variability by 
allowing for endogenous wage indexation. An externality in the individual union’s 
indexation choice has been identified, and has been shown to have close affinities to the 
externality in the individual union’s choice of nominal wage (conditional on a signal 
received regarding a productivity shock) which formed the principal focus of 
investigation earlier in the thesis. In particular, as in the case of the wage-setting 
externality of Chapter III, the indexation externality has been found to be weaker, the 
stronger is competition in the goods market and the smaller is the number of unions. As 
in Chapter III, the externality is absent if the goods market is perfectly competitive, or if 
there is a single economy-wide union, or if each individual union does not regard 
departures of its real wage or employment from their (unconditional) mean values as 
inherently undesirable. The indexation externality has an adverse effect on union welfare, 
and is manifested in an inefficiently low degree of real wage variability in equilibrium, 
together with an inefficiently high degree of associated employment variability. The 
externality has similarly been shown to be adverse in its impact on social welfare, as 
.represented by a standard social loss function featuring a term in the variance of inflation. 
However, in assessing the social welfare repercussions of endogenous indexation, the 
analysis of this chapter has abstracted from the existence of a mean inflation bias, and
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therefore has not taken into account the finding of Waller and VanHoose (1992) that 
atomistic agents’ individual indexation decisions are also characterised by a positive 
externality which operates to reduce the mean inflation bias. The direction of the net 
externality regarding social welfare appears to be ambiguous: the negative indexation 
externality which exacerbates price level/inflation variability will at least partially offset 
the beneficial externality which reduces the bias, and indeed may well outweigh it, so that 
the net externality is negative, with the equilibrium degree of indexation being 
suboptimally high, rather than suboptimally low as suggested by Waller and VanHoose.
The next chapter further investigates indexation externalities under conditions of 
monopolistic goods-market competition by extending the analysis of this chapter to 
multiple-parameter indexation schemes, according to which the nominal wage is indexed 
to another aggregate variable in addition to the price level.
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Chapter VI: Monopoly Unions, Monopolistically Competitive 
Firms and Multiparameter Wage Indexation
VI. 1 Introduction
*
This final major chapter continues the investigation of indexation externalities 
begun in Chapter V by extending the analysis to multiparameter indexation schemes. 
In such a scheme, the nominal wage is indexed to a second macroeconomic variable 
in addition to the price level. As pointed out in Chapter IV, several previous 
contributions to the stabilisation-policy literature have argued that multiparameter 
indexation, by exploiting potential sources of information which are neglected by 
conventional schemes which index the wage only to the price level, can lead to 
superior macroeconomic outcomes. In this context, the optimal outcomes are 
generally assumed to be those associated with labour-market clearing. This 
assumption is to be found in Gray (1976), Ball (1988) and the related literature, and 
the principal papers on multiparameter indexation have similarly assumed that the 
primary purpose of wage indexation is to bring the real wage and employment more 
closely into alignment with their market-clearing values.1 As previously pointed out in 
this thesis, this assumption amounts to a view that the parties who are responsible for 
determining the nominal wage (whether directly via wage-setting, or indirectly via 
indexation arrangements), are indifferent to real wage variability per se. The 
implications of relaxing this assumption in a model of endogenous multiparameter 
indexation are the key theme of this chapter. Consistent with the other parts of this 
work which feature stochastic shocks, we investigate below the consequences of 
alternatively assuming that real wage variability and employment variability are both 
regarded as inherently undesirable by the monopoly unions which set the wage- 
contract parameters governing the determination of the nominal wage.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the 
structural equations of the chapter’s basic model. Section 3, the longest section of the 
chapter, is largely concerned with the simple-rule scenario. It derives and explains in 
detail the efficient multiparameter scheme in which the wage is directly indexed to the 
productivity shock as well as to the price level, and follows this with an analysis of 
the externalities which arise when the indexation parameters are endogenously
1 Drudi and Giordano (2000) is an exception in this respect.
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determined. The analysis is then briefly repeated for an alternative regime-scenario in 
which the central bank sets the money supply after observing the realised values of 
both shocks. (For consistency with previous chapters, this regime is referred to as 
‘discretion’.) Sections 4 and 5 present counterpart results for two alternative
output and the price level, as advocated by Kami (1983), and another variant in which 
the real variable to which wages are indexed is employment.
VI.2 The Model
The stmctural equations are virtually identical to those of the previous chapter, and 
for convenience are set out below once again.
multiparameter indexation schemes, namely indexation of wages to both aggregate
y f  = a l t + 0, 0 < a  < 1 0 )
where 6 ~ N{0,crl) .
(2)
0
y? - y D = - e ( P i - p \ £ > \ (3)
where p =  Jp td i .
y D = y ( m - p + </>), y >  0 (4)
where </> ~ N(0,cr^ ) .
(5)
j / n  I  j / n
I f  = j l f d i  /  p i
0 - 1)/" /  0 - 1)/"
(6)
Wj =wj + xj (p  -  Ep)  +  bfi 
Wj =  w . +  Xj (p  -  Ep) + bjO
w = w + x ( p - E p )  + bd  
*
1 1 n J i  n
where w = j'wi di = —y^ w j , w = jwi di = — ^
o n  j = i  o n  j = i
1 " 
y I
7=1
b= jbfdi = —^ b
n ~ ,  J
w, =  w, + X , ( p -  Ep) + b’( y -  Ey)
wi = + xj (p -  ep ) + b'i (y  -  £y)
w = w + x(p  -  Ep) + b \ y  -  Ey)
where w, w and x  are as previously defined, and b'
w i = W i +  x i ( P  ~  E P )  + b!V ~ El)
Wj = Wj + Xj (p -  Ep) + b”(l -  El) 
w = w +  x ( p  -  Ep) + b"(l ~ El)
where b" = \b”di = - Y > ' '  
o n 7^
where / = j7, di = — .
0  n  7  =  1
Q" - l 2j+ c u(Wj - p ) ‘
Qs = l2+csp 2 
1 ^
Apart from the nominal wage equations, the above are identical to the structural 
equations of Chapter V, and therefore need not be commented upon. For each set of 
wage equations, (7a, 7b, 7c), (8a, 8b, 8c) and (9a, 9b, 9c), three interrelated equations 
specify the nominal wage at firm i and union j ,  as well as their aggregate counterpart, 
for the particular multiparameter indexation scheme in question. The equation trio (7a, 
7b, 7c) assumes economy-wide direct indexing of the wage to the productivity shock 
as well as to the price level, and is intended to capture in a simple way the widespread 
practice of making wages and other forms of contractual remuneration partly 
contingent on productivity-related outcomes (by means, for instance, of profit-related 
bonuses). Equation trio (8a, 8b, 8c) is the equivalent set o f equations for the Kami 
indexation scenario in which wages are indexed to aggregate output as well as to the 
price level.2 (Note that Kami confined his attention to a situation in which the 
parameters b], b'j and b' are decided by a benevolent authority concerned to
maximise social welfare, and consequently did not endogenise these parameters.) The 
final trio, (9a, 9b, 9c), analogously considers multiparameter indexation to both 
aggregate employment and the price level.
The assumed information structure and timing of moves are the same as in the 
single-parameter indexation model of Chapter V. The reader who wishes to refresh his 
or her memory o f these aspects of the model is therefore advised to consult at this 
point Time Lines 1 and 2 o f Chapter V.
VI.3 Multiparameter Wage Indexation with Direct Indexation to the 
Productivity Shock
VI. 3.1 The Simple-Rule Monetary Regime
VI.3.1 (i) Introductory Remarks and Reduced Forms
This section begins the analysis of the macroeconomics of multiparameter 
indexation by assuming that every union’s wage (and hence every firm’s wage also) is 
indexed both to the price level and directly to the productivity shock. The relevant
2 The reader may be prompted to ask why the analysis does not postulate an indexation scheme in 
which firm /’s wage is indexed to its individual output or employment, and union f s  wage is similarly 
indexed to its employer firm s’ output or employment, rather than to their aggregate counterparts as 
assumed here. Unfortunately, for the version o f  the model in which unions are not constrained to index 
their wages symmetrically to aggregate variables, formal analysis cannot progress very far with these 
plausible alternatives since for the specifications in question it is not possible to derive a closed-form  
expression for the price level.
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nominal wage equations are therefore (7a), (7b) and (7c). Our first task is to derive a 
semi-reduced form for the price-level, expressing that entity as a function of m, w, x, 
b, and the realisations of the shocks. This will be a multi-purpose expression in the 
sense that it will also be relevant to the analysis of discretionary monetary policy in 
Section VI.3.2. Since the individual firm’s labour demand for given m ,p  and nominal 
wage Wj, must be the same as in Chapters III and V, we once again have:
jd r ( m - p  + ^ ) - e ( w l - p )  + ( s - l ) 0  
' {a + s { \ - a ) ]
Since desired labour supply, (5), and the individual union’s loss function, (10), are 
here the same as in Chapters III and V, the base nominal wage of both the individual 
firm and individual union is again given by:
Appropriate substitutions involving (1), (7a), (12) and (13) then yield firm z’s output 
as a function o f the indexation parameters specified in its wage contract, as well as of 
the shocks and o f m , p  and their expected values at the contract-signing stage:
s ya[m - E m - ( p -  Ep) + <j>] + ea{ 1 -  x,){p -  Ep) + g(l -  ab,)e
y‘ [a + e ( l -a) ]
The aggregate counterpart to (14) is obtained by integrating individual firm outputs 
over the unit interval:
s _ ya[m -  Em - { p -  Ep) + ^] + ea{  1 -  x){p -  Ep) + s{ 1 -  ab)6 , .
^  [a + £(1 -  a )]
Note that (15) implies that mean aggregate output is zero: E y - E y s = 0 . Equating
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(15) with (4) and solving for p  then yields the semi-reduced form for the price level:
P =
y(\  -  a)(m + <f>) + a (  1 -  x)Ep -  (1 -  ab)0 
[ y ( l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]
(16)
In the next section we allow m to be determined at the discretion of the central bank 
after it has observed the values of the shocks. The current section’s concern, however, 
is with the simple-rule regime in which m is kept fixed regardless of the values taken 
by other variables. As in previous parts of the thesis concerned with this monetary 
scenario, m can be innocuously assigned any suitable value. As in previous chapters, 
the most convenient normalisation is m -  0 , which is therefore adopted for the 
remainder of this section. With m = Em = 0, equation (16) immediately implies that 
Ep = 0 , and consequently equations (13) and (16) simplify to the following:
The variance o f the price level as a function of the two aggregate indexation 
parameters is:
A further consequence o f our m = 0 normalisation is that equations (7a), (7b) and (7c) 
simplify as follows:
wi = Wj — 0 (13')
_ y(l -  d)<t> -  (1 -  ab)6
P l>0 - “ ) + « ( ! - * ) ]
(16’)
E  2 r 2( i - « ) 2g j  + ( i -« & )2g?
P l r ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2
(17)
W, =xip  + b,e
W j  =  X j P  +  b j 0
w = xp + b6
(7'a)
(7'b)
(7'c)
3 Note that in solving the equation y s = y D to derive p  as a function o f  m, Em = Ep  is found to be the 
case.
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Appropriately combining (12), (13') and (16) with (7'b) and (7'c) then yields the 
following reduced-form expressions for the variances of union y’s real wage and 
employment and their aggregate counterparts:
r ' Q - a y Q - X j f a j  I ( ! -* ,) ( !  - a b )
+  ■
[ y ( l - a )  + a ( l - x ) ]  \ \y(} -(x)  + a ( \ - x ) ]
(18a)
El2 = 1
[a + £-(1 -  a)] [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) Y
y '[c(  1 -  a )( l -  Xj) + a{\ -  x ) f  a]
+ {[y ~ «(1 -  *,)](! -  ab) + [y{ 1 -  a )  + a(  1 -  x)] [s(l -  b.) -  l]}2cr,2 (18b)
_ 2 y 2{ \ - a f ( \ - x f a l  + [ \ - x  + y ( \ -a )b f<?]
P W - a ) ^ a ( \ - x ) f
(19a)
2 y \ \ - x f < j l + [ y { \ - b ) - { \ - x ) f a l
El1 =
[ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) f
(19b)
VI.3.1(ii) Efficient Multiparameter Indexation 
The efficient indexation scheme is the (.xj ,bj ) pair which minimises the
representative union’s expected loss when indexation is constrained to be symmetric, 
i.e. when x} = xVj  and bj = bVj must be the case. Hence the efficient pair of
indexation parameters, denoted (x*,b*), is the (x, b) pair which solves the following 
pair of simultaneous equations:
dE(  Q" )
 2 = o  (20a)
dx.
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dEi-n A » *> 'x'~x'b' ‘ b-  -  o (20b)
dbj
The relevant expression for E(Clu\  , ) is obtained by combining (19a) and (19b)
J Ijc = x,bJ =b
with the unconditional expectation of (10). This expression is not stated here, since it 
is not of great interest in itself, and for the same reason we also omit the derivatives 
corresponding to the left-hand sides of the first-order conditions (20a) and (20b). Our 
major interest lies rather with the following unique efficient solution pair:
x* — \ (21a)
b‘ = ---------   r-  (21b)
[l +  c „ ( l - a ) 2]
Under this efficient multiparameter indexation scheme, the nominal wage for a 
particular period is therefore found to be:4
w| =  t   (22)
I * -*  , b - h  [ !  +  C„ ( l - o : ) 2 ]
It is instructive to compare (22) with equation (19) of Chapter III, noting in doing so 
that, since in this section we are abstracting entirely from the existence of informative 
signals of shocks, the unions’ expectation of the price level at the time wage contracts 
are concluded is zero. It is apparent from the comparison that efficient multiparameter 
indexation replicates almost exactly the efficient nominal wage when unions possess 
perfect information regarding both shocks. The efficient nominal wage under fully 
informed wage-setting only differs from the efficient nominal wage under 
multiparameter indexation to the extent that union expectations of the price level, at 
the time that wage contracts are signed, differ across the two scenarios. (In other 
words, efficiency leads to the same mark-up of the nominal wage over the expected
4 The left-hand side o f  (22) could alternatively be written as the individual union’s wage given efficient 
indexation, i.e. as w,
J \ x j  =  x ' V j , b j = b ’ V j
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price-level in both scenarios.) An immediate implication is that the efficient 
multiparameter indexation scheme, as given by (21a) and (21b), ensures that the 
representative union’s labour-market outcome is located at the tangency point 
between the aggregate-level (or symmetric-wage) labour demand curve and the union 
isoloss map. Hence the efficient multiparameter scheme has the same diagrammatic 
representation in ( -  p,  l j ) space as the efficient single-parameter scheme when
velocity shocks are absent. Consequently, Figure V .l of the previous chapter also 
depicts, in all essential respects, the outcome under efficient multiparameter 
indexation, the only differences being in respect o f the parameter settings which that 
diagram indicates to be associated with particular points on the symmetric-indexation 
labour demand curve. With x  = 1, a setting of zero for b would place the outcome at 
the aggregate labour demand curve’s vertical intercept. As b increases gradually from 
zero, the aggregate outcome migrates gradually, down the curve, attaining the 
horizontal intercept when b = 1 .5
There are a few more aspects o f (21a) and (21b) which call for comment. Firstly, in 
common with previous contributions to the macroeconomics of multiparameter wage 
indexation, the variances of the two shocks do not play a role in determining the 
equilibrium degree of indexation to either the price level or the productivity shock. 
This result contrasts with the general finding of the literature on single-parameter 
indexation that the efficient degree of indexation to the price level is a function of the 
relative magnitudes o f the two shocks’ variances. The reason for this difference 
between the two veins o f literature is that with two shocks, two (or more) indexation 
instruments allow the desirable degree of neutralisation of aggregate demand 
disturbances6 to be achieved by appropriate setting of one parameter, allowing the 
other parameter to achieve the optimal wage response to the productivity shock, 
regardless o f the precise magnitude of that shock’s variance. Because our model 
assumes for simplicity, like Kami (1983), that every firm employs labour under
5 I f  b  is negative, the outcom e for 6  >  0 w ill be located beyond the aggregate-level labour demand 
curve’s vertical intercept, since w ith x  =  l ,  b  < 0  im plies that the real w age falls w hen a positive 
productivity shock occurs, thereby exacerbating the shock ’s em ploym ent im pact. I f  b  >  1 w hen x  =  1 , 
the indexation schem e causes em ploym ent to fall in response to 6  > 0 , w ith the real w age increasing 
by more than the full amount o f  the productivity shock. H ence in terms o f  Figure V .l  for 0  > 0 , with 
x  =  1 , settings o f  b  in excess o f  unity place the outcom e on the portion o f  the aggregate-level curve 
w hich lies below  the horizontal axis.
6 Com plete neutralisation i f  every firm has labour contracts, as in K am i (1983), partial neutralisation if  
som e firms em p loy  labour in a spot market, so that cross-sectoral spillovers arise, as in D uca and 
V anH oose (1998b).
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contracts, and omits a second sector with spot-market labour hiring which is central to 
Duca and VanHoose (1991, 1998b), the efficient degree of indexation to the price 
level is unity.
Secondly, provided cu > 0 , the efficient degree of indexation to the productivity
*
shock is less than unity. This reflects the fact that under symmetric indexation with 
x  = 1 , setting b closer to unity makes the real wage more responsive to productivity 
shocks and hence brings lower employment variability at the expense of greater real 
wage variability. A higher cu therefore causes the value o f b* to move closer to zero, 
while in the extreme limiting case in which cu - »  o o , real wage variability is the sole 
source of welfare loss to each union, and (21a) and (21b) then prescribe 
(x* =1 ,b* = 0 ) ,  hence ensuring complete rigidity of the real wage. Conversely, if 
union /  s sole concern is employment variability ( cu = 0 ), equation (21b) indicates
that efficiency will involve full indexation to the productivity shock, so as to ensure 
that the real wage and employment are at their market-clearing values (of 6 and zero 
respectively), with complete employment stability being secured as a consequence. 
This result that in the cu = 0 case (21a) and (21b) become (x* = 1, b \  =1) is in
I cu =0
fact very closely related to Kami’s result that, when the elasticity o f labour supply 
with respect to the real wage is zero, complete stability o f employment can be 
achieved by indexing the wage fully to both the price level and to aggregate output.7
It is clear, therefore, that there are numerous close parallels between efficient 
multiparameter indexation and efficient indexation only to the price level in the 
absence of velocity shocks. Just as Figure V .l requires little modification to depict 
labour-market outcomes under multiparameter indexation, so too is Figure V.2 
concerning outcomes in (E(Wj -  p ) 2, E12j ) space readily adaptable in this respect.
Since x = 1 prevents velocity shocks from being a source of variability in either the 
real wage or employment, the locus of possible outcomes for x = 1 depicted in Figure 
VI. 1 below touches both axes. As indicated, appropriate settings of b allow either of 
these graphical intercepts to be attained, while as b increases from zero towards unity
7 K am i’s paper contains a series o f  algebraic errors, com m encing w ith his equation (10), w hich results 
in the equation w hich is o f  interest to us, his equation (15), also being slightly  incorrect. After making 
the necessary corrections, K am i’s equation (15) prescribes full indexation o f  the nominal w age to 
expectational errors regarding both aggregate output and the price level, w hen the objective is to 
m inim ise output variability (or, what amounts to the sam e thing, m inim ise em ploym ent variability) 
around its mean value.
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Figure VI. 1 
The locus of possible aggregate outcomes 
under multiparameter indexation
E(lj\ )J l r ,  = lV j,bj = b V j'
(1 -a)
b >  1
Real-wage
variance
Notes:
1. Variable on horizontal axis is the individual union’s real-wage variance, given sym m etric indexation,
J  \ X j  =lV/,Oy
2. The depicted iso loss curve has slope equal to - c u .
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the actual outcome in this space migrates down the negatively sloped portion of the 
locus. Values o f b outside the unit interval place the outcome on one or other of the 
two positively sloped branches of the opportunity set, with variability of both the real 
wage and employment tending to the infinitely large as b -»  ±00. These facts will 
alternatively be apparent to the reader from the following expressions, obtained by 
setting x at unity in equations (19a) and (19b):
E ( w - p Y 2 _2X = 1= V(Tt (23a)
EV JC=1
(1 -& )2 2
(1 - a f  6
(23b)
The derivatives o f these expressions with respect to b will prove useful to the 
subsequent exposition:
d E ( w -  p Y
X = ]
db
= 2 bat (24a)
dEV
db
:=1 2(6 - 1) _ 2 
2 G e(1 - a )
(24b)
Equations (24a) and (24b) imply that the derivative with respect to b of the 
representative union’s expected loss, given symmetric indexation on x = 1 , is:
dEQ] :=1 2{b[\ + cu{ \ - a ) 2] - \ } a 2
db (1 - a y
(24c)
It immediately follows from (24c) that:
dEQ]
db
x = \ < (>)0 iff b < {>)b* (25)
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Unsurprisingly, the expected union loss under the efficient multiparameter 
indexation scheme is the same as under efficient indexation to the price level in the 
absence of velocity shocks.8 Hence we have:
E\ Q] W o
xj-wj.bj-b-vjj [l + cu(l - a ) ]
(26)
VI.3. l(iii) Equilibrium Multiparameter Indexation 
In accordance with the practice adopted in Chapter V, our investigation of 
equilibrium indexation begins by deriving solutions for the two extremes of wage- 
bargaining structure. As we know, the equilibrium solution for the case of a single 
economy-wide union always coincides with the efficient solution. Using ( xNE, bNE) 
to denote the symmetric Nash equilibrium parameter pair, we consequently conclude 
that xNE\ = = 1 and that bNE| = b*, as given by (21b). As for the other extreme case,
its key aspect is that each atomistic union assumes that the influence of its individual 
indexation parameter settings on their aggregate counterparts is negligibly small, and 
hence takes x and b as given in working out its individually optimal indexation 
strategy. This optimal ( xj t b j ) pair is the solution to the following pair of
simultaneous first-order conditions:
dEQ,”
dXj
dEQ]
8b,
= 0 (27a)
x  fixed
= 0 (27b)
b fixed
Combining (18a) and (18b) with (10) and differentiating the resulting expected union 
loss with respect to xy and b j , with x  and b treated as given, yields expressions for
(27a) and (27b) which can be solved for union f  s individually optimal ( x bj)  pair.
8 The relevant equation in Chapter V is numbered (28).
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These solutions are not in themselves of much interest, and are consequently omitted 
for the sake of brevity, as are the related pair of equations which implicitly define the 
atomistic-case ( xNE, b NE) solution pair, and which are obtained by imposing
symmetry in indexation scheme choice (i.e. x . = x \ / j , b . = b \ / j ) on union f  s first-/ * J
order conditions. The unique symmetric Nash equilibrium solution pair for the 
atomistic case is found to be:
^ N E , atomistic case  ^ (28 a)
£
^ N E , atomistic case e / i  \  r . / 1  \-i-» (28b){£ + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + £ ( \ - a ) \ }
This pair of equations differs from the efficient pair, as given by (21a) and (2lb). It 
follows immediately from this fact that there is an adverse externality to each
individual atomistic union’s multiparameter indexation decision. In particular, while
every such union chooses, as efficiency requires, to index fully to the price level in 
order to insulate both its real wage and its employment from the impact of velocity 
shocks, straightforward manipulation reveals that bNEatomistjccase < b*, indicating that 
each union in equilibrium chooses to make its nominal wage less responsive to 
productivity shock realisations than is efficient. Since both b* and bNE atomisticcase lie
within the unit interval, and since (24a) and (24b) respectively indicate that when 
0 < b < l , real wage variability is increasing in b, and employment variability is 
decreasing in b, it follows that in the atomistic case the externality results in an 
inefficiently high degree o f employment variability, together with inefficiently low 
variability o f the real wage. This finding obviously has strong affinities with some of 
the key results o f previous chapters, and it is not in the least surprising to note that 
(28b) implies that dbNE atomjsticcase/d£  > 0 , indicating that stronger goods-market
competition reduces the departure of bNE tomisHccase from b*, and hence operates in a 
familiar fashion to mitigate the externality. Another point in common with previous 
results is that it is apparent from (2 lb) and (28b) that b’ and bNE alomisliccase coincide if 
c„ = 0  or if  c —» oo in the limit.
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The equilibrium expected loss of atomistic unions is given by:
E(Q'
^  N E , a to m is t ic  c a se  ■> ^  ^ N E ,  a to m is tic
c„{e2+cu[a + e ( l -a ) f } c r g  
{£ + c J l - a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ] y
(29)
Comparison of (29) with equation (46) of Chapter III reveals that for the case of 
atomistic unions, the equilibrium expected loss from multiparameter indexation is the 
same as the expected loss which results when each union has perfect information
provided shortly, together with a somewhat more detailed discussion of the 
externality, focusing in particular on its source in the trade-off faced by the individual 
union in choosing b j .
Before doing so, however, we derive the symmetric Nash equilibrium for the 
general case in which n can take any of its admissible values, namely n > 1. The 
individual union’s optimal choice of indexation parameters, denoted (x ” ,bJ*), is the 
{Xj,bj) solution pair to the following pair of simultaneous first-order conditions:
The second term on the left-hand side of each of these first-order conditions is the
This indirect effect is the contribution the pair ( x bj) makes to the induced change 
in the aggregate indexation parameter pair, (x , b) ,  and is smaller the larger the 
number of unions, since dx/dx] = db/dbj -  \/n.
9 This expected loss is obtained by setting cru2 = 0 and /? = 1 in equation (46) o f  Chapter III. Note that 
although velocity shocks were ignored in deriving our results for equilibrium wage-setting in Chapter 
III, the very same expressions would have been obtained had we assumed instead that unions possess 
perfect information about the velocity shock when setting wages.
regarding both shocks when setting its wage.9 An explanation for this finding will be
(30a)
(30b)
indirect effect on union f  s loss of its setting o f its individual indexation parameters.
348
Obtaining an expression for £ Q “ by substituting (18a) and (18b) into the
unconditional expectation of ( 10), and differentiating the result with respect to xJ9 bj9
x and b, yields the first-order conditions given by (30a) and (30b), expressed in terms 
of the model’s structural parameters, as well as xJ9 bJy x, and b. In the interests of
brevity these equations are omitted, since what is of interest is the resulting (x**,b**) 
solution pair when x  = 1, namely:10
= 1 (31a)xj x=\
[a + n £ ( \ - a ) ] [ a ( \ - b )  + e ( \ - a ) ] _______
=1 (1 -  a){e[a + ns{ 1 -  a)] + ncu( \ - a ) [ a  + £-(1 -  a ) f }
Imposing b** =b\ /  j  in (31b), the symmetric Nash equilibrium is solved for as:
x n e  =  1 ( 3 2 a )
V  = ----------------- [« + " * 0 - « ) ] ------------------ (32b)
{a  + n £ ( l - a )  + ncu( \ - a ) [a + £ (} -a )]}
The resulting value o f the equilibrium expected union loss is obtained by setting 
x  = xNE = 1 and b = bNE, as given by (32b), in (19a) and (19b), and substituting the 
resulting expressions into the unconditional expectation o f (10):
c, {[a + ns(\ -  a ) f  + n2c, (1 -  a f [ a  + g(l -  a )]2 }al
i x=xm,b=bNE + n £ ( [ - a )  + ncu( \ . - a ) 2[a + £ ( l - a ) ] } 2
Evaluating bNE, as given by (32b) for n = 1, and finding its limit as n -»  oo, we find 
^  V L ,  =b' and n i J m = bm,«<,mls„ccas,,as given respectively by (21b) and (28b).
10 It is explained below why attention is confined to solutions which arise when x = 1. Note that taking 
the limit as n -> o o  o f  , as given by (31b), would provide us with the expression for the
J lx = l
atomistic union’s individually optimal b j , given b, which we chose to omit earlier.
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Thus (32a) and (32b) are consistent with our earlier results relating to the extreme 
cases of wage-bargaining structure. Note, however, that whereas in both the single­
union and atomistic cases the symmetric Nash equilibrium is known to be unique, the
surmised uniqueness o f the only known solution pair, (32a) and (32b), for cases such
11 *that 1 < n < oo, remains unproven.
It is straightforward to show that, in general, bNE is less than b* for all admissible
values of n other than n = 1, and when viewed in conjunction with (25) it is apparent 
from this finding that the adverse externality found earlier to characterise the 
atomistic case generally arises whenever there is more than one union in the economy. 
It is noteworthy that the departure of bNE from b* is greater, and hence that the 
externality is more severe, the larger is n, as is apparent from the following derivative, 
which is strictly negative provided e < co and 0 < cu < oo :
dbNE _ ~ c»g (l ~ <xf [a + g(l -  a )] ;Q
dn {(a + n £ ( \ - a )  + ncu (1 -  a ) 2 [a + f ( l  -  a )] }2
As in the atomistic case, the externality’s strength is generally diminishing in the 
degree of goods-market competition, as represented by s  :
d b NE  __________ n (n - l ) c ua ( \ - a )3
ds  {a  + n s ( l - a )  + ncu( \ - a ) [a + £ ( l - a ) ] Y
(35)
It is clear that d b NE/ d £  > 0  for all n > 1, provided 0 < c u < o o . The correspondence 
with our findings for the atomistic case also extends further to the externality’s 
absence in the extreme cases in which £ -» oo in the limit, and cu is either zero or 
approaches infinity in the limit:
11 Advanced mathematical software (Mathematica) has been used in an attempt to solve the pair o f  
equations which implicitly define all the possible (xNE,bNE) solution pairs. This equation pair is simply 
union f s  first-order conditions, given by (30a) and (30b), with Xj = x and bj = b imposed. The
symmetric Nash equilibrium given by (32a) and (32b) is the only obvious solution pair to these 
simultaneous equations, and while Mathematica does not arrive at a definitive set o f  solutions to them, 
despite being allowed numerous days o f  uninterrupted evaluation time to do so, it is perhaps o f  greater 
significance that the program does not find any other solution pairs additional to the pair (32a) and 
(32b). Our surmise that this pair is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium for the general n > 1 case 
therefore appears to be highly plausible.
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lim 
£ —>oot /  NEbm =b’ (36)
bMF\ =b*N E \ c = o = 1 (37a)cu =0
bm  =c‘^  V  = 0 (37b)
VI.3.1(iv) Discussion of the Source of the Indexation Externality 
As in previous chapters, the externality arises because each individual union, in 
deciding how its nominal wage adjusts in response to the realised value of 6 , does not 
fully internalise the price-level repercussions of its strategy choice. Differentiating 
(17) with respect to b, the variance of the price level is found to be a decreasing 
function of b provided b < \ / a ,  a condition which holds both in equilibrium and 
under efficient indexation:
dE(-P x , .n?  _ - 2 a ( \ - a b ) a 2e
~db = r 2( l~ a )2 ( }
Since we have already established that bNE < b* provided n > 1, and that 
dbNE/dn<  0 , it is clear that the externality leads to increased price-level variability,
and that this increase is greater, the larger the number o f unions. This exacerbation of 
price-level variability does not affect the equilibrium real wage or its variance, of 
course, since the full indexation of each union’s wage to the price level insulates the 
real wage completely from this effect. However, under the simple rule the higher 
variability of the price level necessarily causes aggregate demand to be more variable 
in equilibrium than under efficient indexation, and it is through this aggregate-demand 
channel that the externality’s adverse impact on the price-level variance leads to 
inefficiently high employment variability.
The reason why the externality is weaker, the fewer the number o f unions, is 
straightforward: namely that the smaller is n, the greater is the internalisation by union 
j  of the effect its choice of bj has on the price level. This is a familiar theme from
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previous chapters, and it ought not to surprise us that the externality can be explained 
in terms of a departure of the individual union’s perceived trade-off between its real 
wage and employment, from the trade-off prevailing at the aggregate level. Although 
union j  is ignorant of the realised values of the shocks at the time it sets its indexation 
parameters, it knows that setting jc . = 1 entirely eliminates the uncertainty regarding
real outcomes which arises from the existence of velocity shocks. Hence union j  
perceives that, given efficient indexation by every other union (so that bk = b*Vk * j , 
and, with x . = 1, x = 1 also), there exists a set of possible outcomes for its individual 
labour market, each of which is associated with a particular setting o f b j . The concept
which comes to mind in this context, of course, is the perceived labour demand curve 
which passes through the efficient outcome. Indeed, only minor modifications need be 
made to Figure V.3 of Chapter V in order for it to illustrate the source of the 
externality under multiparameter indexation. Since yet another diagram differing form 
Figure V.3 in only minor respects would clearly be superfluous, we confine ourselves 
here to verbal remarks regarding the perceived labour demand curves under
• 19multiparameter indexation. The key point is the following. Of the infinite set of 
possible perceived labour demand curves when Xj = IV/ , there is only one such curve
whose tangency point with the union isoloss map is coincident with its intersection 
point with the aggregate-level labour demand curve. The curve which is unique in this 
respect is the perceived labour demand curve which prevails when bk = bNE\/k  * j ,
and this is therefore the only member of the set which can induce union j  to follow the
1other unions in its setting of b j .
The slope of the perceived labour demand curve is the trade-off faced by union j  
between on the one hand reducing the impact of a non-zero productivity shock on 
employment by means of a higher setting of b j , and on the other directly increasing
that shock’s real-wage impact, and is given by:
12 Note that Figure V.3 o f  Chapter V has been drawn on the assumption that unions are atomistic. The 
version o f  this diagram which would relate to the present discussion concerned with multiparameter 
indexation when 1 < n < oo would therefore indicate the equilibrium at c as having different real wage 
and employment coordinates than those stated in Figure V.3. For the atomistic case, however, the 
equilibrium values for the real wage and employment would be precisely those indicated in Figure V.3.
13 In the terminology o f  earlier chapters, this perceived labour demand curve which prevails given 
bk = bNEVk *  j  (and x  = 1) is the ‘equilibrium perceived labour demand curve’.
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dlj 
d ( w , - p ) Xj=lVj
- \ a  + n e ( l - a ) \  
n{\ - a ) [ a  + s(\ -  a)\
(39)
It is clear that this slope is flatter (lpss negative), and hence that the trade-off is more 
favourable to union y, the larger is n. The fewer the number of unions, therefore, the 
closer does the trade-off faced by the individual union approximate that which exists 
at the aggregate level.14 Differentiating the right-hand side of (39) with respect to e 
immediately reveals that, provided n > 1, this slope is falling in s . Hence the slope of 
union f  s perceived labour demand curve under multiparameter indexation exhibits the 
same characteristics as its counterparts in earlier parts of this work.15 (The reason for 
the externality’s sensitivity to the degree of goods-market competition is the same as 
in previous chapters, and therefore need not be repeated here.)
VI.3.1(v) Equilibrium Multiparameter Indexation and Full-Information Outcomes'
As noted in the Introduction to this chapter, a major theme of the literature on 
multiparameter indexation is the idea that it may, by exploiting sources of information 
which are unavailable at the time contract wages are set, enable the outcomes that 
would result from fully informed wage-setting to be replicated. It is obviously of 
interest, therefore, to enquire whether the equilibrium multiparameter indexation 
scheme in the present chapter’s model of endogenous indexation brings about the 
same outcomes as would result were the model’s representative agent fully informed 
about the macroeconomic shocks when choosing its strategy. As a step towards 
answering this question, we set out at this point the expression for the individual 
union’s expected loss under full information:
14 Note that evaluating (39) for n = 1 yields, as we would expect, the slope o f  the aggregate-level 
labour demand curve: [ d l j / d i w j  -/? )]| _]v. _j = - l / ( l - a )
15 d[dl j /d(Wj  - p)]| ^ j d e  = - ( n - l ) a / n [ a  + e ( l - a )]2 . This is negative for all n > 1: hence,
provided « > 1 ,  a higher degree o f  goods-market competition steepens union f  s perceived labour 
demand curve and reduces the extent o f  its departure from the aggregate-level curve. Note in addition
that = -1 /(1  - a )  , so that under perfect competition the curve perceived by
the individual union coincides with the aggregate curve, a familiar result from previous chapters.
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c .jp -a  + aV) + c .[a  + g ( l - g ) ]  A }<j „ 
{ya + eA + c„ (1 -  a)[a  + s (l -  a)]A }2
(40)
This expression is simply equation (44) of Chapter III, evaluated for the extreme case 
of perfect information (i.e. for a]  = 0 , p  = 1), and with subscript ‘FT adopted as a
convenient notation for the full-information scenario.
A comparison of (40) with (33), the equilibrium expected union loss when 
indexation is to p  and 6 , elicits several very interesting points. Firstly, whereas we 
established earlier in this chapter that, in the two extreme cases of a single union and 
atomistic unions, equilibrium multiparameter indexation results in the same expected 
union loss as fully informed wage-setting, this is not the case for 1 < n < oo. It is 
straightforward to show that the equilibrium expected loss is unambiguously greater 
under fully informed wage-setting than under multiparameter indexation, provided
The second point of interest provides a clue towards an explanation for this finding. 
Whereas it is apparent from (33) that the equilibrium expected loss under 
multiparameter indexation is completely independent of the aggregate demand 
elasticity parameter, / ,  for all n > 1, perusal of (26), (29) and (40) reveals that the 
full-information equilibrium expected loss is independent of y  only in the two 
extreme cases of atomistic unions and a single economy-wide union. In the 
multiparameter indexation scenario, full indexation to the price level completely 
neutralises aggregate output from aggregate demand disturbances and ensures that the 
price level always adjusts by just enough to equate aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply. In other words, with x = 1, output is determined purely by the supply-side 
parameters a  and b, and by the productivity shock realisation, 6.  Under fully
16 The following is a proof. Equating (33) and (40) and solving for n, the only admissible finite solution 
value (i.e. the only n >  1) to the equation £(Q " |x=Xw£. b=bii e ) = £(Q" L=w^ 7) ,  is found to be n = 1.
(There is another solution to this equation which is easily shown to be necessarily less than unity, and 
which therefore is ignored as inadmissible.) Since it has already been established that the equilibrium 
expected loss, as a function o f  n, is minimised in both scenarios when n = 1, we examine the second 
derivatives with respect to n o f  these loss expressions evaluated at n = 1. Since
1 < n < oo , 16
informed wage-setting, by contrast, there are only two cases in which equilibrium 
output is entirely determined by the supply-side of the economy. The first such case is 
that of atomistic unions. Because the impact of an individual union’s wage on the 
price level, and hence on real money balances, is negligibly small, y  is completely 
disregarded by the individual union when choosing its wage, and thus plays no role in 
determining the .response of output to the known value of the productivity shock. The 
price level then adjusts endogenously to bring aggregate demand into equality with 
aggregate supply. The second case in which supply-side factors solely matter for 
equilibrium output is that of a single monopoly union. With full information on both 
shocks, the union will take full account of the response of the price level to its setting 
of the aggregate nominal wage, and hence will be able to bring about its preferred 
combination of real wage and employment, given the known value o f the productivity 
shock. Output in the n = 1 case is consequently determined purely by supply-side 
factors, and, as in the atomistic case, an adjustment in the price level occurs to ensure 
that aggregate demand and aggregate supply are equal. For intermediate values of n 
between these two extreme cases, i.e. for 1 < « < o o ,  each union recognises that its 
nominal wage decision will have a non-negligible impact on the price level and hence 
on aggregate demand via real money balances. This leads the union’s nominal wage 
to be functionally dependent on y. However, if  n > 1 the union does not fully 
internalise the price-level implications of its wage decision, and finds it optimal to 
deviate from the collectively efficient nominal wage, with the result that the real 
wage, employment, and hence output are not independent o f the aggregate demand 
parameter y.
It is straightforward to show that a higher value for y, i.e. greater sensitivity of 
aggregate demand to the price level, induces the individual union to take greater 
account o f the price level in setting its wage. The externality is thus less severe, and 
the equilibrium expected loss under full information smaller, the larger is y , as can be
seen from the following derivative, which, provided 0  < cu < o o , is unambiguously 
negative for all n > 1 :
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dE(Qj m m ,„) - 2c2u( n - l)2a 3[a + s ( l - a ) ] [ a  + y{ 1 - gQ]crj
dy {ay + sA + cu{\ -  a)[a + s{\ -  a)]A}:
(41)
It is also of interest that in the limiting case in which y  -> 0 , i.e. the case in which 
aggregate demand tends towards a complete lack of responsiveness to movements in 
the price level, unions’ wage-setting behaviour, regardless of n, tends towards the 
behaviour of atomistic unions, with the externality consequently as severe as it
possibly can be: r™0£ (Q “ )=„™=o )> as given by the right-hand
7 J  w  = w n e ,F 1  j  w  =  w N E, FI
side of (29). In the converse extreme case in which y  —» oo, so that aggregate demand 
becomes extremely responsive to price level movements, the sensitivity of the price 
level to the individual non-atomistic union’s setting of its wage approximates very 
closely its sensitivity to the setting of bj (when x . = IVy) in the indexation scenario,
and indeed we find that E(QU ) = E(QU ) ,  as given by (33).y  —>oo '
17
x ~ x NE’b - b NE ^= ^ NE.Fr
In both scenarios, union j  in setting its instrument takes into account two channels 
through which its setting of that instrument can affect its individual welfare. The first 
of these is the real wage channel. For a given value of the productivity shock, a 
particular setting of the wage or of bj contributes to determine union f  s real wage
directly in both scenarios. Under full information, however, the chosen wage also 
does so via the induced change in the price level, whereas under multiparameter 
indexation jc . = 1 ensures this indirect effect is absent. Under fully informed wage-
setting, therefore, the real wage channel matters for union welfare in two ways: 
directly, because of the term in the real wage in the representative union’s loss 
function, (10), and indirectly via the real wage’s role in determining employment. 
Under multiparameter indexation only the former of these two is o f substance. The
17 Since £ (Q “ ) is independent o f  y , and £(Q " ) is a continuous function o f  y , our
J \x=xNE,b=bNe j \ w = w n e , F I
findings that dE(Q.u\  ) l d y < 0 \ f n > \ ,
J \ V = W N E , F I  /
and that ) =„“1  t ) ,
’  j \w = w n e , F I  J \ w = w  ne , F 1 J ' X = * N E . b= bNE
and that ^ ^ ( Q " !  ) = £ ( 0 “| ) ,  together with d E ( Q uI ) /d ? ? > 0 V n > \ ,
■I \W = WN E,F 1  'x = x NE>b = b NE 'x = x HE’b = b NE /
constitute an alternative proof that the equilibrium expected union loss under fully informed wage- 
setting is unambiguously higher than the equilibrium expected union loss under indexation to p  and 6 ,  
provided 0 < c u <  oo and 1 < n < oo .
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second channel involves aggregate demand, which affects union /  s welfare by being 
one of the factors which determine employment. This aggregate demand channel 
exists in both scenarios and operates via the contribution of union /  s instrument, 
whether the wage itself or bj, to price level determination, and hence to the 
determination also of real money balances and aggregate demand.
The conclusion which emerges from the above analysis is that when the underlying 
economic structure gives rise to a negative externality in the individual union’s setting 
of its instrument, the impact of this externality on unions’ equilibrium expected loss 
via the aggregate demand channel is less severe in the multiparameter indexation 
scenario than under fully informed wage-setting. This is because full indexation of 
wages to the price level maximises the responsiveness of aggregate demand to price- 
level movements, which in turn induces each non-atomistic union to exercise greater 
caution in setting its instrument, b j , than in the full-information scenario. While the
two scenarios also differ in how the externality works via the real wage channel, it 
turns out that the difference in the aggregate demand channel suffices to ensure that 
the externality in wage-setting under full information is always worse than the 
externality in indexation-parameter choice, provided of course that 0 <cu <00 and 
that unions are non-atomistic.
VI.3.1(vi) Socially Optimal Multiparameter Indexation 
We end this section by briefly considering the socially optimal multiparameter 
indexation scheme. Substituting (17) and (19b) into the unconditional expectation of 
(11) yields the expected social loss in terms of x  and b. Differentiating this expression 
with respect to x  and b in order to obtain a pair of simultaneous first-order conditions, 
and solving the latter, the unique socially optimal setting of the aggregate indexation 
parameter pair is found to be:
i  = 1_ £ £ C b £0 (42a)
r
b = 1 (42b)
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In order to gain some intuition for this result, note from (19b) that complete
stabilisation o f employment can by achieved by setting both indexation parameters at
unity, i.e. x = b = 1. Equations (42a) and (42b) indicate that when price-level
variability is immaterial to the social loss (i.e. when cs = 0 ), x = b = 1 would indeed
>
be the socially optimal indexation scheme. With cs > 0 , however, full indexation to
both the price level and the productivity shock leads to suboptimally high price-level 
variability. By decreasing x  marginally from unity whilst maintaining b = 1, a 
reduction in price-level variability can be obtained which, in its impact on social 
welfare, outweighs the undesirable increase in employment variability thereby 
incurred.18 This trade-off is optimally exploited when x = x , as given by (42a).
Since the solution pair (42a), (42b) differs from the equilibrium pair given by (32a) 
and (32b), it is apparent that unions’ equilibrium indexation decisions also have a 
negative externality with regard to social welfare. Although it is ambiguous whether 
or not equilibrium multiparameter indexation leads to higher employment variability 
than the socially optimal scheme, it is straightforward to show that if  society attaches 
a positive weight to the variability of the price level, so that cs > 0 , the equilibrium is
necessarily characterised by suboptimally high price-level variability. This point can 
be quickly demonstrated as follows. The variance o f the price level under the socially 
optimal scheme is:
r\r2<r} + <rl)
x=x,b=b (y2+csa 2yE p 2 , 2  * 2 \ 2  (43a)
Considered as a function of cs , this expression will be at a maximum in the limiting 
case in which c . -> 0 :
' <43b)
lim 77’ 2
18 It is apparent from (17) that dEp2/ d x >  0 if  (and only if) x  < l + [ / ( l - a ) / a ] . This result is 
essentially the same as that mentioned in Footnote 9 o f  Chapter V, a fact which is not surprising since it 
is clear from (17) that the value o f  b cannot affect the sign o f the derivative dEp2 / d x .
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The equilibrium scheme features x = 1, and our point can be made by evaluating the 
price-level variance, (17), for x = \:
Ep2 = a j +  (43c)
F  * Y ( ( - « )
It is clear that (43 b) and (43c) together imply that b < 1 is a sufficient (but not a 
necessary) condition for price-level variability to be suboptimally high from society’s 
viewpoint, and as we have seen, this condition is always satisfied in equilibrium 
provided cu > 0 .19
VI. 3.2 The Discretionary Monetary Regime
VI.3.2(i) Introductory Remarks and Derivation of the Monetary Reaction Function 
The purpose of this section is to show that the key results reported in the previous 
section for the simple-rule scenario also arise when the central bank has the 
discretionary power to adjust the money supply in response to the observed values of 
the shocks and after the realisation of the aggregate nominal wage. Consequently, in 
this scenario the individual union in deciding upon its optimal strategy must take into 
account the influence o f its indexation parameter choices on the central bank’s 
monetary reaction function, since this entity will clearly matter for the realised values 
of both the price level and aggregate demand, and hence for the real wage and 
employment.
Our first step, therefore, must be to derive the central bank’s optimal setting o f the 
money supply for given values of x, b and the two shocks. Relevant to this end is 
equation (16), which expresses the price level as a function of m , and which implies 
that Ep = Em.  Substituting (16) for p  and (7a) for w, in firm z’s labour-demand
19 Note that if  cu = 0 ,  so that xNE = b m = 1, equilibrium price-level variability w ill be equal to the 
socially optimal value only in the limit as cs -»  0 , and w ill otherwise exceed it. (If the reader is 
nonplussed as to why we have considered the limit as cs ->  0 in this passage rather than simply 
evaluate price-level variability for cs = 0 ,  note that this is owing to the fact that when cs = 0 society is 
indifferent to price-level variability, and the concept o f  a socially optimal price-level variance then 
obviously has no validity.)
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equation, (12), and aggregating across firms yields aggregate employment in terms of 
m, E m , x, b and the shocks:
/ =   \ r (  1 -  x)(m + 4 )  + [r( 1 -  b) -  (1 ■-  x)]e + a(1  x)l-£(1 x) r] Em 1
[K l-« )  + « ( l -^ ) ] l  [a + e( l -a) }  J
(44)
Since the central bank observes all variables (as well as the aggregate indexation 
parameters x  and b) before setting its instrument, the derivation of its optimal setting 
of m involves the following steps. Squaring our expressions for p  and /, as given 
respectively by (16) and (44), substituting these squares into the social loss function, 
( 11), and differentiating the result with respect to m , allows the central bank’s first- 
order condition dQs/dm = 0 to be formed. Applying the unconditional expectations 
operator to this first-order condition establishes that Em = 0 , and after taking this into
90account, the solution is found to be:
„ •  =  ^  +  w  -  * ) P  -  r C | - ,* ) ]  f  c , q  -  « X 1  -  ah)]}
m - x ) 2 +cs( l - a ) 2]
Appropriate substitutions involving (6), (7'b), (7'c) , 21 (12), (16) and (44) then 
yield the following expressions for the price level and its variance, as well as the 
variances of union/ s real wage and employment and their aggregate counterparts:
[ ( l - x ) 2 + c n - a ) 2]
,2 (1- x )  (1- 6)
[ ( l - ^ + c . a - a ) 2]2
Ep2 = 7  1 (47)
20 Note that both p  (equation (16)) and I (equation (44)) are undefined when jc = 1 + [ ^ ( 1 - « ) /« ] ,  and 
consequently m* is derived here on the assumption that x *  1 + [y(  1 -  a ) / a ] .
21 Note that since Ep = Em = 0 has been found to be the case under discretion, equation (13) implies 
that the wage equations (7a), (7b) and (7c) simplify to (7'a), (7'b) and (7 'c ) , just as under the 
simple rule.
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m  ^  J C 1 - ^ y X 1 -  ^ X 1 - * )  . L 1  2E ( W j - p )  = ’
[ o - ^ + c . o - a n
+ b ; > O'!2 -i ' “j \ 6 (48a)
El2 = 1 212[a + s ( \ - a ) \  [(1- x )  +cs( l - a )  ]
+ cs( l - a ) [ a ( \ - b )  + e ( l - a ) { l - b J)] c] (48b)
E ( w -  p ) 2 = (1 - x f + c . d - a f b  
( l - x ) 2 +cs( l - a ) 2
Ct (49a)
2 c2( \ - a ) 2( \ - b ) 2c 20
[ ( \ - x ) 2 +cs( l - a ) 2]2
(49b)
VI.3.2(ii) Efficient Multiparameter Indexation under Discretion 
The efficient indexation scheme satisfies the pair of simultaneous first-order 
conditions given by equations (20a) and (20b), with the expected union loss under 
symmetric indexation now given by (10) appropriately combined with (49a) and 
(49b). It turns out that there is an infinite set o f (x*,b*) solution pairs to the first-order 
conditions, and this infmite set can be succinctly represented as every (x,b) pair 
which satisfies the following equation:
x = l ±
cs{ \ -b [ \  + cu{ \ ~ a ) 2]}
1 / 2
(50)
where b < 1
[l + C„ ( l - a ) 2]
and b ^
1
[l + c„(l -a)2]
1- cur 2( i - a y  
c .a 2
Were unions symmetrically to set any particular admissible value of b which satisfies 
the restrictions stated in the previous line, the efficient outcome would be brought 
about by every union symmetrically indexing its wage to the price level in accordance
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with equation (50).22 By substituting (50) into (49a) and (49b), and the resulting 
expressions into the unconditional expectation of (10), it is easily shown that every 
possible (x*,b*) efficient solution pair results in the same value of the expected union 
loss, and that this value is given by the right-hand side of equation (26) above. This is 
not in the least surprising, since as we know, when velocity shocks are of no concern, 
efficient indexation which takes into account the behaviour of the price level, and the 
authorities’ monetary reaction function (if any), can always ensure the productivity 
shock’s impact is distributed between the real wage and employment in the most 
desirable way from unions’ collective viewpoint. It ought not to surprise us either, 
therefore, that two of the infinite set of efficient solution pairs have been encountered 
previously in this work. Setting b equal to zero in (50), we find that 
(x* = 1 ± f e / c u)1/2, b* = 0) is an efficient solution pair, and this is precisely the
efficient degree o f single-parameter indexation which was identified in Chapter V for 
the discretion scenario. Secondly, setting x  equal to unity in (50) and solving for b 
reveals that the unique efficient multiparameter indexation scheme for the simple-rule 
scenario is one of the infinite set of efficient schemes under discretion. The reason 
why there is an infinite set of efficient solutions, of course, is that the complete 
neutralisation of velocity shocks by the central bank creates a degree of freedom as 
regards the choice of x  and/or b which will bring about the efficient outcome for any 
particular realisation of the productivity shock. With these shocks the only source of 
macroeconomic variability, one of the two indexation instruments available to unions 
is superfluous, so far as achieving the efficient combination of employment and real 
wage variability is concerned.
VI.3.2(iii) Equilibrium Multiparameter Indexation under Discretion 
We begin this section by deriving the symmetric Nash equilibrium when unions are 
atomistic. The relevant first-order conditions defining union f  s optimal (xJ,bj )
choice are therefore given by equations (27a) and (27b) above. Combining
22 The restriction that the b which unions symmetrically adopt be such as to satisfy the inequality 
b < [1 + c u(l - a ) 2]-1 arises because non-real values are assumed to be inadmissible for x. The 
restriction that b not be equal to \\ + c u{ [ - a ) 2Y x\ \ - \ c uy 2( \ - a ) 2/ csa 2~\} arises because 
[a + y ( l - a ) \ / a  is not an admissible value for*.
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expressions (48a) and (48b) with the unconditional expectation of (10), differentiating 
this expected loss with respect to x. and b j , with x  and b taken as given, and
imposing symmetry (i.e. jc . = jcV/, bj = b \ / j ) on the resulting first-order conditions,
yields a pair of simultaneous equations which implicitly defines every (xNE,bNE)
solution pair for the atomistic case. As under efficient indexation, there is an infinite 
set of solutions, and each o f these symmetric Nash equilibria is a (x ,b ) pair which 
satisfies the following equation:
x = l ±
—ll /  2
c,(l ~ a)[£ ~ He + cu0  ~ oQfc + *(1 ~ <*)]}]
cu[a + s ( l - a ) ]
(51)
where b <
{s + cu( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ] }  
and b * ------------------1-------------------Ig _  cur \ l  -  a)[a + e(l -  a)]
{s + cu{\ - a ) [ a  + s(\  - a ) ] }  I csa
Provided the aggregate (i.e. average) degree of indexation o f wages to the 
productivity shock is less than s/{£ + cu( 1 - a)[a  + f( l -  « )]} , therefore, there exists a
particular degree of indexation to the price level (specifically, that given by (51)),
which, if it is expected to prevail by the individual atomistic union, leads the latter to
• • • ')'! adopt this expected (x,b ) pair as its own indexation scheme. The reason why there
is an infinite set of equilibria is ultimately because both the individual union’s
perceived trade-off between the real wage and employment in respect o f marginal
adjustments in xy, and the similar trade-off it faces in respect of marginal adjustments
in b j , are independent of x  and b in the atomistic case. This means that regardless of
the particular value union f  s expectations of x and b happen to have, it has an 
incentive to set xy and bj respectively equal to these expected values, provided x  and
b are related according to (51). Every such (x,b) pair constitutes a symmetric Nash
23 The reason why the restriction b < s / { s  + c„(l -  a ) [ a  + s( l  -  a ) ] }  must hold is that the equilibrium x 
implied by (51) is otherwise not a real number. Note, however, that one particular b value which 
satisfies this condition cannot feature as part o f  the equilibrium multiparameter indexation scheme, 
since it would require the symmetric degree o f  indexation to the price level to take the inadmissible 
value o f [a  + / ( l - a ) ] / a  . This particular b value is that stated in the second restriction immediately 
following equation (51).
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equilibrium, and may be denoted (xNE,bNE)atomjsliccase.2* It is clear that, provided 
0 < c u <co, equation (51) differs from (50), and hence that, in general, our familiar 
indexation externality also arises under discretion. (As usual, the externality is absent 
when cu = 0 , and when cu —><x> or £  - » co in the limit.)
A further noteworthy aspect of these findings for the atomistic case under discretion 
is that every possible (xNE,bNE) pair results in the same expected union loss, and that
this is given by (29), the expected loss for the equilibrium under the simple rule, 
which we know to be identical to the expected loss under discretion when atomistic 
unions simultaneously index their wages only to the price level. Because of the 
simultaneity of individual unions’ (xJ9bj) choices, an obvious implication of the fact
that the expected loss is the same for all possible equilibria, is that there are no strong 
a priori grounds for arguing that any particular one of the infinite set of (xNE,bNE)
solution pairs is more likely than others to arise. Notwithstanding this, however, there 
are two members of the infinite set which might be argued to have focal-point 
characteristics. The first of these is the solution which involves bNE = 0 , with xNE
consequently identical to expression (62a) or (62b) of Chapter V. This single­
parameter solution appears slightly more plausible than others on account of its 
relative simplicity as an indexation scheme. The second solution pair which may be a 
focal point is that which features xNE = 1, so that bNE takes the value it has under the
simple rule, and hence is given by equation (28b) of this chapter. The principal reason 
for arguing that atomistic unions may focus on this solution is simply that it can be 
thought of as prompted by a rule-of-thumb that the wage ought always to be indexed 
fully to the price level to protect real outcomes from aggregate demand disturbances 
(even when these are known to be neutralised by monetary policy), while the other 
indexation parameter serves as an allocator of the productivity shock’s impact 
between the real wage and employment. There is a second argument in its favour as a 
potential focal point, however, namely that when unions are non-atomistic there is a 
unique equilibrium multiparameter indexation scheme, and this unique solution pair
24 Since it is generally clear that the atomistic-case solution is the subject o f  discussion in the ensuing 
passage, we omit the cumbersome ‘atomistic case’ subscript below, apart from when it serves a useful 
purpose.
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involves full indexation to the price level (i.e. xNE = 1 when 1 < n < oo). We now turn 
to discuss this solution for the 1 < n < oo case.
Appropriately combining (48a) and (48b) once again to obtain EQ.", and
proceeding in an analogous fashion to that described earlier for the atomistic case, 
save that allowance is now made for the fact that dx/dxj and dbjdbj are no longer
assumed to be zero, but are instead both equal to \ /n ,  enables the first-order
conditions (30a) and (30b) to be derived. Imposing symmetry (x y = jcV/ ,bj = b\/j)  on
these equations, and solving for x and b, the unique real symmetric Nash equilibrium 
solution pair under discretion when 1 < n < oo is found to be identical to the only 
equilibrium identified earlier for the simple-rule scenario, namely that given by 
equations (32a) and (32b).25 Taking the limit of (32b) as n -»1 reveals that in this 
extreme case the unique equilibrium solution pair is a member of the infinite set of 
efficient solutions given by (50). For n > 1, however, the equilibrium solution pair 
differs, in general, from the efficient solution involving x  = 1. (The only exceptions 
are the usual extreme cases in which the externality does not arise, i.e. cu = 0 , and the
limiting cu —» oo and s  —» oo cases.) Hence the multiparameter indexation externality
0 (\found to characterise the atomistic case also arises when 1 < n < co . Furthermore, 
since for 1 < n < oo the unique equilibrium under discretion is identical to the only 
known equilibrium under the simple rule, it follows that the equilibrium expected 
union loss under discretion must be given by (33). It is straightforward to show that 
this loss is necessarily smaller than the equilibrium expected union loss which results 
from fully informed wage-setting under discretion. (The latter loss is given by 
equation (94) of Chapter III, evaluated for cr2 = 0 and p  = 1.) Clearly, our earlier
finding in respect o f the simple-rule scenario that the externality is weaker under 
multiparameter indexation than when wages are set in response to full information 
about the shocks is also true of discretion. This is ultimately attributable to the trade­
off faced by union j  being more favourable under fully informed wage-setting than
25 For the sake o f  completeness, we mention that there are also two other solution pairs to the pair o f  
simultaneous equations which implicitly define (xNE,bNE) ,  but that these are disregarded since they 
both involve a non-real value for x. Specifically, these two solution pairs are given by 
{x  = \ ± { \ - a ) [ - n c j { n - \ ) f \  b = \ ) .
26 Note that in the limit as n - >  oo , (32a) and (32b) reduce to a particular case subsumed by (51), 
namely that for which x  = 1 .
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under multiparameter indexation, regardless of the nature of the monetary regime, so
that in general the externality is always stronger under the former when 1 < n < oo.
We end this section with some comments on the uniqueness of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium when 1 < n < oo. The complexity o f union /  s first-order conditions for its
>
optimal (Xj,bj) pair makes it very difficult to devise satisfactory intuitive
explanations for this uniqueness, and for why the unique equilibrium involves each 
union indexing fully to the price level. Nevertheless, it is clear that the equilibrium’s 
uniqueness has to do with the fact that each non-atomistic union’s strategy choice has 
a non-negligible influence on the monetary reaction function, and hence also on price- 
level behaviour. It can be shown that union /  s perceived trade-offs between real wage 
and employment with respect to marginal adjustments in both x. and bj are
functionally dependent on x and hence on its own choice of x} ,27 It so happens that
because other unions’ strategy choices are beyond its influence, union /  s best 
strategy, given its rational expectation of other unions’ decisions, is unique, and 
involves setting x . at unity. This ensures that its real wage is fully insulated from both
monetary surprises and the indexation choices of other unions, and allows bj to be
devoted to the task of determining the impact of productivity shocks on its individual 
labour-market outcomes. O f course, every other union faces exactly the same 
incentives, and hence the unique equilibrium under discretion when 1 < n < co features
VI.4 Multiparameter Indexation of Wages to the Price Level and Output
VI.4(i) Introductory Remarks and Reduced Forms
This relatively brief section demonstrates that qualitatively very similar results to 
those described in Section VI.3 arise when the specification o f the multiparameter 
indexation scheme is given by equations (8a), (8b) and (8c). For convenience, this 
kind o f multiparameter indexation will be referred to as Kami indexation, since, as in 
Kami (1983), it involves each firm’s wage being indexed to aggregate output as well 
as to the price level. In the interests of brevity, we confine attention to the simple-rule
27 If one takes the trouble to derive expressions for these perceived trade-offs, they are found to be 
independent o f  b and b} .
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scenario, and omit all details of the derivations on account of their very close 
similarity to the steps described in previous sections.
Adopting our usual simple-rule normalisation of the fixed money supply at zero, the 
following semi-reduced forms for the price level, its variance, and the variances of 
union/  s real wage and employment, and of their aggregate counterparts, are found to 
arise. (Note that m = 0 once again leads to Em = Ep = wj = Wj =w = Ey = 0 being the
case.)
y ( \ - a  + ab')<l>-6 
[ y ( l - a  + ab') + a ( \ - x ) ]
2 _ y z(l — a  + ab')2 cr  ^+ <j 2
EpL = i: ~~y (53)
[y( 1 -  a  + a b ) + a (  1 -  jc ) ]
=v \2 r  [ab'j(l -  x) -  (1 -  a  + ab'){ 1 -  x  )) cr, + (yb) +1 -  x )  a e
E(w - p )  =  J------------- — -----------  * 7---------1------- (54a)
[y(l - a  + a b )  + a{  1 -  x)]
2 2 2 2 2
E l2 = ___________ /_ .I .1_i 9___________  (54b)
J [a + £■(! -  a ) f  [y( 1 -  a  + ab') + a (  1 -  jc ) ] 2
where: (px = a (  1 -  £b'j){ 1 - x )  + -  x}.)(1 -  a  + ab')
(p2 = y[z( 1 -  b’j)  -  a ( s  - 1)(1 -  b')] -  £:(1 -  Xj) + a {s  - 1)(1 -  x)
2 / 1  _ \ 2 / i  „ \ 2  2 , /  t  \ 2  2v2 y \  1 -  g ) '( l  -  xy<rj + (ybf + 1 -  x)V ,
E(w -  p Y  = — ------ — ----- r ■ ■ ---------------------------------------- (55a)
[ y ( \ - a  + ab') + a ( \ - x ) \ 2
r2 y L (1 -  x f  a# + [ /( l -  b') -  (1 -  x ) f  a] 
[y(l - a  + ab') + a (  1 -  jc ) ]
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Chapter VII 
Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the nature of wage-setting and indexation externalities 
in an economy featuring potentially non-atomistic monopoly trade unions and 
monopolistically competitive firms, as well as the implications of such externalities 
for the optimal design of the monetary regime, including information-disclosure 
practices in respect of supply shocks. It has been assumed throughout that labour is 
homogenous, and that each union is the sole representative o f the immobile potential 
workforce of its associated employer firms. The thesis consequently belongs to a 
particular strand of literature within the broader corpus of research on wage-related 
macroeconomic externalities, namely that which includes Bratsiotis and Martin 
(1999), Soskice and Iversen (2000) and Coricelli et al. (2006), and which is distinct 
from related strands which assume that each union is either inflation-averse and/or 
represents a particular type of skilled labour (so that the unions are themselves 
monopolistically competitive). A principal aim of this work has been to provide a 
thorough analysis of the underlying source of these externalities. However, in addition 
to doing so, it has also sought to extend their investigation to a stochastic framework 
in which unions either possess noisy information regarding productivity shocks at the 
time wages are set, or practise wage indexation in an attempt to allocate the impact of 
shocks between the real wage and employment in accordance with the pattern which 
they prefer. The four chapters of the thesis which report research results are therefore 
divisible into two groups according to whether the chapters in question largely focus 
on synthesising, and providing new insights into, closely related models which are 
already established in the literature (Chapter II), or alternatively contribute more 
substantially to macroeconomic theory by introducing into precursor models, such as 
those of Kami (1983), Ball (1988) and Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), various 
features to be found in other lines of research (Chapters III, V and VI).
The second chapter of the thesis investigated the optimal design o f the monetary 
regime when the basic model common to all the research chapters lacks stochastic 
shocks. The analysis was conducted in respect o f two alternative specifications of the 
union loss function, which differ according to whether the loss function’s real wage 
term is linear or quadratic. Commencing with the simple-rule scenario in which the
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money supply is always kept fixed, an investigation was undertaken o f the externality 
which arises under simultaneous wage-setting, when each union would individually 
benefit were it to receive a real wage and employment combination that differs from 
the combination that would be brought about by means of efficient coordinated wage- 
setting by all unions. This externality was explained in terms of a difference between 
the slope of the labour demand curve which each union perceives itself to face, and 
the slope of the aggregate-level labour demand curve, with these slopes being 
identical for a single economy-wide union, or if the goods market is perfectly 
competitive. The externality was generally found to be stronger, the larger the number 
of unions, and the less competitive the goods market. The analysis was also 
undertaken in respect of various monetary rules which prescribe a particular response 
to the realised value of an aggregate variable which is functionally dependent on the 
aggregate nominal wage: specifically, rules specified in terms of monetary responses 
to the price level, nominal income or employment were analysed. Importantly, and 
unlike previous papers to have considered such rules, no arbitrary restrictions were 
imposed on the set o f values potentially taken by the monetary-response parameter in 
each of these rules. It was found that a rule which implies a high degree o f monetary 
accommodation of wages can induce non-atomistic unions to set the market-clearing 
nominal wage. This key result was explained in terms of the effect which the rule’s 
specified monetary response to the aggregate variable has on the slope of the 
individual non-atomistic union’s perceived labour demand curve. A parallel result was 
found to obtain for the delegation scenario in which a particular objective function is 
assigned to a discretionary central bank. If this objective function features a particular 
negative relative weight on inflation, the implied functional relationship between the 
money supply and wages, and the resulting perceived trade-off between real wage and 
employment faced by each non-atomistic union, are then such as to induce it to set the 
market-clearing nominal wage. This result, implicit in the model of Coricelli et al. 
(2004a, 2006), was argued to have been overlooked by them on account of their 
having restricted the central bank’s weight parameter to be non-negative. It was also 
argued that the result ought perhaps to be regarded as a theoretical curiosity, since a 
non-negativity restriction is entirely plausible when central bankers are empowered to 
conduct monetary policy in accordance with their own personal preferences. 
(Although this restriction is somewhat less justifiable when the extent of their 
independence is limited to their choice of instrument settings, and does not extend to
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the formulation of policy goals.) The chapter concluded by emphasising the potential
relevance o f the Cubitt (1997) critique to this strand of literature, namely that the
underlying wage-setting externality which enables design features of the monetary
regime to influence real outcomes may not arise if unions, in formulating their real
>
wage and employment targets, take into account the constraints implied by the 
economy’s structure.
The third, fifth and sixth chapters extended this analysis of wage-related 
externalities to the case o f an economy subject to stochastic productivity and velocity 
shocks. In addition to the introduction of shocks, two other key features were also 
added to the framework of the first chapter. The first o f these is the specification of 
the representative union’s loss function, which captures the intuitively plausible idea 
that each union is averse to variability in both its employment and its real wage. The 
second additional key feature is the assumption that unions commonly receive a 
potentially noisy signal o f the productivity shock prior to the determination of 
contract nominal wages. (This assumption was relevant only to the wage-setting 
scenario o f Chapter III, and not to the indexation scenarios considered in later 
chapters.) In each chapter, the analysis was conducted in respect o f both a simple-rule 
scenario in which the money supply is kept fixed, regardless of shock realisations, and 
an activist scenario in which the central bank adjusts its instrument in a discretionary 
fashion after wage contracts have been concluded, and in the light of full information 
regarding the realised values of aggregate shocks. For both regime scenarios, adverse 
externalities were found to appertain to union wage-setting and indexation decisions, 
with the symmetric Nash equilibrium nominal wage differing, in general, from the 
efficient wage that would arise were unions to abide by an agreement to coordinate 
their decisions: as a consequence, real wage variability is inefficiently low, and 
employment variability inefficiently high. These externalities were shown to have 
numerous qualitative affinities with the externality which arises in the non-stochastic 
model o f Chapter II: in particular their severity is reduced by stronger goods-market 
competition and a smaller number of unions, while each externality was again found 
to be explicable in terms of a departure of the individual union’s perceived labour 
demand curve (appropriately defined) from its aggregate counterpart.
The wage-setting externality of Chapter III was found to relate only to the 
component of each productivity shock that is anticipated by unions, and hence to be 
dependent on the quality of the signals that unions receive. This finding leads directly
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to one of the third chapter’s principal contributions to the literature, namely that in the 
presence of the identified wage-setting externality, a change in information quality 
has potentially important implications for the variability of employment and output. A 
marginal deterioration in signal quality has, in general, two offsetting effects on 
employment variability: a beneficial effect involving mitigation o f the externality, and 
a detrimental effect involving the increased variance of union forecast errors 
regarding productivity shocks. It was shown that under both the simple rule and the 
activist regime, there may exist a subset of admissible values for the representative 
union’s relative-weight parameter, for which the beneficial externality-mitigating 
effect of greater signal noise on employment variability may outweigh the detrimental 
forecast-error effect. Another of the key results of this part of the thesis is that when 
unions are non-atomistic, greater central-bank conservatism can reduce both 
employment variability and price-level variability, a theoretical result that fits better 
with the empirical stylised facts than do the theoretical predictions of the Rogoff 
model. The result is attributable to the effect of greater conservatism, and the implied 
change in the monetary, reaction function, on the individual union’s wage-setting 
behaviour. In particular, greater conservatism mitigates the wage-setting externality 
and hence reduces both the component of employment variability relating to the 
anticipated component o f shocks, and the associated stochastic inflation bias. These 
two beneficial effects, together with a reduction in the component of price-level 
variability arising from union forecast errors o f shocks, can outweigh greater 
conservatism’s only drawback in this situation, namely that the component of 
employment variability relating to union forecast errors becomes suboptimally large. 
The final part of Chapter III addressed the issue of optimal delegation, and envisaged 
a scenario involving economic transparency: in other words, whereas previously the 
quality of signals received by unions had been assumed to be exogenous, the variance 
of signal noise was instead assumed to be a choice-variable of the central bank. In this 
situation, a particular value of the central bank’s weight parameter was identified as 
crucially significant for the optimal choice of central banker. Depending on how the 
actual union weight parameter compares with this critical value, the optimal appointee 
is found to be either a representative central banker (who would choose entirely to 
deny unions useful information regarding shocks), or an ultraconservative instructed 
to practise full transparency.
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The remaining chapters of the thesis analysed the externalities which arise in respect 
of union indexation decisions. In this part of the thesis, the assumption that unions 
receive a common signal of the productivity shock was discarded, with allowance 
instead being made for indexation of the nominal wage either solely to the price level 
(Chapter V), or to both the price level and a second aggregate variable (Chapter VI). 
These chapters advance the literature by demonstrating that externalities may well 
arise when unions are averse to variability in both employment and the real wage. (In 
previous papers the existence of externalities has depended on arguably rather 
arbitrary assumptions in respect of supply-side features, while in the case of 
multiparameter indexation no previous contribution to the meagre literature on this 
topic has considered a model in which the degrees o f indexation are endogenously 
determined.) For the single-parameter scenario, it was found that the externality leads 
to an inefficiently high degree of indexation in equilibrium, and is found to be much 
the same in its qualitative effects under both of the monetary regimes considered. 
Although there are some minor differences in results between the two regime 
scenarios, these differences are attributable to the neutralisation of velocity shocks 
achieved under activist policy, so that indexation then resembles fully informed wage- 
setting, in that it becomes purely a matter of ensuring the nominal wage adjusts in 
such a way as to bring about the individual union’s preferred productivity-shock 
impact-pattem across employment and the real wage. This is also true of the various 
multiparameter indexation schemes that were considered, since full indexation of the 
wage to the price level ensures complete insulation of real outcomes from velocity 
shocks, so that the efficient impact pattern may be achieved by an appropriate degree 
of indexation to either the shock, or to an aggregate variable which depends upon it, 
such as output or employment. It was found that endogenous multiparameter 
indexation exhibits an adverse externality with characteristics familiar from other 
parts of the thesis. The finding of greatest interest with regard to this issue, however, 
was that, provided unions are non-atomistic, the multiparameter-indexation 
externality is less severe than the externality which arises under fully informed wage- 
setting. This was explained in terms of the fact that the price level is more sensitive to 
each union’s strategy choice under such a scheme, than it is when wages are adjusted 
directly in response to signals.
The overall message o f this work, therefore, is that the combination of a unionised 
labour market and monopolistic competition gives rise to macroeconomic externalities
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which potentially have considerable significance for the optimal design of monetary 
institutions. It seems appropriate to end by suggesting several possible further 
extensions to the analysis. One rather obvious gap in the literature is that it has yet to 
be demonstrated that the quadratic union loss function used in much of the thesis (and 
which, it will be recalled, implies an aversion to variability in both the real wage and 
employment about their mean values), is consistent with any standard utility function 
which might be postulated for a representative union member. (Intuition suggests that 
risk-aversion as regards both real-income and hours-of-work outcomes may plausibly 
be assumed to characterise such individuals.)
Numerous (but by no means all) sections of the thesis have assumed that the central 
bank can influence monetary conditions, and hence aggregate demand, at more 
frequent intervals than wages can be adjusted. As mentioned in Chapter I, the extent 
to which this assumption is appropriate remains controversial, and hence modified 
versions of our wage-setting models in which adjustments to the monetary instrument 
have a lagged, rather than immediate, effect on aggregate demand seem worthy of 
investigation, especially if combined with either the potential incidence of control 
errors in the setting o f the monetary instrument, or the introduction of ‘intrinsic’ 
uncertainty (i.e. regarding a discretionary policymaker’s type, and hence the implied 
monetary response to shocks and the aggregate wage). Another simplifying 
assumption which might be relaxed concerns the joint distribution of the (log) 
productivity shock and noise term in the unions’ observed signal, s = 6 + u .  An 
alternative formulation in which Q and u are multiplicatively, rather than additively, 
related (so that s = 6 u , with E(u) = 1) might be attempted, although the success of 
this venture will obviously depend on whether the resulting model’s tractability is 
seriously impaired by any complications relating to the representative union’s implied 
optimal forecasting equation. Further modifications might also be made in respect of 
this thesis’ abstraction, in common with much o f the literature, from firm-union 
bargaining over the real wage and employment. A version of the model of Chapter III 
which allows for an initial bargaining stage, with the representative union’s 
bargaining power functionally dependent on the strength o f the expected productivity 
shock, /3s, might well yield further insights.
Several possibilities for future work also arise in respect of the indexation models 
presented in the thesis. Firstly, the findings of Hutchison and Walsh (1998), as well as
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preliminary work by the present author, suggest that when unions practise single­
parameter wage indexation, a scenario in which an activist central bank observes 
aggregate shocks but is subject, in its instrument setting, to random control errors, is 
not equivalent to a passive monetary policy scenario in which aggregate shocks do not 
induce a policy response. Despite unions being exposed to outcome-uncertainty as a 
result o f unpredictable movements in aggregate demand in both scenarios, the fact 
that the (intended) instrument setting is adjusted in response to the foreseen 
component of the productivity shock in one scenario, but not in the other, appears to 
lead to significant differences in the equilibrium degree of indexation. Further 
investigation o f this result is therefore obviously warranted. Secondly, the fact that 
figures for aggregate output are typically subject to major revisions following their 
initial publication, suggests the need for a version of the endogenous Kami indexation 
model of Chapter VI in which y  is not (as therein assumed) observable with complete 
accuracy at the date on which the contract wage is paid. Thirdly, one other obvious 
proposal for future work involving the indexation models of this thesis is to address 
the critical observations o f Jadresic (2002), by conducting the analysis with wages 
indexed to lagged inflation, instead of the expectational error regarding inflation for 
the period covered by the wage contract.
It is fitting that our very last paragraph be devoted to the potentially most fruitful 
class of modifications of the models presented in previous chapters. These involve 
relaxing the assumptions made throughout this work, and largely in accordance with 
the prevailing practice in the literature, that the productivity shock is identical across 
firms, and that agents only observe a common signal of each aggregate shock, and do 
not additionally observe a firm- or union-specific private signal o f that aggregate 
shock. However, as shown recently in James and Lawler (2007), allowing for firm- 
specific shocks or signals which have a non-zero common component introduces 
further subtle issues which may be significant for optimal monetary-regime design. 
This particular paper shows that when perfectly competitive firms are subject to 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and the wage at each firm is set at the value that is 
expected to clear the labour market, greater dedication of monetary policy to price- 
level stabilisation also achieves greater employment stability. This is attributable to 
the fact that at each firm in such an economy, deviations of employment from the 
market-clearing level can only occur as a result of expectational errors regarding the 
price level. It would be a relatively straightforward step to introduce into this setting
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monopolistic competition and union concerns to stabilise the real wage as well as 
employment. Space constraints, however, compel us to leave this task to the future.
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Appendices to Chapter II
Appendix II. 1: Derivation o f  the Individual F irm ’s Profit-Maximising Price and 
Labour Demand
Firm i observes the productivity shock, 6 , as well as the aggregate price level p  and 
the realised value of the money supply, m, at the time it choose its individual price, 
/?,, to maximise its profits, with the contract nominal wage, w,, predetermined. The
firm’s price decision then implies it has a particular demand for labour services. The 
key equations for the firm’s optimisation exercise are the versions in levels of its 
production function and individual product-demand function:
Where capital letters denote quantities in levels and e is the base of the natural 
logarithm. C0 and Q  are constants which may be normalised appropriately in order
to eliminate constants from the expressions for the individual firm’s optimal price and 
labour demand. Since these innocuous normalisations are of no interest, all constants 
are henceforth suppressed from the expressions in this appendix.
Firm z’s profit in levels is:
By making use o f the fact that Yts = YjD =Yn  i.e. continuous market-clearing 
characterises the goods market, and also of the fact that (A.II. 1.1.) implies that 
Z, = Y f ae~e'a , firm z’s profit may, after appropriate substitutions, be written as 
follows:
(A.II. 1.1)
(A.II. 1.2)
(A.II. 1.3)
(A.II. 1.4)
Firm Vs first-order condition for its profit-maximising price is therefore:
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^ ■  = (1 - e ) Y DP sp - s + ^ p rDP‘p - <-e*a)e-s f ‘‘Wl = 0 (A.II.1.5)
Solving for the optimal P it it is found to be:
P," = \ v « ( Y DP ef - a)e -<l] lla*‘"~a'j] (A.II. 1.6)
Substituting Y D - { M e ^ / p y  into (A.II. 1.6) and taking logs, the optimal log price of 
firm i is:
= { ( l -a )[ y (m  + t )  + ( s - r ) p ]  + <*Wi-0} (A I I 171
[a + £ ( \ -a ) }
Combining this expression with the logarithmic versions of (A.II. 1.1) and (A.II. 1.2) 
allows firm Vs optimal log demand for labour to be derived:
jd = [r(m + j - p ) - s ( W j  - p )  + ( e - 1)0] II
[a + e(L-a)]
For the sake of completeness we demonstrate that P*, as given by (A.II. 1.6), does 
satisfy the second-order condition for a maximum. The second derivative o f IT, with 
respect to /J is:
= £{s -  1)Y dP £P-(£+1) -  t  lYDp EP ^ E+2aV d ) /a W, (A.II. 1.9)
dP2 a 2 v ■
Tl, is maximised when P. = P* if, and only if, {p2! ! ^  dP2\ . < 0 . Making use of
I Pj =Pj
(A.II. 1.9) and o f the facts that Wn Y D,P  and Pt are all strictly positive, it follows that 
the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied if (and only if):
/ *\[««(i-a)]/a (£ + ct)[{YDP £f - a)e-9]xla Wi
a 2( s - 1)
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Substituting for P*, as given by (A.II. 1.6), and simplifying, this condition boils down 
to: a[a{s  -1 ) -1] < s . This condition does hold, since s  > 1 and 0 < a  < 1. Hence the 
second-order condition for P* to be the Pt which maximises IT, is indeed satisfied.
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Appendix II. 2: Derivation o f  the Symmetric-Wage Labour Demand Curve 
As explained in the text, the term ‘symmetric-wage labour demand curve’ is used in 
this thesis to refer to the labour demand curve in real wage, employment space when 
every union sets the same wage (w; =w V  j ) .  The symmetric-wage labour demand
curve is a special case of the aggregate-level labour demand curve. To derive the 
equations o f these two curves, we make use of the semi-reduced form for the price 
level, (12)1, and the aggregate counterpart to (7) (the individual union’s labour 
demand curve), after modifying these expressions for the velocity shock, and the 
productivity shock, 0.
/ ( I  -  a){m + </)) + a w  -  0 
[a + y ( l~ a )]
(A.II.2.1)
j _ y{m + </>- p ) -  s(w - p )  + ( s - 1)0 
[a + s ( \ - a ) ]
(A.II.2.2)
(A.II.2.1) implies that the aggregate real wage is:
y(\ -  a)(w  - m -(/)) +6 
[ct + y ( \ - a ) ]
(A.II.2.3)
Substituting (A.II.2.1) into (A.II.2.2), we have:
I -y (w -m -< /> ) + ( y - l ) 0  
[a + y ( \ - a ) ]
(A.II.2.4)
The slope of the aggregate-level labour demand curve is given by:
dl _ dl/dw _ 1 (A.II.2.5)
d ( w - p )  d ( w - p ) /d w  ( l - « )
All equation numbers in appendices relating to Chapter II which lack an ‘A ’ prefix refer to equations 
in Chapter II.
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Since /J = 0 implies that market-clearing employment is zero, the market-clearing 
nominal wage under symmetric wage-setting implied by (A.II.2.4) is:
=m + 0 + ^  e  (A.II.2.6)
Substituting (A.II.2.6) into (A.II.2.3), the market-clearing real wage is found to be:
O  -  P ~) market-clearing = 9 (A.II.2.7)
This finding implies that the intercept o f the aggregate-level labour demand curve is 
0/(1 -  a ) . Hence the aggregate-level labour demand curve’s equation is:
/ = _ J w _ £ )  + 0 (A.II.2.8)
(1 -  a )
Although in deriving this expression use has been made of semi-reduced forms for the 
simple rule, it is in fact independent of the monetary regime and could alternatively 
have been derived by making use of the semi-reduced forms for one of the other 
monetary regimes. The aggregate-level labour demand curve simply relates average 
employment to the average real wage and the realised value of the productivity shock, 
and the only structural parameter which matters for this relationship is the 
productivity-related parameter a . The symmetric-wage labour demand curve is a 
special case of the aggregate-level curve, since it assumes that nominal wage-setting 
is symmetric. It is therefore convenient to write the equation of the symmetric-wage 
labour demand curve as follows:
-  ( W :  -  p )  +  6
v ; (A.II.2.9)
W j = w V j  ( l - « )
This equation has been expressed in terms of union f s  labour demand and real wage, 
rather than their aggregate counterparts, in order to stress the fact that the real 
outcomes for the individual union must lie on the symmetric-wage labour demand
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curve whenever there is symmetric wage-setting, w . = w V j . Thus the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium in wages, as well as any outcome arising from coordinated wage-
j
setting, must satisfy equation (A.II.2.9).
2 I f  equation (A .II.2 .9) is satisfied, equation (A .II.2.8) must necessarily also be satisfied.
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Appendix II. 3: Derivation o f  the Individual Union’s Perceived Labour Demand Curve
under the Price Level Rule fo r  the Non-Stochastic Model
As explained in Chapter II, union f  s perceived labour demand curve is the set of
points in employment, real wage space attainable by union j  given every other union
>
sets the same nominal wage. There is an infinite set of possible perceived labour 
demand curves, one for every nominal wage on which the other n - 1 unions could 
coordinate their wage-setting. However the two perceived labour demand curves 
which are of particular interest are those passing through the efficient and equilibrium 
outcomes. This appendix derives the equations of these curves for the case of the price 
level rule, as given by (14), and when the union loss function is given by (29). Our 
task is to derive the vertical intercept and slope coefficient in the equation:
djD
1j = c » +  , ,  ' M i ~ P )  (A.II.3.1)d(w. -  p)
Equations (7), (14) and (15) imply that demand for union/  s labour as a function of its 
individual wage, w ., and the aggregate wage, w, is:
j D = a V£ + / f a  ~ ! ) >  ~ £la  + / ( 1 ~ oQ(l -  ij)]wy
J [a + s(l - a ) ] [ a  + y (1 -  a)(  1 -  xx)]
Equation (15) implies that union/ s real wage is:
w i - p  = w - -----------------   (A.II.3.3)
[a + y ( l - a ) (  1-Ti)]
The slope coefficient in (A.II.3.1) is the ratio of the derivatives with respect to w - of 
(A.II.3.2) and (A.II.3.3):
d lj d lf  / dw j -  (yg + sA) + r[cc + ns(  1 -  «)]r, ( a  I I 3 4)
d (Wj -  p) d(Wj -  p)/d\Vj [a + s(  1 -  a )] [A -  n y (1 -  a )r x ]
This slope coefficient is the same for every possible perceived labour demand curve.
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With the union’s loss function given by (29), the efficient outcome 
is I* = lu -  c'u (1 -  a ) , (Wj -  p)* = (1 -  a)[c'u ( \ - a ) - l u]. Substituting these values 
together with (A.II.3.4) into (A.II.3.1) allows us to solve for the vertical intercept C0.
For the case of the price level rule, the equation of union /  s perceived labour demand 
curve which passes through the efficient outcome is therefore found to be:
jD ^  (n -  \)a[a + y ( I )] [/„ -  c'u (1 -  a)] + {-(ya  + gA) + y[a + n s ( \ -  opfc} (wy -  p) 
j [a  + f ( l - a ) ] [A -« y ’( l - a ) r 1)]
(A.II.3.5)
For the case o f the simple rule, mr - m  (i.e. rl = 0 ), this becomes:
J l r , = 0
(n - 1  )a[a  + / ( I  -  a)] [lu -  c'u (1 -  a)\ -  (ya + eh)(Wj -  p)  
[a + s(l -  or)]A
(A.II.3.6)
Employment and the real wage in the symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome are given 
by (67a) and (67b) respectively, and combining these with (A.II.3.1) and (A.II.3.4) 
yields the equation of uniony’s perceived labour demand curve which passes through 
the equilibrium outcome:
/ ? = -----------------zl--------------------
[a + e(\ -  a)] [A -  ny{ 1 -  a)xx ] 
+ ( n - 1 )a[a + y(\ -  a)(  1 -  t x)]
{ya + s A -  y[a + ns(l -  a)\ux}(wj ~ P)
e:[« + g( l -g )][A-ny(l-«)T i]  j
{ya + sA -  y[a + ns(\ -  a )]^}
(A.II.3.7)
In the case of the simple rule (r, = 0 )  this becomes:
-1
j lr=0 [a + f ( l-« ) ]A
(ya + sA){Wj - p )  + (n - 1 )a[a + y( 1 -  a )] c'u [a + f ( l-a ) ]A  
(ya + sA)
(A.II.3.8)
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Appendix II. 4: The Socially Optimal Wage-Contingent Monetary Rule 
This appendix derives the socially optimal monetary rule, specified as a response to 
the aggregate nominal wage. It is assumed that 1 < n < oo, that the rule, mr , is fully
credible (so that Emr -  mr), and that the individual union’s loss function is given by
*
(29). Using (7) and (12), the demand for union f  s labour and its real wage, expressed
n
as functions of mr and w = (l/ n ) ^ w  . , are:
y=i
jD = r\a+ g ( i  -  q Q K  +  a(£ -  r>  -  £\a + rO- -  g ) ] w y (a i\4 \)
J [a + £ ( \ -a ) ] [a  + y ( l - a ) ]
W j - p  = wJ -  L/f  ™ (A.II.4.2)
The total derivatives o f these expressions with respect to Wj are:
<  = 1 
d\Vj [a + y(\ -  a)] r
dm. (ya + sA) 
n[a + f ( l  -  a )]
(A.II.4.3)
d { W j - p )  
dw ,
1
n[a + y(l - a ) ]
A - n y ( l - a ) (A.II.4.4)
Using (29), union f  s first-order condition for its optimal wage, w**, is:
dEQu f  d ! i  1II to Q j- K )
J
. d W j { d w , )
- c
, d ( W j- p )
dw.
=  0 (A.II.4.5)
where E  is the rational expectations operator. Substituting (A.II.4.3) and (A.II.4.4) 
into (A.II.4.5) with /. = 1° ,  and noting that the rule is assumed to be credible, and that 
union /  s rational expectation of the wages set by other unions is its own optimal
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wage, we may impose w . = wV/' to obtain an equation which implicitly defines the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium nominal wage, wNE:
W N E  =  m r L _  +
[a + 1 -  a)]
K O  -  a )  + (r«  + «A)/« - < [ «  + e(l -  a)]A
{ny[a + f ( l -  a )] x 
(A.II.4.6)
Equation (A.II.4.1) implies that employment in the symmetric Nash equilibrium 
(which involves w . = wNEV j ) is:
i\
NE [a + y(l -  a )]
(A.II.4.7)
The associated price level outcome is:
y ( l - a ) ( m r\ ) + aw N E
[a + y(\ -  a)]
(A.II.4.8)
Substituting (A.II.4.7) and (A.II.4.8) into the social loss function, (9'), yields:
Qs
r 2(m \  - w NEf  + c ,[ y ( \ -a ) ( m \  ) + a w NE]
[a + y ( l - a ) Y
(A.II.4.9)
If we conjecture that the optimal rule is of the form3 mr = (dmr/d w )w , substitute this 
and (A.II.4.6) into (A.II.4.9), and minimise the equilibrium social loss by choice of 
the rule parameter, d m j d w , the optimal rule emerges as:
3 It turns out that if  we include a constant term in the conjectured optimal rule, so that 
mr + (dmr/ d w ) w , the optimal setting o f the constant m is zero if  d m j d w  is chosen optimally. 
To shorten this appendix we therefore omit m from the conjectured optimal rule.
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* {c'u[a + £ ( \ - a ) \ h - ( y a  + £K)lu} m = —ii--------   - ^ w
y[a  + s{\ -  a)][c'u( \ - c c ) - l u]
(A.II.4.10)
It is straightforward to convert this into the optimal price level rule, m*r = x \ p , 
where r* is given by (71). To do so, we make use of the fact that the semi­
reduced from for p , namely p  = [y(l -  a)mr + aw ]/[a  + y(l -  a )], implies that 
w = {[a + y ( \ - c c ) ] p - Y ( \ - a ) m r} l a . Substituting this into (A.II.4.10) and 
manipulating to isolate mr on the left-hand side, yields m* = r * p . Similar procedures 
involving the semi-reduced form for output, y  = ya{mr -  w )/[a  + y( 1 -  a )] , allow the 
derivation o f the optimal nominal income rule, m*r = T*2(y + p ) , and the optimal 
employment rule, m*r = r 37 , where r*2 and r 3* are respectively given by equations 
(100) and (108).
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Appendix II. 5: Equilibrium Wage-Setting in the Non-Stochastic Model with 
Endogenised Union Real Wage Objective 
The wage-setting model with union loss function given by (30) described in Chapter 
II is modified here to allow for an initial stage in which unions simultaneously choose 
their individual real wage objectives. The real wage objective for union j  will be 
denoted w "? , so that its individual loss now becomes:
n ;  = Q, - K f +  c.<y>j - p -  < ; ' ) 2 (a.ii.5.1)
The preference parameters lu and cu are here regarded as primitive and immutable. 
As explained in Chapter II, once lu has been assigned a particular value, symmetric
wage-setting and goods-market clearing implies that every union’s employment and 
real wage outcome will be related according to the aggregate-level labour demand 
curve, I = - ( w -  p ) / ( \ - a ) . Hence if lu happens to be the employment outcome of 
the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the wage-setting game, the associated real wage 
outcome will be (w -  p )I = -(1 -  a)l  . ’Given this structural constraint, and the
assumption that lu is a fundamental component o f union /  s preferences, it follows
that insofar as w™1 * -(1  -cc)lu, this individual real wage objective has an element of
arbitrariness to it. This appendix investigates union /  s equilibrium choice of
when each and every union recognises the existence of this structural constraint and 
this fact is common knowledge. Any of the monetary regimes considered in Chapter 
II will serve our purpose here, and for convenience we make use o f the price level 
rule, mr = t xp . The individual union will foresee that once an aggregate real wage
n
objective, wrueal (where wrueal = n~] ^  wrj° l ) has been determined, the equilibrium
j =i
employment outcome of the subsequent simultaneous-move wage-setting game will 
be given by equation (123b) of Chapter II, which we reproduce here, appropriately 
renumbered, for convenience:
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realI | _ {ya + e h  -  y[a + n s ( \ -  a)]Tx}lu - c u[a + s ( l - a ) ] [ A - n y ( l - a ^ ^ w *
3 ya(  1 -  rj) + {e + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £(1 -  a ) ] } [A -  ny(  1 -  a ) t x]
(A.II.5.2)
Union j  will recognise that in equilibrium I. and (wy -  p)  must be related according
to the equation of the symmetric-wage labour demand curve, and taking this into 
account its rational expectation of its loss function, (A.II.5.1), at the time unions are 
simultaneously choosing their individual real wage objectives, can be rewritten as 
follows:
£ (Q “ ) = (/J ~ luY  + c  [ - ( l - a ) / J  (A.II.5.3)
J  M '=wi/F J \ w = w ne  “ J \ w = W Ue U’J
where E  is the rational expectations operator. Union j  foresees that its w™1 choice can 
influence its loss not only directly, but also indirectly via equilibrium employment, to 
the determination of which wr*a]  contributes via the aggregate real wage objective
real 
Wu •
Substituting (A.II.5.2) into (A.II.5.3), and minimising by choice o f w™1, taking 
other unions’ choices of real wage objective as given, yields a first-order condition for 
union /  s optimal choice o f wr°a] . By imposing = w™al V j  in this first-order 
condition (which we omit because of its length), an equation implicitly defining the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium wrueal is obtained. Solving this equation, the individual 
union’s equilibrium choice of real wage objective is found to be:
< %  = -(} ~<x)h (A.II.5.4)
Hence, irrespective o f n, each union in equilibrium chooses a real wage objective 
which is consistent with the employment objective o f lu . Note that this conclusion
also applies, with some uninteresting minor complications, when the loss function is 
given by (28), i.e. features both a quadratic and a linear term in the real wage, the 
reason being that given /u , cu and c'u are common to all unions, union f s  implied real
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wage objective (i.e. the real wage coordinate of its bliss point) , ( c '/c a) + vu has an
element of arbitrariness to it, and it is the notional real wage objective, vu j9 which is
the source of this arbitrariness. As mentioned in Chapter II, things are rather different 
in the case of union loss function (29), which features no quadratic term in the real 
wage but rather only a linear real wage term, since with this specification the 
preference parameter which is the ultimate source of the wage-setting externality, 
namely the weight c ' , is primitive, and therefore cannot be endogenised.
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Appendices to Chapter III
Appendix III.l: Derivation o f  the Individual Union’s Perceived Labour Demand
Curve under the Simple Rule fo r  the Stochastic Model
*
In the stochastic version of the model, union f  s perceived labour demand curve is 
the set of points in employment, real wage space attainable by union j  given every 
other union sets the same nominal wage, and given also that union f  s rational 
expectation of the shock proves correct (i.e. given fis = G) . As in the non-stochastic 
model, given the conditional expectation of the shock, E{6 \ s) = f s , there is an 
infinite set of possible perceived labour demand curves, one for every nominal wage 
on which the other n -1  unions could coordinate their wage-setting. We confine our 
attention, however, to the two perceived labour demand curves which are of particular 
interest, namely those passing through the efficient and equilibrium outcomes. We 
assume the prevailing monetary regime is the simple rule, according to which the 
money supply is kept fixed, and as in Section 3 o f Chapter III this appendix 
normalises m at zero, and abstracts from velocity shocks.
For each of the two perceived labour demand curves, our task is to derive the 
vertical intercept and slope coefficient in the equation:
diD
E (lf  \s) = C Q + -/ E[(Wj - p ) \ s ]  (A.III. 1.1)
d ( W j - p )
Equations (6), (13 ') and (15) o f Chapter III imply that union f  s conditional 
expectation of the demand for its labour, expressed as a function of its individual 
wage, Wj, and the aggregate wage, w, is:
£ (/j» |j ) =  ( r - W s
[a + y(l -  a)] [a + s(l -  a)] [a + y  (1 -  a)]
Equation (15) implies that union f  s conditional expectation of its real wage is:
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E[(wi - p ) \ s ]  = Ps
{[a + y (1 -  a)]wj -  aw} 
[a + y(l ~ a)] \& + ^(1 -  #)] [a + /(I -  a)]
+ (A .m . i.3)
The slope coefficient in (A.Hl.1.1) is the ratio of the derivatives with respect to Wj of 
(A.III. 1.2) and (A.III.1.3):
dE(lf\s)  dE(lf\s)/dWj _ - ( y a  + gA)
dE[(Wj -  p)  | s] dE[(\Vj -  p ) | s ] /d\Vj [a  + £*(1 -  a)]A
(A.III. 1.4)
This slope coefficient is the same for every possible perceived labour demand 
curve. The (expected) efficient outcome in the stochastic model o f Chapter 
III is given by the expectation, conditional on s, o f equations (20a) 
and (20b): this expected outcome involves employment of
£ (/yL |s )  = ca( l - a ) / f a / [ l  + cu( l - a ) 2], together with a real wage of
E[(Wj -  p )^  _ ^  \ s] = Ps/[l + cu( l - a ) 2] . Substituting these values together with
(A.III. 1.4) into (A.III. 1.1) allows us to solve for the vertical intercept C0. The
equation of union j ’s perceived labour demand curve which passes through the 
efficient outcome is therefore found to be:
1£(/ | s) = —
[a + s ( l - a ) ] A
{/a  + eA + cu( 1 -  a)[a + e (1 -  «)]A} ps 
[l + cu( l - a ) 2]
{ya + ek)E[(Wj-pi  . | j ]J Iwl Va:^ i (A.III. 1.5)
The equation of union/ s equilibrium perceived labour demand curve (i.e. that which 
passes through the equilibrium outcome, which involves employment and real wage 
given by the expectations, conditional on s, of, respectively, (38a) and (38b)) is 
derived in a similar fashion and is found to be:
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1E(l\ \ s )= —1 lw*-WnVk*] [a  + £(\ _
{(ya + sAY +cu[a + s (} -c c ) f  A2}/fa 
{ya + sA + cu (1 -  a)[a + e(\ -  a)]A}
+
- ( y a  + sA)E[{w - p ) \  . | j]
J ^ k = wNE^ k * J
(A.III. 1.6)
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Appendix III. 2: The Impact o f  a Marginal Deterioration in Signal Quality on the 
Expected Union Loss under the Simple Rule in the y < 1 and y > 1 Cases 
For convenience we begin by setting out, and appropriately renumbering, expression 
(54) of Chapter III, namely the necessary and sufficient condition for a marginal
Jr
deterioration in signal quality to be beneficial (detrimental) to the welfare of non- 
atomistic unions:
dE( Q“ )
 * ^ - <(>)() iff A© < (>)0 (A.III.2.1)
d a 2u
where A = (1 -  y)(ya  + sA) + cu [a + s(  1 -  a)]A
© = - ( n - \ ) c ua[a  + y ( l - a ) ] 2 + [ l - y  + cu( \ - a ) ] { y a  + €A + cu( l - a ) [ a  + s ( \ -a ) ] A }
An intuitive interpretation o f this expression for the y = 1 case has been presented in 
Chapter III, and the reader who is familiar with the relevant passage will be aware that 
the two special cases of the representative union’s relative-weight parameter denoted
cu and cu figure prominently in that discussion. The special case in which cu = cu , 
where cu = (y  —1)/(1 - a ) , is that in which in the absence of any adjustment in the
aggregate wage, the movement in the price level which results from a non-zero 
productivity shock, serves to allocate that shock between the real wage and 
employment in the most desirable way from the representative union’s viewpoint. 
Efficient wage-setting therefore requires that each union disregard signals if their
preferences are such that cu = cu . The other special case involves cu =cu, where
cu = ( y - l ) ( y a  + eA)/[a  + £ (1 - a)]A , and is that in which each union in equilibrium 
disregards the signal and always maintains a constant wage, even though efficiency 
requires that its wage be adjusted in response to this item of information. Since cu
cannot take negative values, the possibility that cu = cu or cu = cu does arise if y 
happens to exceed unity, but is precluded if y < 1 is the case. For these reasons, the 
greater part o f this appendix is devoted to the case in which y > 1, to which we now 
turn.
As mentioned in Chapter III, A is equal to minus one times the numerator of the 
coefficient on J3s in the equilibrium nominal wage equation. In the light of the fact
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that unions in equilibrium are led to disregard the signal when cu =cu, it is therefore 
unsurprising to find that A| = 0 . It then follows from (A.III.2.1) that
[dE(n“ ) d a 2] = 0 , indicating that changes in signal quality do not affect
< 0  for all n > 1 .
union welfare under equilibrium wage-setting when cu = cu. The interpretation of 0  
is less straightforward. It is noteworthy, however, that if cu = cu (so that 
[1 -  y + cu (1 -  a )]|c =d = 0 ), we find that provided n > 1 , A|c = _ > 0  and
©I _ < 0 . This implies that when y  > 1 , dE(Qu. ) / dcr2lc„ - cu J W=wm /
This last result is in full accordance with the intuitive arguments advanced in Chapter 
III that, provided n>  1 , deterioration in signal quality must be beneficial to the 
welfare of unions when cu = cu is the case.
To provide further insight into result (A.III.2.1) for the y > 1 case, we now refer to 
its graphical representation in Figure A.III. 1 below. The fact that y >  1 is assumed
ensures not only that cu > 0 and cu > 0 , but also that the horizontal-axis intercept of
A has a positive value, and that the solutions (denoted cu and cu) of the equation, 
0  = 0 are real, with the numerically smaller solution negative, cu < 0 , and the other
 ^ i
solution positive, cu > 0 . (There is nothing to be gained expositionally from stating
the algebraic expressions for cu and cu, and consequently we refrain from doing so.) 
It follows immediately from Figure A.III. 1 that, when y >  1 , the necessary and 
sufficient condition for dE(Qu. ) d a 2 < 0 stated in (A.III.2.1), namely that
J ” = WNE /
A© < 0 , is satisfied if  cu is such that < cu <cu 2 In other words, when y > 1 it is 
necessarily the case, provided n > 1 , that there is a range o f cu values for which
1 The proof that cu < 0 and that cu > 0 when y  > 1 is as follows. Since 3 2@ /dc] > 0 , the parabola o f  
0  considered as a function o f  cu is upright (and is in fact so for all admissible values o f  y , and not 
just for y >  1). Since it is easily shown using (A.III.2.1) with y >  1 that ®| c = 0 < 0  and
(d<djdcu)\c _o < 0 , and that ©|c __ < 0  and that (d&/dcu)|c _ _  > 0 , it then follows that when y  > 1 , 
cu < 0 and cu > cu > 0 , as depicted in Figure A.III. 1.
2 It is apparent from Figure A.III. 1 that, when y  > 1, A 0  < 0  if  cu < c u, where cu < 0 . However, this 
is disregarded since it requires that cu take an inadmissible negative value.
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Figure A .III.1
Identification of the sign of the impact of a m arginal deterioration in 
signal quality on the expected union loss under the simple rule
( r  > 1 case)A, 0
Range o f values for which
dE(Qu\ ) / dcr] < 0
_ ( /  -  0
=o
Notes:
1. It is assumed that 1 < n <  oo and y > 1 . The diagram does not apply to the atomistic case, since A 
and 0  have been derived on the assumption that n is finite.
2. Note that cu = (y -  \)(ya + £A)/[a + £(1 -  a)]A  , A| __ = (n -  \)(y -  \)a[a + y(\ -  « ) ] /( l  -  a)  and
Al  _n = “O' -  ])(ra  + A^) •
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improvements in signal quality are detrimental to unions’ welfare. If  cu is outside this 
range then better-quality information either benefits unions (this is the case when 
0 <cu <cu or when cu > cu) or has no impact on their welfare (the case when cu = cu
or when cu -  cu).
Intuitive arguments can readily be provided for the existence o f a range of
admissible cu values for which dEiCl" ) da]  < 0  is the case when y >  1. For
J w  = wmb /
instance, the fact that this range o f values, namely cu < cu < cu, does not include cu
values close to zero, or above a certain value ( cu) is understandable in the light of the
point established in Chapter III that the externality is weaker when the representative 
union is relatively indifferent to one of the two terms in its loss function: hence in the 
y > 1 case at least, if  cu is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, the beneficial
externality-mitigating effect of a deterioration in signal quality must be weak because 
the externality itself is relatively weak, and thus the detrimental forecast-error effect 
must be the stronger of the two.
A second point concerning the cu <cu < cu set of values in this y  > 1 case is that cu 
lies within this interval. This is entirely to be expected, since from our earlier 
discussion of the cu = cu special case it will be recalled that this is the case in which
efficiency requires that unions always set a wage of zero regardless of the signal: 
hence informative signals must be detrimental to unions’ welfare under equilibrium 
wage-setting when cu =cu, and an increase in the noisiness of the signal must make 
unions better off. A clear implication of this argument is that there must be a range o f 
cu values extending to either side of cv, for which the beneficial externality-
mitigating effect outweighs the detrimental forecast-error effect, with the lower ( cu)
and upper ( cu) bounds of this range being those values at which these two effects of a 
marginal increase in the signal-noise variance are exactly equal in absolute value.
There is a third aspect of this result for the y > 1 case for which intuition can be
provided, namely that cu should be one of the two values at which the externality- 
mitigating effect of an increase in the signal-noise variance should be exactly 
neutralised by the forecast-error effect. As mentioned in Chapter III, when cu = cu the
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externality works in such a way as to cause unions to disregard the signal regardless 
of its quality. Hence changes in signal quality must have a zero effect on the union 
loss in this special case. However, it is worth making the additional and more subtle
point that, while an increase in cr2 does not induce any change in union wage-setting
*
behaviour when cu =cu, it nevertheless does mitigate the externality, since the degree 
of inefficiency in wage-setting clearly does depend on signal quality. To see why this 
is so, note that if  signal quality is very poor (i.e. cr2 is large relative to a ] , so that /?
is close to zero), equilibrium wage-setting behaviour which ignores signals cannot be 
enormously harmful to union welfare, since the low p  means that the efficient wage 
response to a non-zero signal is of small absolute magnitude in any case. Furthermore, 
the better is signal quality, the larger (in absolute magnitude) the efficient wage 
response to a given non-zero signal, and hence the more costly is it for unions to
disregard that signal. It follows that when cu = cu, the inefficiency associated with
keeping the wage always fixed at zero, regardless of the signal’s value, must be 
smaller, the noisier signals happen to be: hence an increase in the signal noise
variance must mitigate the externality when cu = cu, even though it does not alter 
unions’ equilibrium wage-setting behaviour. The reason why the externality- 
mitigating effect exactly counterbalances the forecast-error effect when cu = cu, is 
that the coefficients on the variances of the anticipated and unanticipated components 
of the shock, i.e. on ficr] and P a l , in the expected union loss, as given by (44), are
identical when cu =cu . Consequently, the reapportionment o f the shock variance crj 
between Per] and per], occasioned by a change in cr2 does not have any 
repercussions for union welfare.
We now turn to the y < 1 case. Thankfully, the detailed discussions of the cases in 
which y > 1 that have been provided in Chapter III and earlier in this Appendix, will 
enable us to deal relatively briefly with the y < 1 case. Just as in the y > 1 cases, when 
y < 1 the sign o f the impact of an increase in the signal noise variance on union 
welfare is ambiguous, and depends on the values taken by the other structural 
parameters, cu, n, s  and a  . Among the consequences of y  being less than unity are
3 Note that ficr] + p < j2u = cr] .
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the following. Firstly, considered as functions of cu, A| and ©| ,, as given by
(A.III.2.1), have a common positive vertical-axis intercept.4 Secondly, the equation 
©| = 0  may lack real solutions: if this happens to be the case, it would then be
impossible for union welfare to be" reduced as a result o f an improvement in signal 
quality, since (A| )(©| ) > 0 would be the case for all cu > 0 .
These first two points, together with the fact that the graph of 0  is an upright 
parabola, indicate a third consequence of y being less than unity, namely that if the
equation ©| , = 0  does have real solutions, it will only be when these are positive 
that there will arise the interesting result that dE(Quj ) I  da]  < 0  for a certain
J W = WNE /
range of cu values (this range will be bounded by the values of the two positive 
solutions). It is this situation in which ©|  ^ = 0 has positive real solutions that is 
depicted below as Figure A.III.2. It is of interest to note that, unlike in the y -1  case, 
if there exists a range o f cu values for which d£(Q" ) d a l  < 0  in the y<  1J W = W„E /
case, the lower bound of this range of values must then be strictly positive. This is 
evident from the fact that the parabola of ©|y< ] has a vertical intercept, but note that it
is also implied by the fact that < 0 , since this in turn implies that in the limit as
cu -> 0 , it cannot be that both the externality-mitigating effect and the forecast-error 
effect of an increase in the signal-noise variance will be zero. The economic reason 
for this is that when y  < 1 , employment is not completely insulated from the impact of 
the unanticipated component of shocks, and consequently the variance of forecast 
errors must be contributing to employment variability as well as to real wage 
variability. Thus whereas the externality-mitigating effect does tend to zero as cu -> 0 
in the limit, regardless of the value of y , when y < 1 the forecast-error effect does not 
tend to zero as cu -> 0 , and consequently when y  < 1 the forecast-error effect must be 
the stronger of the two below some positive cu value.
4 A and 0  have the same vertical-axis intercept regardless o f  the value taken by y , as is readily 
apparent from (A.III.2.1): A|c _ o = ©|c = 0 = (1 -  y) ( ya  + s A ) .
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Figure A.III.2
Identification of the sign of the impact of a m arginal deterioration in 
signal quality on the expected union loss under the simple rule
(y  < 1 case)
A,  0
Range o f values for which
dE(Quj\ ) /  dcr] < 0
Notes:
1. It is assumed that 1 < n < oo and y < 1 .
2. It is assumed for illustrative purposes that the equation 0  = 0 has two positive real roots (i.e. that
cu > 0 and cu > 0).
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Appendix III.3: The Relationship between Composite Parameter 'P and the Central 
Bank's Weight Parameter cb
As stated in equation (100) of Chapter III, 'F denotes the following expression:
T  _  cb 0  -  « )[c t« ( l  -  a )  + {g + c .( l -  g ) [a  + g(l -  a )] }<Dt ]3 
(n - 1 )c*a[a + s  (1 -  a ) ] 2[l + cb (1 -  a f  ]3 < V
where O b = «[1 + cb (1 -  a ) 2 ] — 1.
In analysing the functional relationship between ¥  and cb we must bear in mind 
that W has been derived on the assumption that n > 1. Since in the limit as cb -» 0  
the denominator o f 'F  remains strictly positive and its numerator tends to zero, it 
follows that = 0  . The limiting value of ' F  as cb -»  oo is strictly positive, as is
evident from the following expression:
lim {a  + n£ (1 - a )  + ncu (1 -  a ) 2[a + s(  1 -  a)] }3 
n(n -  \)cla(\ -  a )4[a + £(1 -  a ) f
In analysing the derivative of W with respect to cb, it is useful to rewrite *F as 
follows:
( ! - « )
/  \
(n - 1  )cua[a  + £(1 -  a)]
( A . I I I . 3 . 3 )
where ’I" -  ~ + + C“(1 ~ + g(1 ~
[1 + c A l - a ) 2]
Hence we have:
dW ( l - a )
dcb (n -  Y)cua[a  + £(l -  a)Y V d c b J
dW '
\  dcb j
( A . D I . 3 . 4 )
where d(ct/®t)_ ^  dX¥' - g-gKa + gQ-a^P + c.Cl-g)2]
dck <e>; dcu 2 i 2[1 + c J l - a y ]
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Since d(cb/<£>b)/dcb and d 'V /d c b are all strictly positive, it follows that
d ^  /dcb > 0  must be the case. This completes our demonstration of all the statements 
made about 'F in Chapter III, namely that has a limiting value of zero as cb -» 0, 
is a monotonic increasing function" of cb for all admissible values o f cb (i.e. for all 
cb > 0 ), and has a positive finite asymptotic value as cb -> co.
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Appendices to Chapter V
Appendix V.l: Solutions to the Equation Implicitly Defining the Symmetric Nash 
Equilibrium under the Simple Rule
*
The total derivative of union f  s real wage variance with respect to x ., evaluated for 
the case o f symmetric indexation, x . = xV/ , is given by the following expression:
d E ( W ' - p ) :
dxj
- 2 ( \ - x ) [ n y { l - a )  + (n- l ' )a ( \ -x ) ] [ y1( \ - a f < j ]  + cr3] 
n[/(  1 - a )  + a(\  -  x)]3
Xj=xMj
(A. V .l. la)
The counterpart expression for union f  s employment variance is:
dElj
dxj
^ ~ ^{Acc + nsj  1 -  a)]  + (n -  l)gg(l -  x)} [y2 (1 -  op( 1 -  x)cr] + (1 - y -  x )a2e ] 
n[a + s(l  -  a)][y(  1 -  a)  + a(l  -  x)]3
x j = x V j
(A. V .l. lb)
Imposing the restriction that indexation is symmetric on union f  s first-order 
condition for its individually optimal Xj choice yields an equation which implicitly
defines the symmetric Nash equilibrium degree o f indexation xNE. This first-order
condition, of course, equates with zero the total derivative with respect to x; of union 
f  s expected loss, and therefore will involve the weighted sum of (A .V .l.la) and 
(A .V .l.lb), the relevant weight being cu . Following simplification,1 the equation
which implicitly defines xNE can be written as follows:
f i x ,  n, e) = Z xg] + Z 2crj = 0 (A. V. 1.2)
where:
Zj = - y 2( l - a ) ( l - x ) { Z 3 +cu( l - a ) [ a  + £-(1-a)] [ n y ( l - a )  + ( n - l)a ( l-x ) ]}
Z2 = (y — 1 + x)Z3 -  (1 -  x)cu [a + s(l -  a)] [ny( 1 - « )  + ( « -  l)a ( l -  x)]
1 The simplifying step is to multiply both sides o f  union f  s first-order condition (with Xj = xVj
imposed) by n[a  + f ( l - a ) ] [ y ( \ - a )  + a { \ - x ) f  / l .
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Z3 s  y[a  + «£(1 -  a)] + (n -  \)sa  (1 -  x)
The values o f x  which solve (A.V. 1.2) appear below as xm  i and xm  2
K.cr? + K,o-« - K ;* = _ !_ * ------ L_£-------------------------------------------------------------- (A. V.l.3a)
NE-' 2(n -  l ) a K , v ’
K . o- ? + K 2ct3+K.5
xm , = —^ — — -------— (A.V.l.3b)
NE-2 2 (» -l)a K 3
where:
K, = y2(l -  a)[ya + [(n -  l)a  + A] {s + c, (1 -  a ) [ a  + e(l -  a ) ] }]
K 2 = ya[ 1 -  s  (n -1)] + [{n -1  )a  + A] {s 4- cu [a + s(l -  a )]}
K 3 =  T 1 (1 -  a ) {£ +  c H (1 -  a ) [ a  +  e (1 -  a )] }o \  +{e + cu[a + e{ 1 -  a ) ] } a 2e
K4 = y 2{\ -  d)\ya + A{s + cu( 1 -  a)[a + £ ( 1 -  a)]]\y] + {(1 -  y)(ya + eA) + A cu[a + e{\ -  a)]}cr2d
K 5 s  (K x<j \  + K 2cr2ef  -  4{n - l) a K 3K 4
A = (w -1  )a  + ny(  1 -  a)
Our objective is to establish whether in the limit as n -> 1 , and also in the limit as 
£ —> oo, the right-hand sides of (A.V.l.3a) and (A.V.l.3b) are equal to the efficient 
solution for the simple rule, as given by equation (22) of Chapter V. We also need to 
ascertain whether in the limit as n -> qo expressions (A.V.l.3a) and (A.V.l.3b) are 
equal to xNE atomisticcase, as given by equation (35) of Chapter V. Commencing therefore
with the values of xNE, and xNE 2 in the limit as n - » 1 , it is noteworthy for the
derivation of these values that:
Iim z r  1/2   lim
fl-»l K r  ( K ^ ;  + K 2cr2) = y[a + e(\ -  a)] {y* (1 -  a)[ 1 + c„ (1 -  a ) 2 ]cr* + [1 + cu (1 -  a ) K )
(A. V .l.4)
The limit as n —»1 o f the numerator of xNE x is consequently zero, and hence:
Throughout these appendices to Chapter V, r vl  denotes the positive square root o f  r, and - r xn its 
negative counterpart.
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(A. V.l.5a)
The limit as n -»1 of the numerator of xNE 2 is non-zero however, and hence:
2 £ 1(K1ff,2+K l0j)] .
» l  Xhb.2 = -------------^------------- = 00 (A-V -1 -5b)
It is clear from (A. V .l.5b) that xNE<2 does not meet meet one o f the criteria set out in 
Chapter V which any solution to (A.V.l.2) must satisfy if  it is to be regarded as a 
symmetric Nash equilibrium, namely that ^  xNE = x *. It remains to be seen whether 
xNEX meets this criterion, however, since (A.V.l.5a) is inconclusive in this respect 
and necessitates the use of L’Hopital’s rule. The derivative of the numerator of xNE, 
with respect to n is:
d(xm  i Numerator) _ aK, , 3K2 , J 2 ,  Y SK, _ 2 , 5K2 _ 2
dn dn dn
dK,
<J, +  - g q
\
- 2 a K 3 K 4 + (» - ! ) -
dn
dn dn
KJ1' 2 (A.V.1.6)
Since J“ |K jl/2 (K,ct^ + K 2<tJ) 1, equation (A.V.1.6) implies that:
to d(*M?.i Numerator) 2 g K 3(„'“ ,K 4)
dn ^ ( K . ^ + K . c t 2)
(A.V.1.7)
where:
K 4 = y[a  + 5(1 - a ) \ { y 2( \ - a ) [ \  + c„(1 -  a )2]a2 + [1 -  y  + c„ (1 -  a )]a 2e}
(A. V .l.8)
The derivative of the denominator of xNE x with respect to n is independent of n:
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d(xNE, Denominator)
 -  = 2aK
dn
(A. V .l .9)
Applying L ’Hopital’s rule then yields the following result:
n - + \ * N E , \  ~  lim  
1
lim
lim __ n —>1
• _i.1 i — i:_  _
\d(xm l  Denominator)/dri] „‘™ (K,cr2 + K 2<t2)
[8 ( ^ . 1  Numerator)/a/i] J™K4
(A. V .l. 10)
Substituting the right-hand sides of (A.V.l.4) and (A .V .l.8) into (A.V.l. 10) and 
simplifying, gives the result reported as equation (37a) of Chapter V:
The limit as n -> oo of xNE l and its counterpart expression for xNE 2 are 
straightforward to derive:
Since the right-hand side o f (A.V.l. 12a) is identical to xNEatomjsliccase, as given by
equation (35) of Chapter V, it is clear that xNE 1 satisfies the second of our criteria for
determining whether or not a solution to (A .V.l.2) is a legitimate Nash equilibrium. 
Since the right-hand side o f (A.V.l. 12b) differs from that o f (A.V.l. 12a), and, 
furthermore, is known to be an inadmissible value for x  under the simple rule, it is 
also clear that xNE 2 does not meet this requirement.
Turning to the limit as £ - » co of xNE, and the corresponding limit for xNE 2, these
are found to be as follows:
(A. V .l. 11)
=  1 -
[y2{ \ - a ) { £  + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + £(\-a)]}<jl +{s + cll[a + £ ( l - a ) ] } ( j2e}
(A. V .l. 12a)
a  + / (  1 -  a)  
a
(A. V .l. 12b)
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(A. V .l. 13a)
lim
£ —>°o N E , 2
t i n y ( \ - a )  
(n - 1  )a
(A. V.l,13b)
Of our two candidates for the status of symmetric Nash equilibrium, therefore, only 
xNE, has the desirable property that its value in the limit as s  -> oo is equal to the
efficient degree of indexation. Hence xNE 2 does not satisfy any of our three criteria
for deciding which solutions to (A .V.l.2) can be considered valid in economic terms. 
Furthermore, xNE 2 is also unsatisfactory in two further respects. Firstly, unlike xNEl,
xNE 2 does not equal the efficient degree of indexation when cu is assigned (or
approaches in the limit) either one of the two extremes of its set o f admissible values. 
Economic reasoning suggests that in such circumstances the externality should not be 
present, but only xNE, is satisfactory in the sense that it confirms this intuition:
Secondly, xNE 2, unlike xNE,, does not exhibit the desirable property that in the
  | ______________ I  d____________
«.-o [ r 2Q~a) cr ^+(Tj ]
r ° i =  X (A. V .l. 14a)
x | y[a + n e ( l - a ) ]  
(n -  l)sa
(A. V .l. 14b)
I™ _  lim * _  -i
cu^ k**'NE,\ ~ cu^><aA (A. V .l. 15a)
(A. V .l. 15b)
extreme case in which productivity shocks are absent, i.e. crj = 0 , its value should be 
unity.
(A. V .l. 16a)
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X N E , 2
ya  + A{g + c„(l -  a)[a  + e(l -  a)]} ( A V I  16b)
aj=o ( n - \ ) a { £  + cu( \ - a ) [ a  + £ r(l-a )]}
These findings regarding xNE2 imply that only xNEl can be considered an
*
economically valid solution to the model for cases in which n is such that 1 < n < oo, 
and consequently xNE x is the solution presented and discussed as xNE in Section 3 of 
Chapter V.
Our sole remaining task in this Appendix is to prove that xNE j is increasing in n and
decreasing in s  as intuition suggests it should be. As mentioned in the main text, 
rigorous proofs that dxNEl/dn> Q  and dxNE]/ d s < 0  hold for all possible
combinations o f admissible parameter values have not been found. However, proofs 
that these inequalities do hold in the absence of velocity shocks are rather easier to 
devise, and we therefore confine ourselves here to demonstrating that
5(xW£ ]| ^_Q)jd n >  0 and d(xNE j| ^_^)jde<  0 are true. The method of proof makes
use of the implicit function theorem, which when applied to (A .V .l.2), the equation 
implicitly defining xNEA (and xNE 2), implies the following:
dx _  d f  / dn 
dn d f  j  dx
dx _  d f  / de 
de d f  /dx
(A. V .l. 17)
(A. V .l. 18)
For notational simplicity, /  has been used in these expressions as shorthand for 
f ( x , n , s ) .  It is apparent from (A.V.l. 17) that if d f/dn  differs in sign from d f /d x , 
dx/dn>  0 will then be the case, implying dxNE]/d n >  0 as intuition suggests.3
3 To avoid possibly confusing the reader, we stress that as items o f  notation dx/dn  and dxNE xj d n  have
essentially the same meaning: both denote the derivative o f x with respect to n, with all other structural 
parameters treated as fixed, but taking into account any influence o f  n on x  working via the composite 
parameter A which is a function o f  n. (Note, however, that unlike dxm x f d n ,  dx/dn  is not specific 
about which o f  the two x  solutions to (A .V .l.2) is being differentiated.) The reason for using the 
notation dx/dn  at this point is to emphasise the fact that it has been derived by means o f  the implicit 
function theorem.
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(dx/dn  > 0 also indicates that dxNE 2/dn  > 0 , of course, but we henceforth disregard 
what our findings in respect of f ( x , n , s ) imply about the economically invalid 
solution, xNE 2.) Similarly, (A. V .l. 18) tells us that if d f /de  and d f  /dx  have the same 
sign, dx/ds  < 0 is implied, which would confirm our intuition that dxNE xj d s  < 0 .
Proceeding therefore to apply this method of proof, the relevant partial derivatives 
are presented below:
Z4 ^  r 1 (1 -  a) {Z6 + c. (1 -  a )[a  + s (l -  a)] [ny{\ -  a )  + 2(n -  l)a (l -  *)]}
Z5 = ( n -  l)s[y + 2 a (l - y - x ) ]  + [a + f ( l  -  a)] {y + cu [ny( 1 -  a )  + 2 (n -  l)a ( l -  x)]} 
^6 -  y\.a  + n s Q ~ a )]+ 2 (« -  l)m (l -  x)]
(A. V .l. 19)
where:
dn
where:
J .  = [r(i - a )  + a ( 1 -  x)](Z7a l  + (A.V.i.20)
Z7 s  - y 2 (1 -  a)(  1 -  jc){£ + cu (1 -  a)[a  + £:(1 -  a )]} 
Z8 = ys -  (1 -  x){e + cu[a + s (  1 -  a)]}
f  =  - [« r ( l  -  a )  + (» - 1)«0 -  ^ )](Z9^ 2 + (A.V. 1.21)
where:
Z9 S r 2( l - a ) ( l - x ) [ l  + c„ ( l-a )2] 
Z,0 = ( l-x )[ l  + c „ ( l - a ) ] - r
In perusing the foregoing expressions, it should be borne in mind that while our 
xNEX and xNE 2 expressions ((A.V.l.3a) and (A.V.l.3b) respectively) have been
derived on the assumption that n is such that 1 < n < oo, the partial derivatives
(A.V.l. 19) to (A.V.1.21) can be evaluated for n = l .4 Before making use of these 
derivatives (with cr  ^ set to zero, of course), we must first o f all demonstrate that xNE l
is a continuous function of n and s  for all admissible values of these parameters (i.e. 
for 1 < n < oo and 1 < s  < oo). It is necessary to do so since we have yet to show that 
the inequality x* < xNE X < holds for 1 < n < oo. Note that since it has
already been established that **< atomistic case > and that = **, all that is
required to prove rigorously that x* < xNE X < x ^  atomisticcase is a demonstration that 
xNEJ is a continuous function of n. Perusal of (A.V.1.3a) reveals that K 1? K 2, K 5
and its denominator are all polynomials in n and e ,  which implies that all these 
component terms must be continuous in n and s . Since the denominator is strictly 
positive for all admissible n (i.e. for 1 < n < oo), it follows that a necessary and 
sufficient condition for xNE x to be continuous in n and s  is for K 5 to be non­
negative. Thankfully, it is straightforward to demonstrate that K 5 > 0 is the case. 
Expansion of the constituent terms of K 5, together with subsequent rearrangement, 
reveals that K 5 can alternatively be expressed as the sum of three terms, each of 
which is unambiguously positive:
K 5 ^ H ^ ;  + H 2o-; + H 3cr^d^ (A.V.1.22)
where:
H, ^ y 6( l - a ) 2[a + n ( \ -a )S lf  
H2 s  r 2 j  a 2[ 1 - e ( n - 1) ] 2 + S2[s2n2(l - a f  + 2ct{2(n-1  )a + n( 1 - a ) [ l  + s(n - 1)]}] j  
H3 s  2y4(1 -  a ) l  a 2{1 +  (n -  l)c„ (1 -  a)[a +  e(l -  a)]} + aS,[n -  a  + (n -  \)ne(\ -  a ) ]  
+ n ( \ -a )8 2[a + n( \ -a )8 l\ |
8X = s  + cu (1 -  a)[a  + 1 -  a)]
S2 = s  + cu[a + £-(1 -  a)]
4 This is because the derivation o f  xNE x and xNE<2 involves dividing both sides o f  an equation by n - 1 ,
and this step is performed after the preliminary derivation o f  f { x , n , e )  = 0 ,  as given by (A .V .l.2).
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Equipped with the knowledge that x* < xNE] < xNE atomistlccase, we now proceed to 
implement our strategy of examining the conditions which must hold for d f  /dx  and 
d f /dn  to differ in sign, and hence imply, via (A. V .l. 17) that dx/dn > 0 is the case.
Note that the known facts regarding xNE X imply that, with x  = xNE t , , 1 -  x  will be<ri =0
positive wherever it occurs in expressions (A.V.1.19) to (A .V .l.21).5 Furthermore, 
coefficients Z 4, Z 7 and Z9 need not be considered, since our attention here is
directed to the cr  ^ = 0 case. It is clear that Z5 > 0 is necessary and sufficient to ensure
(d f/dx) |ct2_0 > 0 , and that similarly Z8 <0  is necessary and sufficient for
(d f / d n ) =Q < 0. Manipulating Z5, we find that (d f /dx)\^  =0 > 0 if  (and only if):
y{ (n - \)s  + [a + e (1 -  a)] [1 + ncu (1 -  a )]} > 2(n -  l)a[ye -  {s + [a + £(1 -  a )]} (1 -  xNE ])]
(A. V .l.23)
where xNE j  has been substituted for x  to emphasise the fact that it is this solution that 
is of interest to us. The term 1 -  xNE ] is evidently at its smallest, and the right-hand 
side o f (A. V .l.23) consequently at its highest possible numerical value in the limiting 
case in which h -> oo. Obtaining , 2 ) by setting cr] to zero in (A.V.l. 12a),’ I <7^=0 ”
and substituting this expression into (A .V.l.23) yields the following sufficient 
condition for (d f  /dx)\^  = 0 > 0 for all n such that 1 < n < oo:
y{(n - 1)£ + [a + s(  1 -  a)] [1 + ncu (1 -  a)]} > 0 (A.V. 1.24)
It is clear that this condition is unambiguously satisfied.
We now turn to the aforementioned necessary and sufficient condition for 
(d f/dn) |ff2=0 < 0 , namely Z8 < 0 . Manipulating Z8, we find that (df/dn) |ff2=0< 0
holds if and only if:
5 The fact that x* < x NEA < xNE o^m^ ccast also implies that both y ( l - a )  + a ( l - x )  in (A.V.1.20) and 
n y ( \ - a )  + ( n - l ) a ( \ - x )  in (A.V. 1.21) are strictly positive.
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ys < {s  + cu[a + e ( \ - a ) \ ] { \ - x NEi) 2
O f  = 0
(A. V .l .25)
(1 -  xNE j) 2 is at its smallest in the limit as n -»  o o . It therefore follows that if
CT^ =0
>
(A .V .l.25) holds for this extreme case it must also hold for 1 < » < oo. Noting 
from (A.V.l. 12a) that ^ . ( l - J ^ n )  2 = ye/{£.+ cu[a + £ ( l - a ) ] } ,  and that
’ a *  =0
> X  ( 1 - w  2_ » ^  1S evident that (A .V .l.25) must hold for<ri=00  x"e,iK;-o,u„<«,
1 < n < o o , and therefore that {df / dn)\^ _0 < 0 .
This finding, together with our earlier finding that {df/d:c)|ct2=o> 0 ,  therefore 
implies the following result:
3(XNE, 1 2 0)’  f f i  = u
dn
>0 (A. V.l.26)
Our next task is to establish the sign of Q) j ^ e • Equation (A.V.1.21)
implies that a necessary and sufficient condition for {df /d e ) > 0  is Z10 < 0. This 
condition can alternatively be written as follows:
X NE, 1 >
P - y + g , ( i - g ) ]
[l + c„(l-a)]
(A.V. 1.27)
Since the right-hand side of (A .V .l.27) is equal to x* 2 , it follows that (A.V. 1.27)0-1=0
is true, and hence that {df/ 5 f) |ff2_0 > 0 . This result, in conjunction with our earlier 
finding that {df /c b c )^ ^  > 0 , in turn implies the following:
3(XNE,\ 2
 ^ < 0
de
(A. V .l .28)
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For the version of the model without velocity shocks, we have therefore obtained two 
results, namely (A .V .l.26) and (A.V. 1.28), which confirm our intuitions regarding the 
nature of the relationships between xNE j and the parameters n and s .
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Appendix V.2: The Slope o f  the Individual Union’s Locus o f  Possible Outcomes under 
the Simple Rule
Union f  s real wage variance and employment variance, as functions of x. and x,
are given by expressions (19a) and (19b) of Chapter V. The partial derivatives of
>
these expressions with respect to x . are respectively as follows:
dE(wJ - p f  -  2(1 -  ) [ r 2 (1 -  « )2 + o-l ]
dxj [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] 2
(A.V.2.2)
dxj [a + £ ( l -a ) ]  [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( \ - x ) ]  
where:
= y 2e( 1 -  a)[a(\ -  x) + s(  1 -  a)(  1 -  xy)]
^2 = £ { y - £ ( l - X j )  + ( £ - l ) [ y ( \ - a )  + a ( l - x ) ] }
The slope of the atomistic union’s locus of possible outcomes is given by the ratio 
of the above partial derivatives:
dEl,2 d E l21 dx,
1 -  1 ' ‘ (A.V.2.3)
dE(Wj -  p) dE(Wj -  p )  / dxj
Substituting (A.V.2.1) and (A.V.2.2) into (A.V.2.3) yields: 
d E l 2
(A.V.2.4)
By substituting x* and xNE , as given by equations (22) and (35) of Chapter V, for x  in
(A.V.2.4), the slope of atomistic union f  s locus of possible outcomes given efficient 
and equilibrium indexation at the aggregate level may be obtained. We omit these 
expressions on account o f their length, and because our principal interest resides in 
any case with the individually optimal choice of indexation, denoted x **, implied by
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each of these slopes. The optimal choice, of course, is that which ensures union /  s 
locus slope, (A.V.2.4), is equal to the slope of each of its isoloss curves, - c u. Given
efficient indexation at the aggregate level, the x. which solves the following
equation:
dEl?
d E { w , - p ) ‘
=  - C „ (A.V.2.5)
is found in general to exceed x *:
= x  +■ cuya[a + £(l-a)]<rl
{e +cu[a + £ ( \ - a ) \  }{y ( \-c t)[ \  + cu( \ - a )  ]cr^  +[\ + cu( \ - a ) \ a e}
(A.V.2.6)
It is clear that the second term on the right-hand side of (A.V.2.6) is zero only when 
certain parameters take extreme values which are known to prevent the externality 
from arising, namely cu = 0 , the limit cases in which cu -> oo and/or £ —» oo, and the
cases for which cr^/cr^ = 0 .
Given equilibrium indexation at the aggregate level, however, we find that the point
on union f  s resulting locus of individual possible outcomes which is brought about by 
>
setting Xj = xNE is the tangency point between the locus and the isoloss map. In other 
words, the Xj which solves the following equation:
dElj
d E { w , - p ) ‘
~c„ (A.V.2.7)
is the Nash equilibrium degree of indexation itself:
= xN E (A.V.2.8)
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Appendix V.3: Non-Equilibrium Solutions to the Equation Implicitly Defining the
Symmetric Nash Equilibrium under Discretion
As stated in Section 3.4 o f Chapter V, union / s first-order condition for its
individually optimal degree of indexation, with other unions’ indexation choices taken
>
as given, is obtained by combining (33) with the derivatives with respect to xy of
(54a) and (54b). Note that this first-order condition is derived on the assumption that 
n > 1. Imposing on this first-order condition the restriction that indexation be 
symmetric, x . = x \ / j , and simplifying6, the equation which implicitly defines xNE is 
found to be:
2c]a{\ - a ) 2+ {css(  1 -  a)  -  (1 -  x)2 cu [a + s{ 1 -cc)]} [(« - 1)(1 -  x) 2 + (n +1 )cs (1 -  a )2] = 0
(A.V.3.1)
There are four solutions to this equation, two of which are the equilibria, xNE, and 
xNE 2, presented as expressions (63a) and (63b) in Section 3.4 of Chapter V. The two
n
non-real solutions are:
x ) [c,(l -  g ){ (» -  l)g -  (" + l)g, fl - « ) [ «  + e(l - a ) ] } -  Zi1/211/2 ("A V 3 2a)
3 1 2(n -  \)cu[a + s(l -  a)] I
x t , [c , ( l - a ) { (n - l )g - ( n  + l )c ,( l-« )[a  + g ( l -g ) ] } - jr l‘/2 1 1/2 (A V 3  2 b) 
1 2(n -\)c„[a + E ( \ - a ) }  |
where:
Z] = c2(l -  a)2\ {(n -  l)s + (n + l)cB(l -  a)[a + £ (1  -  a)]}2 + 8 (n - 1  )cua[a + £(l -  a)]
6 The simplifying step is to multiply both sides by «[a + f ( l - a ) ] [ ( l - x ) 2 + cs(l -  a ) 2 f  / 2 ( 1 -  x)crj . 
Note that this step loses the fifth solution to the equation which results when Xj = x is imposed on 
union f  s first-order condition with respect to jc ., namely x = 1.
7 To eliminate entirely the potential for confusion, we emphasise that throughout this appendix x \ n  is 
to be understood as denoting only the positive square root o f  %x, with - x l ' 1 denoting the negative 
square root o f  X\ •
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The necessary and sufficient condition for x3 and x4 to be non-real is
x ' n > c, o  -  a){(n -  l)s  -  (n +1 )c„ (1 -  a)[a  + e(l -  a )]} (A.V.3.3)
or, after dividing both sides by c5(l —a ) ,
[(a + b f  + c f 2 > a - b  (A.V.3.4)
where: a = (n -Y )s
b = (n + l)cu (1 -  a)[a  + £(1 -  a)] 
c = 8(» - 1 )cua[a  + e (1 -  a)]
Since n>  1 has been assumed in deriving (A.V.3.1), a, b and c are all strictly positive. 
It follows immediately from this fact that the following inequality must hold:
(a + b)2 + c>  ( a -  b)2 (A.V.3.5)
The final step in the proof that x3 and x4 are non-real makes use of the fact that for
any positive real number r, the derivative of its square root, r 112, with respect to r is 
positive: dr]/2 /dr  = r - V 2 / 2 > 0. Combining this fact with our knowledge that 
(A.V.3.5) holds necessarily, it follows directly that (A.V.3.4) must also hold 
necessarily, and hence it must be the case that x3 and x4 are both non-real.
There is a third real solution to the equation which results when xj = x  is imposed
on uniony’s first-order condition, namely x - \ .  In other words, given that every other 
union sets its indexation parameter at unity (i.e. given xk = 1V& ^  j ), union j  can 
satisfy its first-order condition for a minimum by also choosing to index fully (i.e. by 
setting xj = 1). The question arises, of course, whether setting x} - 1 when
xk = \\fk  ^  j  satisfies union y’s second-order condition for a minimum. To answer 
this we need to ascertain the sign of the second derivative, with respect to xj , of union 
y’s expected loss given xk = W k *  j  . Taking into account the fact that, with non-
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atomistic unions, x  = (l/ xk = (l/ xy + ^ x
*=]  *=1
v **./ y
x^  = 1V& * y , the aggregate degree of indexation is:
it follows that, given
x\
X j + n - I
xk =1V&* j
(A.V.3.6)
Setting x equal to this expression in equation (60) of Chapter V yields union /  s 
expected loss under discretion, given X*. = 1VA: ^  j  :
£ ( 0 / ... .) [a  + £:(1- « ) ] z[ ( l - x y)2 + n2cs( \ -  a ) 1]v2 t2
{ ( „ - l ) * ( l - x  Y
-  «^c,(l -  a ) [ a  + £-(1 -  a)]}2 + n2cu[a + £(l -  a)]l { 1 -  xy) (A.V.3.7)
We shall refrain from setting out the first and second derivatives of (A.V.3.7) with 
respect to xy, since it suffices for our purpose here merely to state the second
derivative of (A.V.3.7) with respect to xy evaluated for xy = 1:
d 2E(Q u,. )
J x k =1VA* j
dx\
-  4 [a + ns{  1 -  a)\cj2e 
n2cs{ 1 -  a ) 4[or + £:(1 -  a)]
(A.V.3.8)
X , =1
This expression is unambiguously negative for all n>  1, indicating that when 
xk = 1V& * j , setting xy = 1 locally maximises u n io n /s  expected loss. An immediate
implication of this finding is that x = 1 cannot be a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
427
Appendix V.4: The Relationship between the Symmetric Nash Equilibrium Degrees o f  
Indexation under Discretion and the Parameters n and s  
The symmetric Nash equilibria for cases such that 1 < n < oo are given by equations 
(63a) and (63b) o f Chapter V, and these expressions are stated again at this point for
Jr
convenience:
and where X\ is as stated following (A.V.3.2b) in Appendix V.3.
Our first task is to determine the limits of xNE x and xNE 2 as n -> 1. Since
limits of x NE j and xNE 2 as n -»1 are undefined. We are therefore compelled to have 
recourse to L’Hopital’s rule. The derivative of the numerator of E with respect to n
(A.V.4.1a)
(A. V.4. lb)
where cs(1 ~ <*){(n -  l)g -  (n + l)c«(l -  a)[a  + s(l - a ) ] }  + x l ' 1 
2(n - 1  )cu[a + £:(! -  a)]
^ \ X \ 2 = 2 cJcM( l - a ) 2[a  + £ ( l - a ) ] ,  it is clear that lim n-> 1 0/ 0 , and hence that the
is:
d(E Numerator)
dn
y~m ( d y  \= cs( \ - a ) { s  - c u( l - a ) [ a  + £ ( l - a ) ] }  + —--------—
2 \ d n  j
(A.V.4.2)
where:
= 2c] (1 -  a ) 2 {s + cu (1 -  a)[a  + f ( l  -  a )]} {(n -  l ) f  + (n + 1 )cu (1 -  a)[a  + s(  1 -  a )]}
dn
+ 4cua[a + £•(! -  a)] (A.V.4.3)
It therefore follows that:
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lim 
n—>1
3(5  Numerator) = 2cs[a + £-(1 - a ) ] (A.V.4.4)
dn
The derivative o f the denominator of 5  with respect to n is independent of n:
It follows directly from this result that the values of xNE x and xNE 2 in the limit as 
n -» 1  are the two efficient solutions:
Our second task in this appendix is to provide a proof of results (66a) and (66b) 
reported in Chapter V, namely that dxNE x jdn  > 0 V« > 1 and dxNE 2jdn  < 0 V« > 1. In
what follows, we focus on proving the former of these two results, since if  proven it 
will imply that the counterpart result for xNE 2 must also be true. It is evident from
(A.V.4.1a) that the derivative of xNEl with respect to n can be written as follows:
3(5  Denominator)
(A.V.4.5)
dn
Applying L’Hopital’s rule, we have:
lim 
n -*  1
lim
»->1Hd { n Numerator)/on _ c s 
3(5  Denominator) /  dn cu
3(5   d (A.V.4.6)lim 
«-> 1
(A.V.4.7a)
f  V/2n •
(A.V.4.7b)
(A.V.4.8)
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Note that it is known from result (A.V.4.6) above that ^ , 5  > 0 , while equation (64a) 
of Chapter V implies that > 0 . It has already been established, therefore, that E
is strictly positive for the two extremes of the set o f admissible values for n. (We 
remind the reader at this point that this set consists of all real numbers in excess of 
unity, but does not include unity itself since 3  is undefined when n = 1.) These facts, 
together with the fact that 3  is a continuous function of n for all n>  1 , implies that in 
order to prove that H1/2 > 0 is the case for all n > 1 , it is necessary and sufficient to 
demonstrate that E  is a monotonic function of n for all admissible n. It then follows 
immediately that a necessary and sufficient condition, for dxNE J d n  > (<)0V« > 1 is
that the inequality d E / d n  <{>)0 hold for all n >  1. The method o f proof therefore 
requires us to examine the derivative d E / d n :
I T  = 7C,(1n»g)i 2 [ z r - c s{ (n - l ) [ s ( l -a )  + 2a] + (n + l)c„ (1 -  a )2 [a + s  (1 -  a)]}]
dn ( n - 1) x\
(A.V.4.9)
Since > 0 and %\n  > 0  for all n >  1, it follows that the next expression is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for d E / d n  < 0:
cs { (n - 1)[*(1 -  a )  + 2 a ]  + (n + \ )cu(\ -  o f  [ a  + e{ 1 -  a ) ] }  > x\'2 (A. V.4.10)
Since the left-hand side of (A.V.4.10) is positive, and since %\ > 0 ,  squaring both 
sides of (A.V.4.10) will not cause the inequality sign to reverse direction. After 
performing this step and simplifying, this inequality reduces to:
in  - 1)[1 + (1 -  a ) 2] > 0 (A.V.4.11)
This expression holds for all admissible values of n (i.e. for all n > 1), and hence it 
follows that 5  is a monotonic decreasing function of n for all admissible n. An 
immediate corollary of this finding that d E / d n  < 0V« > 1 is that dxNE x/ d n  > OVn > 1
is indeed the case. Furthermore, since xNE 2 = 2 - x NE x, a further implication is that
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dxNE 2/ 3 / i < 0 V h > 1 .  Hence for both equilibria, an increase in the number o f unions
exacerbates the departure o f the equilibrium degree of indexation from the efficient 
degree.
Our third and final task in this appendix is to provide a proof of expressions (67a) 
and (67b) of Chapter V, namely that dxNEl/d s  < 0 \ fn > l  and dxNE 2/ d £ * > 0 V « > l .
Since xNE 2 = 2 -  xNE t , a proof of the former result implies the latter is also true. It is
convenient to write the derivative of xNE, with respect to £ as follows:
= (A.V.4.8)
de 2 , ds J a y
It has already been established earlier in the appendix that E is positive for all
admissible values o f n, and it therefore follows that it is also positive for all
admissible values o f e .  This implies that d E ld s>  0 is a necessary and sufficient
condition for dxNE xJds  < 0. The expression for d E /d s  is:
~  = ~ r ^ 1 f'*  v,2 [“  + -  a ){{n-\)£c t + (n-  3)c„a(l -  a)[a  + f(l -  a)}]
os 2cu[a + £ ( l - a ) \
(A.V.4.9)
Every term on the right-hand side is positive, implying that d E /d s  > 0 for all 
admissible values o f the parameters, and hence that expressions (67a) and (67b) of 
Chapter V must be valid. This amounts to a proof that for both equilibria, an increase 
in the degree o f goods-market competition mitigates the departure of the equilibrium 
degree of indexation from the efficient degree. One final point of interest here is that 
we would expect to find that ^ d E / d e  = 0 , since in the case of a single union the
externality is known to be absent and the equilibrium degree of indexation coincides 
with the efficient degree. Sure enough, when note is taken of the fact that 
^ \ X \ 2 = 2cscu(L~a )2[a  + £Q'~a )]’ it is clear from (A.V.4.9) that ^ d E / d s  = 0 is 
indeed the case.
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Appendices to Chapter VI
Appendix VI. 1: Solutions to the Equations Implicitly Defining the Symmetric Nash
Equilibrium under K am i Indexation
*
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, it sets out the two values for the 
degree of symmetric indexation to aggregate output which, together with a symmetric 
degree of indexation to the price level of unity, satisfy the pair of simultaneous 
equations which implicitly define (xNE, b'NE) solution pairs. Secondly, it demonstrates
that these solutions have certain properties which imply that only one of them can be 
considered a valid symmetric Nash equilibrium on economic grounds.
The two solution values in question are:1
b' = (” ~ + ^  ~ + c» Q ~ + gQ ~ + (A  V I 1 la)
NE,] 2 { n - \ ) a { s +  cu[a + s ( } -a ) ] }
b' = (”  ~ + ^  ~ + C“A ~ a ^ a  + ~ ~ x " 2 (A  V I 1 lb)
NE,2 2 (» -  l)a{£: + cu [« + £■(!-«)]}
where: %2 = { ( n - \ ) a ( s +  \)-n \\ .  +cu([ -a )] [ a  + £ - ( l - a )]}2 +
4(« -  l)a [a  + ns(l -  a)] {e + cu [a + ^(l -  a)]}
b'NE, is the satisfactory solution, in the sense that its value in various special cases of
the model which involve a structural parameter taking an extreme value, is consistent 
with what economic reasoning suggests its value should be. For this reason it is b'NE x
which is presented in Chapter VI as the symmetric Nash equilibrium value of b ' ,
where it is denoted more simply as b'NE . Our sole task in this appendix with regard to
b'NE j is to demonstrate that, as mentioned in the main text, the limit as n - » 1 of b'NE x
is indeed the efficient solution, namely b'*, as given by equation (56b) of Chapter VI. 
It is evident that the limits as n -> 1 of both the numerator and the denominator of
1 Throughout these appendices to Chapter VI, r U2 denotes the positive square root o f  expression r,
where r  is equal to a positive real number.
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b'NE j are zero, and consequently that L ’Hopital’s rule must be deployed to evaluate 
the limit as n -»1 o f b'NE ,. As a preliminary step to doing so, however, we state the 
derivatives with respect to n of the numerator of b 'NE, and of X i :
d(b'NE ] Numerator) 
dn
= a ( s  + 1) -  53[a + £-(1 -  a)] + 1 ] { 8 x A
W 2 2) on J
(A. VI. 1.2a)
dXi _
dn
= 2{ S3 [a + £-(1 -  a)] -«(£* + !)}{ nS3 [a + £-(1 -  a)] - ( n - 1 )a{e  +1)}
+ 4a S 2 [a + (2n -  !)£•(! -  a )] (A. VI. 1.2b)
where: S2 = s  + cu [a + e (1 -  a)]
S3 = l + c „ ( l - a )
At this point we take note of three facts. Firstly, the derivative of the denominator of 
b'NE, is simply 2aS2. Secondly, it is straightforward to show that:
n —>1 z 2 =d*[a + e ( \ - a ) ' f (A. VI. 1.3a)
Combining (A.VI. 1.3a) with the limit, as « - > l ,  of (A.VI. 1.2b) gives us our third 
useful fact, namely:
lim 
n—>1
(d%2/dn)  
2 X ?
-  - { a {s  +1) -  S3[a + f ( l  -cr)]} +
2aS,
(A. VI. 1.3b)
Making use o f these facts, together with (A. VI. 1.2a), in the application o f L ’Hopital’s 
rule, gives us the following result:
lim„-.i[9(^£,1Numerator)/a»]
n-^ l^NEA ~   , — O
M->1 [d(b'NE! D enom inator)/^]
(A. VI. 1.4)
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where b'* = l/[l + cu( l - a ) ] .  This result indicates that b'NEX is a legitimate solution in 
economic terms, since it tells us that in the limit as n —»1 , b'NE 1 reduces to the setting 
of b' that would be chosen by a single economy-wide union.
Turning to the second solution, we find that the limit as n -> 1 o f b'NE 2 is not equal 
to the efficient solution:
This result would by itself compel us to regard b'NE 2 as an economically spurious
solution to the equations which implicitly define the (xNE = 1, b'NE) solution pair.
However, we also find that b'NE 2 can be justifiably rejected on economic grounds on
account of the value it takes in certain other special cases of the model, which we set 
out below:
N E , a to m istic  case (A. VI. 1.5b)
lim i t
(n - 1  )a
(A. VI. 1.5c)
(A.VI.1.5d)
[a + n £ { \ -a ) ]  
(n - 1  )sa cu = 0
(A.VI.1.5e)
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Appendix VI. 2: Proof that db'NE/dn<  0 provided 0 < cu <  oo 
For convenience we reproduce here our expression for b'NE, namely equation (58b) 
of Chapter VI:2
, = (n -1  )a {s  +1) -  n[ 1 + cu( l -  a)][a  + g(l -  a)] + (A VI 2 1)
NE 2 (n - \ )a { £  + cu[a + s ( l - a ) ] }
where: Xi = {(n - \ ) a { e  + \) -  n\\ + cu(\ -  a)][a + e(\. -  a)]}2 +
4(n -1  )a[a  + ns{ 1 -  a)] {s + cu [a + s(  1 -  a )]}
As mentioned in Chapter VI.2, it is readily apparent that in the atomistic case b 'NE, 
as given by equation (57b), is in general below the efficient setting o f this indexation 
parameter, b'*, as given by (56b), the exceptions being the special cases in which 
cu = 0 (as well as the two limiting cases in which cu - » co and s  -»  oo). In what
follows we assume that all parameters are finite and that cu > 0 , so that
b'NE a to m istic  case  < b'* is indeed the case. On the basis of our results reported elsewhere in 
this work, we surmise on intuitive grounds that the externality under Kami indexation 
is stronger, and hence that the departure of b'NE from b'* is greater, the larger is n. 
Clearly, to prove this conjecture formally we must show that the derivative db'NE/dn  
is unambiguously negative for all n > 1. Note that we have yet to show that 
i<»<« < 6’’ - However, since Xi is polynomial in n, and is strictly 
positive for all n>  1, b'NE is clearly a continuous function of n for all n > 1. 
Therefore, a proof that db'NE/dn<  0 is indeed the case would immediately imply that
^ N E ,  a to m istic  case  ^  ^ W £ , l< /i< o o  < b  i s  t r u e .
The following expression must therefore be the focus of our attention:
2 b'NE is identical to the expression denoted b 'N E in the previous appendix. Note that b'NE has been
derived on the assumption that n > 1 .
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db[NE 1
dn 2{n -1 ) a S 2
S3[a + s ( l - a ) ]  + 1 1
[ I  2 J { d n  )
Z 2 (A.VI.2.2)
where: S2 = s  + cu[a + s ( \ - a)\
83 = \ Jrcu( \ - a )
8%2 _
dn
= 2{S3[a + £■(! -  a)] -  a (e  +1 )}{nd3[a + s(l -  a)] - ( n -  \)a (e  +1)},
+ 4a82[a + {In - 1)£(1 -  a)]
The necessary and sufficient condition for db'NE/dn  < 0 is the following:
S3 [a + £-(1- a ) ]  +
r1'2\A2 y 2 A dn
Z 2 < 0 (A.VI.2.3)
Using the above expressions:
—Y~ = -[« + f (1“ a )]k3{(«-1)«(^-l) + «^3[« + ^ (l-«)]} + 2(«-l)cua 2]
(A.VI.2.4)
Equations (A.VI.2.3) and (A.VI.2.4) together imply that db'NE/dn  < 0 if (and only if):.
(n -1 )a(s  -1) + nS3[a + f(l -  a)] + - (--- -1)c“a  > x f-  (A.VI.2.5)
Since both sides of (A.VI.2.5) are strictly positive, squaring both sides will not cause 
the inequality sign to reverse direction. Performing this step, cancelling terms 
common to both sides of the resulting expression, and simplifying, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for db'NE/dn  < 0 is found to reduce to:
Note that it is helpful (but not essential) to add and subtract the term ( n - l ) a ( s  + 1) to the left-hand
side, so that after squaring, the term {«J3[«  + f ( l - a ) ] - { n - \ ) a { e  + 1)}2 is common to both sides and 
hence can immediately be cancelled.
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c u a W  +  c u 0 - « )2]« > c ua [ l  +  c u ( l - a )2] (A.VI.2.6)
The coefficient in n on the left-hand side of (A.VI.2.6) is strictly positive provided 
cu > 0 , an assumption made at the^utset of this appendix. Dividing through by this 
coefficient then completes the proof of our original conjecture, namely that 
db'NE/dn  < 0 , provided cu > 0 . (Note that the proof fails in the cu = 0 case, which is
unsurprising since we know that b'NE\c =Q = b'* , and hence that b 'NE|c =Q is
independent o f n .)
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Appendix VI. 3: Proof that db'NE/d s  > 0 provided 0 <cu < oo 
Throughout this appendix it us assumed that all parameters are finite and that n > 1 
and cu > 0 , so that the externality is present. The derivative with respect to £ of b'NE,
as given by equation (58b) o f Chapter VI, or equation (A.VI.2.1) of the previous 
appendix, is as follows:
db[NE _ 1
ds  2 (n -1  )aS
j  < a[(n -1  )c„a + <53] + 1/2
\ X i  ,
& Y  S z P  
ds $zXi
(A.VI.3.1)
where: S2 = £ + cu[a + £(1 -  a)] 
5 ,= \  + cu( l - a )
S% 2 
d£
= 2[{n -1  )a  -  n( 1 -  cr)J3]{(« -1  )a(£  +1) -  nS3[a + £(1 -  a)]}
+ 4(n -1  )a{a[S2 + ncu(1 -  a )] + 2«f(l -  a)S3}
(A.VI.3.1) implies that the necessary and sufficient condition for db'NE/d£  > 0 is the 
following:
1/2
. X i  )
'O z P
8e j
> -a[(n  -1  )cua  + 83] (A.VI.3.2)
Noting that %2 > 0 , it is convenient to rearrange this as follows:
1
a[{n-X)cua  + 83]
At this point we make use of the following fact:
SlY
2 A de < X i
1/2 (A.VI.3.3)
$ i X i - I A 1 (dX 2)to Se  J = a[(n -1  )cua  + S3 ] {nS3 [a + £*(1 -  a)] -  {n -1  )a(£  +1)}
+ 2(n - 1 ) a 282 [S3 -  ncu (1 -  a)] (A.VI.3.4)
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Hence, (A.VI.3.3) and (A.VI.3.4) together imply that db'NE/d s  > 0 if, and only if, the 
following condition holds:
S<<%22 , (A.VI.3.5)
2(n -1  )aS2 [S3 -  ncu (1 -  a)]
where: S4 = nS3[a + e ( l - a ) ] - ( n - l ) a ( e  + l) + -
[ 0 ? - l ) c Ma  +  £ 3]
The composite parameter 54 is not necessarily non-negative for all possible 
combinations of the structural parameters. Since (A.VI.3.5) holds necessarily when 
S4 < 0, our sole concern is to show that it also holds when S4 > 0 . Clearly, for the 
84 > 0 case a necessary and sufficient condition for db'NE jd s >  0 equivalent to 
(A.VI.3.5) is that S4 < %2 be true. It follows, therefore, that a demonstration that 
S4 < x 2 holds will amount to a proof that db'NE jd s  > 0 for all n > 1. Our next step, 
therefore, is to obtain an expression for S4 -  %2:
Sl-Zt. uA{n-X)aSf ; ,  (A.VI.3.6)
[ (n - \)c ua  + S3]
where: S5 = { n - \)a 8 2[ncu( \ - a ) - S . i f'
-  [(« -1  )cua  + S3 ] [ncu (1 -  a ) -  S3 ] {nS3 [a + £:(1 -  a)] - { n - 1 )a{e  +1)}
-  [(« -1  )cua  + S3 ]2 [a + ns{ 1 -  a)]
Hence our necessary and sufficient condition for db'NE/d s  > 0 to be the case boils 
down to the requirement that £5 < 0  hold for all n > 1. S5 is quadratic in n and its first 
and second derivatives with respect to n are as follows:
^  = (1 + a  -  2n)cu [1 + c„ (1 -  a ) 2 ]S2 (A.VI.3.7a)
dn
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= - 2 c„[l + c„(l - a f ] S 2
on
(A.VI.3.7b)
It is evident from these two expressions that S5 is at a maximum when n -  (\ + a ) / 2 . 
Since (1 + a ) /2  < 1, and since £5|m=1 = 0 , it follows that S5 < 0 > 1, and hence that
8] < x 2 f°r n> \ . Hence (A.VI.3.5) also holds, and this completes the proof that 
db'NE/d s  > 0 for all n > 1 (provided cu > 0).
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Appendix VIA: Solutions to the Equations Implicitly Defining the Symmetric Nash 
Equilibrium under Indexation to the Price Level and Aggregate Employment 
This appendix is the analogue of Appendix VI. 1 for the model in which wages are 
indexed to the price level and aggregate employment, and in respect of which the only
Jr
known b'^ E solutions for 1 < n < oo are the following:
h "  g(” -1) -  »g, (1 -  «)[« + g(l -  «)] + & a V I , lo,
° N E ,  1 ~  o /  1 \  r  . / 1  VI2(n -1  )cu[a + £{\ -  a )]
v, =  £ ( n - l ) - ^ ( l - a ) [ a  +  £ ( l - g ) ] - ^ 2 ( A . V I A l a )
m a 2(n -V ,cu[a + s ( \ - a ) ]
where:
= {s(n - 1) -  ncu (1 -  a)[a  + £(\ -  a)] }2 + 4(n -1  )cv [a + e(l -  a )] [a + ns{ 1 -  a)]
We wish to derive J™! b ' f , and b^E 2, and a relevant fact to this end is 
= c l ( l - a ) 2[a + s ( \ - a ) ] 2 . It is clear that the limits, as n -»  1 o f both the 
numerator and denominator of b’^E t are zero. We therefore proceed to obtain:
dipNE i Numerator) ^ _  (  1 >\
dn
= s - c u( 1 -  a)[a  + £(l -  a )] +
V2^3 A  uri J1/2 dn
(A.VI.4.2a)
= 2{£ - c u( 1 - a )[a  + £(\ -  a )]} {£{n- 1) - ncu(1 -  a)[a  + £(\ -  a )]}
dn
+ 4cu [a + £•(! -  a)] [a + (2n -  V)£(\ -  a)] (A.VIA.2b)
Hence we have:
lim
n -*l
2
dXz\  [2  +  c „ ( l - a ) 2] [ a  +  £ ( l - a ) ] - £ ( l - a )
dn ( l - a )
(A.VI.4.3a)
Applying L ’Hopital’s rule, equations (A.VI.4.2a) and (A.VI.4.3a), together with the 
fact that d(b'xE t D enom inator)/^  = 2cu [a + £(\ -  a ) ] , imply that:
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>»A" ^ [ 5 ( ^ , 1  Denominator)/dn] t „, r A V TdW i
n ^ V ) N E , \ ~  lin , r  T v — ^ (A.VI.4.3b)Jjii _ ™i[9(*wW N u m erator)/an ]
where Z/'* = l/cu( l - a ) .
So far as the second solution, b^E 2, is concerned, this can be disregarded since for
the following special cases which each involve a structural parameter being assigned 
an extreme admissible value, the value taken by b„E2 is inconsistent with the
economic theory on which the model’s formulation is based:4
£ i% ,2 =«>**"* (A.VL4.3C)
=  ' ( I  ”  * )  *  ^ N E ,  a to m istic  case  (A.VL4.3d)
^ K e,i = -f — r - *  b'" (A.VI.4.3e){ n - 1)
lin. U "  ~ [ g  +  n g ( l ~ « ) ]  , lim w
( n - l ) gc.^I>Se.7 = o t r  (A.VI.4.3f)
lim i n _ -  n(l -  a )\ _ lim u rl*
c„ ->oo N E ,2  /  -t \( n - 1 )b'ns.  = V A  * (A. VI. 4. 3g)
4 N ote that equation (A .V I.4 .3 f) for 2 has been derived using L ’H opital’s rule.
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Appendix VI. 5: Proof that db '^/dn  < 0 
b'xE is given by equation (67b) of Chapter VI, and is reproduced here for ease of
^3 = { ( n - 1)£ -  ncu(1 -  a)[a  + 1 -  a )]}2 + 4(n - 1  )cu[a + s(l  -  a )][a + ns{ 1 -  a)]
Since it has been assumed in deriving b'^ E that n > 1 and that cu > 0 , these
assumptions underpin the entirety of this appendix. We also assume throughout that 
all structural parameters are finite, so that the externality is present. The derivative of 
b„E with respect to n may be written as follows:
reference:5
b„ (n -  l)g -  ncs( 1 -  a)[a  + g(l -  «)] + %V
m 2 (n - l) c u[a + £ { l-a ) ]
(A.VI.5.1)
where:
8Ke 1 ( l - « )  | _____ 1 S [ X ,K n -1)2]1/2 (A.VI.5.2a)
dn 2 ( n - 1)2 cu [a + £ ( l - a ) ] dn
where:
(A.VI.5.2b)
Slz,/ (" -I )2] - 2 e.[g + g ( l-g )] {ncu (1 -  a ) 2[a + £“(1 -  a)] + ( n - 1)[2a  + si} -  a )]}
dn { n - iy
(A.VI.5.2c)
(A.VI.5.2a) implies that d b ^ /d n  < 0 if  (and only if):
(A.VI.5.3)
5 b'hE is identical to the solution denoted b '^ E, in the previous appendix.
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It is evident from (A.VI.5.2c) that 9[^3/ ( « - 1 ) 2]/5a7 < 0 , and hence (A.VI.5.2b) 
implies that 5[^3/ ( w - l ) 2]1/2/3 « < 0  also. This in turn implies that the right-hand 
side o f (A.VI.5.3) is strictly positive; After squaring both sides o f (A.VI.5.3), the 
necessary and sufficient condition for db'/E/dn < 0 reduces to:
X3( \ - a ) 2 <{ncu( } - a ) 2[a + -a ) ]  + (n - \)[ 2 a  + sQ - a ) ] } 2 (A.VI.5.4)
Substituting for / 3 in this expression, expanding both sides and dividing through by 
the common factor 4[a + s{[ -  a )] , yields another inequality which can be rearranged 
so that the term ncu (1 -  a )2 [a + s(l -  a)] [n -1  + ncu (1 -  a ) 2 ] is common to both sides 
and can therefore be cancelled. After a few further simplifying steps, the necessary 
and sufficient condition for db'^E/dn  < 0 is found to boil down to n > 1, which is true
since it is one of the implicit assumptions made in deriving b '/E.
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Appendix VI. 6: Proof that d b ^ /d s  > 0 
As in the previous appendix, it is important to bear in mind that b^E has been 
derived on the assumption that n>  1 and cu > 0 . The derivative of b'^ E with respect 
to s  may be written as follows:
dbNE 1
ds 2 (n -  l)cu
( n - l ) a  | d { x j [ a  + s ( \ - a ) f } 1/2
[a + £-(1 -  a)Y ds
(A.VI.6.1a)
where:
d { x J [ a  + s { \ - a ) f } ' n [a  + g ( l - a ) ]  
ds  2x-1 / 23
3 { ^ j/[a  + e ( l - a ) ] 2}
de
(A.VI.6.1b)
d{XJ [ a  + E { \ - a ) f }  2 (n - l)a
ds [a + s ( l - a ) f  
(A.VI.6.1a) implies that db„E/d s  > 0 if  (and only if):
{(« - 1)£ + (n -  2)cu (1 -  a)[a  + £“(1 -  a )]}
(A.VI.6.1c)
2{n-Y)aX\ /2 
[a + f ( l  -  a ) f
>  -
8 { x J [a  + e ( \ - a ) f }
ds
(A.VI.6.2)
The left-hand side of (A.VI.6.2) is strictly positive, but its right-hand side is of 
ambiguous sign. Therefore, the inequality sign will not reverse direction when
both sides are squared if 2(n - \)a%]12/[a  + s (  1 -  a ) f  > -  d {z3/[cc + s(l -  a ) f } / d s .^
However, this latter condition must hold if  the square of the left-hand side of 
(A.VI.6.2) is greater than the square of its right-hand side. Consequently the necessary 
and sufficient condition for d b ^ /d s  > 0 becomes:
4 ( n - \ f  a 2 z 3 
[a + s( 1 -  a ) f
>
S { z J [ a  + s ( \ - a ) ] 2}
ds
(A.VI.6.3)
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Substituting our expression for into the left-hand side, and (A.VI.6.1c) into
the right-hand side of (A.VI.6.3), expanding the right-hand side of the resulting 
inequality, and performing various simplifying steps,6 the necessary and sufficient 
condition for d b ^ /d s  > 0 reduces to the following:
M
a  > - ( l - a ) { €  + cu( l - a ) [ a  + e ( l -a ) ] }  (A.VI.6.4)
This condition holds necessarily, and this completes the proof that d b ^ /d s  > 0 .
6 The steps involve multiplying both sides o f  the inequality by [a + s ( l - a ) ] 6/ 4 ( n - \ ) 2a 2 , rewriting 
the right-hand side so that the term { { n - \ ) s ~ n c u( \ - a ) [ a  + s ( l - a ) ] } 2 is common to both sides and 
can be cancelled, and then dividing through by the common factor 4 (n - 1  )cu[a  + s {  1 -  a ) ] .
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